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In both academia and the popular media, much attention has been paid to the increasing number 
of people living in cities while a relatively understudied but related phenomenon is silently 
gaining strength: that of “shrinking cities.”  In the context of massive economic restructuring, 
increasing globalization, and unprecedented social and demographic change, a growing number 
of cities in industrialized countries such as Germany, the United States, and Canada are 
experiencing a population decline.  The usual approach of planners in these cities is either to do 
nothing or to focus on “growing” their cities to previous population levels.  To date, however, 
both approaches have been largely unsuccessful in addressing the many and varied challenges 
that arise from population decline. 
 
This leads to the overarching question I ask in this thesis: What are other possible approaches to 
planning besides a population and economic growth orientation that might be successfully 
implemented in shrinking cities?   A small but growing number of shrinking cities researchers 
are encouraging planners in shrinking cities neither to focus on planning for growth nor to ignore 
decline but to focus on planning to meet the needs of the population that remains. While it can 
be argued that improving the quality of life of existing residents should be the goal of planners in 
all cities – growing or declining – what is “new” and “different” about planners focusing on 
quality of life in the context of shrinkage is the fundamental belief by shrinking cities researchers 
that cities which are declining in population can offer a high quality of life.  These researchers 
argue, in a heretofore fragmented way, that this can be accomplished if planners adopt the 
following general principles for “good planning” in shrinking cities: leaving behind the 
assumption of future growth; using processes that are strategic, with an emphasis on citizen 
participation; adopting a balanced approach in addressing the needs of the community; and 
changing the role they play in the community.  Unfortunately, the literature is not clear what 
factors might facilitate or impede the adoption of each principles. 
 
In order to address this gap in the literature, I use these general principles as a point of departure 
for assessing and comparing the recent planning exercises in two shrinking cities: Youngstown, 
Ohio (which, in its recently-adopted Youngstown 2010 Plan, has begun to tackle the issues of 
population decline in a way that is ostensibly resembles the principles of good planning in 
shrinking cities) and Sudbury, Ontario (which has opted for the traditional “growth is the only 
option” approach in its recently-adopted Official Plan).  Based on a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative data, I find that, taken as a whole, the principles of “good planning” for shrinking 
cities are in practice difficult to achieve, even where a city has actively begun to move away 
from the traditional focus on attracting new population growth.  Whether or not planners in 
shrinking cities will decide to adopt these principles is influenced by a number of factors, 
including the presence or absence of young, innovative leadership, levels of devolution and 
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In both academia and the popular media, much attention has been paid to the trend 
towards global urbanization (that is, the increasing number of people living in cities) and the 
resulting problems associated with the growth of “megacities.” While it is true that a limited 
number of large cities are growing larger, a relatively understudied but related phenomenon is 
silently gaining strength: that of “shrinking cities.”  In the context of an increasingly dominant 
system of capitalism (the very hallmark of which is uneven development) massive economic 
restructuring away from an industrial-based economy, increasing globalization, and 
unprecedented social and demographic change, many cities in industrialized countries such as 
Germany, the United States, and Canada are experiencing a decline of both population and 
economic activity.  In many regions, shrinking cities have become the rule and throughout the 
world their numbers are increasing.  Worldwide since 1990, the proportion of cities over 100,000 
people with a declining population has almost doubled from 1 in 6 to more than 1 in 4 (Rieniets, 
2005a).  The negative impacts arising from the recent economic downturn felt by many cities 
(particularly older industrial cities) in the developed world means that this number may be even 
higher today.  For instance, a recent article in the Toronto Star explains that “Oshawa [Ontario] 
residents hit hard by GM cutbacks are turning to food banks in droves” and many are considering 
leaving the city altogether in search of jobs elsewhere (Kennedy & Balkissoon, 2009).  Another 
recent article discusses the potential negative effects of the impending closing of Pittsburgh 
Glass Works in Hawksebury, near the Ontario-Quebec border (Van Alphen, 2009).  Traditional 
“sunbelt” areas are not immune and are also seeing the effects of the economic downturn: 
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Central Florida lost 9,700 people in the last year, largely as a result of people leaving in search of 
jobs.  As Kunerth & Shrieves (2009) observe, “for a region that has grown like a bodybuilder on 
steroids, it's something of a shock.”  What these stories reveal is just how vulnerable cities 
everywhere are to outside pressures and events.  
 This vulnerability may lead some to argue that, in the context of declining populations as 
a result of forces beyond their control, planners are powerless to effect positive change.  Others 
may argue that planners in shrinking cities need to focus on “selling” their city in order to 
achieve past population levels.  Both approaches are premised on the notions that growth is the 
only positive development in the life of a city and that municipal officials are powerless in the 
face of global pressures.  There are indeed examples of cities dealing with population decline 
using both of these approaches (Pallagst, 2005; Allweil, 2007), particularly the second as will be 
seen in Chapter 3.  However, a review of case studies of shrinking cities leads to the conclusion 
that neither of these are desirable options.  Doing nothing is not the answer: shrinking cities face 
numerous challenges, such as infrastructure overcapacity and high vacancy rates, that are 
unlikely to be addressed (and are likely to worsen) if left alone.  Neither is blindly pursuing 
growth that is unlikely to occur at all costs a practical solution in the context of shrinking 
municipal revenues or any solution to issues such as growing social polarization.   
This leads to the overarching question I ask in this thesis: What are other possible 
approaches to planning besides a population and economic growth orientation that might 
be successfully implemented in shrinking cities? Indeed, while the shrinking cities research 
remains largely focused on the causes and effects of population decline, a small but growing 
number of shrinking cities researchers have begun to speculate  (in a heretofore fragmented way) 
about the ways in which planners might have a positive impact in the context of population 
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decline.    The overall approach advocated by these researchers (and others in the urban 
regeneration and strategic planning fields who are examining effective planning approaches in 
the context of population decline) prompts planners in shrinking cities neither to focus on 
planning for growth nor to ignore decline but to focus on planning to meet the needs of the 
population that remains. When one examines both extreme views of planning in the context of 
population decline mentioned above, it is clear that one important consideration is lost: the 
quality of life of remaining residents (for few shrinking cities end up emptying completely).  The 
approach put forth in the shrinking cities literature puts this consideration (and the role of 
planners in achieving it) at the forefront.  Of course, it can be argued that improving the quality 
of life of existing residents should be the goal of planners in all cities – growing or declining – 
and that shrinking cities researchers are not adding anything new in this regard.  However, as 
will be discussed below, the prevailing notion in planning research, education, and practice is 
that the only successful cities are those that are growing.  Cities experiencing population decline 
are commonly viewed as “failures.”  Thus, what is “new” and “different” about planners 
focusing on quality of life in the context of shrinkage is the fundamental belief that cities which 
are declining in population can still be successful; that is, they can offer a high quality of life.   
Certainly, shrinking cities researchers recognize that there are many outside pressures 
facing cities that local planners will not be able to change; however, in leaving behind the 
endless quest for achieving population growth and focusing on improving the quality of life of 
remaining residents by minimizing the challenges of and capitalizing upon the opportunities 
present by population decline, shrinking cities researchers maintain that planners in shrinking 
cities can make a positive difference  that is at once proactive, effective, and realistic.  Indeed, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 7, even in the face of global pressures beyond their control, 
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municipal officials (particularly in North America) in both growing and shrinking cities continue 
to  have responsibility for a wide range of areas that affect residents’ quality of life; the key, 
again, to planning in the context of population decline is minimizing the challenges and 
capitalizing upon the opportunities (a notion which, to date, was not presented in the literature as 
possible in the context of population decline).   
Of course, this is not to say that the task of improving quality of life in the context of 
population decline is an easy one and, as will be discussed below, shrinking cities researchers 
recognize that it will be a difficult task.  The challenges arising from urban shrinkage are many, 
including vacant properties (many of which are contaminated brownfield sites), infrastructure 
overcapacity, shrinking municipal revenues, chronic unemployment, and high crime rates.  
Furthermore, the quest to develop effective planning strategies in shrinking cities is complicated 
by the fact that the challenges and opportunities vary with the form of shrinkage: for instance, a 
shrinking city within a shrinking region (such as Youngstown, Ohio and Sudbury, Ontario) will 
face a set of challenges that may differ in certain respects from that faced by a shrinking city 
within a growing region (such as Detroit).  Exacerbating the difficulty of the task of planning in 
shrinking cities is the fact that the experience of urban planners has traditionally been focused on 
managing growth and its corresponding issues such as the increased demand for infrastructure, 
not dealing proactively with population decline.  Shrinking cities researchers have only recently 
begun to consider how traditional planning models, theories, and tools need to be revised in the 
context of population decline.  However, according to shrinking cities researchers, planners in 
shrinking cities can take heart that not all impacts are negative: population decline also leads to 
less congestion and presents opportunities for incorporating more greenspace into the urban 
environment.  First, however, planners must learn to recognize these opportunities.  
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So, what do shrinking cities researchers say this “needs of remaining residents” approach 
entails?  Indeed, central in the shrinking cities literature is the notion that planners can improve 
the quality of life for remaining residents in shrinking cities as long as the way that planning 
currently happens in these cities (that is, doing nothing or “going for growth”) changes.  
Unfortunately, the bulk of this growing body of literature remains focused on addressing the 
physical effects of shrinkage in order to improve quality of life, and has not yet addressed in a 
comprehensive manner how the other aspects of urban life – economic, social, and 
environmental – should be addressed in an atmosphere of shrinking municipal revenues and 
growing resident disenchantment.  Fortunately, the bodies of literature on strategic planning and 
urban regeneration in the context of decline are both instructional in this regard.  In reviewing 
this diverse collection of literature, I have gathered and assembled the following general 
principles for “good planning” in shrinking cities: 
 Planners must leave behind the assumption of future growth;
 Planners must use processes that are strategic, with an emphasis on citizen 
participation;
 Planners must adopt a balanced approach in addressing the physical, economic, 
environmental and social needs of the community; and 
 Planners must change the role they play in the community. 
According to the literature, in adopting these general principles of good planning, planners1 can 
make a positive difference in the quality of life offered by shrinking cities, rather than just doing 
nothing or blindly adopting the “growth is the only option” approach.  Of course, similar to the 
overall goal of  “quality of life” being relevant also to growing cities, many of these specific 
 
1 I adopt the broad definition of urban planners used by Luithlen (1998), who defines urban planners as “all those 
who are professionally involved as representatives of the public sector in making decisions relating to land use, 
environmental conditions, and development” (p.69).  Accordingly, Luithlen’s definition includes “not only 
professional planners but also highway engineers, economists, sociologists, and, more recently, ecologists.  These 
may be working at local or central/regional government levels” (p.69). 
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principles of good planning can equally apply to growing cities.  What is different in the recent 
shrinking cities literature, however, is the fact that they are being put forth by these researchers 
as being as both possible and necessary in the context of sustained population decline. 
It is important to note that the efficacy of these principles in improving the quality of life 
of remaining residents has yet to be tested and doing so is not the focus of this thesis.  However, 
it can certainly be inferred at this point – given the inefficacy of other approaches and the 
inherent logic of developing a more “internal” focus to planning in shrinking cities – that this 
approach is more likely to improve the quality of life of those currently living in shrinking cities.  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the principles of good planning in shrinking cities 
are being realized in practice and what opportunities and obstacles exist to planning using these 
concepts.  In fact, little is known in the existing research about either.   In order to accomplish 
this purpose, I am using these general principles of good planning in shrinking cities as a point of 
departure for assessing and comparing the two recent planning exercises in two shrinking cities: 
Youngstown, Ohio (which has begun to tackle the issues of population decline in a way that is 
ostensibly “different” than traditional approaches and which, in part at least, seems to be based 
on the principles of good planning in shrinking cities) and Sudbury, Ontario (which has opted for 
the traditional “growth is the only option” approach).  Both cities are facing long-term 
population decline in the context of overall regional population decline.  In the remaining 
sections of this introductory chapter, I orient the reader to the issue of shrinking cities in terms of 
its growing prominence and persistence.  I then discuss the lack of attention paid to it in both the 
professional and academic realms of urban planning, which has resulted in a pressing need for 
research in this area.  I end with an outline of the chapters that follow, including a description of 










Historically there are many examples of cities shrinking in population.  As Oswalt and 
Rieniets (2006c) state, “[s]hrinking cities have always been a feature of settlement history, a fact 
that sank into oblivion during the period of expansion precipitated by industrialization” (p.26). 
The sheer numbers and persistence of the shrinking cities phenomenon is what makes urban 
population decline today different from shrinkage in pre-industrial times (Rieniets, 2005b). This 
sentiment is reflected in Polèse and Shearmur’s (2006) argument that, while regional decline is 
not new, “…we suggest that the scope and duration of decline will, in coming decades, occur on 
a scale unknown in the past” (p.24).  The modern causes of urban shrinkage will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2.  For instance, economic restructuring from an industrial-based towards 
a “knowledge-based” economy has contributed to the shrinkage of older industrial cities of 
developed nations (Rieniets, 2005a and b; Rieniets, 2006; Oswalt & Rieniets, 2006c and e; Birg, 
2005; Irurah, Park, & Yeang, 2005; Friedrichs, 1993; Polèse & Shearmur, 2006; Müller, 2006; 
Genske & Ruff, 2006; Schilling & Logan, 2008).  On an even more fundamental level, however, 
the theory of “uneven development” advanced by Neil Smith in the mid-1980s indicates that 
capitalism, by its very nature, leads to “uneven development” resulting in the gap in distribution 
of growth between growing and declining regions becoming even more advanced in the future.   
As explained by Smith (2008): 
The point is that uneven development is the hallmark of the geography of capitalism.  It 
is not just that capitalism fails to develop evenly, that due to accidental and random 
factors the geographical development of capitalism represents some stochastic deviation 
from a generally even process.  The uneven development of capitalism is structural rather 
than statistical.  The resulting geographical patterns are thoroughly determinate (as 
opposed to “determinist”) and are thus unique to capitalism. (p.4) 
 
The competitive nature of capitalism necessarily results in areas of growth and decline in the 
perennial search for new sources of profit.  This contributes to the conclusion in the literature 
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that  more cities are expected to become “shrinking cities” in the coming decades (Rieniets, 
2005b; Oswalt & Rieniets, 2006b and c; Irurah, Park, & Yeang, 2005; Polèse & Shearmur, 2006; 
Andersen, 2005; Koziol, 2004; Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999; Leo & Anderson, 2006; Müller, 
2004; Müller & Siedentop, 2004; Grossman, 2004; Martinez-Fernandez & Wu, 2007; Mace et 
al., 2007).  Even in growing regions, particularly in the United States, central cities continue to 
empty out as people move to the suburbs creating a “hole in the doughnut” effect (Wiechmann, 
2006; Pallagst, 2005; Fishman, 2005).  As will be discussed further in Chapter 2, although 
shrinkage occurs on a regional level in the United States, since the 1950s, more and more cities 
are becoming shrinking cities as a result of a process of “regional restructuring” in which people 
and jobs shift from the core of the region to the periphery (Fishman, 2005).  In these cases, 
shrinkage is embedded in an overall context of growth.   
Whatever the reason (and more reasons will be discussed in Chapter 2), Rieniets (2005b) 
warns that “…cities are shrinking in unprecedented numbers: more than one out of every four 
large cities in the world lost population during the 1990s, and general population prognoses 
suggest that the number of shrinking cities will increase…” (p.4).   Specifically in the United 
States: “During the run-up of urbanization in the 19th century, urban population loss was rare and 
episodic.  After 1930, and with the exception of the 1940s, it became the norm as population 
losses were significant and prolonged” (Beauregard, 2003, p.672).  Decline has been particularly 
pronounced in the struggling industrial “Rust Belt” region of the United States  (Pallagst, 2005; 
Cleveland Shrinking Cities Institute, 2007; Rieniets, 2005b; Beauregard, 2003) and, as just 
mentioned, in central cities even where the entire region is growing (Fishman, 2005).  According 
to Rybczynski and Linneman (1999), between 1950 and 1990, 26 of the 77 largest American 
cities (500,000+) shrank by an average of 24 percent (this includes shrinking cities within both 
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growing and declining regions).  Of large cities that lost population (many of which did so in the 
context of regional growth), losses in some have been dramatic (for example, Detroit has lost 
about half a million people since 1970 while Philadelphia has lost more than 350,000).  
Furthermore, “this decline is neither merely recent nor episodic” (Rybczynski & Linneman, 
1999, p.33).  American cities that have been declining in population have been doing so at a 
steady rate and the decline continues today (Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999; Pallagst, 2005).  
According to Popper and Popper (2002):  
Our history and planning have given us a sense that the U.S. population is on a permanent 
roll, that is will inevitably continue to increase everywhere.  This belief has in it a strong 
element of myth.  In fact, the U.S. has experienced population spurts at various times and 
in various places, but that increase is by no means universal.  It has occurred in some 
parts of the country but not others.  Thus, the American infatuation with growth has 
always meant overlooking an important chunk of reality. (p.1) 
 
In Canada, growth is similarly unevenly distributed; the vast majority of the population 
resides in a relatively small number of large metropolitan areas (Seasons, 2007).  According to 
Simmons and Bourne (2007), two-thirds of all growth in Canada during the last census period 
occurred in the six largest places (Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa-Gatineau, Calgary, and 
Edmonton) with population over 1 million.  On the flipside, many Canadian cities (especially 
resource- and industrial-based cities outside of commuting range of large cities) are experiencing 
prolonged periods of population decline (Seasons, 2007; Simmons & Bourne, 2007; Shearmur & 
Polèse, 2007; Bourne & Simmons, 2003; Hall & Hall, 2006; Leadbeater, 2007).  In fact, 37 of 
144 Canadian cities lost population between 2001 and 2006  (Simmons & Bourne, 2007).  
Unlike in the United States where a large number of central cities are shrinking within growing 
regions, shrinking cities in Canada tend to be located in what Leadbeater (2007) calls the 
“hinterland” of the country: the periphery of larger metropolitan areas and otherwise isolated 
regions in Atlantic region, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and northern British Columbia.  Of course, 
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population decline is not a new phenomenon in Canada, where many cities are familiar with 
“boom and bust;” however, 
…a half century of continued demographic expansion, coupled with frequent 
interventions by government – for example, in terms of regional development and social 
welfare policies – have given us false feelings of security.  Recently, it has become 
apparent that population decline of (and within) cities has become a widespread 
phenomenon.  The security blanket provided by continued population growth has been 
removed. (Simmons & Bourne, 2007, p.13) 
 
The trend towards population decline in Canada’s hinterland is expected to continue in the future 
(Simmons & Bourne, 2007; Polèse & Shearmur, 2006; Leadbeater, 2007; Hall & Hall, 2006): 
“…given the aging demographic structure, [the number of shrinking cities in Canada] is …likely 
to increase in the next decade with the decline becoming much more widespread and more 
visible” (Simmons & Bourne, 2007, p.19).   
 Similar to the situation in Canada’s hinterland, many peripheral regions in other 
industrialized countries are in a state of accelerated decline and hence the number of shrinking 
communities within them is increasing.  For instance, the decline of peripheral resource- and 
industrial-based communities is happening in countries such as Sweden, Finland, Norway, 
France, and Australia (Polèse & Shearmur, 2003 and 2006; Cunningham-Sabot & Fol, 2006; 
Ward, 1999; Kitchen, 2003; Couch et al., 2005; Martinez-Fernandez & Wu, 2006 and 2007; 
Munck, 2005; Jauhiainen, 2004).  According to Shearmur and Polèse (2007), “…the most remote 
(often resource-dependent) regions in the western world are facing population decline” (p.33).  
In Finland, for instance, where during the 1990s some cities grew with the location of high 
technology industries within their boundaries, “…peripheral rural areas, towns in the countryside 
and small industrial towns could not take advantage of the technological turn and they continued 
to lose population” (Jauhiainen, 2004, p.31). Moreover, the phenomenon of urban shrinkage is 
becoming increasingly prominent worldwide (Andersen, 2005; Kabisch, Haase, & Haase, 2006; 
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Irurah, Park, & Yeang, 2005), influencing such countries as Japan and South Africa (Andersen, 
2005).   
 As will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, population decline affects cities, and thus urban 
planning, on a fundamental level.  As Sander (2006) explains, the growing number of shrinking 
cities means that “[t]he built city as presently structured has come under increasing pressure for 
change.  It has become more evident than in the past that many aspects of urban development 
and planning are now experiencing far-reaching change” (p.1).  The question becomes: given the 
increased prominence and likely persistence of the trend of shrinking cities, how are urban 












Unfortunately, despite the recent emergence of a discussion taking place largely in 
Europe on shrinking cities, the issue of planning for population decline has yet to gain significant 
traction in both planning practice and planning research, particularly in North America.  The 
attention of academic planning research is largely focused on how growing cities can manage 
increases in population; when it is undertaken, most academic research on cities that are losing 
population tends to focus on what these cities can do to reverse the decline and to start growing 
again.  Similarly, the focus of urban planners – especially in North America – largely remains 
how to attract and manage future growth, even where future population growth is unlikely or 
even impossible (Cleveland Shrinking Cities Institute, 2007).  Why does the growth paradigm 
(that is, the paradigm that growth is necessary, desirable, and achievable) persist in both realms?  
The answer, it appears, lies in the “taboo” of actively planning for, or indeed even admitting the 









Historically, as Rieniets (2005b) explains, growth was not always seen as the only 
positive development in the life of a city.  In fact, there was a time when urban scholars and local 
officials saw shrinkage as a desirable antidote to the negative effects of growth.  In the context of 
rapid industrialization in the early 20th century, many cities in Europe and North America 
multiplied their population, leading to acute housing shortages, infrastructure problems, and poor 
social and hygienic conditions.  In many of these cities, on-going in-migration was soon 
accompanied by partial out-migration.  Some critics of the industrial metropolis saw 
decentralization and even shrinkage as desirable alternatives.  For instance, Ebenezer Howard’s 
Garden City (1898) presented as desirable the movement of people out of crowded cities to the 
country.  According to Rieniets (2005b), Howard’s ideas particularly caught on in Russia, where 
the Garden City was declared urban planning doctrine in the early 1920s.  Planners in America 
also caught on to the idea of low density and decentralization.  Frank Lloyd Wright’s 1932 work 
The Disappearing City promoted extremely low densities to reverse the failures of urban 
centralization. As Rieniets (2005b) states, 
[w]hat all these visions—and many others—have in common is that ideas of shrinkage 
were perceived as desirable, controllable, and progressive developments as opposed to 
the undesired, uncontrolled, and failed urbanization of the early industrial metropolises. 
(p.3)   
 
Rieniets (2005b) goes on to explain that what is different today is not just the sheer numbers and 
persistence of shrinking cities, but the way they are perceived: 
Because we customarily associate urban growth and urban livelihood with economic 
prosperity, shrinking cities are perceived as a symptom of crisis, an undesirable side 
effect of failed economic and political policy. And it is widely hoped and believed that 
the economy, politics, and—last but not least—urban planning can find appropriate 




Because of this shift in perception, planning proactively for likely future population decline is 
politically difficult.  Put simply, shrinking is a political taboo amongst politicians because of the 
negative connotations associated with urban decline (Allweil, 2007; Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 
2006).  Of course, a certain degree of reluctance in facing the prospects of long-term population 
decline is understandable given that most effects of shrinkage are not positive, as will be seen in 
Chapter 2.  However, problems arise when politicians automatically associate shrinkage with 
failure and thus do not address the issue realistically and candidly, instead promising that the 
next project or program will restore the city to its peak population (Allweil, 2007).  Indeed, 
mayors who are candid about a city’s demographic prospects may not get re-elected (Allweil, 
2007).  As Beauregard (2003) explains, “[i]n a political economy where growth, particularly for 
civic leaders, has always been ideal, population loss – whether absolute or relative – is a 
stigma…” (p.673). Even in Germany, where the academic debate on shrinking cities has been 
growing since the turn of the century,  “…demographic decline has been only sporadically 
discussed in the local political arena, and when the issue is broached, it is only to debate about 
reversing the process, i.e., achieving growth” (Müller & Siedentop, 2004, p.7). According to 
Hollbach-Grömig and Trapp (2006), “[d]emographic change and the discussion on how to deal 
with it is not only a complex issue but also a politically and emotionally highly charged subject” 
(p.17). 
 The tendency for politicians to engage in “growth talk” is especially pronounced in North 
America (Leo & Brown, 2000; Leo & Anderson, 2006).  Leo and Anderson (2006) explain that  
[g]rowth is to North American civic leaders what publicity is to Hollywood stars; there is 
no such thing as bad growth and no such thing as too much of it.  If we take local media 
seriously, we may come away with the impression that growth is the elixir that cures all 
ills, from potholes to poverty, and that any city that is not growing rapidly is being ‘left 
behind’ and is ‘off the map.’  The city is seen, first and foremost, as a ‘growth machine’ 
… and is valued only if it conforms to that image. (p.169) 
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This fixation with growth has deep roots in United States and Canada where “the settlement of 
the west and the industrial revolution were marked by boosterism, as expanding cities competed 
for investment” (Leo & Anderson, 2006, p.169).  This sentiment has carried through to the 
present day, with the effect that “cities that are growing rapidly, or have grown to a great size, 
are the ‘successful,’ desirable, and admired ones, while residents of Nowheresville struggle with 
a diminished sense of self-worth” (Leo & Anderson, 2006, p.169).  According to Leo and 
Anderson (2006), this diminished sense of self-worth felt prompts civic leaders of shrinking 
cities to pursue pro-growth policies that are often damaging to the health of slow- or no-growth 
cities.  Again, this tendency is particularly pronounced in North America, which may explain 
why the emerging debate on alternatives to the growth paradigm for planning in shrinking cities 






One of the main contributors to the persistence of the growth paradigm is the fact that 
disciplines of urban planning and urban design emerged in response to rapid urban growth in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries for the purpose of controlling and redistributing urban growth. 
As such, while there are tools, models, and legal mechanisms to deal with growth, there are none 
to deal with shrinkage (Rieniets, 2005b; Cleveland Shrinking Cities Institute, 2007; Kabisch, 
Haase, & Haase, 2006; Andersen, 2005; Schilling & Logan, 2008).  For example, infrastructure 
policy and planning has traditionally been geared towards planning for new growth and 
increasing capacity (Moss, 2008). Nuissl and Rink (2005) explain that strategies to curb sprawl 
(which still happens in shrinking cities) are largely focused on the problem in the context of 
population growth.  Rieniets (2005b) explains that  
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…architects and planners are being faced with an entirely new task for which nothing in 
their previous experience has prepared them. Instead of designing new buildings, old 
buildings have to be deconstructed, dismantled or altered; instead of designing new 
infrastructures, old infrastructures have to be reduced, reorganized, and adapted to less 
intense use; instead of designing buildings for old programs, new programs have to be 
invented for existing buildings, and so on. (p.6) 
 
Most of the suggestions for decreasing urban densities mentioned in the previous section  never 
went beyond the realm of visions.  As such, planning for growth has become somewhat of a 
familiar “routine.”  As Jessen (2006) notes, in the context of being focused for so long on 
controlling growth,  “…something in the way of a placid routine developed in urban planning on 
the basis of saturated experience” (p.8).   
 Indeed, Rieniets (2005b) argues that urban planning as a profession has developed a 
“…quasi causal relationship with urban growth.  Its methods, visions, and values, only become 
justified through the assumption of continuous growth…shrinking cities have been ignored, 
forgotten or considered taboo” (p.1).  To Squires (2003), “[t]he emphasis on growth is not a 
response to any compelling social science evidence [of the benefits of growth].  Rather, it 
reflects the values and interests of those in power who make policy decisions and who benefit 
from this approach to urban development” (p.28). According to these arguments, this “quasi-
causal” relationship with growth and the desire of those in power to achieve growth for their own 
gain (that is, an increase in the market value of the land and resources they control which can 
only happen in the context of growth) has lead urban policymakers to focus on reversing 
population decline, rather than finding ways to deal with it in a way that that improves the 
quality of life of remaining residents, regardless of growth or decline.  In explaining the failed 
revitalization attempts in Baltimore and Detroit, Andersen (2005) finds problematic the one-
sided focus on achieving population growth: “…in the past hundred years growth has been the 
goal and the ideal that planners, politicians and architects have been working to achieve and 
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control.  But with these failed revitalization strategies it seems that decline is here to stay and 








It seems likely that part of the reason for urban planning’s focus on growth is the fact that 
planning research – when it deals with issues of population decline, which is relatively less often 
than when it deals with issues associated with urban population growth (Ward, 1999; Seasons, 
2007; Rieniets, 2005b) – similarly concentrates on how shrinking cities can achieve growth.  As 
a result, planners in shrinking cities are left with little guidance on how to deal with the effects of 
population decline other than trying to reverse it.  In Canada, according to Hall and Hall (2008), 
current academic research in this area, while acknowledging the issue, does not address how 
urban areas should plan if they leave behind the assumption of future growth. In general, in the 
Canadian urban planning literature 
…while there is an appreciation of the unevenness in growth rates across the Canadian 
urban system, all too few articles were focused on decline and no-growth as continuing 
trends that require further research and planning attention.  In their strategy 
recommendations, articles were keen to discuss methods to attract growth, as well as the 
challenges associated with growth, and growth management strategies.  Issues of direct 
pertinence to declining and no-growth areas are obscured.  When policy-makers and 
planners seeking solutions for urban areas facing these conditions turn to the literature 
they may be told why they are in decline, but the guidance they are presented with 
constitutes, for the most part, denial.  Growth is overwhelmingly presented as expected 
and normal. (Hall & Hall, 2008, pp.21-22) 
 
Evidently, the “dogma of growth” so prevalent in urban planning practice also dominates to a 
large extent planning education and research despite the likely persistence of the trend of 
population decline in many communities (Allweil, 2007; Leadbeater, 2007; Bontje, 2004).  Leo 
and Anderson (2006) agree that the tendency in the local media and policy literature to engage in 
“growth talk” extends to mainstream academic literature in which there is a “subtler and 
unintended but nevertheless pervasive tendency to emphasize the benefits of growth and 
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underplay the costs, combined with insufficient analysis of the consequences and policy 
implications of different rates of growth” (p.171).  Studies of growth tend to cast growth in a 
positive light.  The opposite is true of studies of decline, most of which simply track the cycles of 
demographic change and make broadly generalizations about the policy implications that lack 
nuance or detail, for instance referring to growing cities as “winners” and shrinking cities as 
“losers.”  According to Leo and Anderson (2006),  
…the existing literature has tended to view urban population growth in terms of 
stereotypes and does not encompass the kind of research necessary to develop a nuanced 
understanding of the policy implications of different rates of growth.  We argue that such 
research is needed to fill an important lacuna in urban studies and to support intelligent 
policy-making. (p.173) 
 
In short, there exists in the bulk of the existing literature dealing with population decline a 
general notion that the absence of population growth represents a failure, with the implication 
that the only strategies discussed as “effective” are those that seek to increase population. In the 
context of the likely increase in the number of cities which will experience long-term population 
decline, this assumption needs to be challenged.  Fortunately, a body of literature has begun to 
emerge which calls for a shift away from the growth paradigm in the context of long-term 
population decline.  Most importantly, it introduces the notion that cities can be successful and 
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As a reaction to the lack of attention paid to this issue in both the academic and 
professional realms, a debate has recently begun on how to plan for and design shrinking cities.  
This debate originated in Europe, prompted primarily by the dramatic population decline in 
Eastern Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Kabisch, Haase, & Haase, 2006; Allweil, 
2007; Rieniets, 2005b; Moss, 2008).  Since the turn of the century, there have been a number of 
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events in Europe dealing with the issue of shrinking cities and policies have been developed on 
both the local and national level (such as Stadtumbau Ost) which are focused on deconstruction 
and conversion measures (Wiechmann, 2007a and b).  The German government-funded 
Shrinking Cities Project has produced case studies on shrinking cities in Germany, Great Britain, 
Japan, Russia, and the United States. A lively academic debate is taking place on the causes and 
effects of shrinkage, and the planning strategies to cope with it, contributed to by such European 
researchers as Wiechmann (2003; 2007a and b), Moss (2008), Müller & Siedentop (2004), and 
Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp (2006).   
 While the swift shrinkage of New Orleans brought on by Hurricane Katrina (and more 
recently the economic downturn) has brought the issue of shrinkage more to the forefront in 
North America, the debate has yet to gain the same momentum here as it has in Europe (Allweil, 
2007; Pallagst, 2005). Pallagst (2005) notes that particularly in the United States, there is less 
active discussion about shrinking cities, largely because a strong stigma remains attached to 
admitting and planning for population decline. While in North America the latest trend in urban 
and regional planning sphere is “smart growth,” several concepts of which could relate to 
shrinkage (such as the importance of containing sprawl), “…it has to be noted that – in order to 
achieve political acceptance – the center of the concept is growth, however in a tamed variation.  
An active discussion of urban, regional, or metropolitan shrinkage, as it is provided recently by 
European planners, is missing” (Pallagst, 2005, p.4).  Of course, this is not to say that the issue of 
shrinking cities is completely ignored in the North American academic literature. The Berkeley-
based Shrinking Cities International Research Network is examining shrinking cities in a global 
perspective, with comparative case studies from Mexico, Brazil, Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, and Australia.  Research such as that put forth by Popper and 
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Popper (2002), Dewar (2006), and Schilling and Logan (2008) addresses planning issues 
associated with shrinking cities. Also in the United States, the Cleveland Shrinking Cities 
Institute – a practice-based initiative – focuses on finding effective urban planning and urban 
design methods for the shrinking older industrial cities of Northeast Ohio.  While no such group 
has been formed yet in Canada, researchers such as Bourne and Simmons (2003), Polèse and 
Shearmur (2003; 2006), and Leadbeater (2007) are examining the causes of regional decline in 
the Canadian context. The majority of a recent issue of Plan Canada was devoted to the issue of 
planning for population decline. In addition, Leo and Anderson (2006) and Leo and Brown 
(2000) have studied urban development policies in slow growth regions in Canada, the 
conclusions about which they argue might be equally applied to those regions experiencing 
population decline.   
 The momentum of the growing debate surrounding the shrinking cities phenomenon 
needs to be sustained and built upon, especially in North America where the recent economic 
downturn has brought issues of urban decline into the forefront.  Shrinking cities are not going to 
disappear and thus an open dialogue – within both the professional and academic realms – is 
needed on the spatial effects of population decline and their consequences for all levels of 
government (Müller & Siedentop, 2004).  Particularly with respect to academic research, there is 
a need for international comparative studies because, even though the context varies, shrinking 
cities all over the world face many of the same issues (Pallagst, 2005; Leo & Brown, 2000; 
Kabisch, Haase, & Haase, 2006).  To date, according to Pallagst (2005), the issue of shrinking 
cities has been “widely underrepresented in international comparative research” (p.1).  
Regardless of methods used, however, officials at all levels of government, as well as planning 
researchers, need to start addressing this issue in a way that leaves behind assumptions of the 
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likelihood of, and necessity of, growth.  As Seasons (2007) succinctly puts it:  “let’s talk about 
place decline and better still, act with a basis of sound planning” (p.6). 
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This thesis research is an attempt to push the shrinking cities debate further in the 
direction of understanding how planners in shrinking cities might move towards adopting 
strategies that are geared towards their particular demographic context.  In the chapters that 
follow, in addition to reviewing the shrinking cities literature, which provides general principles 
for “good planning” in shrinking cities, I assess and compare two case studies of recent planning 
initiatives in the context long-term population decline.  More specifically, in Chapter 2, I provide 
a definition of shrinking cities, discuss the usual causes of urban decline and where it is most 
prevalent, and identify the common effects of urban shrinkage.  I continue my literature review 
in Chapter 3, in which I discuss in more detail the four principles of “good planning” in 
shrinking cities and present my research questions.  In Chapter 4, I describe my methodology for 
conducting this research, including my choice of research strategy, research design, data 
collection procedures, and data analysis procedures. In Chapter 5, I introduce the Youngstown 
case study: including the physical, economic, environmental, and social context of the planning 
process and a general overview of the main components of the Youngstown 2010 Vision and 
Citywide Plan.  I then introduce the Sudbury case study in Chapter 6, also with an overview of 
the physical, economic, environmental, and social context of the planning process and the main 
components of the Official Plan.  In Chapter 7, I use the general principles of good planning in 
shrinking cities gathered from the literature as a point of departure for comparing the plans.  The 
result of this comparison is an assessment of how each planning exercise “measures up” against 
the principles of good planning and what factors have either facilitated or impeded the adoption 
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of each principle.  In the final chapter, I surmise how these case studies can provide lessons for 
planners in shrinking cities facing similar demographic decline and how the issues uncovered in 













The next two chapters present a review of the developing body of literature on shrinking 
cities, which is quite diverse and sometimes contradictory.  Oswalt (2005) cautions that even the 
term “shrinking cities” is problematic because it fails to reflect the complexity of this 
phenomenon: “…behind the term are hidden various causes, processes, and effects that the 
words themselves do not reveal” (p.12).   In reviewing the shrinking cities literature, I attempt to 
delve beneath the apparent simplicity of the term in order to address a number of questions.  This 
chapter provides answers to some basic “shrinking cities” questions.  First, how are shrinking 
cities defined?  Second, what are the usual causes of urban population decline (influencing the 
pattern of urban population decline) and where is it most prevalent?  Finally, what are the most 
common effects of urban shrinkage?  In the next chapter, I incorporate discussions from the 
literature on planning practices in shrinking cities into a framework for how planning should take 
place so that it is most effective in dealing with the unique issues shrinking cities face; in 
particular, I focus on the proper goal of planning in shrinking cities, the best method for 






Likely because this is a relatively recent area of research, there is no widely accepted 
definition of the term “shrinking cities.”  In fact, many researchers (particularly Canadian 
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researchers) do not use the term at all.  Where it is used, some researchers define shrinking cities 
purely in terms of population decline while others define it in terms of both population and 
economic decline.  For instance, Grossman (2004) refers to “declining cities,” which she seems 
to define as cities that “have lost population” (p.1).  In the Canadian literature, for example, 
Bourne and Simmons (2003) and Simmons and Bourne (2007) discuss the challenges faced by 
“growing” versus “declining” regions, distinguishing between the two on the basis of gains 
versus losses (or stagnation) in population numbers.  Hall and Hall (2008) use a similar 
distinction in comparing the attention in academia paid to “growing” versus “declining” urban 
areas, as do Leo and Anderson (2006) in their comparison of policies in a slow-growth and a 
rapidly-growing city, Leo and Brown (2000) in their discussion of urban development policy in 
slow growth regions, and Simmons (2003) in his examination of the characteristics of “declining 
cities.”  Polèse and Shearmur (2003) examine the causes and consequences of “population 
decline” in peripheral regions.  More recently, Shearmur and Polèse (2007) discuss declining or 
stagnating peripheral areas, terms which they use to refer to those peripheral areas facing 
population decline caused by declining employment.  However, in an earlier article, they use the 
term “regional decline” to refer to a “decline in absolute population and employment numbers” 
(Polèse & Shearmur, 2006, p.34).  In a similar way, Seasons (2007) refers to “place decline,” 
which he seems to define as “population and economic decline” (p.6).  Thus, most of the 
Canadian literature on this topic does not use the term “shrinking cities” using instead the 
language of “growth” and “decline.” The bulk of this literature distinguishes between the two 
primarily on the basis of population numbers, with economic decline presented as a cause and a 
consequence.  However, Polèse and Shearmur (2006) and Seasons (2007) add a decline in 
employment numbers to their definition of “place” or “regional decline,” meaning that, in the 
24 
 
context of their discussions, a “declining city” is one that is experiencing a loss of both 
population and economic activity. 
The term “shrinking cities” tends to be used more often in the international literature, in 
particular the German literature on “schrumpfenden stadte” (“shrinking cities”).  However, most 
of these researchers use the term without providing any formal definition, leaving it to the reader 
to infer from the discussion to what exactly the author is referring.  For instance, Franz (2004) 
seems to define “shrinking cities” as cities facing demographic decline.  In fact, he deliberately 
divorces population shrinkage from economic decline in order to examine “whether or not a 
declining population means lagging economic growth” (p.1).  He finds that the mere fact that a 
city is “shrinking” (in population) does not necessarily mean that city is declining economically.  
Hollbach-Grömig and Trapp (2006) appear to define “shrinking communities” as those that are 
experiencing “declining populations,” the result of which is “economic problems” (p.3).  In the 
following statement, Irurah, Park, and Yeang (2005) also seem to be equating urban shrinkage 
with population decline: “Everybody is talking about global urbanization...  Yet there is also an 
opposite trend at work: that of the shrinking city. City planners must be prepared to deal with a 
dynamic process that includes simultaneous growth and decline of population” (p.156, emphasis 
added).  Other authors similarly infer that a shrinking city is one that is losing population for a 
variety of reasons (including economic reasons) and with a variety of consequences (including 
economic decline) (Mäding, 2004; Müller, 2004; Müller & Siedentop, 2004; Oswalt & Rieniets, 
2006b; Rieniets, 2006; Ward, 1999; Cleveland Shrinking Cities Institute, 2007; Hollander & 
Popper, 2007; Popper & Popper, 2002; Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999).  
Fortunately, some researchers provide a formal definition of the term “shrinking cities,” 
although definitions vary in content and helpfulness.  Oswalt (2005) explains, somewhat 
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vaguely, that the term “shrinkage” refers to “an essential change: the epoch of growth has come 
to an end… [T]he process of urbanization has reached its zenith and is declining” (p.12).  On a 
more specific note, Andersen (2005) explains that the definition of “shrinking cities” depends on 
the perspective one takes when examining the phenomenon:  
Among other things, the phenomena of Shrinking Cities can be seen from a political-
economical, a sociological and an urban planning perspective.  The political-economical 
perspective sees Shrinking Cities as being cities which suffer from an economic decline, 
while the sociological and urban planning perspectives see shrinking cities as cities with 
a decline in population. (p.2) 
 
Andersen herself, although focusing largely on urban planning issues, adopts the perspective that 
a shrinking city is one that faces both population and economic decline: 
This is seen as the most suitable because a city can be suffering from a decline in 
population, but still have a growing economy and, on the other hand, a city can suffer 
from a declining economy and still have a rising population.  It is the opinion that a 
Shrinking City both has an economic problem and a declining population and that it is 
impossible to devote focus on one of these subjects when dealing with a Shrinking City. 
(p.2) 
 
Wiechmann (2006) adopts the Berkeley-based Shrinking Cities International Research 
Network’s definition of “shrinking cities,” which also incorporates the economic element.  
According to him, a shrinking city is: 
 a densely populated urban area with a minimum population of 10,000 residents 
 that has faced a population loss in large parts of it 
 for more than two years and 
 is undergoing economic transformations with some symptoms of a structural 
crisis. (emphasis in original) 
 
In contrast, Oswalt and Rieniets (2006b), in echoing Oswalt’s (2005) caution about the 
problematic nature of the term “shrinking cities,” state that “the term ‘shrinking city’ first and 
foremost describes a symptom: population loss.  A wide variety of processes and causes can be 
hidden behind this symptom…” (p.6). Rieniets (2005b) similarly defines shrinking cities 
according to the symptom of population loss, but he adds to that loss must be “significant” (p.1).  
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While Rieniets (2005b) does not elaborate on what he means by “significant,” others are quite 
specific about the amount of population loss needed to qualify as a “shrinking city.”  For 
instance, Delkin (2007), in his study of “happiness” in shrinking cities, defines shrinking cities as 
cities which have experienced a population decline of more than three percent between 1990 and 
2005.  Similar to Wiechmann (2006), Leadbeater (2007) further adds the element of time to the 
definition.  He states that the process of shrinkage in a given urban area or region refers to “long-
term population decrease, whether it is a persisting decline or a reduction to a lower, more or less 
stable scale;” this shrinkage is typically accompanied by economic decline (p.1, emphasis 
added). 
 Apparently, then, there appears to be no commonly accepted definition, either explicit or 
implicit, of the term “shrinking cities.”  Indeed, the term is sometimes not used at all in favour of 
the language of “decline.”  In this thesis, I have adopted the term “shrinking cities” instead of 
“regional decline” or “place decline” because it seems to me to be more value-neutral.  As will 
be discussed below, not all of the effects of shrinkage are negative, in the same way that not all 
of the effects of growth are positive.  As was noted in Chapter 1, using the growth/decline 
dichotomy (and using the terms “winners” and “losers”) assumes the superiority of growth which 
precludes a more nuanced discussion of the policy implications of population loss or stagnation 
(Leo & Anderson, 2006).   
In terms of which definition of “shrinking cities” I adopt in this thesis, the dominant trend 
in the literature points me towards identifying the defining characteristic of “shrinking cities” to 
be population loss as opposed to both population loss and economic decline.  I find this approach 
is more helpful for two major reasons: first, as discussed above and as will be elaborated upon 
below, a city that experiences population shrinkage may not experience economic decline.  
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However, a city that that loses population but does not experience economic decline will still 
have to deal with the physical effects of people leaving, such as underutilized infrastructure.  To 
me, such a city is a “shrinking city.”  To exclude such cities from the definition would result in 
shrinking cities researchers missing some important urban planning implications of population 
loss.  Second, on a related note, I find it more useful to deal with the economic causes and 
implications of population shrinkage separately from the mere fact of population loss because the 
strength and nature of the influence of the “economic element” is likely to vary from situation to 
situation.  In addition to defining shrinking cities according to population loss, I believe, as 
Wiechmann (2006) and Leadbeater (2007) do, that to qualify as a “shrinking city,” a city must be 
losing population in the long-term (that is, at least for more than two years).  Temporary 
population loss is unlikely to result in the types of problems and opportunities that arise from 
more sustained population decline.  I do not find it useful to quantify how much population loss 
would result in a “shrinking city.”  A shrinking city is a city that is experiencing any long-term 
population loss.  The question of “how much” a city is shrinking is simply one of degree.  A city 
that has experienced dramatic shrinkage will experience more significant effects than one that 
has experienced only minor shrinkage.  For all of these reasons, I find Leadbeater’s (2007) 
definition of a shrinkage – which is, again, “long-term population decrease, whether it is a 
persisting decline or a reduction to a lower, more or less stable scale” (p.1) – most useful and I 





As mentioned in Chapter 1, urban shrinkage is not a new phenomenon (Rieniets, 2005b; 
Rieniets, 2006; Oswalt & Rieniets, 2006c; Lang et al., 2004; Wiechmann, 2008a) As Rieniets 
(2006) states, “throughout most of history, phases of shrinkage were as much a part of the 
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development of cities as phases of growth” (p.30).  It is only with the onset of industrialization in 
Europe that cities experienced phases of long and intense growth: “new means of transportation, 
communication, and conservation, fed by the rapidly growing availability of fossil fuels, enabled 
the growth of cities far beyond their old boundaries. This historic turning point fundamentally 
changed the quantity and quality of urbanization…” (Rieniets, 2005b, p.2).  From the onset of 
industrialization to World War One, many cities in Europe and North America multiplied their 
population as rural populations left the countryside in hopes of finding better living and working 
conditions in cities.  Prior to industrialization and the accompanying long and intense phase of 
urban growth, shrinkage was more commonplace.  Many cities experienced stages of population 
decline because of, for instance, war, crises, fires, epidemics, and natural disasters (Beauregard, 
2003; Krüger, 2006; Oswalt & Rieniets, 2006a; Rieniets, 2006; Shaw, 2006; Schott, 2005).  
Following the demise of the Roman Empire, Rome, for instance, faced a lengthy period of 
decline.  Because of an earthquake in 1509 which killed 5000 people, Istanbul (which had 
previously gone through periods of decline as a result of wars) shrank considerably in the space 
of a few hours.  An epidemic of the plague in Nuremburg in the 1630s claimed the lives of 
20,000 people, decreasing its population by nearly two-thirds.  Indeed, some cities have 
disappeared completely, such as Troy, Carthage, and Pompeii (Rieniets, 2005b).    
While shrinkage itself is not new, in postindustrial times the major causes of shrinkage 
have changed.  Epidemics, for instance, do not tend to have the impact on population numbers 
they once did because “in most developing countries the growth rates are too dynamic.  In the 
wealthy lands of the ‘North,’ the sanitary infrastructure and healthcare systems are so well 
developed that there have not been demographically significant epidemics in decades” (Krüger, 
2006, p.58).  Population loss because of disasters is also less likely today than it once was, 
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mainly because “response mechanisms are more elaborate and institutionalized, as are support 
systems that enable people to remain in place during a disaster’s aftermath” (Beauregard, 2003, 
p.686).   
Of course, some of these “historical” threats, such as natural disasters and war,2 have 
continued to play a role in the shrinkage of postindustrial cities (Beauregard, 2003; Oswalt & 
Rieniets, 2006a; Rieniets, 2005a; Schott, 2006).  For instance, many cities in Europe and Asia, 
such as Warsaw, Dresden, and Hiroshima, shrank dramatically during the Second World War 
(Rieniets, 2005b).  In 1997, a volcanic eruption in Plymouth, Montserrat, emptied the city of all 
of its inhabitants (Oswalt & Rieniets, 2006a). Even more recently, Hurricane Katrina brought 
“quick and intense shrinkage” to New Orleans (Allweil, 2007, p.91; Schott, 2006).  However, in 
recent years, it has become much more common for shrinkage to occur like a “slow-motion 
Katrina” (Allweil, 2007, p.91) because of a set of different factors, acting either on their own or, 
more commonly, in combination.  For reasons that will become clear, while cities throughout the 
world are shrinking,3 these “new” causes of shrinkage tend to disproportionately affect cities in 
the developed world, particularly older industrial or resource-based cities (Rieniets, 2005a and b; 
Rieniets, 2006; Oswalt & Rieniets, 2006c; Birg, 2005; Irurah, Park, & Yeang, 2005; Friedrichs, 
1993; Polèse & Shearmur, 2006; Müller, 2004; Genske & Ruff, 2006). As Rieniets (2006) states, 
shrinking cities have become “a phenomenon of wealthy and developed industrial nations” 
(p.30).   
 
2 Rieniets (2005a) and Shaw (2006) note that because of technological advances and the greater destructive power of 
weapons, war now actually poses a greater risk to urban populations than it did in pre-industrial times.  Rieniets 
(2005a) notes that this is also true of ecological disasters, with high-profile examples being Bhopal (1984) and 
Chernobyl (1984). 
3 According to Rieniets (2006), while urban shrinkage tends to disproportionately affect older industrialized cities, 
shrinkage still occurs in cities in the developing world.  Natural disasters, wars, and violent conflicts have caused 
destruction in and streams of refugees from cities in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa.  On the whole, 
however, these are “isolated cases” that have occurred in the larger context of high urban growth rates in the 









According to the literature, demographic change and migratory movements are a major 
cause of postindustrial urban shrinkage (Koziol, 2004; Lang et al., 2004).  Put simply, cities are 
shrinking in countries where population growth is slowing.  Simmons (2003) explains that there 
are three components of population growth: natural increase (births minus deaths);4 net migration 
(in-movers minus out-movers) and net immigration from abroad.  In countries and regions where 
the birthrate is falling and there is not enough immigration/migration from abroad of other parts 
of the country to compensate for the falling birthrate and/or the number of (typically young) 
people moving away (Kabisch, Haase, & Haase, 2006; Rieniets, 2005b), the number of shrinking 
cities is on the rise.   
Where is this trend most prevalent?  According to Eisinger (2006), “developing countries 
currently account for ninety-five percent of world population growth…” (p.28). In the past fifty 
years, Birg (2005) explains, birthrates have decreased at a greater rate in developed countries 
(50%) versus developing countries (44%).  In addition, the average age of population in 
developing countries is much younger than in developed countries.  Birg (2005) refers to this 
phenomenon as “demographic aging.”  According to him, “comparative international studies 
show that the greater the decline in the birthrate and the more intensive the aging of society, the 
greater the country’s level of economic development (‘demographic-economic paradox’)” 
(p.112).  Birg (2005) finds that demographic aging is very pronounced in countries such as 
Japan.  Indeed, Japan – because of low birth rates and high life expectancy – is the fastest-aging 
and fastest shrinking society in the world (Oswalt, 2005).  In addition to Japan, low fertility rates 
are also found in countries such as Italy, Germany, the Czech Republic, Finland, Spain, and 
 
4 Palmer (2003) clarifies that population requires at least 2.1 children per family to grow from Natural Increase.  
According to Beaujot & Kerr (2004), 2 births are needed to replace parents and 0.1 is needed to compensate for 
small number of deaths that occur before next generation reaches reproductive ages. 
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Russia (Allweil, 2007; Andersen, 2005; Hall & Hall, 2008; Beyer, 2005; Bourne & Simmons, 
2003; Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 2006; Kabisch, Haase, & Haase, 2006; Müller, 2004; Genske 
& Ruff, 2006).  In these countries, the only hope for growth comes from immigration or internal 
redistribution of residents (Rieniets, 2005); however, in many countries  the levels of 
immigration are such that it will only slow the trend, not reverse it (Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 
2006).   
Particularly in Europe, according to Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp (2006), all countries are 
experiencing demographic change.  In general, fertility rates in European countries are not 
sufficient to keep population numbers stable.  In addition, life expectancy continues to rise, as 
does international migration.  As a result, Europeans are becoming “older, fewer and more 
heterogenous” (Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 2006, p.2).  Hollbach-Grömig and Trapp (2006) 
expect that international migration will give slight growth to the European Union population 
until around 2025, when the population will decrease significantly.  According to them, 
“immigration cannot stop population decline but only diminish it” (p.14).  This projected long-
term decrease in population is especially evident in Germany, where birthrates have been falling 
for over a century (Müller, 2004).5 Since 1972, the annual number of deaths in Germany has 
exceeded the number of births (Birg, 2005).  By 2050, the German population is expected to fall 
from over 82 million to under 70 million.  This will be accompanied by a dramatic change in the 
demographic structure: the portion of working-age people (defined as people between the ages of 
20 and 65) will be 55 percent of the population as opposed to 62 percent today (Müller, 2004).  
While immigration to Germany has, so far, compensated for falling birthrates (and has even led 
 
5 According to Birg (2005), fertility rate in eastern parts of Germany even lower than in western parts (1.1-1.2 in 
East versus 1.3-1.4 in West). 
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to a slight increase in population), at current immigration levels, population will still start to fall 
as birthrates continue to drop (Birg, 2005).   
In Canada, fertility rates are also declining (Beaujot & Kerr, 2004; Bourne & Simmons, 
2003; Simmons & Bourne, 2007; Palmer, 2003), a situation that is “truly unique in the history of 
Canada” (Palmer, 20003, p.3).  In the long-term, fertility rates have declined from seven births 
per woman in 1851 to 1.5 in 2000, well below the rate of 2.1 used to mark replacement fertility 
(Beaujot & Kerr, 2004).  According to Beaujot and Kerr (2004), with fertility constant at 1.5, 
births will continue to outnumber deaths until 2025.  In addition to (and related to) declining 
fertility rates, the population of Canada is also aging (Bourne & Simmons, 2003; Simmons & 
Bourne, 2007).  Taken together, these two factors mean that communities can grow only by 
attracting residents from elsewhere (Bourne & Simmons, 2003; Simmons & Bourne, 2007).  
Indeed, as Simmons and Bourne (2007) explain, “…immigrants account for a larger and larger 
proportion of the growth in national population (two-thirds of growth in the last Census period)” 
(p.18).  The problem is that most immigrants settle in larger, growing metropolitan areas and do 
not tend to disperse over time (Bourne & Simmons, 2003; Hall & Hall, 2008; Simmons, 2003; 
Bourne & Simmons, 2007; Palmer, 2003).  Thus, large cities in Canada such as Toronto, 
Vancouver, Montreal, and Calgary are growing larger and more heterogeneous while the rest are 
stagnating or declining in population, remaining homogenous with a rapidly aging population 
(Bourne & Simmons, 2003; Simmons, 2003).   
More specifically, according to Polèse and Shearmur (2006), urban shrinkage in Canada 
is occurring primarily in the country’s periphery, which they define as an area located more than 
one hour’s travel time from a major urban centre of 500,000 or more (Polèse & Shearmur, 2006, 
p.25).  Polèse and Shearmur (2003) explain that birth rates are declining in peripheral areas and 
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while outmigration used to be compensated for by high natural growth, the declining birth rate 
means that the population in peripheral areas, who are generally not able to attract a large 
number of immigrants, is declining.  In other words, in peripheral areas, net outmigration 
automatically means population decline (Polèse & Shearmur, 2006).  Atlantic Canada has 
particularly been affected by declining birth rates and uneven immigration settlement patterns 
(Palmer, 2003).  The provinces of Atlantic Canada, with the exception of PEI, have fertility rates 
well below the national average.  Despite its potential to, immigration is not offsetting declining 
fertility rates and cities and towns in the Atlantic region continue to lose their (predominantly 
young) residents. 
It is important to note that, in comparison to Canada and most European countries, 
shrinkage in United States is embedded in population growth at the national level (Pallagst, 
2005).   However, while the birth rate in the U.S. is higher6 and immigration plays less of a role 
in population growth, uneven immigration and migration patterns certainly have a role to play in 
the continuing pattern of urban shrinkage since people still tend to move to larger, thriving urban 
centres.  In other words, even though fertility rates remain relatively higher in the United States 
than in other developed countries, it is unlikely that shrinking cities will reverse the downward 
trend in population since areas of demographic and economic decline will likely continue to lose 
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In addition to long-term demographic change and immigration patterns, the literature 
identifies “globalization” (Cunningham-Sabot & Fol, 2006; Martinez-Fernandez & Wu, 2006; 
Grossman, 2004; Pallagst, 2005) and the accompanying “economic restructuring” (Cleveland 
 
6 The birth rate in the United States is almost 2.0 (Statistics Canada, 2007). 
34 
 
Shrinking Cities Institute, 2007; Lang et al, 2004) as a major cause of urban shrinkage.  
“Globalization” is a complicated, multi-faceted process that is characterized by many factors, 
including: 
 increasing mobility of labour (Andersen, 2005) and capital resulting in the 
internationalization of the production process (Castells, 2000; Cusack, 1998); 
 the growth of transnational corporations (Castells, 2000; Cusack, 1998; Dicken, 2003); and 
 increasing international trade and investment (Castells, 2000; Rondinelli, 2001) and the 
emergence of a global market for goods and services, though some barriers still exist 
(Bradford, 2003; Castells, 2000; Costa et al., 1998). 
All of these factors have been facilitated by the proliferation in recent years of new information 
and communications technologies (ICTs) (Benner, 2002; Breathnach, 2000; Castells, 2000; 
Cusack, 1998; Dicken, 2003; Salomon, I. & Tsairi, B., 1994; Salomon, 1996).   ICTs have 
drastically reduced the cost of transporting information across geographic space (Audretsch & 
Feldmann, 2000).  They have also opened and expanded markets, increased mobility, led to the 
creation of new varieties of products, and changed the relative costs of production and 
distribution (Behrman & Rondinelli, 1992).  With ICTs as a facilitator, the process of 
globalization is leading to the creation of a global economy which Castells (2000) defines as “an 
economy whose core components have the institutional, organizational, and technological 
capacity to work as a unit in real time, or in a chosen time, on a planetary scale” (p.102). 
With globalization and the proliferation of ICTs has come structural economic change –
which Seasons (2004) defines as a “significant and long-term shift in the comparative influence 
exerted by a sector (or sectors) in an economy” (p.11) – from a natural resource or 
manufacturing-based economy to service or knowledge-based economy.  In the past, 
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metropolitan economies were based on manufacturing and the exchange of physical goods 
(Rondinelli, 2001).   Today, metropolitan economies are increasingly based on ICT-intensive 
economic activities where information is the raw material and ICTs are used in the production 
process (Caves & Walshok, 1999; Gibbs & Tanner, 1997; Hall, 1997; Rondinelli, 2001; Van den 
Berg & Van Winden, 2002; Beyers, 2000).  In particular, rapid advances in ICTs have fuelled the 
expansion of knowledge industries; that is, industries “that depend for their competitive 
advantage primarily on the exchange, development, and use of information” (Rondinelli, 2001, 
p.8).  ICTs play an important role in knowledge industries as they facilitate the transmission, 
processing, and stocking of information (Polèse & Shearmur, 2002). Related to the shift to a 
knowledge-based economy, metropolitan economies are increasingly based on services (Hall, 
1997; Hodos, 2002; Buchanan & Koch-Schulte, 2000; Stanback, 2002).  ICTs have been 
associated with the growth in the service sector, “as an increasing share of economic activity is 
associated with information processing” (Giuliano, 1998, p.1078). 
How have these developments contributed to the phenomenon of shrinking cities?  First, 
while a small number of “global cities” are playing a strategic role in the new economy (Sassen, 
2002; Andersen, 2005), economic restructuring from a manufacturing-based economy to a 
knowledge-based economy (which emphasizes producer services, finance, insurance and real 
estate and the high tech industry) has resulted in many cities in industrial nations losing their 
relative economic position and role in the wider market (Friedrichs, 1993; Andersen, 2005; Hall 
& Hall, 2008; Pallagst, 2005).  The ensuing loss of industry and jobs (Allweil, 2007; Friedrichs, 
1993; Pallagst, 2005) has led to significant out-migration (Rieniets, 2005a and b; Rieniets, 2006; 
Oswalt & Rieniets, 2006c and e; Birg, 2005; Irurah, Park, & Yeang, 2005; Friedrichs, 1993; 
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Polèse & Shearmur, 2006; Müller, 2004) as people leave to find job opportunities in growing, 
economically-thriving cities (Fassman, 2006a).7 As Pallagst (2005) states, 
urban decline and the loss of employment opportunities are closely linked in a downward 
spiral, leading to an outmigration of population.  This process of decline is often due to 
the post-industrial transformation of cities and to the shift from manufacturing activities 
to services, a process that has left industrial and working-class cities with very few 
resources in terms of employment and fiscal base… (p.1) 
 
Examples of cities undergoing industrial transformation are predominantly found in old 
industrial areas of Japan, the United States, Britain, and Continental Europe (Wiechmann, 2006; 
Popper & Popper, 2002; Rybcybski & Linneman, 1999; Prigge, 2005; Munck, 2005; Rieniets, 
2005b).  According to Rieniets (2005b):  
following the industrial boom that occurred during the war and in the postwar period, 
former industrial cities in the Rust Belt, central England, the Ruhr and Saar regions, and 
the Po Valley fell into crisis. The closure, modernization or relocation of production 
locations led to the widespread loss of jobs, which had a predictable impact on population 
growth in the cities affected. (p.4) 
 
Marseilles, for instance, lost 10 percent of its 800,000 residents in the 1980s because of the loss 
of heavy industry (Munck, 2005).  Britain, which was first to “peak” in the industrial era, has 
been particularly hard-hit by the transformation to a knowledge-based economy (Munck, 2005).  
Between 1955 and 1983, manufacturing employment in Britain fell from 48% to 34%, more than 
any other industrialized country.  The loss of manufacturing jobs in, for example, Liverpool, 
Manchester, and Glasgow resulted in massive out-migrations of these cities’ populations 
(Munck, 2005; Ward, 1999).  
In the United States, industrial cities in the so-called Rustbelt region have fared 
particularly poorly in the transition from an industrial-based to a knowledge-based economy 
 
7 Indeed, growth and decline are closely connected: the growth of some cities “very much rests on the shrinkage of 
other places” (Andersen, 2005, p.5). 
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(Beauregard, 2003).  The inability for cities in this region to adapt to this transition has greatly 
contributed to the phenomenon of urban shrinkage:  
Cities that did not make the transition from a manufacturing base to advanced services in 
the early postwar era – cities such as Akron, Detroit, and St. Louis – have continued to 
lose population just as earlier commercial cities that did not develop or were bypassed by 
manufacturing.  The contemporary equivalent is the failure to build telecommunications 
infrastructure, international airports, and high-speed highways and thereby situate the city 
in the global economy.  Cities have to be competitive to retain and attract investors and 
households… (Beauregard, 2003, p.686) 
 
One of the most extreme cases of urban shrinkage in the United States is Detroit, which has lost 
nearly 1,000,000 inhabitants in the past 50 years because of a combination of industrial 
restructuring, suburbanization, anti-urban federal policies, and racism (Armborst, D’Oca, & 
Theodore, 2007; Fishman, 2005).   
 In addition to, and related to, industrial transformation, globalization, in particular the 
increased mobility of capital, has contributed to urban shrinkage because of the growth of 
outsourcing (Martinez-Fernandez & Wu, 2006; Müller, 2004; Andersen, 2005).  According to 
Müller (2004), today companies are no longer just outsourcing labour-intensive stages of 
production to countries with lower unit labour costs.  Now, entire branches of production and 
technology-intensive industries are withdrawing from older industrialized nations.  As well, 
higher order functions, such as financial services and entire research and development 
departments are being relocated.  In general, globalization and outsourcing have led to new 
patterns of unemployment with countries such as Brazil and India profiting and becoming more 
integrated into the world economy.  In the meantime, unemployment, while still lower than what 
it is in developing countries, is rising in developed countries.  As Fassman (2006b) states, “the 
economic causes for large-scale unemployment in Western industrialized nations are always 
related to high labor costs and rigid employment regulations.  Manual labor in the production 
38 
 
sector is reduced by rationalization and automation, and services are simplified or outsourced” 
(p.74).   Taken together, both deindustrialization and outsourcing has hit older, industrialized 
cities, particularly those relying on one industry (Friedrichs, 1993), in the West particularly hard.  
While some cities have become players in the new global arena (for example, becoming home to 
corporate headquarters, insurance companies, etc…), many older industrialized cities are 
experiencing shrinkage (Fassman, 2006b).  Fassman (2006b) explains that  
[i]n the monoindustrial cities of Western and Eastern Europe, unemployment has settled 
in and has long since changed from cyclical to structural unemployment.  Whereas 
monoindustrial cities were once the engines of national economies, today they are 
locations in crisis suffering a loss of purchasing power, emigration, and aging 
populations.  Efforts to move modern service companies into old factory halls have been 
only partially successful.  Shopping malls, office parks, and entertainment centers do not 
need coal, iron, or even cheap transportation routes, rather they require access to 
highways, a nearby airport, lots of parking space, and the look of urbanity.  A changing 
economic dynamic – job growth in one place and job loss in another – is associated with 
a return of internal migration.  Whereas in the nineteenth century, workers moved in great 
numbers to the emergent industrial centers, these days migrants are going to the large 
service-industry metropolises of the world: New York, London, and Paris, but also 
Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Munich. (p.74) 
 
In Canada, these trends “tend to favour large metropolitan regions, in particular Toronto, 
Montreal and Vancouver…” (Hall & Hall, 2008, pp.5-6).  Indeed, according to 2006 census, 
growth continues to concentrate in Canada’s six largest metropolitan areas (with a population 
over 1,000,000) while other areas are declining or stagnating (Shearmur & Polèse, 2007).  A 
similar trend is occurring in remote regions countries such as Australia, the Scandinavian 
countries, and Scotland.  The literature cites a variety of reasons for this growth disparity in 
Canada, most of which are related to globalization and structural economic shifts.  For instance, 
Bourne and Simmons (2003) and Hall and Hall (2008) explain that because of the decline of the 
resource and manufacturing sectors, the growth of the service sector, and the fact that 
knowledge-based jobs tend to concentrate in large metropolitan areas, Canadian cities in 
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resource and manufacturing-based regions have experienced significant job losses.  According to 
Leadbeater (2007), both small and large resource-based towns and cities are shrinking because of 
changing conditions at both the macro and community level that have “shifted fundamentally the 
development prospects for hinterland and labour” (p.11).  This new “crisis of hinterland 
development,” which began to take shape in the early to mid-1970s, has a number of key 
features.  First, an increase in productivity in resource industries has resulted in absolute decline 
in employment, even when production was maintained or even increased.  Second, there have 
been massive increases in the concentration of capital, both domestically and internationally, 
resulting in poorer employment conditions for workers at the hands of transnational corporations 
who could, when challenged, “more easily threaten to go elsewhere” (Leadbeater, 2007, p.10).  
Third, there has been a major shift in state policy towards cutbacks in employment and social 
programs.  Fourth, production and consumption are facing more environmental limits.  Finally, 
extensive resource development has faced increased political resistance from Aboriginal peoples 
over questions of sovereignty and land claims.  Thus, the growth of resource communities in 
Canada through expanded resource extraction has been limited by availability of resources or 
access to resources.  Where expanded resource extraction is possible, its employment impacts 
have been limited because of increased productivity. 
Polèse and Shearmur (2003) and Shearmur and Polèse (2007) offer reasons for shrinkage 
in Canada’s periphery that are similar to Leadbeater’s (2007), but they place more of an 
emphasis on the location (or lack thereof, in the case of the periphery) of knowledge-based 
industries.  According to them, the trend towards peripheral population decline is based on 
“fundamental and structural changes that are occurring in Canada’s periphery, its metropolitan 
areas and, more generally, in similar economies in the developed world” (Polèse & Shearmur, 
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2003, p.47).  Put simply, these changes mean that employment is declining in the periphery and 
people are leaving to find economic well-being elsewhere (Shearmur & Polèse, 2007).   
More specifically, in addition to declining birth rates and uneven patterns of immigration, 
they highlight several factors leading to regional decline in the periphery.  First, most peripheral 
regions were settled to gain access to natural resources and they grew as demand for resources 
grew.  Importantly, Shearmur and Polèse (2007) point out that situation of growth in the 
periphery was maintained “somewhat artificially perhaps” by the cold war: 
…on the one hand, the reconstruction of Europe, coupled with phenomenal material 
growth throughout the western world, ensured growing demand for Canada’s natural 
resources. On the other hand, alternative sources of supply, in the Soviet Union and its 
dependencies, were not easily available to fuel this growth. Political instability in many 
Latin American countries also limited supply.(Shearmur & Polèse, 2007, p.34) 
 
In recent years, global growth rates have slowed significantly.  Although demand for resources is 
still growing, it is at a slower rate than in the 50s, 60s, and 70s.   In addition, the fall of Iron 
Curtain and relative calm in Latin America has meant that many new sources of supply are now 
available.  Thus, changes in demand and increased competition have led to employment decline 
in most of Canada’s resource industries.  Second, in many regions, resources are being depleted 
(for example, seas are being over-fished, regions are being over-logged, etc…), also leading to 
employment decline.  Third, productivity is increasing in resource extraction industries at a rate 
that is outstripping increases in demand.  According to Shearmur and Polèse (2007), 
by definition, increasing productivity faster than demand leads to job losses: thus, even in 
regions that depend upon resources that are not exhausted and for which demand is 
rising, job losses are still likely. Needless to say, in those industries where natural limits 
have been reached (forestry and fishing, for example) the job situation is even worse 
since jobs lost due to productivity increases combine with those lost due to decreased 
production. (pp.34-35) 
 
Fourth, the internet and the knowledge economy have not provided the hoped-for development 
opportunities for peripheral areas (Polèse & Shearmur, 2003).  Of course, there are examples of 
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individual entrepreneurs who have been able to seize opportunities; however, the fact remains 
that the internet, while good at transmitting codified knowledge, is not good at transmitting tacit 
knowledge and thus face-to-face-meetings are still important.  Peripheral regions are therefore at 
a disadvantage for attracting industries that rely on the use of tacit knowledge. Fifth, with the 
shift from resource-based sectors to service sectors, higher-order service industries (such as 
management consulting and computer services) are driving growth in the knowledge economy.  
Large metropolitan areas, not peripheral areas, provide what these industries require, such as 
market access.  Finally, although globalization has resulted in different parts of the production 
process being located in different areas, peripheral areas are still at a disadvantage because most 
economic activity, including manufacturing, continues to locate in central places.  This final 
point is echoed by Bourne and Simmons (2003): “the information economy and the diffusion of 
new telecommunications technologies may have reduced the friction of distance but, 
paradoxically they have also increased the importance of place and location – of locality” (p.33).  
In the end, Shearmur and Polèse (2007) argue that “any one of these global trends would have 
had an effect on remote regions.”  Taken together, these trends are “having a major impact, 
similar, we believe, to the impact that the industrial revolution had on Britain’s and Europe’s 
rural areas (from which crafts industries rapidly disappeared, followed by a sharp decline in farm 





Numerous researchers cite suburbanization, or the flight of people to the suburbs, as a 
major cause of urban shrinkage (Andersen, 2005; Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 2006; Wiechmann, 
2006; Pallagst, 2005; Cleveland Shrinking Cities Institute, 2007; Müller, 2005; Prigge, 2005; 
Fishman, 2005).   Suburbanization, defined generally as “the sprawl of urban settlements beyond 
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the bounds of a core city and into its hinterland” (Hesse, 2006, p.96), is a central characteristic of 
20th century urban development in almost all industrialized countries.  According to Rieniets 
(2005a), people migrate out of city centres mainly because of the promise of a better quality of 
life: “The need for more room, greater demands on residential areas, and increased mobility 
within developed countries have resulted in disproportionate growth of suburbs in metropolitan 
areas and a simultaneous stagnation or shrinkage of central urban zones” (p.31).  
Suburbanization is often facilitated by planning and policy (for instance, through the 
development of new highways leading out of the downtown core and the existence of lower 
taxes in suburban communities).  In general, suburbanization results in what is called the “hole in 
the doughnut” effect (Wiechmann, 2006; Pallagst, 2005) or the hollowing out of the core city. 
While a common occurrence in most industrialized countries, the extent of 
suburbanization varies from country to country.  While not as much of a cause of shrinkage in 
Europe (Pallagst, 2005; Rieniets, 2005b) and Japan (Rieniets, 2005a), suburbanization is a major 
cause of shrinkage in the United States (Beauregard, 2003; Hesse, 2006; Rieniets, 2006 and 
2005a; Fishman, 2005) and Great Britain (Hesse, 2006).  As Hesse (2006) explains, “by the end 
of the twentieth century, the great majority of both the British and American populations lived in 
suburbia as opposed to less than half the German population” (p.96).  In the United States, 
suburbanization began in 1950s.  Suburbanization happened later in other Western industrial 
nations and Japan, but on a much smaller scale (Rieniets, 2005a).  During the 1950s, the number 
of shrinking cities in US increased from 3 to 38.  By the 1970s, number of people living in 
suburbs in US doubled to 74 million.  For the first time, this exceeded the urban population 
(Rieniets, 2005a).    Beauregard (2003) deems this the “white flight,” in which white people fled 
the city after the influx of African Americans from the South: 
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Racial fears and suburbanization have been two of the most important factors in post-war 
central city population loss.  The two became linked, with blacks blocked from moving to 
the suburbs by racial discrimination and confined to central cities in disproportionate 
numbers, often isolated in ghettos.  Their presence further contributed to white flight.  
The formation of suburban municipalities also blocked population growth in the cities.  
The suburbs resisted annexation and consolidation thus making it difficult for cities to 
increase in population by adding land area. (Beauregard, 2003, p.685) 
 
It is important to note that suburbanization and the shrinkage of core cities, especially in 
the US, often occurs within the context of region-wide population growth (Fishman, 2005; 
Pallagst, 2005), although even shrinking cities within shrinking regions continue to spread out: 8 
“despite their diminished utilization, shrinking cities continue to sprawl beyond their borders and 
thereby undergo a twofold thinning out: less activity is spread out over a greater space” (Oswalt, 
2005, p.12).  In the United States, however, shrinkage is often “embedded in a larger process of 
growth” (Oswalt, 2005).  For example, while Detroit has declined from over 2 million at its peak 
in early 1950s to 950,000 today, the Detroit region is almost 5 million and has grown steadily in 
population and wealth in the same time period (Fishman, 2005).  Thus, although shrinkage also 
occurs on a regional level, many examples of shrinkage in US are  
…due not to region-wide shrinkage, according to which the central city, its suburbs, and 
surrounding agricultural hinterland shrink overall as key industries such as mining or 
textiles decline with little new employment to replace them.  Instead, shrinking cities are 
at the core of regions where population and employment continue to grow region-wide 
but their location shifts from the center to the periphery – leaving extensive abandonment 
and poverty at the core.  This transformation is in fact a radical “regional restructuring.” 
(Fishman, 2005, p.67) 
 
According to Fishman (2005), making this distinction is important because this type of shrinkage 
calls for different policy responses than other forms of shrinkage.  With core-city shrinkage 
embedded in region-wide population growth, there is hope in the rediscovery of traditional 
urbanism based on density and pedestrian street life.   In fact, in the US, while suburbanization 
 
8 Although, in countries such as Germany, even suburbs are starting to shrink (Hesse, 2006; Hollbach-Grömig & 
Trapp, 2006; Müller & Siedentop, 2004). 
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remains a powerful force, “reurbanism” is “… bringing new life to many shrinking cities.  An 
understanding of this dynamic is crucial to any constructive response to the shrinking city” 
(Fishman, 2005, p.67).  This “reurbanism” is not likely to play a large role in shrinking cities 
where the whole region is shrinking, for example in the northern Great Plains and many parts of 
the Rust Belt of the eastern and Midwestern US.   
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Urban shrinkage has long been an issue for cities facing political upheaval (Pallagst, 
2005; Riess-Schmidt, 2006; Rieniets, 2005b).  Recently, the euphoria of reunification in 
Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union has given way to the bleak reality of urban 
shrinkage in Eastern Germany (Reiss-Schmidt, 2006; Schmidt, 2005; Beyer, 2005), other former 
Eastern European planned economies (Rieniets, 2005b; Prigge, 2005; Beyer, 2005), and the 
former Soviet Union (Beyer, 2005).  As Beyer (2005) states, “…in the space of just a few years 
whole industries have ground to a halt or experienced fundamental structural change…” (p.74).    
Rieniets (2005b) further clarifies that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the “planned 
economy”  
…triggered a new, incomparably more dramatic development: from one day to the next, 
numerous cities fell into a state of political, economic, and demographic instability. 
Waves of emigration, rapidly falling birth rates, and a decreasing life expectancy 
triggered a demographic landslide. More than 200 large cities (approximately one out of 
every two) experienced population losses; 93 of them in Russia alone. There, as in 
Bulgaria, eastern Germany, Hungary, and Ukraine, the population of large cities declined, 
and the majority of large cities shrank. Cities also became victims of the ethnic and 
nationalist conflicts that broke out after the fall of the socialist regimes. (p.4) 
 
Thus, economic reorganization and collapse of an entire political system (together with its 
distinctive worldview and social structures) have led to significant shrinkage in the postsocialist 
societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Particularly with respect to 
deindustrialization, the collapse of state planning has meant that industrial regions – formerly 
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highly specialized as part of the “planned economy” – have been forced to create for themselves 
a new economic basis.  This has proved difficult for many industrial regions and those regions 
have lost jobs and, as a result, population (Beyer, 2005).  In Eastern Germany, for instance, the 
outmigration of young, well-trained labour, has led the population of cities to become mixed, 
older, and poorer (Reiss-Schmidt, 2006).  Armenia has lost about a quarter of its population 







According to Lauinger (2006) and Pallagst (2005), environmental pollution, particularly a 
problem in older industrialized cities, has contributed to urban shrinkage.  Environmental 
pollution was particularly high in industrialized countries in the “boom” phases prior to the First 
and Second World Wars (Lauinger, 2006).  At that time, immense damage was done to the soil 
and water in older industrialized cities.  When deindustrialization began in the 1970s, air and 
water pollution in these cities diminished drastically, but the problem of soil contamination 
persisted and this contamination has presented a significant barrier to attracting new 
development to these cities: 
…the damaging aftereffects have proved in retrospect to be an unwelcome legacy for 
urban development.  The unknown risks and high costs of contaminant removal pose a 
huge obstacle to converting countless disused sites in inner cities, so that such sites often 
go unused for decades, with severe consequences for the municipal structure, urban 
planning, and the image of the city.  In many monostructural industrial cities, extensive 
disused areas can even be found in the former city center.  In Germany alone there are 
currently forty billion square meters of sites awaiting conversion. (Lauinger, 2006, p.56) 
 
Thus, because of the legacy of industrialization, many older industrial cities find themselves 





The literature reveals that shrinkage is often a combination of two or more of these 
causes (Dabinett, 2005; Hall & Hall, 2008; Martinez-Fernandez & Wu, 2007).  Dabinett (2005) 
warns against oversimplifying the causes of shrinkage, stating that shrinkage may be a result of 
many events and processes.  For instance, with respect to shrinkage in Canada, Hall and Hall 
(2008) note that the disparities between growth and decline are “a result of economic 
restructuring, changing trade patterns, the concentration of immigrants in large metropolitan 
areas, and lower birth rates…” (p.6). Moreover, causes and effects are often linked in a 
downward spiral.  An example is a city that loses population because of loss of industrial or 
resource-based jobs, where the effects of shrinkage makes the city less attractive to new 
investors, leading to further decline (Beauregard, 2003).  Thus, the process of shrinkage is 
complex and multidimensional and as the causes of shrinkage are varied and complex, so too are 





As noted above, shrinkage can affect regions, cities, or parts of cities (Pallagst, 2005).  In 
the case of suburbanization in the United States, shrinkage can also be embedded in overall 
process of growth.  Of course, population decline is more extreme in some cases than in others 
(Leo & Brown, 2000).  As Leo and Brown (2000) state, “…in large metropolitan areas, modest 
population decline might well continue for some time without significantly affecting the 
character of the city or its degree of prosperity…” (p.196). Population decline also occurs at 
different rates.  In Canada, for instance, cities tend to decline quite slowly9 (Simmons & Bourne, 
 
9 According to Simmons & Bourne (2007), this slow rate of decline can be attributed to the fact that “there are 
powerful forces resisting the loss of population in small communities.  These include a variety of public assistance 
programs that encourage people to stay put, ranging from government transfers to municipalities, to the variety of 
social insurance available to individuals and families, as well as the weight of the financial and human capital 
already invested in a home, business or community that people are reluctant to write off.  Moving out is usually 
difficult, sometimes traumatic, and likely expensive” (p.18) 
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2007).  Thus, the effects of population decline vary case by case according to the circumstances 
surrounding it (Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 2006; Leo & Brown, 2000).  In addition, many of the 
effects of population shrinkage are still unknown (Strohmeier & Bader, 2004).  Keeping this in 





According to the literature, economic decline is both a cause and consequence of 
population decline.    A common characteristic of many shrinking cities is chronically high rates 
of unemployment (Andersen, 2005; Delken, 2007; Fassman, 2006b; Friedrichs, 1993; Ward, 
1999; Rybcznski & Linneman, 1999; Seasons, 2004; Foster, 2007; Jauhiainen, 2004; Bourne & 
Simmons, 2003). Foster (2007) describes the economic situation in Cape Breton, which has 
consistently lost population for 40 years:  
… [The] employment rate in March, 2007 was 44.9%. Based upon the size of our 
working age population, the region would have to create an additional 14,000 jobs to 
achieve the average rate of employment in Nova Scotia and an incredible 24,000 jobs to 
achieve the average rate of employment in the Halifax Regional Municipality. This 
provides some sense of the economic disparity that exists in our small province. (p.22) 
 
As Fassman (2006) explains, gainful employment has many positive effects: it “structures the 
lives of individuals, secures their income, and defines their position in society…  Employment is 
the anchor of every individual in the course of his or her life and in the structure of society” 
(p.74).  Being a shrinking city has serious and adverse long-term consequences for both the 
quantity and quality of employment in the city, including loss of highly-paid unionized jobs and 
the shift towards lower-paid, non-union jobs (Leadbeater, 2007).  High unemployment rates are 
often accompanied by high poverty rates (Rybcznski & Linneman, 1999) and a rise in the 
number of people on social assistance (Friedrichs, 1993). 
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Importantly, while the decline of the dominant industry or industries may be the 
precipitating cause of shrinkage and hence unemployment, the population loss itself may lead to 
further economic problems, accelerating population decline.  Shrinking cities often see reduced 
development activity (Seasons, 2004) and lack of investment (Simmons & Bourne, 2007) 
because of a lack of confidence in the area (Ward, 1999).  According to Beauregard (2003), 
absolute population loss results in a stigma for all cities that experience it:  
Absolute population loss is an unwanted event in the life of a city.  Even when it involves 
only a few households, it is a sign of declining attractiveness to investors and residents 
and of possible long-term stagnation.  When the numbers are large, the loss is traumatic.  
A steep drop-off reveals serious flaws in the processes of investment and migration that 
sustain a city and make it prosperous.  In a political economy where growth, particularly 
for civic leaders, has always been ideal, population loss – whether absolute or relative – 
is a stigma… (p.673) 
 
Friedrichs (1993) explains that this is especially true of urban economies dependent on 
one industry.  In these dominant industry towns, decline of dominant industry will extend to 
other firms and result in a negative image for the city, which will deter new companies from 
locating there.  Compounding this problem is the fact that shrinking cities have fewer funds to 
use to attract new industry (Friedrichs, 1993) at the very time where more funds are needed in 
the cut-throat competition for people and jobs (Mäding, 2004).  However, this disadvantage does 
not equally affect all sectors of the urban economy.  While shrinking cities may have trouble 
attracting new economy jobs in knowledge-based industries such as finance and business 
services, they seem to be able to retain and attract government jobs.  Indeed, according to 
Simmons (2003), in Canada, cities experiencing population decline attract almost 20 percent 
more government jobs: “Public agencies are much slower to respond to growth signals than the 
private sector, and they may also be unwilling to reduce employment in declining cities.  In fact, 
they may even try to reallocate public facilities to slow-growth areas” (Simmons, 2003, p.4). 
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As well, new businesses may be deterred from locating in shrinking cities because of the 
shrinking labour market (Jessen, 2006) that is also aging.  Younger and better educated people 
tend to leave shrinking cities (Friedrichs, 1993; Rieniets, 2005b; Simmons & Bourne, 2007), 
leaving behind a population that is generally older (Simmons, 2003; Simmons & Bourne, 2007) 
and less educated.  According to Friedrichs (1993), demographic aging results in the shrinking 
city losing creative potential that lowers chances for adapting to the new economy:  
Zero growth or even decline will result in a structure of the labour market characterised 
by a mismatch between the skills of the displaced workers and the skills required for the 
given employment opportunities. Hence, only a small percentage of those laid-off from 
the decline of manufacturing companies will qualify for the new jobs-for example, in 
banking, insurance or electronics-nor will most of them be willing to take an 
underqualified and low-paid job in the services, such as restaurants. This employment 
qualification mismatch has been documented for many cities in West Germany and the 
US. (Friedrichs, 1993, p.911) 
 
Hollbach-Grömig and Trapp (2006) agree that, in shrinking cities, skilled labour becomes scarce 
so the city becomes less attractive for new businesses, which may in turn accelerate population 
decline.  In Germany, for example, 
2015 will mark a turning point: the skilled labour will decrease significantly because of 
the declining population.  Even an increase in the employment rate for women and older 
people, a migration rate of about 200,000 persons per year, and shorter periods of 
education would be unable to stop this development. (Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 2006, 
p.13)   
 
Indeed, certain characteristics of dominant industry shrinking cities may further deter 
new economic activity, accelerating population decline.  For instance, new industry may be 
prevented from locating in these cities because of the high wages paid by the dominant industry 
(Friedrichs, 1993).  This is called “intrusive rentier syndrome” by Polèse and Shearmur (2006): 
high wage rates drive up local wage levels and they become an expectation, which makes it 
difficult for start-up businesses.  As well, Friedrichs (1993) explains that, in dominant-industry 
towns, as the dominant industry declines, the elite does not want to lose influence and tries to 
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maintain it, which reduces the city’s capability to accept new industries and reallocate resources.  
As Friedrichs (1993) states, “[t]he conservative strategy of the local elite, in turn, has two 
negative effects on the city's economy: the period of decline is prolonged, but decline not 
prevented and the city government's interest in attracting new industries is delayed and funds 
necessary for this purpose are not available” (p.912).  This has happened in cities in Ruhr Valley.  
In addition to industry elites, trade unions fight the decline of the industry.  Friedrichs (1993) 
gives the example of Detroit where, in 1981, the “Rational Reindustrialization” strategy, which 
proposed a shift away from the auto-related industry, failed because of opposition from industry 
leaders, unions, and city officials. 
Declining populations also means economic problems for the private sector, especially 
the retail sector (Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 2006; Lötscher et al., 2004) and the service sector, 
most notably real estate agencies (Simmons, 2003).  Quite simply, fewer residents consume 
fewer goods and services.  Moreover, population loss leads to more than just decline in market 
size.  It also leads to disinvestment and discourages new investment and enterprises: “As the 
population declines and the overall consumption of many services is reduced, existing stores are 
going to find themselves fighting for a shrinking market with few opportunities for rapid growth” 
(Simmons, 2003, p.6).  Businesses also find their investments diminishing in real value terms 
(Bourne & Simmons, 2003).  
It is important to note at this time that the literature indicates that a declining population 
does not always mean lagging economic growth in all shrinking cities (Franz, 2004).  In his 
study of the major cities of Eastern Germany, Franz (2004) finds “no concurrent demographic 
and economic decline” (p.1).  Despite having shrinking populations, many Eastern German cities 
recorded above average economic growth rates between 1994 and 1996.  In these cities, Franz 
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(2004) finds, instead, a pattern of economic growth without employment effects (which has term 
“jobless growth”).  For this reason, Franz (2004) cautions against the acceptance in all situations 
of the notion that a downward spiral occurs in shrinking cities, consisting of a “shrinking 
population, growing housing vacancies, urban decay, declining economic basis, diminishing 
attractiveness, growing outmigration.  Negative scenarios of this type can become self-
reinforcing and self-fulfilling prophecies” (p.2).  Franz (2004) admits that “there is no disputing 
that sections of the housing industry and municipal undertakings responsible for infrastructure in 
cities with vacant housing are suffering losses”(p.2).  However, he argues that it is not yet 
confirmed that the regional economy as a whole is being negatively influenced by population 
loss.  Some studies in Germany have found that population shrinkages does not always lead to a 
deterioration in income position, leading to the conclusion that the relationship between 
demographics and economics is more complex.  Certainly, the correlation in Eastern Germany 
may be looser for a number of reasons, including the fact that in Eastern Germany, many firms 
are closing the productivity gap, which leads to economic growth but not necessarily higher 
employment rates.  However, this looser correlation between demographics and economics may 
have more widespread application, for instance in areas where suburbanization is the major cause 
of shrinkage; that is, where the core loses population but the regional population remains stable 
or is growing.  In that case, Franz (2004) explains, the economic effects of shrinkage may be 
minimal.  This highlights the need to examine the issue on the level of the entire region:  
It might … be the case that population losses in a city have a statistical impact but no 
economic effect.  This is true of migration from cities to suburbs which involves a change 
in residential location but usually neither a change in job nor in consumer behaviour.  
Investigation within narrow administrative boundaries is inadequate in this regard.  It 
needs to include the complete urban region… This holds not only for residential 




Thus, different patterns of decline may have different effects on the economy.  In general, 
it appears that “a fall in population caused primarily by suburbanization appears to be less 
damaging to [economic] growth than a decline due mainly to the outmigration of younger 
carriers of high-quality human capital.” (Franz, 2004, p.7).  In addition, it is important to 
remember at this time that economic woes are not solely the domain of shrinking cities.  Indeed, 
there are also many problems associated with economic growth, as pointed out by Shearmur 
(2006):  
…in fact: economic growth – particularly when driven by elites… – puts pressure on 
poorer people.  The increased congestion and pollution that accompany fast growth often 
have, as first victims, the residents of poorer neighbourhoods.  Poor neighbourhoods that 
are attractive are rapidly gentrified.  Rising real estate prices put property ownership out 
of reach of many people. (p.38) 
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In shrinking cities, “…urban citizens are leaving empty cities behind them, and all that 
expensive urban infrastructure is going to waste” (Ward, 1999, p.248).  Population decline often 
leaves shrinking cities with unused or underutilized infrastructure (Allweil, 2007; Hollbach-
Grömig & Trapp, 2006; Kabisch, Haase, & Haase, 2006; Ritter, 2006; Sander, 2006; Seasons, 
2004; Moss, 2008).  This creates fiscal problems for shrinking cities (Rybczynski & Linneman, 
1999; Rieniets, 2005b; Friedrichs, 1993) which are facing a reduction in the tax base without a 
concomitant reduction in the amount of network-related infrastructures (such as water, sewer, 
and public transport) and social public infrastructures (such as schools, libraries, and swimming 
pools) which must be maintained at the same fixed costs (or even rising costs).  Certainly, as Leo 
and Brown (2000) assert, population decline “entails fiscal strain only if it brings with it both 
decline in revenues and the inability to reduce expenditures correspondingly” (p.195).  However, 
the bulk of the literature indicates that most shrinking cities are unable to reduce their 
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expenditures on infrastructure and services at a rate equal to population decrease.  As Hollbach-
Grömig and Trapp (2006) explain,  
…the financial burden per capita is actually rising [in shrinking cities] because 
municipalities find it difficult to reduce their services (especially as regards technical 
infrastructure facilities) at the same rate as that of population change, decline or ageing… 
On the other hand, elderly care facilities will have greater demand for their services and 
will need to expand.  These changing demands require high levels of investment to 
convert and modernize infrastructure and facilities for the elderly. (p.3) 
 
Similarly, Müller and Siedentop (2004), state that: 
…one thing is clear: the settlement structure of the future will entail greater resources and 
be more expensive.  The demolition and downsizing of redundant buildings and 
infrastructure cannot be achieved at a level proportionate to the fall in population… 
Maintaining and operating the building and infrastructure stock will have to be paid for 
by fewer and fewer residents.  The ‘shrinking city’ will doubtless be an expensive one. 
(p.7) 
 
Thus, with respect to maintaining infrastructure and services, population decline has resulted in 
many shrinking cities’ budgets being “pushed to the limit” (Rieniets, 2005b, p.7).  In fact, many 
shrinking cities are experiencing losses (Franz, 2004).  In Germany, for instance:  
Over the past decade, hardly any German city has been able to balance its budget.  
Investment, personnel, and volunteer activities have been dramatically reduced in recent 
years.  Although privatization and asset sales, not to mention increased borrowing have 
provided room for manoeuvre in the short term, the long-term economic capabilities of 
cities have been destroyed. (Reiss-Schmidt, 2006, p.3) 
 
As mentioned above, shrinking cities may face not just fixed infrastructure costs, but 
rising infrastructure costs.  Most of shrinking cities are older industrial cities and while there may 
be diminished expenditure on expanding infrastructure networks (Mäding, 2004), it is becoming 
more expensive to maintain the old infrastructure which is often in need of repair and 
replacement (Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999; Seasons, 2004; Rieniets, 2005b; Mäding, 2004).  
In addition, the population in shrinking cities is usually aging, so while fewer teachers and day 
care workers are needed and school rolls are falling (Ward, 1999; Simmons, 2003; Müller, 
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2004), more health care workers are required (Simmons, 2003) as the health care sector and 
other services for the elderly become more important (Simmons & Bourne, 2007; Mäding, 
2004).  Furthermore, as Mäding (2004) asserts, the growing number of people living in single 
person households requires more per capita spending on services.  In the end, the higher costs of 
operating and maintaining infrastructure in shrinking cities become, the harder it becomes to pass 
these costs on to the citizens who remain.  According to Müller (2004), “since durable utility 
systems are difficult to adapt to demographic developments, higher per capita spending is 
incurred, which is more and more difficult to pass on to the dwindling number of users” (p.1).  
As taxes are increased to compensate, this may accelerate population decline as mobile residents 
(particularly in growing regions) move out to the suburbs or (particularly in declining regions) 
out of the region altogether.   
Particularly with respect to hard infrastructure, Moss (2008) explains that in shrinking 
cities in Germany, 
…levels of consumption of water, in particular, are stagnating or falling, sometimes quite 
dramatically. Utility managers accustomed to expanding their physical networks to meet 
an ever-growing demand for water are in some areas having to confront an unfamiliar and 
unwelcome phenomenon: over-capacity in parts—or even across all — of their 
infrastructure network. In serious cases the drop in consumption is so great that it is 
causing major problems for the technical functioning and economic feasibility of 
infrastructure systems. (p.437) 
 
Koziol (2004) similarly explains that falling residential, commercial, and industrial demand for 
network-related infrastructure leads to lower network utilization levels which in turn “have a 
fundamental impact on the efficiency of operation” of infrastructure (p.3).  The effects of 
population shrinkage differ for each type of utility service (e.g. water, sewer, 
telecommunications, power supply), some of which are interdependent (e.g. water and sewer).  
For the drinking water network, decline in consumption can lead to bacterial aftergrowth because 
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of longer water retention times.  Declining water consumption can lead to reduction in sewage 
volumes, which can lead to sediment deposit, making it necessary to flush sewers frequently.  
With respect to heating, there can be condensation if the critical demand level is not reached.  
Reduction in supply leads to higher operating costs: “When the lines are too large, the system 
tends to become less efficient and more difficult to control” (Koziol, 2004, p.7).   
 With respect to transportation, both Koziol (2004) and Hollbach-Grömig and Trapp 
(2006) agree that population decline affects public and private transport (that is, traffic volume, 
trip purpose, modal choice, and spatial distribution of traffic volume).  According to Koziol, 
there can be both positive and negative effects.  On the private transportation side, fewer people 
means less traffic and fewer parking problems.  With respect to public transportation, however, 
municipalities have to pay more for upkeep of the road system and public transit systems “have 
to accept much lower utilization rates and cost-effectiveness when vacancy rates in the service 
area are high” (p.4). 
Koziol (2004) points out that, unfortunately, the anticipated positive ecological impacts 
of reduced consumption are minimal.  He states that “although falling consumption can generally 
be expected to ease burdens on the environment, i.e., to have a positive impact on resource 
consumption, in practice it can have negative ecological repercussions, e.g. by hampering the 
operation of network-related systems” (Koziol, 2004, p.8).  For example, corrosion of sewer 
shafts can contaminate groundwater and anaerobic transformation in pipe lines can lead to odour.  
Furthermore, the need for frequent pipe cleaning may thwart efforts to save water.  Thus, while 
there may be some positive effects with respect to reduced use of infrastructure in shrinking 
cities, especially in the area of transportation, the impacts on cost, efficiency, and the 






According to the literature, population decline affects a city’s land use patterns, leading 
to long-term changes in urban structures (Koziol, 2004).  As Kabisch, Haase, and Haase (2006) 
state, “...shrinkage, population losses and vacancies unhinge the balance of existing urban 
structures, and produce new patterns of cityscapes” (p.6).  Physically, a shrinking city loses 
density and ends up with an overly large footprint (Allweil, 2007; Andersen, 2005; Rybczynski 
& Linneman, 1999), with large empty open areas available.  The city of Leipzig in Germany was 
the first to coin the term “the perforated city” (Jessen, 2006).  This term is also used by Müller 
and Siedentop (2004) and Sander (2006) to describe the structure of shrinking cities which, as 
Andersen (2005) explains, is not traditional: “the city we previously thought of as a high density 
becomes a more open structure” (p.3).  Buildings are being torn down, in effect leading to 
“unbuilding” of the city (Andersen, 2005, p.5).  Andersen (2005) speaks of an “indescribable 
urbanism” in which cities like Detroit are becoming the suburb of their own suburbs.  In effect, 
the city is not a centre and periphery but a poly-nuclear structure, with enclaves connected 
through different networks. 
According to Hollander and Popper (2007), within the shrinking city there are a number 
of physical effects of population decline, including “derelict structures, vacant lots, underutilized 
properties, and changes to inferior land uses” (p.39).  Indeed, shrinking cities are often home to a 
large number of vacant properties, both residential and commercial (Allweil, 2007; Andersen, 
2005; Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999; Kabisch, Haase, & Haase, 2006; Krumholz, 2007; Dewar, 
2006; Schilling & Logan, 2008).  For example, the number of vacant properties in cities such as 
Baltimore, St. Louis, and Washington can number in the tens of thousands (Krumholz, 2007).  
As Allweil (2007) states, “…vacant plots, empty apartments, and gray and brown areas amount 
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in some cases to 70 percent of the municipal area.  The spread can be like an epidemic, causing a 
sharp drop in property values and a sense of helplessness among the remaining population” 
(p.91).  Schilling and Logan (2008) emphasize the market effects of vacant properties which 
deter further investment: “…An oversupply of urban vacant land depresses land prices, property 
values, and tax revenues…. Conventional market-based redevelopment policies to induce 
reinvestment are insufficient to reverse this imbalance and the cyclical nature of decay and 
disinvestment…” (p.452).  
In general, Andersen (2005) explains that “in some areas it is like living in a ghost town 
and it seems as an evil circle which is difficult to break” (p.2).  According to Rybczynski and 
Linneman (1999), this reduction in population density is problematic because it usually happens 
in an irregular manner, resulting in “irregular gaps in the urban density pattern” (p.36).  For 
example, with respect to commercial and retail land uses, while growing cities have more 
planned modern malls and industrial parks, shrinking cities have more “unplanned” clusters of 
retail in pedestrian and arterial strips, and dispersed stores (Simmons, 2003).  These gaps mean 
that the city is no longer continuous, with populated areas separated by unplanned and vacant 
areas, which is a problem because older cities are designed to operate most efficiently with 
mostly continuous densities of people:  
As depopulation occurs, not only does the provision of normal municipal services 
become more expensive (unplanned vacant space is expensive to secure and maintain) 
but there may no longer be a sufficient population base to support neighborhood social 
and retail activities in many areas. This results in services being further reduced, inducing 
those who can to move away. (Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999, p.37)  
 
This “thinning out” in turn creates lack of dynamism and reduced sense of safety, signalling the 
overall deterioration of the quality of life in shrinking cities (Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999; 
Rieniets, 2005b).  According to Rybcznski and Linneman (1999), the overall effects of the large 
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number of vacant properties in shrinking cities can be likened to the effects of a large number of 
vacant stores in a mall:  
A city that has lost much of its population has - to borrow a real-estate phrase - a high 
vacancy rate. When a shopping mall has a high vacancy rate, the owner suffers not only 
because of the lost revenue on the empty space but also because the overall vitality and 
attractiveness of the center's shopping experience is diminished. This, in turn, makes 
other tenants more likely to vacate, depressing rents on leased space. So, too, for a city 
with a high vacancy rate: It suffers not only a loss to its tax base but, unless it is 
successfully repositioned, it becomes a less attractive place to live and work. (p.35) 
 
Again, population decline does not necessarily lead to shrinkage of the physical space of 
the city (Rieniets, 2005b).  In fact, the city may continue to spread out through suburbanization 
of both residents and businesses.  As discussed above, many shrinking cities are embedded in 
regions of growth where shrinking inner cities are surrounded by growing, sprawling peripheries.  
This sprawl is “accompanied by the inverse densification of an urban settlement, a process that 
becomes more extreme when the total population of an urban region is no longer growing, but 
stagnating or even shrinking” (Hesse, 2006, p.96).  Indeed, according to Couch et al. (2005) and 
Nuissl and Rink (2005), even in shrinking urban regions, some shrinking cities are still 
sprawling.  This makes servicing such a city particularly problematic and it becomes more 
expensive to do so as the population thins out over a greater area (Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 
2006).  In the end, underutilized infrastructure drives cost of living in the suburbs up (Hollbach-
Grömig & Trapp, 2006; Müller & Siedentop, 2004).  Müller and Siedentop (2004) argue that, 
given that people are more mobile in shrinking cities where housing prices lower and there is 
more to choose from,10 the rise of the cost of living in the suburbs may motivate people to move 
back to more densely populated areas of the city such as the downtown.  However, Couch et al. 
 
10 Although this may be limited by Allwiel (2007) and Simmons & Bourne’s (2007) observation that people leave 





(2005) do not find that happening in their case study of two examples of sprawl in the context of 
decline –Liverpool and Leipzig –which leads them to conclude that downtowns are declining 
faster in these “expanding shrinking cities” than in growing cities. They argue that one specific 
characteristic of sprawl in declining regions is that it is a zero-sum game “in which new areas are 
developed at the expense of existing urban quarters” (Couch et al., 2005, p.118).  Both Liverpool 
and Leipzig have lost significant population, but they continue to sprawl beyond their borders.  
Interestingly, in both cities, it is not housing sector, but the commercial and industrial sectors that 
are sprawling.  The main reason for this is that local authorities are competing fiercely for 
investors and are in a weak bargaining position when it “comes to making decisions over these 
new developments” (Couch et al., 2005, p.129), particularly where they will locate.  They 
explain that 
in both cities, Liverpool and Leipzig, decline and the pressure to create additional jobs 
has led the planning system to offer weak resistance (and in some cases active support) to 
the sprawling of employment zones such as research and development facilities, but also 
big industrial fabrication plants, beyond the existing urban boundary. (Couch et al., 2005, 
p.131)   
 
Because of this sprawl, in both cities, downtown decline is aggravated because overall 
population is declining.  In the end, Couch et al. (2005) conclude that the effect of decline and 
sprawl is the emergence of a new, more complex pattern of urban structure, one that increasingly 
involves downtown decline.  Yamashita (2004) finds a similar pattern of downtown decline in 
the case of Saga, Japan, where, despite a shrinking population, businesses such as big box stores 
continue to locate in the suburbs. 
It is important to note that, in terms of land use, there are opportunities in shrinking cities.  
As Sander (2006) states, “the perforated city harbours risks like dilapidation, stagnation, and 
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loss; but it also offers opportunities and positive stimuli for development like adjustment to 
modern living requirements, ‘retreat’ from the urban fringe, more open spaces in the city” (p.3). 
Müller and Siedentop (2004) agree that population decline can have positive effects on land use 
within a shrinking city:  
It should not be forgotten that population decline can be an opportunity.  It can open the 
way to renewal and modernization (e.g., in competition, in urban development 
revitalization), it can offer opportunities for quality improvement (e.g., in the residential 
environment, for open space quality and local recreation, as well as for the near-natural 
landscapes) and provide and incentive to mobilize the endogenous resources or regions 
(e.g., new economic sectors and initiatives). (p.10) 
 
Sander (2006) argues that population shrinkage opens up new opportunities for land uses 
because of the decline of manufacturing: 
The decline of the manufacturing sector and the simultaneous growth in tertiarization 
release major land resources in cities and create new possibilities for economic activities 
in existing areas – either through demolition and new construction or through the 
conversion of existing buildings in attractive inner-city locations. (p.5) 
 
Members of the Cleveland Shrinking Cities Institute (2007) also assert that shrinking cities 
present opportunities to reclaim vacant land.  Thus, although population decline poses many 
challenges to land use in shrinking cities, it also presents opportunities, especially the 




One type of land use is “particularly affected” by population shrinkage (Sander, 2006, p.3) 
and thus warrants special attention: housing (Martinez-Fernandez & Wu, 2006).  In shrinking 
cities, there tends to be a large number of vacant houses and apartments (Allweil, 2007; Kabisch, 
Haase, & Haase, 2006; Koziol, 2004; Rieniets, 2005b; Sander, 2006; Mace et al., 2007).  In 
recent years, German shrinking cities, for instance, have become home to an unprecedented 
number of vacant houses and apartments (Rieniets, 2005b).  As well, in Detroit, there is an 
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“unfathomably large amount of vacant land” (Amborst, D’Oca, & Theodore, 2007, p.9).  Since it 
started to decline 50 years ago, 40,000 lots have reverted to City ownership and one-third of all 
properties in Detroit are tax delinquent.  Because Detroit’s building block is 30 foot by 100 foot 
single family lots, most of the lots that have reverted are single-family lots next to occupied 
homes, so they are not very appealing for developers and thus have low market value (Amborst, 
D’Oca, & Theodore, 2007).   
In general, the large number of vacant properties negatively affects the houses that 
remain occupied in two major ways.  First, the drop in demand for housing in shrinking cities 
(Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 2006; Jessen, 2006; Müller, 2004; Sander, 2006; Krumholz, 2007) 
has meant that investments in housing diminish in real value terms (Bourne & Simmons, 2003) 
and property prices fall (Jessen 2006; Ward, 1999).  In fact, in some areas, there is virtually no 
demand for housing (Ward, 1999), which, in shrinking cities, tends to be older (Simmons, 2003).  
Second, although Delken (2007) has found that overall satisfaction with life appears to not be 
lower in German shrinking cities than in growing cities and that satisfaction with several aspects 
of urban life actually appears to be higher in shrinking cities, many researchers have concluded 
that the large number of vacant properties negatively affects the general quality of life in the 
neighbourhoods in which the vacancies are located.  As Hollander and Popper (2007) state, 
“because a house is not an island, the conditions of nearby housing stock, roads, and utilities can 
affect its future tremendously” (p.39).  According to Ryczynski and Linneman (1999) vacant 
buildings lower quality of urban life.  Many vacant buildings are burned and collapse; some 
vacant lots become dumps.  This decay in turn causes further disintegration.  Hollbach-Grömig 
and Trapp (2006) agree with this conclusion and also comment on the effects that an aging 
population has on the housing market in shrinking cities: 
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shrinking means empty buildings and shops, falling property prices and frequent 
vandalism in derelict areas.  Ageing challenges municipalities as well as private investors 
and housing companies to offer housing options and neighbourhoods adapted to the 
requirements of an ageing society; e.g., lifts instead of stairways, neighbourhoods with 
services the day-to-day needs (health care, shopping facilities) of elderly and disabled 
people. (p.12) 
Thus, at the same time that existing housing is being negatively affected by population decline, 
housing and neighbourhoods also need to be upgraded to meet the needs of an ageing society. 
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In addition to leading to issues with the economy, infrastructure and services, land use, 
and housing, several researchers argue that population decline leads to other problems in 
shrinking cities, particularly social issues such as drug problems (Andersen, 2005), poorer 
schools (Andersen, 2005), lack of social control (Ward, 1999), anti-social behaviour (Ward, 
1999) and fear of crime11 (Ward, 1999).  Strohmeier and Bader (2004) speak of deteriorating 
social conditions in traditional working class neighbourhoods because of lack of jobs in heavy 
industry and the security associated with them.  Lötscher et al. (2004) argue that the gap between 
rich and poor is increasing in shrinking cities.  Krumholz (2007) similarly argues that areas 
where the central city is declining and suburbs are growing in United States have high regional 
socioeconomic inequality: 
Regional socioeconomic inequality is high in the U.S. compared with other industrial 
democracies. Differences are nearly always presented in terms of central city/suburban 
disparities, with striking rates of poverty, unemployment and inequality of opportunity in 
central cities. This pattern differs from trends in many Canadian and European cities 
where urban gentrification is common and lower-income families are losing access to 
central city neighbourhoods. (p.31) 
 
In particular, declining central cities and inner suburbs tend to be home disproportionately to low 
income African American populations (Krumholz, 2007), which has roots in the “white flight” 
 
11 Although, as Rybcznski & Linneman (1999) explain, crime rates are similar (and high) for both large shrinking 
and large growing cities.  Crime rates are only slightly higher in large shrinking cities. 
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mentioned above which originally led to population and jobs dispersing out of central cities.  
According to Krumholz (2007), in these central cities, infrastructure is obsolete and in many 
areas zoning laws and building standards limit housing for low income minorities.  Rieniets 
(2005b) and Allweil (2007) argue that, in addition to the social aspects of shrinkage, population 
decline can also cause “cultural” shrinkage as many important aspects of local society begin to 
disappear.   
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The effects of population decline are diverse and varied, and they are often dictated by 
the causes of the population decline which are, as seen above, also diverse and varied. This 
complex environment presents a significant challenge to planners in shrinking cities.  While 
many of the effects are clearly undesirable – such as water and sewer system overcapacity and an 
abundance of vacant houses – the literature indicates that the effects of population decline are not 
always negative.  For example, as Rybcznski and Linneman (1999) state: 
Is population loss always a bad thing for a city? We think not. Cities with more than a 
million inhabitants were rare before the twentieth century. There is no reason to assume 
that a smaller city is worse than a large one. In fact, an argument can be made that when a 
city is smaller it is also more human in scale, more livable, less anonymous, with a more 
manageable and responsive government. (pp. 34-35) 
 
Houston et al. (2008) point out that a city with a declining population may have some positive 
effects such as reducing demands on public services.  However, the bulk of the literature seems 
to subscribe to the notion that population decline is generally not a positive occurrence in the life 
of a city.  Indeed, Houston et al. (2008) go on to agree with the literature cited above that 
shrinkage is not likely to benefit a city’s economy and indeed the loss of population “…in some 
circumstances may be economically damaging” (p.134).  Thus, most researchers seem to be in 
agreement with Seasons (2007) assertion that, if left unaddressed in a proper manner, “decline 
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can create destabilizing economic, fiscal, social and environmental impacts that can compromise 
a community’s quality of life and viability” (p.6).  Importantly, however, all is not lost in cities 
experiencing population decline: while acknowledging the negative impacts, most shrinking 
cities researchers also argue that, with skillful planning aimed at minimizing the challenges, the 
positive effects of shrinkage can be capitalized upon and the negative consequences can be 
turned into opportunities.  It is to the literature on effective planning practices in shrinking cities 











As might be expected, the diverse causes and effects of shrinkage outlined in Chapter 2 
have enormous implications for urban planning which, in this thesis, I broadly interpret to 
include land-use, economic, social, and environmental planning.  Irurah, Park & Yeang (2005) 
caution that “… in the future shrinking cities might cause more urban problems than expanding 
ones” (p.158).  Andersen (2005) similarly argues that since shrinkage is increasingly becoming a 
worldwide phenomenon, urban planners in a growing number of cities will need to be prepared 
to deal proactively with the effects of urban population decline: “The shrinking cities 
phenomenon has to be incorporated into the general assumptions about the contemporary city 
and maybe the understanding of the city needs to be updated in some areas…” (p.1).  Indeed, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the “hallmark” of the geography of capitalism is “uneven development;” 
that is, a system of growing and declining cities and regions.  The implication of this seems to be 
that if capitalism is here to stay, so is the phenomenon of urban shrinkage.    
Fortunately, there is general agreement amongst shrinking cities researcher that rather 
than ignoring the issue or blindly pursuing growth that is unlikely to happen, urban planners can 
play a constructive role in improving the quality of life of residents in cities experiencing long-
term shrinkage.  In short, in the context of global forces beyond their control, planners can effect 
positive change in shrinking cities with skilful planning aimed at minimizes the challenges and 
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capitalizing upon the opportunities presented by population decline. Researchers such as 
Rybczynski and Linneman (1999) see shrinkage as an opportunity for cities to “…reinvent 
themselves, becoming better cities…” (p.38). Pallagst (2005) explains that in planning for 
population decline, local governments play a “crucial” role.  As Rieniets (2005b) acknowledges, 
planners cannot reverse shrinkage, but they can shape the effects to the best ends possible:  
[u]rban planning has never generated urban growth, but rather enables and controls it by 
means of planning. Likewise, urban planning can hardly stimulate the opposite process—
shrinkage—nor can it reverse it. However, it can guide the process to the best urban 
solutions possible. (p.6) 
 
Indeed, some researchers view the importance of skilful urban planning in the context of 
population decline as even greater than the importance of planning in the context of growth.  
According to Müller and Siedentop (2004), “…downsizing and redevelopment have to rely on 
coordinated planning in much greater measure than growth and expansion.” (p.8) Shrinking 
cities researchers also agree that these efforts will be more effective if local officials in cities that 
are likely to experience long-term population decline are proactive and do not wait until the 
decline has progressed to an advanced stage.   
 Unfortunately, as noted in Chapter 1, despite the growing need to find urban planning and 
policy solutions which address the issues associated with population decline, this issue remains 
for planners and planning academics alike, as Seasons (2007) describes it, the “policy elephant in 
the living room” (p.6).  According to him, shrinking cities face enormous challenges that 
…require responses based on sound decisions.  However, we know much less about 
planning for and managing place decline than we know about growth management.  It is 
time to develop appropriate responses to the place decline reality. (Seasons, 2007, p.6) 
 
The policy elephant that is shrinking cities remains largely unacknowledged in practice: Ritter 
(2006) found that while 70 percent of mayors in German cities view the implications of 
demographic change as very serious, less than one third have answers ready.  According to 
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Simmons and Bourne (2007), “[a]t present, most communities at risk of decline are in a state of 
denial” (p.21).  As Rieniets (2005b) explains, this lack of forethought is problematic: 
…architects und urban planners are usually confronted with urban shrinkage at a time 
when the process of decline has already reached an advanced stage: empty apartments, 
debilitated infrastructures, and public budgets pushed to the limit. Architects and urban 
planners then find themselves in a position where they can only react to the given 
circumstances rather than draw up plans for future developments. Therefore, in the same 
way traditional urban planning usually operates on the assumption of urban growth, cities 
that are expected to lose population in the long run need to be planned in advance. Only if 
foresighted plans are implemented can shrinking cities be designed in the most effective 
and sustainable way. (pp.6-7) 
 
Even in the emerging shrinking cities literature, the discussion of how best to plan in shrinking 
cities remains fragmented and is usually presented as an afterthought to a discussion on the 
causes and effects of population decline in specific cases.  In addition, when the issue of 
planning in the context of population decline is discussed, it is largely focused on planning for 
the physical effects of urban shrinkage (for instance, vacant buildings).  Shrinking cities 
researchers are only beginning to address the issue of how planners can be most effective in 
shrinking cities.  In this chapter, I have assembled the fragmented discussions about planning in 
the context of population decline from shrinking cities researchers (supplemented by other 
bodies of literature that deal with aspects of planning in the context of decline, including urban 
regeneration and strategic planning) into four general principles for good planning practice in the 
context of population decline, namely: 
 Planners must leave behind the assumption of future growth;
 Planners must use processes that are more strategic, with an emphasis on citizen 
participation;
 Planners must adopt a balanced approach in addressing the physical, economic, 
environmental and social needs of the community; and 
 Planners must change the role they play in the community. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, these four principles incorporate established aspects of good 
planning in all cities – growing and shrinking.  For instance, while good planning in shrinking 
cities requires that planners take on different roles (for example, manager of the decline process) 
than those undertaken in the context of growth., existing planning processes increasingly used in 
the context of growth (namely strategic planning) remain useful and in fact take on heightened 
importance in the context of population decline. However, what is different about these 
principles in the context of population decline is the fact that shrinking cities researchers see the 
use of them as necessary for improving the quality of life in shrinking cities despite the lack of 
population growth.  The bulk of the literature discussing planning in the context of population 
decline has heretofore presented population decline as a “failure” and prescribed growth as “the 
cure.”  In the shrinking cities literature, the “cure” is presented as the ability to minimize the 
challenges of population decline and capitalize on the opportunities through the use of “good 
planning” principles.  Only this will improve quality of life, not growth.    At the conclusion of 









The clearest recommendation from shrinking cities researchers is that urban planners in 
shrinking cities need to leave behind the assumption of the likelihood (and, indeed, necessity) of 
future population growth (Couch et al., 2005; Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999; Grossman, 2004; 
Hollander & Popper 2007; Kitchen, 2003; Cleveland Shrinking Cities Institute, 2007; Leo & 
Anderson, 2006; Hollbach-Grömig & Trapp, 2006; Müller & Siedentop, 2004; Müller, 2004; 
Andersen, 2005; Polèse & Shearmur, 2003 and 2006; Bourne & Simmons, 2003; Simmons & 
Bourne, 2007; Martinez-Fernandez & Wu, 2007).  In shrinking cities, planners need to let go of 
the ultimate goal of attracting future growth and instead must tailor their policies to realistic 
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demographic prospects. As Andersen (2005) states, “…urban planners and designers have been 
so used to growth and how to handle growth when they are planning that the goal for the city, 
automatically, becomes growth and development” (p.3).   However, focusing on attracting future 
growth when it is unlikely is not only inefficient, but may prove detrimental to urban 
development in the long run.  Indeed, strategies to attract future growth may divert much-needed 
resources in shrinking cities away from more pressing issues and may end up wasting scarce 
resources (Shearmur, 2006; Allweil, 2007; Mäding, 2004; Wiechmann, 2007a and b). 
 For instance, Mäding (2004) explains that every shrinking city seems to have a local 
economic development policy to increase the attractiveness of the city to industry and they also 
seem to all pursue policies to maximize the attractiveness of the city to potential in-migrants.  
However, in Mäding’s opinion, this type of “cut-throat,” expenditure-side competition for 
residents is dangerous because “…for a given total population, each individual can win only to 
the cost of others” (p.14).  Wiechmann (2003) argues in the European context that focusing on 
attracting growth “…is risky, because on a European scale population decrease in many (if not 
most) cities is inevitable in the coming decades.  Undoubtedly there is a danger that growth 
targeted strategies expend substantial resources for investors that will never come” (p.19). 
Leo and Brown (2000) similarly caution that 
[a]t a minimum, our analysis suggests strongly that the desire to be in the ‘major leagues’ 
or at least to act as if a city is in that league, puts serious obstacles in the way of rational 
policy-making.  Few communities will drastically alter their growth rate; no matter how 
much money they spend on infrastructure or economic development.  Policies pitched to 
a city’s actual circumstances will serve it better.” (p.210) 
 
Furthermore, Shearmur and Polèse (2007) explain that the continued focus on achieving 
unattainable growth may have a negative effect on the morale of local officials:  
Policies aimed at growth – particularly if it is employment growth that is being sought – 
are very likely to fail. Repeated failures discredit development policies and lead to 
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burnout amongst development officers and planners. Instead, policies should be geared 
towards qualitative changes and managing the decline. (p.36) 
 
Polèse and Shearmur (2006) emphasize that the core premise that a region can “grow” again if it 
correctly organizes itself is ill-suited to the needs of shrinking communities.  
 Growth policies pursued where growth is unlikely to happen are particularly detrimental 
to the physical structure of shrinking cities.  Several shrinking cities researchers point out that, 
given the physical effects of population decline including oversized infrastructure (which 
becomes more expensive to maintain and operate for fewer people) and a “perforation” of the 
urban structure (which tends to lead particularly to downtown decline), instead of continuing to 
allow a city to sprawl outwards thereby exacerbating those issues, urban planners in shrinking 
cities need to shift their mindset towards consolidation and downsizing (Couch et al., 2005; 
Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999).  As Couch et al. (2005) explain in the context of a discussion of 
sprawling, shrinking cities in Europe: 
Given that little demographic growth is to be expected in Europe in the foreseeable 
future, declining cities like Liverpool and Leipzig should not anticipate a return to their 
former importance and place in the urban hierarchy.  The past has shown that efforts to 
attract (and subsidize) industrial investors and to develop big infrastructural facilities 
with public money, which have taken place in both cities, could not stop – let alone 
reverse – the decline.  Besides, since most of these investments have been located on the 
urban periphery they often have changed the functional structure of the urban space to the 
further detriment of the inner city.  Hence, urban policy making and planning will have to 
concentrate on the organization of shrinking and redevelopment. (pp.133-134) 
 
Hollbach-Grömig and Trapp (2006) similarly explain that 
Demographic changes generate differing spatial planning requirements in prosperous or 
stable regions and in shrinking regions.  Spatial planning in prosperous regions and cities, 
like the metropolitan areas of Helsinki, Frankfurt, Munich, Comunidad Valenciana or 
Madrid, may still function under the traditional premise of ‘growth allocation.’  … In 
shrinking regions and cities, by contrast, urban density … needs to be sustained or 
reconfigured.  Usually, shrinking implies a decrease in population density.  A 
consequence of this development is the underutilization of infrastructure.  Spatial 
planning has to employ tools to keep … infrastructure functioning and (more or less) 
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cost-efficient and to develop measures to increase the attractiveness of a city and region. 
(pp.11-12) 
 
Thus, especially in the realm of spatial planning, the idea of growth as the ultimate “goal” of 
planning needs to be left behind.  So, the question becomes: if population growth should not be 
the goal in shrinking cities, what should be?   
 Shrinking cities researchers argue that instead of focusing on attracting new residents, 
urban planners need to direct their attention inward, to maintaining and indeed improving the 
quality of life of those who remain (Rybczynski & Linneman, 1999; Popper & Popper, 2002; 
Grossman, 2004; Allweil, 2007; Müller & Siedentop, 2004; Polèse & Shearmur, 2003; 
Andersen, 2005).  According to Grossman (2004), the success of a city should be measured not 
by its population or economic growth, but by the quality of life it provides: 
The growth paradigm as a cultural pattern has translated into routines of perception and 
action.  Such a routine of action is the town planning which sees itself as designing by 
means of steering growth.  Another routine of perception is the measuring of successes in 
the competition of cities by spectacular construction projects, economic benchmarks and 
not least by great events.  According to a change of paradigm in the direction of 
sustainability these categories could be replaced by categories of quality of life. (p.22) 
 
While focusing on quality of life is not (or, at least, should not be) a goal which applies to only 
shrinking cities, the fact that a city that is declining in population can still offer a high quality of 
life (and that, in fact, there are opportunities that come from a smaller population) may be a new 
concept for many planners. Importantly, Rybczynski and Linneman (1999) remind us that 
historically, many European cities have gone through periods of decline and yet they still provide 
residents with a high quality of life.  For instance, Vienna is now about 20 percent smaller than 
its zenith before World War One.  To them, cities like Vienna provide a “critical lesson” that 
“…a smaller city can be made a good place to live. Using these cities as role models, the 
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question for shrinking cities is not, ‘How can we grow big again?’ but rather, ‘How can we 
prosper and have a wonderful, smaller city?’” (pp.39-40)   
 In focusing on building on existing assets and improving the quality of life of those who 
remain (that is, in focusing their attention and efforts inward, rather than outward), shrinking 
cities researchers argue that urban planners in shrinking cities will begin to see the opportunities 
associated with population decline.  Kabisch, Haase, and Haase (2006) explain that  
[u]rban policy makers are challenged [in shrinking cities] – the paradigm of growth has to 
be replaced also in practice-related thinking and in developing new strategic goals for 
urban futures, treating shrinkage not only as a menace but also as a chance for reshaping 
urban spaces. (p.1) 
 
In short, urban planners in shrinking cities, in leaving behind the quest for growth, will see that 
smaller is (or at least can be) better.  Rybczynski and Linneman (1999) and Popper and Popper 
(2002) recognize the difficulty planners will face in changing their mindset to “smaller can be 
better” given that planning has always had a bias towards growth.  Despite the challenges, 
Popper and Popper (2002) propose that planners adopt an approach they call “smart decline,” 
which involves “…leaving behind the assumptions of growth and finding alternatives to it.  In 
particular, smart decline requires thinking about who and what remains.  It may entail 
reorganizing or eliminating some services and providing different ones…” (pp.2-3). Again, they 
acknowledge that   
[d]ecline planning strategies are often controversial and difficult.  But they have the 
virtue of acknowledging the reality, persistence, and effects of population decline.  Such 
a recognition is a necessary first step that allows planners to think creatively and 
practically about smart decline, just as they do about smart growth. (Popper & Popper, 
2002, p.4) 
 
Hollander and Popper (2007), in outlining their Reverse Land Use Allocation Model for 
predicting where future decline will happen in shrinking cities, emphasize that planners (with the 
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help of local residents) will find opportunity in adopting a mindset that is not based solely on 
attracting future growth:  
What are other possible successor land uses to the housing units which will be left 
behind, besides abandoned buildings and vacant lots? What else can become of the 
homes left behind? What can the existing vacant lots become? If we can expect residents 
to abandon housing units in the blocks from Seventh to Tenth Street along Vine Avenue, 
what would early neighbourhood intervention accomplish? Can we convert those entire 
blocks into community gardens, into an urban forestry project, into a baseball field, into a 
human-made lake? The options are as unlimited as the imaginations of local residents – 
and planners can help realize them. (p.40) 
 
Andersen (2005) similarly argues that, in focusing inward on the quality of life of remaining 
residents, planners will find new value in abandoned spaces and will learn to work creatively 
with the open structures of a shrinking city.  Schilling and Logan’s (2008) proposed model for 
“right-sizing” America’s shrinking cities is based largely on downsizing shrinking cities in a way 
that recognizes the potential of abandoned properties: “With an abundance of vacant properties, 
these shrinking cities provide fertile ground for neighborhood-scale and citywide greening 
strategies that can revitalize urban environments, empower community residents, and stabilize 
dysfunctional markets” (p.451). 
 Thus, shrinking cities researchers suggest that, in terms of planning goals in shrinking 
cities, the ultimate focus should not be on planning for future growth, but instead planning to 
improve the quality of life for the residents that remain.  In other words, the focus of planners 
needs to shift from the external to the internal.  Again, while the goal of planning for quality of 
life is a laudable goal in both growing and shrinking cities, recognizing that there are 
opportunities that come with population decline will require that planners adopt a new way of 
thinking in shrinking cities.  Especially in the realm of physical planning, leaving behind the 
mindset of growth may lead to planners addressing the negative effects of population decline in 
creative ways that ultimately result in a “smaller being better” way of thinking.  Of course, 
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shrinking cities researchers also acknowledge that this will be a difficult transition for planners, 
requiring them to make many difficult choices.  However, this change in mindset is seen as an 












So how is planning for improving the quality of life of remaining residents in shrinking 
cities to be achieved?  The answer lies in a planning process which is increasingly being used by 
cities in all demographic circumstances – growing or shrinking: strategic planning, which places 
an emphasis on citizen participation.  Müller (2004) explains that, in shrinking cities, “[p]lanning 
is to be understood as strategic and as the management of shrinkage processes” (p.3).  Reiss-
Schmidt (2006) agrees that population decline requires a new response from planners, one of 
strategic, proactive “urban development management” (p.2).  Kühn (2007) explains that elements 
of strategic planning play a key role in the transformation and regeneration of urban areas.  As 
discussed in the following section, the theory of urban regeneration is based on the premise that 
balanced, qualitative development in shrinking cities is best achieved using strategic planning 
processes (Kühn, 2007).  More specifically, Roberts (2000) and Carter (2000) both emphasize 
that declining cities seeking to regenerate need to do so using strategies which are based on a 
comprehensive and integrated vision, one that balances the physical, economic, environmental, 
and social needs of a community.  Again, shrinking cities usually have shrinking resources 
(Hutter & Neumann, 2008); discrete strategies based on a longer-term comprehensive and 
integrated vision allows these communities to invest their limited resources where they are likely 
to have the most effect: 
Conventional, all-encompassing master plans are often impossible to fund and usually 
divorced from the need for solutions to pressing urban problems.  As municipalities 
struggle to become more effective and efficient in their functioning in the light of 
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increasingly scarce resources, strategic planning with its selective, action-oriented, 
partnership approach can help to identify priorities and to mobilise resources to address 







A large body of literature exists on strategic planning in various disciplines, including 
planning and business studies, a detailed review of which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
However, it is worthwhile illuminating from this literature exactly what is meant by “strategic 
planning.”  In fact, there is no uniform conception of strategic spatial planning (Kühn, 2006), but 
for the most part the definitions given in the literature are similar to Roberts’ (2000) description 
of strategic planning in the context of urban regeneration (see above).  Albrechts (2006), for 
instance, defines strategic spatial planning as “…a transformative and integrative, (preferably) 
public-sector-led…sociospatial…process through which a vision, coherent actions, and means 
for implementation are produced that shape and frame what a place is and what it might become” 
(p.1152).  To Hutter and Wiechmann (2005), strategic spatial planning is “…“…a social process 
for coordinating actors and institutions in fragmented, uncertain environments in order to 
empower and motivate key stakeholders and to provide a decision framework for the 
management of spatial change” (p.2). In general, Albrechts (2006) explains that strategic 
planning is different from comprehensive planning primarily in its selectivity; that is, strategic 
planning focuses on certain projects which are chosen based on an overall vision.  In contrast, 
comprehensive planning involves “…the integration of nearly everything” into technical or legal 
regulations (p.1149).  Kühn (2006) explains that strategic planning “…attempts to find a third 
way between the large master plan and small steps” (p.331).  To Wiechmann (2003), strategic 
planning is different from comprehensive planning in that it places emphasis not only on a 
formal output, but on a decision framework.  It is a social process where a range of actors get 
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together to design a plan-making process and develop strategies. In other words, what is 
important in strategic planning is the process, while comprehensive planning is about product.  
To him, “…[m]ore important than the plan itself is what involved actors learn when they engage 
in a strategic planning process…” (Wiechmann, 2008b, p.6).  Plans may be forgotten; what is 
important is what is learned in the process of forming them. 
+%6&#& # $$# ($#)

$






Strategic planning is increasingly being incorporated into the planning processes in 
growing cities; however, according to the shrinking cities literature, there are several 
characteristics of strategic planning which, according to the literature, make it particularly useful 
for planning in shrinking cities.  First, strategic planning is based largely on the need for long-
term thinking through the creation of long-range visions (Albrechts, 2006; Kühn, 2006; 
Sartorio, 2005).  The creation of a vision upon which subsequent policies and projects are based 
is the first key step in strategic spatial planning process.  In short, the vision provides the 
framework for action.  According to Kühn (2006), the vision plays “…an important role in 
creating consensus and guiding activities for a shared future when integrating various actors and 
departments…” (p.330). Kühn (2006) further points out that it is vitally important that there is a 
connection between projects and visions in strategic planning.  Unfortunately, there is often a 
gap between the two.  Kühn (2006) illustrates this in his study of two East German shrinking 
cities: Cottbus, which has failed to translate vision into action and Gorlitz, which has undertaken 
projects in the absence of a vision anchored in local consensus.  According to him, both are 
unlikely to succeed in the long term because of the lack of a link between vision and action. 
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Importantly, the literature emphasizes that the vision should balance the social, physical, 
economic, and environmental needs of present and future generations (Narang & Reutersward, 
2006; Roberts, 2000; Carter, 2000).  This is in contrast to comprehensive planning, which 
Albrechts (2006) argues is usually based on a particular, more short-term time-frame.  This 
emphasis on long-term thinking and visioning how a city could be or should be is particularly 
useful in shrinking cities where residents and local officials alike may be used to focusing on the 
negatives associated with shrinkage, rather than the opportunities.  Strategic planning may 
inspire residents and planners to innovate (Sartorio, 2005); for instance, they may think more 
creatively what the vacant lots in their neighbourhood could become and, on a broader scale, 
how “smaller can be better.”  Successful planning in shrinking cities requires vision and inspires 
creativity; thus, strategic planning’s use of visioning as a first step towards creating effective and 
innovative strategies is particularly useful in shrinking cities.   
 This leads to the second characteristic of strategic planning that is particularly important 
for shrinking cities: that of inclusiveness (Albrechts, 2006; Narang & Reutersward, 2006; 
Sartorio, 2005).  Strategic planning dictates that all relevant actors must be included in a 
meaningful way.  Albrechts (2006) explains that this is different from participation in traditional 
master planning: 
In most traditional spatial planning the focus is clearly on producing a plan, and public 
involvement is mainly end-of-the-line. In strategic spatial planning the plan is just one 
vehicle amongst others with the purpose of producing change. As spatial planning has 
almost no potential for concretizing strategies, strategic spatial planning involves relevant 
actors needed for their substantive contribution, their procedural competences, and the 
role they might play in acceptance, in getting basic support, and in providing legitimacy. 
(p.1163) 
 
The inclusive nature of strategic planning is important for shrinking cities (Allweil, 2007; Reiss-
Schmidt, 2006; Sander, 2006; Hutter & Neumann, 2008; Kühn, 2006 and 2007), which may lack 
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the resources to develop and implement strategies on their own and which have to rely on a wide 
range of actors to both lend their expertise, ideas, and efforts in developing and implementing 
strategies.  As Sander (2006) explains, there is a need to intensify participatory requirements and 
civic engagement in shrinking cities, “which generates identification and thus quality” (p.12). 
Given the general sense of apathy towards top-down planning approaches in many shrinking 
cities, including all parties in meaningful and creative ways in developing and implementing 
strategies to improve their city may generate a feeling of excitement about a city’s future which 
is beneficial in and of itself.  It cannot be emphasized enough that in order for strategic planning 
processes in shrinking cities to be truly inclusive, participation must be meaningful and open, 
“…fostering a fair balance between the interests of various social and age groups, and between 
women and men.” (Reiss-Schmidt, 2006, p.6).  Plans may be labelled as “strategic,” but if they 
do not involve meaningful participation, they are not true strategic plans.  As Wiechmann (2003) 
explains, this seems to be the case of the planning document adopted in 2000 in Newcastle which 
was called a strategic plan, but whose contents were “…elaborated inside the city administration 
by working groups and were provided top down” (p.8).   Thus, true strategic plans need to be 
inclusive.  It is worthwhile to note at this stage, however, Hutter and Schanze’s (2008) caution 
that not all aspects of strategic planning may lend themselves to broad-based consensus-building.  
Thus, planners need to decide which aspects of strategic planning call for broad stakeholder 
involvement and which call for the inclusion of external experts in a more technical discussion. 
 Next, the selective nature of strategic planning is important for shrinking cities.  
According to Albrechts (2006), while comprehensive planning attempts to develop policies on 
nearly everything, strategic planning is 
…oriented to issues that really matter.  Indeed, budgetary constraints and a lack of 
institutional capacity make it impossible to do everything that needs to be done. 
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`Strategic' implies that some decisions and actions are considered more important than 
others and that much of the process lies in making the tough decisions about what is most 
important for the purpose of producing fair, structural responses to problems, challenges, 
aims, and aspirations. (p.1155) 
 
As noted above, financial and human resources are often scarce in shrinking cities.  As such, it is 
virtually impossible for these cities to address all of their issues at the same time.  Through 
strategic planning, shrinking cities can prioritize projects based on which are most pressingly 
needed to accomplish the long-term vision for the city.  Planners can also focus their energy and 
resources on issues they can actually do something about (Hutter, Schanze, & Wirth, 2008).  In 
fact, as Kühn (2006) explains, “…[s]trategic projects are called ‘key projects’ when their effects 
are intended to radiate outward.  In the case of regeneration of shrinking cities, these effects are 
often expected to spread geographically (metastasizing) or accelerate in time (catalyzing)” 
(p.330). 
 In addition, the process of strategic planning is context-specific (Albrechts, 2006; Hutter, 
Schanze, & Wirth, 2008; Sartorio, 2005), which is helpful in shrinking cities for two main 
reasons.  First, as mentioned in Chapter 2, cities shrink in different ways and for different 
reasons, so the fact that strategic planning principles are flexible enough to take these different 
circumstances into account is useful.  Secondly, on a more fundamental level, the fact that 
strategic planning processes must be tailored to the specific circumstances and needs of the 
community in itself reinforces for shrinking cities the fact that context is important in planning 
processes.  That is, in choosing the most appropriate way to carry out strategic planning in their 
communities, planners in shrinking cities will need to take into account, among other things, the 
city’s specific realities, including the likelihood of long-term population decline.  In addition to 
being context-specific in terms of process, strategic planning emphasizes the need for a realistic 
examination of context in the development of long-term visions and strategies (Hutter & 
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Schanze, 2008; Hutter, Schanze, & Wirth, 2008).  As Albrechts (2006) states, a sense of realism 
must permeate the strategic planning process: “…the vision must be placed within a specific 
context (economic, social, cultural, political, or power), a specific place, a specific time, and a 
specific scale in relation to specific issues that are of interest and within a particular combination 
of actors” (p.1160).  In short, visions must be rooted in an understanding of the basic processes, 
including demographic and economic trends, which shape places.  This is particularly important 
for shrinking cities because, as Kitchen (2003) explains, successful planning in shrinking cities 
needs to involve strategic thinking about the potential of the existing asset base: “…we need to 
think hard about how best to support the kinds of economic activities that have at least a realistic 
chance of growing in our cities in the future…”  (p.131).  As noted above, the first step towards 
realism and acknowledgement of context in shrinking cities may involve a shift away from the 
assumption of future growth towards an acceptance that demographic and economic forces are 
likely to dictate further population decline.  Strategic planning encourages shrinking cities to take 
this first step. 
 Next, strategic planning is designed to be flexible both in terms of process and product.  
In terms of process, again, there are many ways to go about strategic planning; the best way is 
one which is geared towards the specific characteristics of a city and the circumstances it is 
facing.  In fact, Hutter, Schanze, & Wirth (2008) argue that strategic planning may stifle 
creativity if it becomes too formulaic.  This flexibility is beneficial for shrinking cities (Allweil, 
2007; Kühn, 2006), each of which faces a variety of issues associated with population decline 
based on specific circumstances and each of which, in the absence of established planning 
principles dealing with population decline, needs to encourage creativity.  In terms of product, 
strategic planning is meant to be flexible.  Speaking in the context of Dresden’s planning 
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strategy, which focused on growth when the city was shrinking and on shrinking when the city 
grew unexpectedly, Wiechmann (2007a) argues that, in fact, “…strategic flexibility [is] more 
important than the strategy itself” (p.1).  While comprehensive plans may “lock-in” a city’s 
policies for a specific time period, strategic planning recognizes that, as context changes, so do 
visions and priorities (Albrechts, 2006).  If something is not working, strategic planning dictates 
that it be changed.  As Albrechts (2006) states, “[t]raditional spatial plans are judged in terms of 
conformance, strategic spatial plans in terms of performance…” (p.1165). In fact, shrinking 
cities researchers argue that strategies developed in the context of population decline need to be 
flexible (Wiechmann, 2008a; Allweil, 2007; Reiss-Schmidt, 2006; Sander, 2006).  Reiss-
Schmidt (2006) argues that the goal of planning in shrinking cities is “… not to produce a 
quickly obsolete master plan with concrete individual measures but to formulate development 
strategies permitting flexible responses to unpredictable changes…” (p.6). In general, 
“…[s]trategic thinking and flexible action are becoming more important than concern with 
operative details…” (Reiss-Schmidt, 2006, p.13).  In fact, Hutter and Wiechmann (2005) argue 
that in the context of shrinking cities, planners should pay attention not only to developing 
strategies but also to detecting existing patterns in the city’s day-to-day activities that work and 
that can be exploited and built upon on a wider scale.  According to them, “[p]lanners do not 
have to be strategy makers. They can be finders…[I]ntentions are only the beginning of the 
strategy making journey…” (Hutter & Wiechmann, 2005, p.7, emphasis in original).  
Wiechmann (2008b) argues that planners need to find a balance between deliberate strategy-
making and the more incremental learning-based strategy-finding.  
 Finally, strategic planning is integrative on the scale of the region, with agencies and 
communities acting in cooperation rather than competition (Albrechts, 2006; Sartorio, 2005).  As 
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Sartorio (2005) explains, unlike comprehensive planning, strategic planning can go beyond 
territories that are legally defined and shift boundaries from administrative ones to more 
operational ones.  This focus on cooperation within the broader region is useful for shrinking 
cities (Reiss-Schmidt, 2006; Pallagst, 2005; Müller, 2004; Jessen, 2006; Müller and Siedentop, 
2004; Sander, 2006), particularly in the United States, where planning is done in a fragmented 
way (if it is done at all).  According to Pallagst (2005), who advocates for an approach called 
“progressive regionalism,” the lack of a regional response is problematic, especially where 
shrinkage occurs on a regional level.  Müller (2004) argues that shrinking cities in all countries 
need “…integrated regional strategies for adjusting to demographic change, drawn up in 
intermunicipal cooperation and placing decline or growth trends in a regional context” (p.3).  
Intermunicipal cooperation allows communities within a region to avoid wasting efforts: 
“…..only on the regional scale can duplicate investment be prevented in competing for 
population and jobs… This could lower the risk of desperate action by local authorities in the 
form of dubious beacon projects…” (Jessen, 2006, p.11).  Müller and Siedentop (2004) similarly 
see the growing importance of the region as a level for action in shrinking cities.  To them, it is 
becoming more and more important to treat functionally interrelated areas as a unit for planning 
purposes, primarily for the sake of efficiency:  
If redevelopment and downsizing are on the municipal agenda, adjustment concepts need 
to be discussed and implemented in regional cooperation.  In contrast to traditional policy 
approaches, the region is becoming more important, less as a level for the order-oriented 
control of development than as a spatial platform for the efficiency-oriented adjustment 
of settlement structures.  If a number of municipalities face the same problems of having 
to close schools or scale-down technical infrastructure, these problems should not be 
tackled at the level of the single municipality: regional solutions should be sought to 
‘save’ facilities and maintain public services in the long terms and in keeping with 





Müller and Siedentop (2004) further state that the opportunities arising from population decline 
“…can be exploited only if municipalities collaborate with their regions…” (p.10).   
 Thus, these characteristics of strategic planning are presented by shrinking cities 
researchers as being particularly useful exercise in shrinking cities.  Not only is strategic 
planning more likely than traditional comprehensive planning to produce strategies that are more 
flexible, efficient, and effective, simply engaging in the process of discussing an overall vision of 
how to turn the negatives of shrinking into opportunities to maximize the quality of life of the 
residents who remain is likely to be immensely valuable.  The participatory nature of strategic 
planning is especially helpful in shrinking cities where residents tend to become disenchanted as 
a result of past failed attempts to reach former population levels.  The selective nature of 
strategic planning is particularly useful in cities which are experiencing declining municipal 

















In order to ensure that the quality of life of the citizens that remain in shrinking cities is 
indeed improved, many shrinking cities researchers argue that planners in shrinking cities, like 
those in growing cities, need to deal with the effects of population decline in a balanced manner.  
For instance, policies to improve the economic conditions in shrinking cities should not be 
pursued at the expense of physical, social, and environmental conditions.  Unfortunately, the 
literature indicates that, to date, this has not been the case and usually it is the social and 
environmental realm that are “sacrificed” in search for economic growth at all costs (a 
consequence of seeing growth as the only positive development in the life of a city).  Beyond 
providing the general suggestion that planning be “balanced,” however, the shrinking cities 
literature is lacking in guidance as to for ways as to how this balance can be accomplished.  
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Urban regeneration literature – which posits that it is only through a comprehensive and balanced 
approach that urban policies in declining cities can improve the quality of life of remaining 
citizens in an effective and sustainable way – provides assistance in this regard.  This body of 






As Barbanente and Monno (2004) explain, the literature “…shows few examples of 
successful stories of long term efforts to regenerate widely deindustrialised regions…” (p.36).  
Strategies to deal with shrinkage have tended to focus on reversing demographic and economic 
decline and returning to previous population levels by attracting foreign investment (Polèse & 
Shearmur, 2006).  Cities adopt an “entrepreneurial” role and attempt to “sell” their locations with 
business friendly policies.  Typical amongst these “market-based” strategies are place promotion, 
image boosterism, and flagship projects (Punch, 2004).    Underpinning these economic 
development strategies is a fundamental belief that urban decline cannot be “fixed” by 
government, but by the private sector (Beswick & Tsenkova, 2002) and that economic growth is 
achievable and is the cure for ills of urban decline.  In fact, as Lovering (2007) explains, “...there 
is no consistent evidence that increasing the openness of the local economy, encouraging inward 
investment and flows of trade and tourism, has had a positive effect on growth, much less on 
employment rates and per capita incomes…” (p.357). Dabinett (2004) points out that in the UK, 
despite consistent economic growth since 1997, the division between the richest and poorest in 
society has increased.  In the realm of spatial planning in shrinking cities, with such exceptions 
as Leipzig (Jessen, 2006; Bontje, 2004) and Youngstown (discussed below), the “property-led” 
approach to regeneration is common (Beswick & Tsenkova, 2002) and like the market-based 
approach in economic development, it reflects the emphasis on achievable growth as the ultimate 
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goal.  For example, shrinking cities designate new land for development, develop industrial 
parks, and plan new housing projects in the hopes of attracting industry and people (Müller & 
Siedentop, 2004).  Even in the rare cases where the emphasis has shifted away from growth in 
the physical sphere (for instance, Leipzig and Youngstown have developed strategies in the 
physical sphere based on downsizing the built environment), in the economic sphere policies 
tend to resemble more traditional entrepreneurial strategies (Bontje, 2004).   
 Unfortunately, where these market-led economic and property-led spatial policies are 
successful in contributing to economic growth, social conditions remain unchanged or even 
worsen (Andersen, 2005; Lovering, 2007; Lang, 2005; Punch, 2004; Gosling, 2008; Pattison, 
2004). As Pattison (2004) explains, “…policies based on an economic rationale guided by 
aesthetic judgements remain insufficient to match the real complexities of both community 
regeneration and areas suffering decline” (p.329). The major problem is that these one-sided 
policies fail to address the gap between privileged and middle class and the working class and 
marginalized in shrinking cities, instead reinforcing and exacerbating this disparity.  Sheffield, 
UK, a former steel town which saw many job losses beginning in the late 1970s, has been 
successful in attracting new businesses, leading to both a quantitative and qualitative change in 
the economic base.  However, according to Dabinett (2004), continued presence of deprived 
communities suggests that these post-industrial activities have not benefited the wider “urban 
well-being” and have not resulted in social justice for disadvantaged groups: “…inequitable 
impacts are occurring alongside the more obvious quantitative changes in the employment base 
of the city” (p.21).  For instance, ethnic minorities in Sheffield continue to experience higher 
levels of unemployment and while educational attainment has generally improved in Sheffield, it 
still lags behind the south east of England and is deeply divided within the city.  Dublin, Ireland, 
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whose traditional industrial base declined in the post-war period, has experienced recent 
economic growth as a result of various policies which encouraged foreign direct investment and 
private property redevelopment (Punch, 2004).  However, the newly redeveloped “Port and 
Docks” global finance capital facility has contributed to the gentrification of the inner city, 
raising concerns about social integration and displacement of poorer residents (Punch, 2004).  As 
well, because of the city’s emerging role as a site of back-office functions for multinationals, the 
occupational structure of the city has become increasingly polarized, with growth in high-grade 
professional services (e.g. legal services, engineering, architecture,…) or low-paid vulnerable 
services (e.g. for hotels, restaurants, etc…).  According to Punch (2004), Dublin’s working class 
is not benefiting from new economic growth or policies.  Instead, they have been left without 
opportunities for manual work and they are unable to compete for skilled-manual or white-collar 
positions created.  Punch (2004) argues that  
…the contradiction between the opportunities and benefits accruing to the privileged and 
middle classes and those accruing to working-class and marginalized people remains a 
key issue and a central feature of Irish society, which has perhaps been reinforced, if 
anything, by the economic boom. (p.11) 
 
In short, in these cases, economic priorities have taken precedence over social concerns. 
Another type of common economic growth policy which has failed to address social 
concerns is creative class attraction strategies, made popular by Richard Florida.  Florida’s basic 
argument is that cities can be economically revitalized by making themselves attractive to the 
creative class (Florida, 2002).  Once this is done by, among other things, encouraging cultural 
activities and “tolerance,” jobs will follow.  However, studies have shown that the creative class 
follows jobs and not vice versa; that is, educated people tend to move to growing, thriving areas 
(Houston et al., 2008).  According to Shearmur (2006), policies promoting the interests of the 
creative class fail to deal with the concerns of the rest of the population and in fact end up 
87 
 
reinforcing the already privileged position of the elite “knowledge aristocracy:” “In fact, the type 
of municipal and regional policy inspired by Florida’s ideas is squarely aimed at attracting and 
retaining elites, often at the expense of other pressing, concrete but less visible municipal and 
regional responsibilities…” (p.38). The attraction of the creative class in fact does not ameliorate 
the social and economic issues facing many residents in shrinking cities and may indeed 
exacerbate them by, for instance, increasing inequality and class disparities (Squires, 2003). 
 In addition to negatively affecting (or, at best, failing to take into account) social 
concerns, the focus on attracting economic growth (whether through making the city attractive to 
foreign investment or to members of the creative class) has caused problems for the physical 
development of shrinking cities.  Again, focusing on creative-class attraction (a typical strategy 
amongst shrinking cities) may cause the city to ignore other, more pressing municipal 
responsibilities (Shearmur, 2006), such as crumbling infrastructure in poorer neighbourhoods.  In 
addition, as alluded to earlier, the desire to attract any kind of economic activity may lead 
shrinking cities to be more permissive in allowing sprawl.  According to Couch et al. (2005), in 
shrinking cities  
…it tends to be more difficult to restrict peripheral employment growth, because the 
political pressure to allow almost every investor what they demand is particularly strong 
when economic growth is lacking.  In a situation of decline the economic development 
aims invariably take precedence over the aims of sustainable development and the 
planning system is obliged at least a passive role and often an active role in stimulating 
employment sprawl. (p.132) 
 
Couch et al. (2005) give as examples Liverpool and Leipzig, where little demographic growth is 
expected, but city officials have used public infrastructure money to develop large facilities on 
the urban periphery in an effort to attract industrial investors.  In both cases, this has negatively 
affected the functional structure of the city and has been particularly detrimental to the inner city.  
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Similarly, Foster (2007) explains that in the Cape Breton Regional Municipality in Nova Scotia, 
despite population decline, retail activity continues to gravitate towards the outskirts of town:  
Decline does not exempt this region from changes in retailing that affect us all. Box 
stores and strip malls have moved the focus of retailing to the periphery near major 
arteries, leaving the downtowns of former towns as neighbourhood commercial centres. 
Increasingly, those without a car become disenfranchised from society. (Foster, 2007, 
p.24) 
 
Dublin’s inner city has experienced similar disinvestment as both people and businesses 
suburbanize (Punch, 2004).  In addition, allowing developments on the outskirts of shrinking 
cities has proved environmentally detrimental as these developments tend to locate on greenfield 
sites (which require no refurbishment or decontamination), leaving brownfields vacant.  For 
instance, in Eastern Germany after reunification, local authorities welcomed all types of private 
investment no matter where they chose to locate and where they chose to locate was often 
ecologically sensitive areas, despite the large number of brownfields waiting for reuse (Nuissl & 
Rink, 2005).  In this case, the lack of planning on the part of local authorities was not the only 
contributor to sprawl: 
In eastern Germany, the most effective incentives to sprawl…came from the programmes 
and fiscal instruments implemented by the federal government in order to stimulate the 
influx of capital. By awarding high subsidies without distinguishing between different 
locations, these programmes and instruments attracted several enterprises and companies 
to suburbia where building development was easiest. (Nuissl and Rink, 2005, p.126) 
 
Strategies in the Ruhr District of Germany, where the closing of steel mills has resulted in vast 
areas of industrial wasteland, are attempting to halt this trend and reduce unemployment by 
encouraging, through funding schemes, the location of clean, innovative industries on industrial 
brownfields (Genske & Ruff, 2006).  Nuissl and Rink (2005) caution that it remains to be seen 




Thus, these types of typical strategies for dealing with the issues arising from shrinkage 
have proved problematic, particularly because of their one-sided emphasis on attracting 
economic growth at all costs.  Simply put, “…when planning cities in decline like Baltimore and 
Detroit it is important to incorporate all aspects of shrinkage and therefore, both look at the 
demographic and the economic side, but also to include the physical, social and human aspects 
of the problem.” (Andersen, 2005, p.2).  According to shrinking cities researchers, 
comprehensively coordinated and integrated strategies are needed in order to achieve sustainable 
urban development under conditions of shrinkage (Koziol, 2004; Reiss-Schmidt, 2006; Müller & 
Siedentop, 2004; Bontje, 2004; Schilling & Logan, 2008). The concept of “urban regeneration” 









The term “urban regeneration” has been used to refer to many things, basically anything 
that is “new” (Lovering, 2007).  Most are not “urban regeneration” projects according to the 
definition of term provided in the urban regeneration theoretical literature.  In short, there is 
often a divergence between what Lovering (2007) terms “actually existing urban regeneration” 
and urban regeneration in theory.  The notion of urban regeneration emerged in the United 
Kingdom in the 1990s in response to the deficiencies inherent in economic and planning policies 
geared only towards the physical and economic renewal (Tsenkova, 2002; Lang, 2005).  As 
Beswick and Tsenkova (2002) state, “[p]roperty-led regeneration, and the government’s focus on 
urban economic policies of the past, received a lot of criticism, claiming that it failed to 
recognise critical social and community issues and problems” (p.15).  The focus thus shifted 
towards a more comprehensive approach – captured in urban regeneration theory – which would 
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address, in addition to physical and economic issues, social and environmental concerns in a 
balanced and strategic way.  
 The most quoted definition of “urban regeneration theory,” and the definition adopted in 
this paper, is that of Roberts (2000).  To him, urban regeneration is a  
comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban 
problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, 
physical, social and environmental condition of an area. (p.17)   
 
The following chart from Lang (2005) illustrates the concept of urban regeneration.   
Figure 1: The concept of urban regeneration12 
Roberts (2000) emphasizes that it is critically important for cities to create a comprehensive and 
integrated framework with a clearly articulated vision upon which discrete urban regeneration 
strategies would be based.   This use of strategic planning principles is particularly important to 
urban regeneration theory since, as mentioned above, shrinking cities often have shrinking 
resources and thus they must choose carefully policies in which to invest their limited resources 
(Hutter & Neumann, 2008).  Having an overarching framework for choosing strategies allows 
 
12 Source: Lang, 2005 
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cities to undertake projects that are seemingly discrete, but which are based on a longer-term 
vision for the city – a visions which recognizes the interdependence of the economic, social, 
physical, and environmental spheres.  Carter (2000) explains that 
[s]trategic vision is concerned with creating the framework in which longer-term goals, aims and 
objectives of individuals, organisations and areas can be realized…The creation of a strategic 
vision can ensure that resources, for example land, capital and labour, are used in such a way as 
to achieve the best overall effect. (p.42) 
 
Roberts (2000) further clarifies that this framework, in order to be a basis for successful 
regeneration policies, should be developed by consensus through the fullest possible public 
participation.  Care must be taken to avoid the situation in regeneration attempts in communities 
in northern England where, “…although representatives from local communities are often 
present at regeneration meetings, they do not have the power, knowledge and/or skills to make 
any real decisions…” (Gosling, 2008, p.619).  In short, participation must be meaningful 
(Gosling, 2008; Roberts, 2000; Friesecke, 2007).  
 Of course, each city is unique and what works in one may not work in another.  Lovering 
(2007, p.344) cautions against relying on “cookbooks” – that is the “fairly standard set of policy 
goals and outcomes” – in attempting to bring about urban regeneration.  However, one principle 
is applicable in all shrinking cities: to be successful, urban regeneration policies must be created 
within a comprehensive strategic framework that simultaneously seeks to balance improvements 
each area (physical, economic, social, and environmental) (Roberts, 2000; Lang, 2005; Deakin 
and Allwinkle, 2007; Carter, 2000; Tsenkova, 2002; Grossman, 2004; Andersen, 2005; Squires, 
2003); in other words, objectives in one area of urban life should not compromise developments 
in the other.13 Again, it is important to remember that, in the context of shrinking cities, 
 
13 This is similar to the notion of sustainability, where the economic, ecological, and social sphere are treated as 
equal and one is not to be developed at the expense of the other. The core idea is that each area is interdependent.   
In fact, Grossman (2004) and Genske and Ruff (2006) specifically state that the concept of sustainability should be 
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“resolving” problems and “improving” conditions does not mean “growing” to previous 
population levels where growth is unrealistic (Andersen, 2005; Allweil, 2007; Hollbach-Grömig 
and Trapp, 2006; Leo and Anderson, 2006; Müller and Siedentop, 2004; Polèse and Shearmur, 
2006; Popper and Popper, 2002; Rybczynski and Linneman, 1999).  As Lang (2005) states, 
“urban regeneration is about implementing policies in existing urban areas rather than 
developing new urbanisation” (p.8).  Put another way, urban regeneration in shrinking cities is 
about qualitative, not quantitative development.  According to Squires (2003), “[b]alanced 
development may be far more difficult to achieve than growth, but it would also constitute a 










The bulk of the emerging literature on planning in shrinking cities involves case study 
research.  In the course of discussing measures taken to address population decline in particular 
cases, researchers often comment (either explicitly or implicitly) on the role played by planners.  
For instance, Krumholz (2007) explains that “…the role of planning varies between Las Vegas 
with its 85 percent growth and St. Louis with its 13 percent decline” (p.30). Taken together, the 
various discussions of what planners have done well and where improvement is needed in these 
cases provides a general prescription for the role planners should play in shrinking cities.  The 
overall consensus seems to be that in some respects planners need to play a qualitatively different 
role in shrinking cities than in growing cities (for instance, managing the decline process versus 
steering growth); in other respects, the role of the planner is the same in any demographic 
context – growth or shrinkage – but the importance of that role is heightened in the context of 
 
used as an alternative to the growth paradigm in shrinking cities.  Urban regeneration theory adds the physical 
element, which is so often a major concern in shrinking cities.   
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population decline (for example, facilitating residents to undertake projects on their own 
becomes more important when a municipality is under fiscal strain).  The following section 












According to Martinez-Fernandez and Wu (2007), government and planning officials 
play a crucial role in shrinking cities, one that is different from the role played in the context of 
growth.  As has already been discussed, the traditional role of planners has been to steer growth 
in the most desirable direction.  However, the bulk of the shrinking cities literature suggests that, 
instead of focusing on attracting and steering new growth, planners in shrinking cities need to 
become “managers” of the population decline process (Müller, 2004; Kitchen, 2003; Seasons, 
2004; Schilling and Logan, 2008; Rybczynski and Linneman, 1999; Rieniets, 2005b; Hollbach-
Grömig and Trapp, 2006; Irurah, Park & Yeang, 2005; Müller and Siedentop, 2004; Bourne & 
Simmons, 2003; Shearmur & Polèse, 2007; Koziol, 2004; Simmons & Bourne, 2007).   In this 
respect, Kitchen (2003) explains that planners in shrinking cities with little hope of growing 
again need to manage the process of getting smaller “…with minimum damage both to its quality 
of place and to the lifestyle opportunities it offers to its present and future citizens” (p.124).  
Seasons (2004) argues that planners in shrinking cities need to assist in the “difficult transition to 
a no- or slow-growth economy” (p.11).   As mentioned above, Rieniets (2005b) explains that 
“[u]rban planning has never generated urban growth, but rather enables and controls it by means 
of planning. Likewise, urban planning can hardly stimulate the opposite process—shrinkage—
nor can it reverse it. However, it can guide the process to the best urban solutions possible” (p.6).   
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According to Müller and Siedentop (2004), instead of focusing on ways to distribute 
quantitative increases in population, planners in shrinking cities need to concentrate their efforts 
on improving the quality of the environment for residents who remain in the most cost-effective 
way possible.  Bourne and Simmons (2003) similarly argue that planners in shrinking cities need 
to downsize communities in an equitable and efficient manner, re-thinking conventional planning 
approaches.  In managing the decline process, the literature suggests that planners may adopt a 
variety of methods that are fundamentally different from those used to plan for growth.  For 
instance, Schilling and Logan (2008) argue that planners need to actively “right size” 
communities using a model they provide, which involves “… (a) instituting a green 
infrastructure program and plan; (b) creating a land bank to manage the right-sizing effort; and 
(c) building community consensus through collaborative neighborhood planning” (p.452).  The 
Cleveland Shrinking Cities Institute (2007) suggests that managing the shrinkage process could 
involve, for example, removal of redundant streets and downsizing of infrastructure, which could 
in turn open up opportunities to restore native landscapes, improve air and water quality, and 
enhance wildlife habitat.  Irurah, Park and Yeang (2005) provide some possible tools to be used 
in shrinking cities, including introducing food production into cities (farming in the city), urban 
forestation (turning streets into forests), introducing green roofs, and creating “green corridors” 
that link green areas of the city and provide habitats and routes for animals.  Koziol (2004) 
discusses ways planners can adapt a shrinking city’s hard infrastructure to a declining 
population, including prioritizing extensive downsizing over dispersed downsizing and carrying 
out downsizing, if possible, from the ends of networks rather than at points in-between.   
 Importantly, as discussed above, the shrinking cities literature emphasizes that effectively 
managing the shrinkage process involves planners shifting their mindset from seeing growth as 
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the only positive direction for a city to take.  In other words, planners in shrinking cities need to 
be able to see that smaller can be better. As Rybczynski and Linneman (1999) state, 
[a] fundamental change in mind set is required once we accept that smaller can be better. 
A city that has irretrievably lost large amounts of its population needs to examine ways to 
redesign itself to become more compact, perhaps even smaller in area. This will not be 
easy. City planners have traditionally favored growth and expansion. It is now time for 
planners to look for ways to shrink our cities. Just as physicians should allow gracious 
and healthy decline as people age, so too must our planners manage older cities. 
However, just as aging is not merely adolescence in reverse, urban planning for shrinkage 
is fundamentally different than planning for growth. (p.40) 
 
In accepting that with population decline comes benefits, planners will be able to effectively 
manage population decline in a way that enhances the quality of life of the residents who remain.   
However, although a shift away from overly optimistic growth scenarios is needed 
(especially in the context of infrastructure planning – see Koziol, 2004), it is also important that 
planners not become overly pessimistic about demographic trends, instead adopting a more 
realistic and flexible stance.  For instance, in discussing Leipzig’s efforts address population 
decline – which have been based, since reunification, on overly optimistic growth scenarios 
(resulting in policies promoting the construction of suburban homes which were never occupied) 
and then too-pessimistic decline scenarios (in the context of an unexpected stabilization of the 
population), Bontje (2004) argues that  
[u]nder these conditions, Leipzig is probably best off with a realistic development policy 
aiming at modest economic growth, creating enough employment opportunities to 
stabilize the urban population and prevent a new exodus to the West. The city 
government has to find its way between unnecessary pessimism and unreasonable 
optimism. (pp.18-19)  
 
As mentioned earlier, Wiechmann (2008a) discusses the similar case of Dresden, where planners 
were overly optimistic when the city was losing population, and overly pessimistic when it 
unexpectedly gained population.  He explains that since planning in shrinking cities happens in a 
very uncertain demographic context, planners need to be flexible and adaptable.  While relying 
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on overly optimistic growth scenarios (and the accompanying one-sided policies that concentrate 
on attracting external investment) can be “risky,” so too can relying on scenarios that are overly 
pessimistic.  Realism and flexibility are thus an integral part of the planner’s role in managing 




While planners have throughout the years acted as innovators in developing new policies 
for dealing with urban growth, not often has there been an issue which required planners to come 
up with solutions to a pressing urban issue literally from scratch.  In the context of shrinking 
cities, the shrinking cities literature suggests that planners need to take on the role of innovator 
and pioneer in a manner that involves a complete overhaul of existing principles (Rieniets, 
2005b; Bontje, 2004; Nuissl & Rink, 2005; Schilling & Logan, 2008; Tietjen, 2007; Sander, 
2006; Reiss-Schmidt, 2006; Jessen, 2006).   Certainly, the need for this new role is due in large 
measure to the lack of models and tools currently available to deal with the issue.  As Nuissl and 
Rink (2005) explain, “[o]nly innovative strategies and instruments will provide a chance to 
pursue this task since it faces various difficulties... One such difficulty arises from the very fact 
that the instruments and means at hand for urban policy and planning are designed to organise 
growth, not decline (which is reflected by the discussion on strategies to curb sprawl being 
largely focused on the problem of growth…)” (p.132).  Schilling and Logan (2008) similarly 
explain that “[u]rban policymakers and practitioners are challenged by shrinkage because they 
lack models of how existing and foreseeable future population levels influence urban systems… 
Planners must develop new policies and strategies to address the challenges shrinkage 
presents…” (p.453). However, the need for planners to be innovators and pioneers in this field 
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also arises from the lack of attention paid to this issue in planning education and research.  As 
Rieniets (2005b) explains, 
…in many regions we cannot count on continuous and ubiquitous growth, and the old 
principles of urban planning have to be modified, complemented or invented from 
scratch. However, if urban planners want to successfully implement new strategies, they 
have to be able to rely on a supportive environment with regard to institutional patterns, 
legal frameworks, and, first and foremost, the willingness of all of the stakeholders 
involved. In this respect, urban planners are not just being asked to revise their fields of 
activities, but to address the changes required to be made in the fields of research and 
education alike. (pp.7-8) 
 
Thus, population decline is placing considerable pressure on planners in shrinking cities to invent 
a completely new way of planning, in the course of which they are being asked to address 
deficiencies in planning education and research.  In addition, Tietjen (2007) suggests that 
planners need to invent new urban identities, which can aid in “…socially, economically and 
environmentally cohesive territorial development” (p.5) and which can provide something 
people can rally around. 
 In developing innovative strategies, Sander (2006) explains that planners in shrinking 
cities need to look at the experiences of other cities.  He identifies Leipzig as a pioneer for 
innovative concepts for bringing the landscape back to the city.  While examples of planners 
already taking on this role in North America are few and far between, Jessen (2006) explains that 
planners in East Germany have been discussing how to deal with shrinking cities for about eight 
years now and while a coherent set of mechanisms for dealing with population decline has not 
yet been developed: “It is still a lively search involving a lot of people” (p.8).  He outlines 
different contexts in which new procedures, new approaches, new concepts from urban planning 
in shrinking cities are being sought: (1) internal innovative impetus (practitioners in local 
authorities facing specific problems); (2) top-down innovative impetus (higher-level government 
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programs); and (3) lateral innovative impetus (such as the German Shrinking Cities Project).  
According to him:  
Over the past five years, local planning authorities, especially in East German cities, have 
been laboratories where, accompanied by an abundance of welcome and unwelcome 
advice, new planning strategies and concepts have been developed for a task without 
precedent – at least in Germany.  Instead of controlling and organizing growth processes 
in space, planning has had to cope with shrinking cities.  Prototypes are being developed, 
new categories for describing, analyzing, and planning are being tested; new concepts 
and actor constellations, cooperation with neighbouring disciplines are being 
experimented with.  Seldom has so much innovative effort been invested by the planning 
profession in so brief a period.  But it remains to be seen how shrinking cities will 
develop and what role urban planning can play at all.  The ‘built city under pressure for 
change’ has put the discipline of urban planning under pressure to innovate. (p.1) 
 
Importantly, Jessen (2006) explains that there are two sides to innovation: (1) successful 
implementation of new ideas that (2) leads to changes in broad, established practices by gaining 
practical recognition.  One can only speak of innovation if novel developments have impact 
beyond the specific city by becoming a model for others, “thus gaining recognition and 
becoming embodied in legal instruments, subsidy guidelines, and other norms and standards” 
(p.2).  There are, however, limits on how much of each side of innovation urban planning can 
accomplish.  First, there are also limits with respect to how much an urban planner can 
accomplish in terms of successfully implementing new ideas in his or her particular city because 
“…urban planning is always integrated into a political process.  Within his own area of action, 
the municipal urban planner is only one of many agents; he accordingly has only limited control 
over boundary conditions and over the possibility of implementing new concepts” (p.2).  Thus, 
“[u]rban planning must be understood as a process liable to political and social revisions and not 
as the straightforward expansion and renewal of a canon of goals and procedures” (p.3).  
Secondly, with respect to the diffusion of novel ideas “…urban planning is always place-related, 
and innovations that take effect do so initially at the local level alone, and generally only if the 
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circumstances are right: a specific constellation, a propitious moment; and they apply only in a 
particular case” (p.2).  Hence, there are limits to how much knowledge can be transferred from 
one case to another.  Ultimately, though, a “collective renewal” can happen “…through an 
abundance of single decisions.  The mechanisms of this renewal change with shifts in the 
prevailing perception of problems among planners and with the tasks they address” (p.5).  It is 












In general, the field of urban planning has been moving towards more and more citizen 
participation in the planning process, especially in developing strategic visions and plans (see, 
for instance, Healey, 2006; Albrechts, 2006; Kühn, 2006; and Sartorio, 2005).  In the context of 
population decline, however, the importance of public involvement in both the development and 
implementation of planning policies is elevated, primarily because shrinking cities also have 
shrinking funds and there generally is a lack of funds for creating innovative policies and  later 
implementing them.  To counter this, the shrinking cities literature suggests that importance of 
planners acting as a facilitator for citizen action and a source of citizen empowerment is 
particularly heightened.  As Rieniets (2005b) explains, in the context of population decline,  
…architects and urban planners are not in a position to deal with shrinking cities on a 
large scale. Rather they have to act as mediators, pioneers or instructors, demonstrating 
alternative urban practices, instructing and inspiring inhabitants to cope with the burden 
of their urban environments and to create their own solutions. (p.6) 
 
Punch (2004), after discussing urban regeneration attempts in Dublin which have generally been 
unsuccessful, comments that planners need to empower local citizens in order to deal 
successfully with the issues faced.  Yamashita (2004) explains that one reason why revitalization 
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attempts in shrinking city of Saga, Japan were unsuccessful was because of a lack of citizen 
empowerment.  According to him, planners in shrinking cities need to empower citizens to come 
up with innovative ideas and proposals on their own: 
It is vitally important that innovative ideas and proposals from citizens be incorporated in 
revitalization programs. Empowered to participate in urban revitalization, citizens will not 
only spur innovation in municipal planning and regulatory systems, but more generally will 
contribute to restoring the creative energy that will ensure our common future. (p.473) 
 
Similarly, Schilling and Logan (2008) discuss the need to empower community residents 
throughout the process of developing planning strategies in shrinking cities.  For instance, 
according to them, regreening strategies present an opportunity to empower residents to address 







On a related note, the shrinking cities literature calls for planners in shrinking cities to 
increasingly take on the role of consensus-builders.  Again, this role is also being seen as more 
important in urban planning in general, but it has heightened importance in shrinking cities, 
where widespread apathy and disenchantment (arising mostly from failed past promises of top-
down measures that will “save” the city) will hamper any attempts to deal with population 
decline in any meaningful way.  In short, the shrinking cities literature suggests that policies to 
deal with the effects of population decline will not be successful if they do not reflect the general 
consensus of residents, in particular about how population decline has affected them and how the 
negative effects can be addressed and the positive effects enhanced.  For instance, in addition to 
being unsuccessful because of a lack of citizen empowerment, Yamashita (2004) explains that 
revitalization attempts in Saga, Japan were unsuccessful also because of “…a lack of public 
participation. Almost no meaningful pursuit of consensus between the municipal government and 
citizens was conducted. The revitalization process did not reflect the ideas or views of citizens” 
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(p.472).  In a similar way but different context, Pattison (2004) argues that the “D”-village policy 
of County Durham, UK (where certain mining villages were slated for demolition based on the 
notion that the residents of these villages would be better off where there were more economic 
opportunities) failed because planners did not work with local residents in achieving a consensus 
about how population decline in this area should be dealt with.  In this case, planners acted as if 
they knew what was best for local residents and went on the assumption that if only people could 
see the effects of their policies, they would be happy.  Unfortunately, policy-makers failed to 
consider how their policies impacted local residents on a social level:  
…[t]heir lack of social insight led to a failure to explore the existing networked social 
structures in the villages. In the early days, public opposition seems to have come as 
something of a shock to many policy makers. It is almost as though they felt that their 
sincerity was under question. When this happened their only counter argument relied on 
wider arguments. Residents might be discontented in the short term but when they saw 
their new homes and employment opportunities they would see the wisdom of the policy. 
This argument did not stand the test of time. (Pattison, 2004, p.327)  
 
Because planners did not speak to residents, the intrinsic value of the villages was not taken into 
account: “[h]owever evangelistic the planners and policy makers were in their desire to build a 
better future, theirs was a top-down imposition on a system that had survived for generations on 
a strong and federated sense of mutuality” (Pattison, 2004, p.328).  In failing to consult with 
village residents, the policies were unsuccessful at addressing population decline in any 
meaningful or lasting way, illustrating the need for planners to incorporate the community 
consensus into their policies.   
This need for consensus-building is also reflected in Schilling and Logan (2008) right-
sizing model, part of which involves building a community consensus through collaborative 
neighbourhood planning.  According to them, planners need to reach a consensus when making 
difficult decisions in shrinking cities: “Identifying a comprehensive plan for greening that takes 
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into account neighborhood and city interests will require planners to develop flexible policies 
respectful of, and in collaboration with, a diverse group of stakeholders” (Schilling & Logan, 
2008, p.460).   It should be noted at this point that the planner’s role as consensus-builder might 
conflict with their role as innovator because a broad-based consensus may reflect the lowest 
common denominator.  Indeed, it may be more difficult for planners to achieve a public 
consensus about new and innovative ideas.  How planners will successfully incorporate these 






Planners have always been a source of knowledge for many people, including citizens, 
developers, and people looking to relocate to a particular city.  However, in the context of 
shrinkage, this role is becoming even more important especially where it relates to the successful 
redevelopment of vacant property.  Dewar (2006) explains that especially with respect to vacant 
land, planners need to be a source of complete and accurate information to facilitate urban 
redevelopment in shrinking cities.  They need to reduce uncertainty for prospective buyers of 
property, reduce costs, and speed up the redevelopment process.  In order to do this, planners 
need to keep complete and accurate information.  To illustrate this, Dewar (2006) uses cases of 
Detroit, where a clear inventory of vacant property is non-existent and policies with respect to 
vacant land are unclear and ever-changing, and Cleveland, where complete records are kept and 
policies are more streamlined.  Not surprisingly, more vacant land has been put to productive use 
in Cleveland than Detroit, largely because developers find the task more daunting where records 
and policies are disorganized and amorphous.  Schilling and Logan (2008) agree that planners 
need to conduct a vacant land inventory and environmental assessment.  They need to stay aware 
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of properties as they become vacant and national data sources for vacant properties should be 
augmented by local efforts.  In addition, they argue that planners in shrinking cities need to 
become a source of knowledge for each other by establishing a network of shrinking cities to 





Finally, some shrinking cities researchers have suggested that the role of planner as 
advocate for the disadvantaged should be enhanced.  In the process of describing what they call 
the “New Suburbanism” in Detroit, Armborst, D’Oca, and Theodore (2007) argue that planners 
should become “ghostwriters” in shrinking cities: that is, they argue that part of the role of 
planners in shrinking cities is to discover and advocate for things people are already doing.  
According to them, the “New Suburbanism” – which they define as “the process through which 
entrepreneurial homeowners take, borrow, or buy adjacent vacant lots” (Armborst, D’Oca, & 
Theodore, 2007, p.1) – is happening throughout Detroit: “All over Detroit, homeowners—many 
of who have stuck it out through race riots, deindustrialization, and the resulting depopulation 
and disinvestment—are starting to spread out, expanding their property by gradually 
accumulating lots that others abandoned” (Armborst, D’Oca, & Theodore, 2007, p.1).  These 
expanded lots are the “DNA” of the New Suburbanism.  While the results are not always 
spectacular (for instance, some people use the adjacent properties to house satellite dishes or 
trampolines), this is an important phenomenon that is  
…perhaps best understood as unplanned, unacknowledged, and yet entirely plausible 
response to Detroit’s depopulation and disinvestment… [T]he New Suburbanism is 
unknowingly authored by thousands of entrepreneurial, self-interested individuals… 




The problem in Detroit is that, as mentioned above, it is very difficult for people to acquire clear 
title to vacant land.  Importantly, there is no land bank, which would make this “blotting” (the 
term they use to describe the new, expanded lots) easier.   
 In this context, Armborst, D’Oca, and Theodore (2007) argue for a new type of planning: 
“namely, a planning that attempts to identify, document, and finally advocate for potentially 
progressive practices that, like the New Suburbanism, already exist, but are underappreciated and 
have little legitimacy” (p.14).  They explain that this sort of planning originates from ideas of 
Hernando DeSoto, in particular the idea that the best thing governments in developing countries 
can do is “formalize the informal, so that the poor can leverage their informal holdings (i.e., in 
informal, squatted land, in informal goods, and in informal jobs) for financial gain” (Armborst, 
D’Oca, & Theodore, 2007, p.14). On a more general level, the most important of DeSoto’s ideas 
is that of “listening to the excluded,” (Armborst, D’Oca, & Theodore, 2007, p.14) where officials 
listen to what is going on in the streets so that policies and laws do not lag behind how people 
actually live and work.  In short, it is important for planners to make it “easier for (mostly poor) 
individuals to do what they are already doing.” (Armborst, D’Oca, & Theodore, 2007, p.15, 
emphasis in original).  This is particularly relevant in shrinking cities where, in many cases, 
residents have been left to cope with the effects of population decline on their own, often in 
innovative ways.  Following DeSoto’s, and to a lesser extent, Davidoff’s ideas, advocacy 
planners need to spend time “defining, describing, and telling seductive stories about the client” 
(Armborst, D’Oca, & Theodore, 2007, p.15).  In that sense, the planner becomes a “ghostwriter,” 
who identifies and documents “…progressive practices that already exist, but that are 
underappreciated and have little legitimacy. We’re suggesting is that there is an entire phase of 
planning that should happen before we start talking about policies…” (Armborst, D’Oca, & 
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Theodore, 2007, p.16). This phase involves telling the story of those who are experts in dealing 
with population decline: the residents who have remained.   
 In a similar vein, Krumholz (2007) argues that planners in shrinking cities in the United 
States are more and more becoming advocates for the disadvantaged.  For example, planners in 
Cleveland have lobbied for better state laws on tax delinquent land; in doing so, they were trying 
to address issues of regional socioeconomic inequality.  In addition, planners in some shrinking 
cities are working on “reverse commute” programs to help connect poor central city 
neighbourhoods with suburbs where new jobs are emerging, for example by reconfiguring bus 
routes.  Some planners in the United States also work for with Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) doing such tasks as “designing and administering local land banks, 
working to equalize regional responsibilities among cities and their suburbs, and helping to raise 
local family incomes” (p.30). In these CDCs, planners becoming advocates for poor and working 
class residents.  This signals a shift in the role of planners in the United States, particularly 
prevalent in shrinking cities, away from land use planning, urban design, and growth regulation 
towards more diverse tasks, including advocacy. 
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Thus, the research on shrinking cities provides the framework of “good planning 
principles” for planners in cities experiencing population decline.  The following chart 
summarizes the key components of this framework. 
General principle Key points Key bodies of literature 
Planners must leave behind 
the assumption of future 
growth 
 Urban planners need to be 
realistic about future 
population growth. 
 Strategies to attract future 
growth may divert much-




cities away from more 
pressing issues, may end up 
wasting scarce resources, and 
may prove detrimental to 
urban development in the 
long run. 
 Instead of focusing on 
attracting new residents, 
planners need to direct their 
attention inward, to 
maintaining and indeed 
improving the quality of life 
of those who remain.  
Planners must begin to 
realize the opportunities that 
come with population 
decline. 
 
Planners must use processes 
that are strategic, with an 
emphasis on citizen 
participation;
 Planners in shrinking cities 
must incorporate key 
elements of strategic 
planning into their planning 
processes, including: the 
creation of a comprehensive 
vision; extensive and 
meaningful citizen 
participation; selectivity; 
attention to context; 
flexibility; and integration on 
a regional scale. 
 Ultimately, what is important 
in strategic planning is the 
process. 
 
Shrinking cities, Strategic 
planning in declining 
cities, Urban regeneration 
Planners must adopt a 
balanced approach in 
addressing the physical, 
economic, environmental and 
social needs of the community 
 Planning policies must not 
prioritize, for instance, 
economic over physical, 
social, and environmental 
concerns.   
 It is critically important for 
cities experiencing 
population decline to create a 
balanced framework with a 
clearly articulated vision 
upon which discrete 
strategies would be based. 
 Having an overarching 
strategic framework allows 
cities to undertake projects 
Shrinking cities, Urban 




that are seemingly discrete, 
but which are based actually 
on a longer-term vision for 
the city – a vision that 
recognizes the 
interdependence of the 
economic, social, physical, 
and environmental spheres. 
 
Planners must change the role 
they play in the community 
 In order to be effective, the 
role of planners must change 
in the context of population 
decline. 
 In some respects planners 
need to play a qualitatively 
different role in shrinking 
cities than in growing cities 
(for instance, planners should 
actively manage the effects of 
population decline rather than 
plan for growth that is 
unlikely to happen). 
 In other respects, the role of 
the planner is the same in any 
demographic context – 
growth or shrinkage – but the 
importance of that role must 
be emphasized in the context 
of population decline (for 
example, facilitating 
residents to undertake 
projects on their own 
becomes more important 








Evidently, shrinking cities researchers are beginning to address the lacuna in the 
literature, mentioned in Chapter 1, which exists regarding the subject of planning in the context 
of population decline.  In this thesis, I seek to further narrow the gap between the wealth of 
knowledge about planning for growth and relative lack of knowledge about planning for decline.  
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I also seek to move the trajectory of the shrinking cities literature beyond a discussion of the 
physical effects of decline and appropriate related strategies (where most of the focus remains 
concentrated) towards a broader examination of how planners may go about having a positive 
impact in all urban spheres: physical, economic, social, and environmental (all of which, as 
mentioned above and in Chapter 2, are inter-related).  
In this regard, researchers have only begun to speculate about what planning approaches 
will work best in shrinking cities and why: in this literature review I have attempted to assemble 
these fragmented discussions (both explicit and implicit) into four principles of good planning in 
shrinking cities.  In doing so, what I have found is missing is a discussion of what these 
principles might look like in action and how these principles might be incorporated into 
shrinking city planning.  For instance, shrinking cities researchers will use case studies to 
illustrate the causes and effects of population decline in shrinking cities, will argue that a shift 
away from the growth-oriented paradigm is needed and willadmit this will likely be difficult, but 
this is as far as they go.  What is not clear from their discussions is how this shift may work in 
practice and what factors may facilitate or impede such a shift.  The same is true for adopting a 
strategic approach, incorporating a balanced focus, and shifting the role of planners in cities with 
declining populations.  Shrinking cities researchers tell us that it is possible for planners to 
improve quality of life in the absence of population growth by adopting these principles, but how
are the principles of good planning in shrinking cities being realized in practice and what are 
the opportunities and obstacles to planning using these principles??  It seems necessary to ask 
and answer this research question in order to steer the discussion on planning in shrinking cities 
in a more nuanced direction.  
More specifically, in this thesis I am asking the following sub-questions: 
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 What approach have Youngstown, Ohio and Sudbury, Ontario taken in their recently-adopted 
Official/Comprehensive Plans? 
 Does this approach incorporate each principle of good planning in shrinking cities? 
 If yes, what opportunities led to the break from tradition?  If no, what obstacles prevented a 
break from tradition? 
Ostensibly, Youngstown Ohio has taken a “new” approach to planning for population decline 
which incorporates some of the principles of good planning in its recently-adopted 
comprehensive plan while Sudbury has opted for a more traditional “going for growth” 
approach.  By investigating the nature of two ostensibly polar planning approaches and exploring 
what factors influenced each city to either step towards the principles of good planning in 
shrinking cities and to hold fast to more traditional approaches, I intend to advance the debate 
beyond “what do we need to do and why” to “how can it be done?”  These polar cases can 
provide new insights into what factors might encourage or impede the adoption of good planning 
practice in shrinking cities. 
 At this point, it is important to note some of the limitations of the approach I have taken 
in this thesis.  First of all, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, I am not assessing the efficacy of the 
principles of good planning in shrinking cities.  Based on what I have read in the literature and 
on the logic that the opposite approaches have not worked, I am inferring that these principles 
would provide a sounder basis for effectively improving the quality of life for residents who 
remain in shrinking cities.  This, however, remains an untested inference and, I believe, a fruitful 
area for future research (provided a case study where all of the principles have been 
wholeheartedly adopted can be found).  Secondly, I have limited myself to examining the 
approaches taken in two comprehensive/official plans.  Of course, not all aspects of plans get 
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implemented and thus some policies included in both Sudbury’s and Youngstown’s plans may 
never see the light of day.  As well, not all projects or strategies undertaken by municipalities are 
based on the plans [nor should they be: see Wiechmann, 2008(b) and Hutter and Wiechmann, 
2005], so the decision-making processes (particularly with respect to day-to-day decisions) in 
these instances are not addressed in this thesis.  It would also be fruitful in future research to 
examine in practice Hutter and Wiechmann’s (2005) theory that in the context of shrinking 
cities, planners should pay attention not only to developing strategies but also to detecting 
existing patterns in the city’s day-to-day activities that work and that can be exploited and built 
upon on a wider scale.  For this thesis, I remain focused on the approach taken in each 
official/comprehensive plan as practically it affords me an opportunity to examine the overall 
approach taken in each city’s recently-adopted plans which, based on discussions with municipal 
officials in both cities, were both intended to be a “guiding document” (where not legally, then 
morally) for each city.  With these research questions and research limitations in mind, I now 









In this chapter, I present and justify my choice of research strategy, research design, data 
collection procedures, and data analysis procedures.  Recognizing that my methodological 
choices have consequences which may strengthen my conclusions and or serve to limit them, I 
conclude the chapter with a discussion of how I attempted to capitalize on the strengths of my 
approach and minimize the limitations in the context of the five tests of good quality research: 





In choosing a research strategy from a myriad of options, including surveys, experiments, 
histories, and archival analysis, I considered three factors as suggested by Yin (2008), each of 
which pointed to the conclusion that a case study would allow me to most effectively accomplish 
my research goals.  First, I considered the nature of my research questions. According to Yin 
(2008), Kyburz-Graber (2004) and Meyer (2001), case studies are useful in addressing questions 
of what happened, how, and why, rather than who or how many. While parts of my research 
questions deal with identifying who or how many, these questions are only a precursor to asking 
a how, why, or what happened question (for example, I seek to identify the major players in the 
planning process in order to discuss how they were involved).  Hence, the what happened, how,




However, according to Yin (2008), I needed to consider two more factors in order to 
determine the appropriateness of using case study as a research strategy since how or why 
questions can also be answered using histories and experiments.  Thus, the second factor I 
considered was the extent of control I would have over behavioural events.  While experiments 
rely on control over behavioural events, case studies are appropriate where there is little or no 
control (Yin, 2008).  Obviously, in this study, I would have no control over the planning process 
in each city.  An experiment would therefore not be appropriate.  In also ruling out using a 
history as a strategy, the last factor I considered was the degree of focus on contemporary 
versus historical events. As Yin (2008) explains, a conventional historical study is preferred 
when the focus of a study is the “dead” past – that is, when there is no one alive to talk about the 
event, even retrospectively.  In such situations, the investigator relies heavily on documents and 
artefacts as sources of evidence.  In contrast, a case study, while similar in technique to an 
historical study, employs two important sources of data not available to historians: interviews 
and direct observations.  In my study, I am certainly able to talk to those involved in the planning 
process in both cities and to observe the effects of population decline and the strategies to 
address it.  It is thus much more appropriate for me to use case study as a strategy, not a 
historical study. 
 Therefore, given the nature of my research questions, the extent of control I would have 
over behavioural events, and the degree of focus on contemporary versus historical events, I 
chose to use a case study as my research strategy.   This is indeed the situation identified by Yin 
(2008) where a case study strategy has distinct advantages.  That is, “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question 
is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no 
control” (Yin, 2008, p.13).   
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My decision to use a case study strategy based on Yin’s three factors was reinforced by 
Hakim’s (2000) comment that case studies are often used for cross-national comparative studies 
and Meyer’s (2001) assertion that “case studies are tailor-made for exploring new processes or 
behaviors or ones that are little understood…” (p.330; see also Eisenhardt, 1989, p.532).  
Certainly, my research involves a cross-national comparison, which is important to identify legal 
and political contextual factors which contribute to the choice of planning approach, and also is 
being undertaken in an area about which little is understood, that is, planning for shrinking cities.  
Indeed, as was seen in Chapters 2 and 3, in the literature that does exist on this topic, case studies 
tend to be the preferred strategy.  For instance, in their examination of urban development 
policies in a slowly-growing city (Winnipeg) versus a rapidly-growing city (Vancouver), Leo 
and Anderson (2006) explain that “because the study of policy implications of different urban 
growth rates is a largely unexplored field (but see Leo & Brown, 2000), our purpose in doing a 
pair of case studies is to undertake a contextually rich exploration of a largely unexplored 
terrain…” (p.173-174).  As well, Martinez-Fernandez and Wu (2006), in researching cases of 
shrinking cities in Australia, comment that “case studies provide an in-depth understanding of 
the cycles of growth and shrinkage, policy and community responses and [their] effectiveness.”  
Additionally, the German Federal Cultural Foundation’s Shrinking Cities Project explores the 
causes, effects and cultural perspectives of shrinking cities on an international level by looking at 
these issues in four different case studies: Detroit, Halle/Leipzig, Ivanovo, and 
Manchester/Liverpool.  Similarly, the Berkeley-based Shrinking Cities International Research 
Network is using case studies as its primary strategy in researching various aspects of shrinkage 
throughout the globe.  Thus, my decision to use a case study research strategy was reached by 
114 
 
considering Yin’s factors and was reinforced by examining the strategies typically used in this 





Despite its wide use in many different disciplines (Meyer, 2001), the literature on the 
case study as a research strategy is sparse (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Meyer, 20001; Palys & 
Atchison, 2008; Tellis, 1997b), especially as compared to other strategies such as experiments or 
surveys.  In terms of a definition, a few authors have provided their own definition of case study.  
Eisenhardt (1989) explains that case study is a “research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings” (p.534).  Kyburz-Graber (2004), 
defines a case study as one that analyzes “an existing, real-life situation in all its complexity, 
exploring it as close to the people concerned as possible, describing the situation in as much 
detail as possible, and finally explaining the findings in a clear and comprehensible way” (p.54).  
Most authors, however, defer to Yin’s definition of case study and I will do so here as well.  Yin, 
in the later (2008) edition of his “bible” on case study research, expands on his earlier definition 
and provides a two-part “technical” definition.  The first part deals with the scope of a case 
study: 
1.  A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. (Yin, 2008, 
p.18) 
 
In other words, unlike experiments, case studies deliberately deal with contextual conditions 
because the researcher feels they are relevant to the phenomenon being studied.  Meyer (2001) 
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echoes the importance of context in case study research.  To her, the ability of case study to 
examine contemporary phenomena in real life contexts is one of its main strengths.  Indeed, in 
the present study, the context is very important: I am comparing the factors internal to the city 
(past strategies, political, economic, and demographic characteristics) and external to the city 
(state/provincial and federal policy and legislation) that led to the development of the each 
planning strategy in order to determine which were pertinent to one city’s motivation and ability 
to innovate in the face of population decline. 
 The second part of Yin’s definition deals with technical characteristics, including data 
collection and data analysis strategies: 
2.  The case study inquiry 
 
 copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
 
 relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
 
 benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis. (Yin, 2008, p.18) 
 
I will deal with the technical points of data collection and analysis in more detail below as I 
discuss my research design.  What is particularly important here, and what this part of Yin’s 
definition nicely illustrates, is that case study is a research strategy in its own right (see also 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Kyburz-Graber, 2004; Meyer, 2001; Robson, 2002; Tellis, 1997a and b).  As 
Robson (2002) puts it “case study is not a flawed experimental design; it is a fundamentally 
different research strategy with its own designs” (p.180, emphasis in original).  Case study as a 
research strategy is an “all-encompassing method…covering the logic of design, data collection 
techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis” (Yin, 2008, p.18).  Until recently, many 
methodological texts did not consider case study a strategy in its own right (Yin, 2008; Robson, 
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2002).  It was to be undertaken only in preparation for or in concert with more “hard-nosed” 
experimental or survey research (Robson, 2002).  According to Yin, many social scientists 
believed – and still believe - that case studies are only appropriate in the exploratory phase of 
research.  Importantly, however, it is increasingly recognized that there is no “hierarchy” of 
strategies.  Each research strategy has distinct advantages in particular situations and each can be 
used for the three purposes of research: exploration, explanation, and description (Yin, 2008; 
Tellis, 1997b).  Most significantly, each, including case study, has its own distinct logic of 








Even if some critics now accept the inherent value of case study as a research strategy, 
there is still a prevailing view that case study is a somewhat less desirable form of strategy 
compared to experiments or surveys.  Yin (2008) outlines three common concerns.  What Yin 
(2008) labels as the “perhaps the greatest concern” is the lack of rigour in case study research 
(p.10).  As he states,  
too many times, the case study investigator has been sloppy, has not followed systematic 
procedures, or has allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction 
of the findings or conclusions.  Such lack of rigour is less likely to be present when using 
the other methods – possibly because of the existence of numerous methodological texts 
providing investigators with specific procedures to be followed.  In contrast, only a small 
(though increasing) number of texts besides the present one cover the case study method 
in similar fashion. (p.14) 
 
Meyer (2001) and Hakim (2000) see this lack of guidance from texts as to specific design 
decisions as both a blessing and a curse.  According to them, it can be a good thing because it 
results in a great deal of flexibility, in particular allowing the “tailoring [of] the design and data 
collection procedures to the research questions” (Meyer, 2001, p. 329).  On the other hand, they 
both acknowledge that, as mentioned above by Yin, this flexibility has led to sloppiness, with 
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researchers failing to systematically address design, data collection, and data analysis decisions.  
Hakim (2000) comments that “precisely because they are flexible, they are open to sloppy 
use…” (p.70).  Meyer (2001) mentions that the methodology sections of published case studies 
are far too limited and fail to give the reader a detailed “map” as to the decisions taken in the 
process of planning and conducting the research.  As Meyer (2001) states, “this approach has 
resulted in many poor case studies, leaving it open to criticism, especially from the quantitative 
field of research” (pp.329-330).   
 In order to address this criticism, Yin (2008), Meyer (2001), Robson (2002) and Hakim 
(2000) all suggest that special effort needs to be made when conducting a case study to 
documenting the decisions made and procedures followed from the design stage through to the 
reporting stage.  As Meyer (2001) states, 
I believe that there is a need for articles that provide a comprehensive overview of the 
case study process from the researcher’s perspective, emphasizing methodological 
considerations.  This implies addressing the whole range of choices concerning specific 
design requirements, data collection procedures, data analysis, and validity and 
reliability. (p.330) 
 
As such, I have attempted in this chapter to heed this suggestion and systematically document 
my decisions at all of the stages mentioned by Meyer (2001). 
A second common criticism of case study as a research strategy is that it is not possible 
to generalize the findings from a specific case to a general population.  The problem with this 
criticism is that it assumes that the goal of case study research is statistical generalization from a 
representative sample to a population.  In actual fact, the cases chosen to study are not chosen 
because they are representative of a broader population (Yin, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Meyer, 
2001).  As Eisenhardt (1989) states, “cases are chosen for theoretical, not statistical 
reasons…The cases may be chosen to replicate previous cases or extend emergent theory, or they 
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may provide examples of polar types” (p.537).  The goal of case study research is to use each 
case to generalize to theoretical propositions, not populations or universes (Yin, 2008; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Meyer, 2001).  Yin (2008) calls this “analytical generalization.”  In this case, 
by identifying factors the led to the adoption of different approaches in Youngstown and in 
Sudbury, I will be extending the broader theoretical issue of how “good planning” principles 
might be adopted in shrinking cities.  This “replication logic” is similar to the logic of 
performing multiple experiments in order to test and strengthen or disprove a theory (Yin, 2008).  
In both instances, I am seeking to help build a theory of how planning happens in shrinking 
cities.  My goal is thus analytical, not statistical, generalization. 
Finally, Yin (2008) identifies as a common criticism of case studies the assertion that 
they take too long and that they “result in massive, unreadable documents” (p.15).  While Yin 
admits that this may have been the situation for previous case studies, he outlines methods of 
writing up case studies that, if utilized, would aid the researcher in producing readable 
documents rather than lengthy narratives.  Meyer (2001) also provides suggestions for effective 
and efficient case-study write-ups.  I outline some of these strategies and discuss the method I 
chose below.  In terms of case studies taking too long, in my opinion, having research questions 
that are answerable in the time allotted to complete the case study (whether that time limit is self-
imposed or determined by a “higher power”, for example, by a funding agency or by university 
regulations) goes a long way to allaying those concerns about the possibility of falling into a 
long, drawn-out case study process.  When defining my research questions and sub-questions, I 
tried to identify questions that I could reasonably answer in the time I was provided to complete 
my thesis.  I also believe that having a well-defined research design helped me to keep on track, 







Prior to discussing how my research was designed and carried out, it is important to note 
that designing and conducting a case study is a highly iterative process.  Palys and Atchison 
(2008) define an “iterative process” as follows: 
an iterative process is one that is cyclical but not merely repetitive.  Instead, the term also 
connotes increasing sophistication or change, as in a feedback loop, where each 
successive pass is different from the one preceding.  In that sense, to describe a process as 
iterative is to suggest more the form of a spiral than that of a circle, with each cycle 
taking us a little further in some identifiable direction. (p.308) 
 
At each step in the research process, the researcher may return to an earlier step.  For instance, a 
researcher may visit and revisit the research site, performing interviews and re-interviews so that 
each repetition takes the researcher “closer to an increasingly well-defined goal” (Palys & 
Atchison, 2008, p.308).  The research question may also shift in the process of conducting the 
case study, sending the researcher back into the field to collect additional data (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  As well, certain steps – most commonly the data collection and data analysis steps 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) – may overlap.  In addition to being an iterative process, and although case 
studies are widely used in many disciplines, it is also important to once again note the existence 
of only a few models for designing case studies – the “how-to” literature is sparse and the 
information presented in the methodology section of published case study research is, most of 
the time, inadequate.  It is thus particularly important, as mentioned above, to be explicit about 
the choices made and the reasons for those choices.  With this context in mind, I now turn to my 
design decisions, following a combination of the steps as laid out by Meyer (2001), Yin (2008) 










The first decision that I made was a fundamental one.  What exactly is “the case” or unit 
of analysis?  A case can be many things: a situation, an individual, a group, an organization, a 
project, a decision, an implementation process, etc… (Robson, 2002; Yin, 2008)  According to 
Yin (2008), “as a general guide, your tentative definition of the unit of analysis (and therefore of 
the case) is related to the way you have defined your initial research questions” (p.30).  As well, 
Yin (2008) suggests that, when choosing a case, the researcher should keep the available 
research literature in mind.  Presumably, a researcher will want to compare their findings with 
others; for this reason, the unit of analysis or case should be similar to those in previous studies.  
“In this manner,” Yin (2008) states, “the previous literature also can become a guide for defining 
the case and unit of analysis” (p.33).  In my study, the objective of my study is to examine in 
detail how a city arrives at a policy approach to deal with population decline and what factors 
shaped the decision to adopt this approach.  These objectives and the resulting research questions 
point towards using cities as case studies.  In addition, as was seen in Chapter 1, much of the 
research on shrinking cities involves case studies of cities.  As such, I chose to conduct my study 
using cities as cases. 
 Importantly, though, while I chose cities to comprise my cases, I also chose to examine 
sub-units of analysis within these cities.  According to Yin (2008), case studies may be either 
holistic or embedded. A holistic case study examines the entire nature of the case study, while 
an embedded case study gives attention to subunits.  Yin (2008) provides this example of an 
embedded case study: “even though a case study might be about a single organization, such as a 
hospital, the analysis might include outcomes about the clinical services and staff employed by 
the hospital (and possibly even some quantitative analyses based on the employee records of the 
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staff” (p.50).  Yin (2008) explains that both types of case studies are more or less advantageous 
in different situations.  For example, a holistic case study is appropriate when there are no logical 
sub-units to study.  An embedded design is thus appropriate when there are identifiable sub-units 
and it can “serve as an important device for focusing a case study inquiry” (Yin, 2008, p.52). In 
my study, in addition to examining each city’s approach to population decline, I chose to 
examine more closely and form conclusions about the role of planners in shrinking cities.  Thus, 
I chose an embedded case study design, making sure to keep in mind Yin’s (2008) caution that if 
such a design is chosen, the researcher has to ensure that the analysis does not end up focusing 





Case studies can include single or multiple cases.  For many research issues, it possible 
and, in fact, appropriate to conduct a case study using a single case.  Yin (2008) provides 
examples of such issues.  For instance, a single case study design might be appropriate for testing 
theory in an extreme or unique case, such as a case study of an individual with a rare disease, 
where the goal is to gain information from each new person who contracts the disease.  As well, 
a single case design might be appropriate in a longitudinal study, where the case is studied at two 
or more points in time.  In most instances, however, it is desirable to include more than one case.  
Keeping in mind the replication logic discussed above, conducting multiple cases is like 
conducting multiple experiments.  As more cases are added and the findings are replicated, the 
findings are more compelling and more robust (Yin, 2008).  As Hakim (2000) states:  
…confidence in the generalisability of the results of a case study design increases with 
the number of cases covered, with the greatest proportional gains being achieved when 
the number of cases is increased from one to two, three, or more.  When the number of 
cases remains small, there is an advantage in selecting them so as to cover the known 




Thus, when a pattern is replicated in more than one case, the researcher can be more confident 
about the robustness of the theory (Tellis, 1997b).  As such, as Yin (2008) encourages, 
“…having at least two cases should be your goal” (p.62).  According to Hakim, this is 
particularly true in the study of communities: “while most studies focus on a single location, the 
strongest designs involve the comparative study of two or more communities” (p.63). 
 For these reasons, I chose to conduct my study using more than one case.  In deciding to 
examine two cases and not more (which would have added further confidence to the findings), I 
heeded Meyer’s (2001) and Hakim’s (2000) caution that while multiple cases are desirable, the 
researcher needs to balance the benefits of including more and more cases with the desire for 
depth and with practical considerations, such as cost and time constraints.  In Meyer’s (2001) 
case study of organizational integration in mergers and acquisitions in Norway, she chose to 
focus on two cases because that allowed for “comparison and contrast between cases as well as a 
deeper and richer look at each case” (p.333).  In my study, given the time allotted and the 
resources available, I decided that I could conduct two case studies at an appropriate level of 





After deciding on a number of cases, I then chose the actual sites.  The selection of cases 
is an important issue in conducting a case study.  As mentioned above, cases are chosen for 
theoretical, not statistical reasons.  That is, cases are selected because they replicate or disprove 
emergent theoretical propositions, not because they are representative of a population or 
universe.  In particular, according to Yin (2008), “each case must be carefully selected so that it 
either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons (a theoretical replication)” (p.54).  Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that if only a 
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limited number of cases are being studied, the researcher should choose cases that are extreme 
situations and polar types “in which the process of interest is ‘transparently observable’” (p.537).  
In my particular area of research, case studies of polar examples are often used.  For example, 
Leo and Anderson (2006) contrast urban development policies in a rapidly growing city 
(Vancouver) and a slowly growing city (Winnipeg).  Pallagst (2005) examines responses to 
population decline in Youngstown, Pittsburgh, and San Jose, each of which is pursuing very 
different strategies.  Grossman (2004) similarly contrasts planning approaches to decline in 
Pittsburgh (which continues to pursue growth strategies) and Chemnitz (which is systematically 
“reducing” the city). 
As such, I chose to focus on two polar examples: Youngstown, which has ostensibly 
begun to move away from traditional “growth-oriented” approaches, and Sudbury, which 
continues to pursue growth-oriented strategies despite predictions of continued long-term 
population decline.  I chose the Sudbury case study first, as I had done previous research on the 
economic, labour force, and land use impacts of the call centre industry in Sudbury and thus was 
familiar with Sudbury officials’ “growth is the only option” approach to planning the city’s 
future.  In addition, as a result of my work on Sudbury’s call centre industry, I had established a 
network of government, business, and labour contacts I was able to re-contact for this research.   
Sudbury is also my hometown and I was thus familiar with the demographic decline faced by the 
city as well as its various attempts to address it.  Of course, this raises the issue of the possibility 
of bias on my part, which I deal with below in section 3.4. After choosing the Sudbury case 
study, I then focused on choosing another city whose approach to planning was a polar opposite 
to Sudbury’s.  I knew from media reports and recent academic research (for instance, that of 
Pallagst, 2005) that the recently-adopted Youngtown 2010 Plan was being touted as something 
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“new” and “different” in the world of planning shrinking cities in that it deviated away from the 
traditional growth paradigm.  Further investigation revealed that Youngstown is one of the only 
(if not the only) shrinking city in North America to have so publicly, in an Official Plan, adopted 
a “smart decline” approach.  Thus, the approach taken in the Youngstown 2010 Plan was a 
logical choice for a case study that was in polar opposition to Sudbury’s more traditional “going 
for growth” approach.  Further cementing my choice of case studies was the fact that both cases 
are in two different countries, which would allow me to examine whether the policy context at 
the regional, state/provincial, and national levels within which each city exists played a role in 
the adoption of each strategy. Furthermore, each city has codified its approach in recently-
adopted official plans.  In practical terms, this made each city’s strategy, in Eisenhardt’s words, 
“transparently observable” and it also made it easier for me to get in touch with the people 
involved (most are still working in the same positions they did when the plan was formed) to talk 
to them about a process that is still relatively fresh in their minds.   
It is important at this point to note that with my choice of case studies come limitations.  
For instance, Sudbury and Youngstown have each experienced very different levels of decline.  
Sudbury’s long-term population decline has been much slower and much less drastic.  As such, it 
does not face the same pressing physical issues such as how to deal with the large amount of 
vacant property.  However, this difference does highlight, as will be seen in Chapter 7, the fact 
that the level of physical decline influences a city’s decision to adopt or not adopt a “smart 
decline” approach.  As well, Sudbury is a mining town and mining remains a productive 
industry.  Youngstown was a steel town and the steel industry has virtually abandoned the city.  
Thus, there may be issues of comparability in this sense.  However, I would argue that both are 
(or were) single industry towns (regardless of industry) and once again, the fact that the single 
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industry remains viable in Sudbury (of course with the characteristic upswings and downturns) 
highlights the dependence of Sudbury planners on that industry to determine the city’s future, not 
on their Official Plan policies, and the freedom of Youngstown planners to “chart their own 
course.”  All in all, I believe that the limitations on comparability of my case study choices are 
outweighed by the insights that their comparison provides and indeed, some of these limitations 




For all of these reasons, then, I chose to an embedded, multiple-case design to carry out 
my research.  In other words, I chose to compare two cases (the polar examples of Youngstown 
and Sudbury) in context using more than one unit of analysis.  This type of design is illustrated 
in contrast with others types of case study designs by Yin (2008). 
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In order to answer my research questions using the embedded, multiple case study 
design, I needed to decide what types of evidence I would seek.  In other words, would my 
conclusions be based only on words (i.e. qualitative evidence) or numbers (i.e. quantitative 
evidence) or both?  Although case studies are often equated with purely qualitative research, it is 
possible, and indeed desirable, to include both sources of evidence in a case study (Yin, 2008; 
 
14 Source: Yin (2008), p.46. 
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Kyburz-Graber, 2004; Robson, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hakim, 2000; White, 2004) “instead of 
privileging one over the other” (White, 2004, p.247).  This approach is found in most place-
based studies of urban economic and demographic decline.  For example, Polese & Shearmur 
(2006) use both quantitative and qualitative evidence in their examination of 5 peripheral 
declining regions in Eastern Canada.  As Eisenhardt (1989) explains, the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative data 
can be highly synergistic.  Quantitative evidence can indicate relationships which may 
not be salient to the researcher.  It also can keep researchers from being carried away by 
vivid, but false, impressions in the qualitative data, and it can bolster findings when it 
corroborates those findings from qualitative evidence.  The qualitative data are useful for 
understanding the rationale or theory underlying relationships revealed in the quantitative 
data or may suggest directly theory which can then be strengthened by quantitative 
support…” 
 
Thus, in this study, I adopted a quantitative-qualitative approach in which I used quantitative 
data to uncover broad economic, land use, and demographic trends and qualitative data to 
provide a contextualized narrative of economic and demographic decline in each city and the 






There are many possible sources of evidence in case studies.  Six of the most important 
are identified by Yin (2008): documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant observation, and physical artefacts.  While a case study could rely solely on one 
source of evidence, this is not recommended (Yin 2008; Meyer, 2001; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hakim, 
2000; Kyburz-Graber, 2004; Tellis, 1997a; Tellis, 1997b).  Indeed, one of the major strengths of 
the case study as a research strategy is its ability to incorporate multiple sources of evidence.  
Doing so allows the researcher to achieve triangulation, which “provides stronger substantiation 
of constructs and hypotheses” (Meyer, 2001, p.336).  Yin (2008) explains the concept of 
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triangulation as the “development of converging lines of inquiry,” which is desirable because 
“…any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate 
if it is based on several different sources of information…” (p.116).   Thus, following Yin’s 
(2008) suggestion that a good case study will “want to use as many sources as possible,” (p.101) 
– subject, of course, to constraints in time, monetary resources, and access (Meyer, 2001; Yin, 
2008) – my sources of evidence include documents, archival records, interviews, direct 





Documents were a large source of information in this case study.  I used a variety of 
documents, including official plans, written reports, minutes of meetings, government 
documents, newspaper articles, and community newsletter articles.  I selected documents based 
on their relevance to my research questions.  Most of the documents were accessed over the 
internet; however, I also spent time at the local libraries in Youngstown and Sudbury.  In 
addition, I was given documents during my interviews.  These documents were useful for a 
number of reasons.  First, they provided me with an overview of the general situation in each city 
as regards to population decline and strategies pursued.  Second, reading the documents helped 
me to identify questions to be asked during interviews.  Third, the documents provided basic 
facts about people and events (e.g. titles of interviewees, timelines, etc…), allowing me to focus 
interviews more on the interviewees’ views and opinions.  Fourth, the documents provided 
corroboration for other sources of evidence (e.g. the correct spelling of names and titles).  In 
using documents, I of course had to keep in mind that documents are not always accurate and 
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they could be biased.  For that reason, I paid special attention to who wrote the document and for 




In terms of archival records, I used as evidence in this study primarily maps and census 
records.  The majority of quantitative evidence came from archival records, particularly census 
records and government data.  Thus, archival records were particularly useful in identifying 
broad economic, land use, and demographic trends.  They were also useful for the same reasons 
that the documents were useful: providing a basis for interview questions and providing 
corroboration of other sources of evidence.  Again, as with documents, I was careful to keep in 
mind who produced the data and for what reason when judging its usefulness and accuracy.  As 
Yin (2008) states, “…archival records can be highly quantitative, but numbers alone should not 





Interviews were an essential source of information in this case study. Conducting 
interviews was at once the most rewarding and the most challenging aspect of conducting this 
case study.  I conducted 28 interviews during my three visits to Youngstown and my several (at 




As Yin (2008) states, “key informants are often critical to the success of a case study.  
Such persons provide the case study investigator with insights into a matter and also can initiate 
access to corroboratory or contrary sources of evidence” (p.107).  For each case study I selected 
key informants based on a review of documents and web sites, contacting them initially either by 
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phone or email.  I also identified key informants using the “snowball technique;” that is, at the 
end of each interview, I asked the informant if they could suggest any further informants who 
might be knowledgeable about the issues in my case study.  As I wanted to do as many 
interviews as possible on my field trips, I also asked informants when I was arranging on-site 
interviews if they could suggest people I should talk to while I was in town.  When informants 
started suggesting the same group of people I had already spoken to, I felt confident that I had 
spoken to a sufficient range of key informants.  I spoke to as wide a range of informants as 
possible, purposely seeking informants with diverse or contrary views in order to obtain a 




In terms of practicalities, prior to conducting the interviews, I received Ethics clearance 
from the University of Waterloo’s Office of Human Research according to the Guidelines for 
Research with Human Participants.  In the process of completing the ethics application, I dealt 
with the issue of informed consent, developing a consent form with dealt with such issues as 
consent to use the informant’s name in my thesis and consent to tape record.  With respect to the 
issue of consent to be named, prior to conducting the interview, I gave the interviewees the 
choice to either be named in the thesis and have their quotes attributed to them or to remain 
anonymous and have their quotes remain unattributed.  In explaining these options to the 
interviewees, I encouraged them to make whatever decision would allow them to speak most 
freely.  That is, I would rather obtain “the real story” and have it remain anonymous than obtain 
only limited information that I could attribute to a certain source.  Some informants chose to be 
named in the thesis and others did not.  Furthermore, some decided that parts of what they said 
could be attributed, while other parts could not.  For this reason, out of an abundance of caution, 
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I decided to keep all of the interviews anonymous.  With respect to tape-recording, all 
interviewees agreed to be tape recorded.  As Hancock and Algozzine (2006) state, “the best way 
to record interview data is to audiotape the interaction” (p.40).   I found tape-recording very 
helpful in that it ensured an accurate rendition of the interviews.  I was only unable to record one 
interview, not for lack of consent, but because of problems with the tape recorder.  For that 





Most of the interviews were conducted in person at the interviewee’s place of work.  One 
interview was conducted in Youngstown’s public library.  Where an in-person interview was not 
possible (for example, if an informant was not available when I was at the case study site or it 
was impossible for me to travel to their place of work, such as for my interview with a planner in 
New York City), I conducted interviews over the phone, which I also tape-recorded.  Wherever 
possible, though, I tried to talk to the interviewees in person as it was easier to establish a rapport 




As is most common in case studies (Yin, 2008), the interviews I conducted were semi-
structured and open-ended in nature.  I developed a list of questions for each interviewee which 
were aimed at addressing my research questions and which were derived from information I 
gathered from documents and other interviews.  I asked for both facts of the matter and opinions.  
I asked these pre-determined questions at the interviews, but I also asked follow-up questions 
based on the interviewee’s responses.  In fact, I found that the most fruitful discussions were the 
unplanned discussions.  For this reason, I tried to keep the pre-determined questions to a 
minimum.  Some interviewees (particularly those in political office) asked for the list of pre-
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determined questions beforehand, which I provided to them, along with the warning that I would 





At the end of the interview, I asked each informant if I could contact them for a follow-up 
interview if need be.  After transcribing interviews, reviewing more documents, and speaking to 
more people, I found that it was necessary to re-interview people in order to obtain clarification 
or additional information.  In fact, I conducted several follow-up interviews.  I found these 
interviews very helpful because, having already dealt with introductory issues in the first 





Several visits to the case study sites provided me the opportunity for direct observation.  
These observations were largely informal and involved driving around each city, taking field 
notes about my observations (which are basically a stream of consciousness commentary of what 
I was observing), and taking pictures.  In Youngstown, a zoning officer gave me a two hour long 
guided tour of neighbourhoods in varied states, from stable to declining.  I found the tour very 
informative as it, borrowing from Yin’s (2008) comments about the benefits of direct 
observation, “add[ed] new dimensions for understanding” the context of the development of the 
“positive decline” strategy and the effects of the strategy itself (p.110).  I could not appreciate the 





My final source of evidence in this study was websites and videos.  Of course, all the 
caveats about documents and archival records apply equally to documents found on websites.  
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As mentioned above, several documents, particularly newspaper and other popular media 
articles, were obtained by searching websites.  I also looked at city websites, community group 
websites, and the websites of various levels of government.  The City of Youngstown developed 
a website devoted to progress on the Youngstown 2010 plan and I found this site particularly 
helpful as it contained links to videotapes of town hall meetings, presentations, and design 
charrettes dealing with the Youngstown 2010 plan.  It was very beneficial to me to be able to 
observe, for instance, the town hall meeting when the 2010 plan was unveiled and the urban 
design charrette where students from Kent State University worked with residents of a 
Youngstown neighbourhood in developing a vision of how the neighbourhood should look in the 






I found some aspects of the data collection process particularly challenging.  First, the 
issue of scheduling interviews was often difficult as I only had a limited amount of time I could 
spend at the case study sites.  As such, arranging times for interviews involved a lot of 
“juggling” and when a potential interviewee was not available during my visit, I had to do the 
interview by phone.  Second, with respect to those interviewees who chose to let me use their 
name in the thesis, I felt at times as if I was not getting the “whole picture” when I asked for the 
interviewee’s opinions on certain matters.  A few interviewees seemed to be choosing their 
words carefully for fear of saying something they would later regret.  Finally, there were times in 
Youngstown when I felt unsafe driving through neighbourhoods and taking pictures.  
Youngstown does, in fact, have a high crime rate.  One of the interviewees told us we were lucky 
to not encounter one of the “crackheads” downtown who routinely ask people to give them five 
dollars to watch their car while it is parked.  Another interviewee pointed out to me 
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neighbourhoods that she would never go to, day or night, for fear of being mugged.  As such, I 
made sure to always “bring a buddy” (my husband), but this, of course, meant that I also had to 
schedule trips around his schedule.  The feeling of lack of safety also resulted in my doing some 
observations from the car, which meant that I could not get as close to what I was observing as I 
would have liked.  Despite these challenges, however, I found that the process of data collection, 
particularly the interviews and field visits, resulted in a rich collection of data, from which I 





In conducting a case study, it is important to have a general analytic strategy, explained 
by Yin (2008) as “defining priorities for what to analyze and why” (p.126).  As with the 
preceding steps in conducting a case study, the literature on case studies provides little guidance 
in this area, a fact that is confirmed by Yin (2008): “analyzing case study evidence is especially 
difficult because the strategies and techniques have not been well defined” (p.126).  In order to 
address this deficiency, Yin (2008) outlines three general strategies: relying on theoretical 
propositions, thinking about rival explanations, using both qualitative and quantitative data, and 
developing a case description.  According to Yin (2008), the last strategy is less preferable and 
should be used only when theoretical propositions and rival explanations are difficult to identify.  
As this was not the situation in my case, I chose the first strategy: relying on theoretical 
propositions, while also attempting, wherever possible, to identify rival explanations.  Using this 
strategy meant that my theoretical propositions, and the research questions based on them, 
guided my case study analysis, focusing attention on certain data and allowing me to ignore other 







In preparing the data for analysis, I maintained a case study database, as per Yin’s (2008) 
suggestion, which included case study notes, case study documents, tabular materials, and 
interview transcripts.  Most of the case study notes (transcribed from hand-written field notes) 
and all of the tabular materials and interview transcripts (as well as the original digital voice 
files) were kept in a “dissertation” file on my computer.  I transcribed all of the interviews 
myself which, although time consuming, as Meyer (2001) states, gave me a “good grasp of the 
data” (p.338).  Paper copies of case study documents and hand-written case study notes were 
filed according to subject in a filing cabinet in my home office.  In order to manage the large 
volume of case study documents, I created, again as per Yin’s (2008) suggestion, an annotated 





Taken together, the suggestions put forth by Meyer (2001), Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin 
(2008) provided me with the steps for analyzing my data using my general analytic strategy in 
order to reach my conclusions. 
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The first step in my data analysis process was the coding of data into themes.  I derived 
the themes from my research questions and sub-questions. Themes also arose in the coding 
process itself.  The broad themes largely revolved around the four principles of “good planning” 
in shrinking cities and sub-themes arose from those.  For instance, I searched transcripts for 
passages dealing with the “role of the planner” in developing each plan and I also looked for 






The next step in my data analysis process involved writing up each case separately using 
the aforementioned themes.  This step was necessary in order to deal with the large volume of 
data (Eisenhardt, 1989).  It also enabled me to become “intimately familiar with each case as a 
stand-alone entity” (Eisenhardt, 1989; see also Meyer, 2001).  This familiarity is important 
because, as Eisenhardt (1989) states, it “allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge before 
investigators push to generalize patterns across cases… [This familiarity], in turn, accelerates 
cross-case comparison” (p.540).  During this step, case study documents were used primarily to 
establish the facts and interviews were used primarily to give input into perceptions and reactions 
(although some documents also provided perceptions and some interviews also provided facts).  
The themes I used helped to focus the case and helped me to develop a framework that could be 





After I became familiar with each case as an individual, I then compared the two cases 
according to my previously determined themes as well as themes that emerged during the within-
case analysis.  Within these themes, I looked for similarities and differences.  This method of 
carrying out a cross-case comparison is one of three15 suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) who 
emphasizes the importance of the use of systematic cross-case comparison techniques: 
overall, the idea behind these cross-case searching tactics is to force investigators to go 
beyond initial impressions, especially through the use of structured and diverse lenses on 
the data.  These tactics improve the likelihood of accurate and reliable theory, that is, a 
theory with a close fit with the data.  Also, cross-case searching tactics enhance the 
probability that the investigators will capture the novel findings which may exist in the 
data. (p.541) 
 
15 The other two methods suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) involve first, comparing pairs of cases (when a large 
number of cases is involved) and second, dividing data by data source and looking for patterns. 
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Since, in the next stage, I employed Yin’s (2008) “pattern matching” technique – which 
he describes as “one of the most desirable techniques” for case study analysis (p.136) – at this 
point my goal was to identify similarities and differences in the patterns of each case, in 




In this final step of the data analysis process, I compared the similarities and differences 
in the patterns I identified with the relevant theory identified in my literature review.   The logic 
of this pattern-matching technique is to compare “an empirically based pattern with a predicted 
one” (Yin, 2008, p.136).  As Meyer (2001) states, “this comparison of emergent concepts, 
theory, or hypothesis with the extant literature involves asking what it is similar to, what it 
contradicts, and why…” (pp.342-343). In this process, I identified which similarities and 
differences in the patterns of each case could be explained by theory and, importantly, which 
patterns could not.  The latter was especially important because, as Palys and Atchison (2008) 
caution, “…the researcher is compelled not only to try to create an account that ‘explains’ the 
data, but also to try to consider all the various reasons why that account might not be true” 
(p.316, emphasis in original). 
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A case study, like any other type of research, must meet certain “tests” in order to be 
considered “good quality” or rigorous research.  In the context of case studies, Yin (2008) 
discusses four tests commonly used for all types of research: construct validity, internal validity, 
generalizability, and reliability.  Meyer (2001) adds a fifth test: objectivity.  I employed 
measures suggested by Yin (2008), Meyer (2001), and others at all stages of my case research in 






The issue of construct validity is “especially challenging in case study research” (Yin, 
2008, p.41).  Threats to construct validity occur when the researcher “fails to develop a 
sufficiently operational set of measures [and uses] ‘subjective’ judgments…to collect the data” 
(p.41).  In other words, a study lacks construct validity when the research findings fail to 
accurately reflect the phenomenon being studied.  In order to avoid this pitfall and to meet the 
test of construct validity, Yin (2008) provides two steps: 
1.  Select the specific types of changes that are to be studied (and relate them to the 
original objectives of the study) and 
 
2. Demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific 
types of change that have been studied. (p.42) 
 
In order to fulfill these two steps, Yin (2008) and Meyer (2001) recommend employing several 
tactics, each of which is relevant at various stages in the research process: triangulation, 
establishing a chain of evidence, considering the comments of key informants, and using 
feedback loops.  First, as discussed above, triangulation, most relevant in the data collection 
phase, involves using multiple sources of evidence to establish a converging line of inquiry.  
Second, establishing a chain of evidence, also relevant in the data collection phase, involves 
including sufficient citation in the report to the relevant portions of the case study database 
which, “upon inspection, should reveal the actual evidence and also indicate the circumstances 
under which the evidence was collected – for example, the time and place of an interview” (Yin, 
2008, p.123).  Third, considering the comments of key informants involves distributing a draft 
case study report to key informants for their review.  Fourth, using feedback loops involves 
returning to interviewees for further clarification if their comments reveal contradictions in the 
data.   
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In this study, I attempted to incorporate all of these tools in order to meet the test of 
construct validity.  First, in choosing to examine the planning strategies in two shrinking cities, I 
relied on multiple sources of evidence, including the background literature, documents, 
interviews, direct observation, and archival records.  In evaluating how each planning strategy 
meets the criteria of “good planning” in shrinking cities, I again relied on multiples sources of 
evidence (being careful to maintain a chain of evidence).   Where necessary, I re-interviewed 
selected informants when I needed clarification; that is, where their comments revealed 
inconsistencies in the data.  Where the comments simply revealed a difference of opinion, I took 
those comments into account but did not necessarily make changes to the draft.   Using each of 





The second test of research quality is internal validity.  According to Patton (1986), 
“internal validity, in its narrowest sense refers to certainty about cause and effect.  Did X cause 
Y?  In a broader sense, it refers to the ‘trustworthiness of an inference’…, in a sense that one is 
reasonably confident about an interpretation” (p.234).  In order to avoid making any unjustified 
inferences, I employed two of the tools suggested by Yin (2008) to increase my confidence that 
my inferences were indeed correct: pattern matching and addressing rival explanations.  I also 
kept in mind Meyer’s (2001) caution that “the main problem with internal validity as a criterion 
in qualitative research is that it is often not open to scrutiny” (p.346).  As such, I was careful to 
document my processes of data collection and analysis, chains of evidence, and my interpretive 






The third test deals with the generalizability (sometimes referred to as “external validity”) 
of the study.  Are the study’s findings “generalizable beyond the immediate case study?” (Yin, 
2008, p.43)  This is the point on which case studies are often criticized: “critics typically state 
that single cases offer a poor basis for generalizing” (Yin, 2008, p.43).  However, as was 
emphasized earlier in this chapter, this criticism mistakenly assumes that the goal of case study 
research is to generalize from a representative sample to population.  In case studies, the goal is 
not statistical generalization but analytical generalization, or generalization of “a particular set of 
results to some broader theory” (Yin, 2008, p.43).  If multiple cases (versus a single case) are 
used because they will produce similar results (literal replication) or different results for a 
predictable reason (theoretical replication), this provides stronger support for the theory.  As Yin 
(2008) explains, “this replication logic is the same that underlies the use of experiments…” 
(p.44). Thus, in this study, I opted to examine two polar cases, expecting to achieve theoretical 
replication.  For reasons mentioned above, including cost and time constraints, I was unable to 
include more cases, even though this would have even further strengthened my analytical 
generalizations.  In providing rich description of the context of each case, I provided a basis upon 
which other cities could determine if the theory would apply in their case. 
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While each type of validity concerns the meaning and meaningfulness of the data, the 
fourth test of research quality focuses on the consistency of the results (Patton, 1986).  In 
essence, reliability concerns whether or not the same study, carried out by different researchers, 
would result in the same findings.  As Yin (2008) describes:  
the objective is to be sure that if a later investigator followed the same procedures as 
described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same case study all over again, the 
later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions.  (Note that the 
emphasis is on doing the same case over again, not on “replicating” the results off one 
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case by doing another case study.)  The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and 
biases in a study. (p.45, emphasis in original) 
 
Patton (1986) confirms that reliability “concerns the problem of error in data collection” (p.228). 
In order to achieve reliability, Yin (2008) and Meyer (2001) emphasize that it is essential 
to document procedures followed in case studies.  As mentioned above, most case study reports 
are deficient in this respect and this lack of documentation – and hence, lack of reliability – has 
been a major criticisms of case studies.  In this chapter, I have attempted to provide detailed 
documentation of my case study procedures.  In other chapters, I have attempted to provide a 
detailed description of how I reached my findings.  I have, as suggested by Yin (2008), 
attempted to “make as many steps as operational as possible and to conduct [this case study] as if 
someone were always looking over [my] shoulder” (p.45). 
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The last test plays a role in all of the others just discussed, but its importance has led me, 
following Meyer’s (2001) example, to deal with it separately.  According to Meyer (2001), the 
basic issue here is “relative neutrality and reasonable freedom from unacknowledged research 
biases” (p.344).  In conducting any kind of research, the researcher is in danger of losing 
objectivity by becoming too involved with the people or organizations and becoming an 
“advocate” versus an “observer.”  Of course, some level of closeness with the research subjects 
is helpful in order to establish trust which may help in gaining access to information and other 
key informants.  Indeed, in this study, I feel that I was able to establish a relationship with the 
key informants which led them to trust me enough to provide me with information they may not 
otherwise have divulged and to provide me with the contact information for other key 
informants.  I believe that the fact that my hometown is Sudbury helped me to gain access to 
many key informants in Sudbury as I was not seen as an “outsider.”  I also believe that the fact 
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that my hometown is a city which has lost population also helped me to gain access to key 
informants in Youngstown as many Youngstown informants seemed interested in learning about 
the planning strategies of a Canadian city in a similar situation and they also seemed to believe 
that I would be more understanding of the issues faced by Youngstown.  
 That being said, since my hometown is Sudbury, I needed to be careful that my findings 
with respect to Sudbury were “not simply a product of [my] prejudices and prior experience” 
(Meyer, 2001, p.344).  I have not lived in Sudbury since 1994, so I believe that my absence 
allowed me to gain some “outsider” perspective on recent planning initiatives.  Following 
Meyer’s (2001) suggestions to counteract biases in case studies, I made an effort to state any 
potential presuppositions and to set aside these presuppositions.  I also made a point to actively 
seek out evidence that conflicted with previous evidence and to consider rival conclusions.  I feel 
confident that I made every effort to acknowledge, document, and counteract any possible biases. 
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I chose to answer my research questions using case study as my research strategy.  I 
designed an embedded, multi-case design and collected a mix of quantitative and qualitative data 
using documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, and multimedia materials.  
Data was analyzed using several steps, including coding, writing up and analyzing each case, 
comparing the cases with each other, and comparing the cases with the theory.  The primary tool 
used in this process was pattern matching.  Throughout the case study process, I took measures 
which would enhance the validity and reliability of the research so that the product would be a 











At the turn of the millennium, the City of Youngstown embarked on a visioning and 
comprehensive planning exercise, the results of which have garnered national and international 
attention.  Once the poster child for the effects of rust belt decline, the City of Youngstown is 
now drawing attention from similarly struggling cities searching for new ways to address their 
persisting physical, economic, social, and environmental issues.  What has drawn the most 
attention has been the City’s willingness to admit that it has a smaller population and its land-use 
policies which call for reducing its physical structures and infrastructure accordingly.  While the 
admission that the city is not the size it used to be may not seem revolutionary to some, as was 
argued in previous chapters, this is hardly the norm in the field of urban planning, the theories, 
models, and tools of which tend to be focused on growth.   From its inception, the discipline of 
urban planning has dealt almost exclusively with how to manage growth and its corresponding 
issues such as the increased demand for infrastructure, not decline, which brings with it an 
entirely different set of issues including vacant buildings and surplus infrastructure.     
 In effectively “right-sizing” the city to match its currently population levels, the City of 
Youngstown seems to be charting new territory in its 2010 Plan.  As will be seen in Chapter 7, 
on closer inspection, the argument that the city is somehow “shaking the growth paradigm” 
seems to apply only to the Plan’s land-use policies; even then, the hope for eventual growth 
remains in the background.  In fact, Youngstown 2010’s economic and environmental strategies 
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– seeking economic revitalization through attracting new industries (including high tech 
industries) and foreign investment and adding more greenspace – are more commonplace, as is 
the fact that comprehensive social policies are not included as part of an overall integrated plan.  
This will be examined more closely in Chapter 7.  In this chapter, I discuss the context of the 
2010 process (including the physical, economic, social, and environmental challenges the city 
faced as it began the process of creating the 2010 Plan), identify the factors that “sparked” the 







The City of Youngstown is located in the Mahoning Valley of north eastern Ohio, 10 
miles west of the Pennsylvania state line.  It is situated midway between Cleveland (located 65 
miles northwest) and Pittsburgh (located 61 miles southeast) and also, on a broader scale, 
midway between New York City and Chicago. 
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Figure 3: Youngstown, Ohio16 
On a regional level, the City of Youngstown is part of the Youngstown-Warren-Boardman 
Metropolitan Statistical Area17, which encompasses Mahoning and Trumbull Counties in Ohio 
and Mercer County in Pennsylvania.  More locally, the City of Youngstown is the county seat of 
Mahoning County and is bordered by the Mahoning townships of Boardman, Austintown, 
Campbell, Coitsville, and Struthers. The City also extends slightly into Trumbull County to the 
north, and is bordered by such Trumbull townships as Girard, Liberty, and Hubbard. 
 
16 Source: U.S. Census Bureau Reference Maps, 2008. 
17 A Metropolitan Statistical Area is a geographical entity defined by the U.S. government for statistical purposes.   
An MSA contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population, together with surrounding areas that have a high 
degree of economic and social integration with the core.  The definitions of MSAs change periodically and were last 
changed in 2000 (U.S. Census, 2008). 
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Figure 4: Trumbull County18 
Figure 5: Mahoning County19 
The City of Youngstown itself has a total area of 34.2 square miles (88.7 km²) and is made of up 
several distinct neighbourhood and clusters. 
18 Source: www.co.trumbull.oh.us 
19 Source: www.mahoningcountyoh.gov 
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Figure 6: City of Youngstown Neighbourhoods20 
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Youngstown is a former steel town whose downward spiral was triggered by the steel 
industry downturn of the 1960s and 1970s.  According to Linkon & Russo (2002), “Youngstown 
offers a classic case of the rise of industrial America, the importance of economic and social 
struggle, and the human costs of economic restructuring” (p.8).  Indeed, Youngstown was once a 
part of “…the industrial heartland of North America that stretched from western Pennsylvania to 
Wisconsin, and from the Ohio River to the Canadian Shield…[and which] produced most of the 
consumer goods bought by North Americans” (High, 2003, p.5).  Because of deindustrialization, 
 
20 Source: www.youngstown2010.com/plan/final_plan/Ytown2010_chapter2.pdf 
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this “heartland” region – once home to thriving auto, rubber, steel, and agricultural machinery 
industries – is now referred to as the Rust Belt (High, 2003; Safford, 2004).  
Figure 7: The United States Rust Belt21 
Like other older industrial cities in the Rust Belt such as Cleveland and Detroit, and 
indeed like single-industry towns in general, Youngstown’s fortunes have grown and declined 
with the fortunes of the major industry upon which it was built – in Youngstown’s case: the steel 
industry (Safford, 2004; Buss & Redburn, 1983; Faga, 2006).  The first steel mill appeared in the 
Mahoning Valley in the late-1800s; at the time, Youngstown was a village of 3000.  By 1900, the 
population had grown to 45,000 and by the 1960s, it reached its peak population of 166,000.  Up 
to this point, as described by Buss & Redburn (1983): 
Youngstown grew quickly and with minimum attention to amenities not associated with 
steel.  Its reliance on steel has been both its strength and a source of vulnerability.  
During strikes, economic downturns, and especially during the Great Depression of the 
1930s, the city’s people suffered.  Nevertheless, the productivity of the mills, the 
 
21 Source: www.coalcampusa.com 
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struggles of the union, and the prosperity generated by the success and growth of this 
industry and the nation’s entire economy, gave thousands a living and, in time, made 
Youngstown’s steelworkers one of the most productive, best-paid, and seemingly secure 
industrial labor forces in the world. (p.2) 
 
Beginning on September 19, 1977 (referred to as “Black Monday”) with the announcement of 
the impending closure of Youngstown Sheet and Tube’s Campbell works and the layoff of 5000 
workers, the City of Youngstown lost about 50,000 manufacturing jobs in a relatively short 
period of time as Youngstown’s steel industry all but disappeared (Linkon & Russo, 2002; Buss 
& Redburn, 1983; Fuechtmann, 1989; Faga, 2006; Mock, 2008).  The reasons for the steel 
industry decline were many, including sagging profitability, increased labour productivity, 
increased foreign competition, and slackening domestic and international demand (Buss & 
Redburn, 1983).  The loss of these jobs, together with suburban flight which began in the 1950s, 
“…all but devastated the city…” (Faga, 2006, p.54) and began Youngstown’s population decline 
to about half its original size: from 166,000 in 1960 to around 74,000 today.  According to 
Wilson (2007), Youngstown, in its era of prosperity, could never have predicted how hard it 
would fall.  In short, Youngstown has become “…a poster child of post-industrial decline.” 
(Safford, 2004, p.3).  Youngstown informant Y1 – an employee with the City of Youngstown’s 
Finance Department  – describes the decline as follows:  
…you went from a community you felt had prosperity and a future to a community that 
had a 20% unemployment rate and there’s lines for people to get jobs at McDonald’s.  I 
mean, it was just a collapse of almost the American Dream, you know?  You look at it 
and you say there’s a future and there’s a way to make things work … I think we had 20 
miles of mills around the river here and all of a sudden it’s all gone in a period of about 3 
or 4 years and it’s pretty amazing to look at that and say what type of upheaval is going 
to take place because of this?  It’s a huge economic event and so in terms of living it, you 
say to yourself, ok, do you want to stay and fight this battle?  Do you want to go to some 
area of the country that’s more prosperous, you know, and a lot of people said I’m getting 
out.  Probably 80% of my graduating class took off, you know, the ones that were getting 
degrees and had a skill that was wanted in other places in another community, where the 
ones that stayed behind just wanted to fight the fight.  So, I kind of viewed myself as 











At the turn of the millennium, the City of Youngstown embarked on the process of 
creating a new citywide plan in an effort to revitalize the struggling city.  Prior to this, the City 
was operating according to a comprehensive plan that was written in the early 1950s and updated 
only once in 1974.  Unlike the Ontario Government’s mandatory planning requirements under 
the Planning Act (which will be discussed in the next chapter), the State of Ohio, like many other 
states, does not require cities to update, or even have, a comprehensive plan (Finnerty, 2003).  As 
Light (2003) states, “…American land-use planning is weak and usually optional…” (p.25). 
Youngstown informant Y9 – a professor at Youngstown State University – describes Ohio as 
“…a very low impact state.  This is not Florida.  This is not Maryland.  Some of the states 
mandate comprehensive planning.  This state is very hands off about planning…”  Similarly, 
according to Youngstown informant Y7 (a Youngstown State University professor): 
Planning is not a priority in Ohio on any level whatsoever.  Transportation is required by 
the feds so we have our local MPO and they are regional, but that’s only there because in 
order to get federal highway funds, you have to have transportation planning and the state 
participates in that because they want federal highway funds.  But, as far as urban or 
regional planning, no, it’s not required in Ohio…Ohio is a free-for-all state! 
 
In this regard, Youngstown informant Y14 – a high-ranking city official – explains that 
…certainly there are state regulations, requirements with respect to certain things, but 
nothing that would be as specific and definitive as related to planning, especially because 
we are a Charter city, so as a Charter city, we have the ability to exercise certain 
municipal powers that can’t be in conflict with state authority but it can go beyond 
certain state authority.  So, I actually think that might have been helpful had there been 
something [similar to mandatory planning requirements in the Ontario Planning Act]
here. 
 
Typical of land-use regulation in other American cities where comprehensive planning is not 
mandated, Youngstown relied predominantly on zoning, rather than planning (Cullingworth & 
Caves, 2003; Wright & Gitelman, 2000) to regulate land use.  Thus, the city thus lacked a 
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comprehensive vision that was based on up-to-date conditions.  When Youngstown’s original 
plan was drafted, planners in the then-thriving city expected the population to reach between 
200,000 and 250,000 (City of Youngstown, 2005).   Large amounts of land were set aside for 
residential, commercial, and industrial expansion.  After the collapse of the steel industry, the 
lack of appropriate vision and guidance resulted in failed “knee jerk reactions to events outside 
of the City’s control” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.17).  Indeed, at the time the City undertook 
its 2010 planning process it faced of a number of demographic, physical, economic, social, and 








The population of the City of Youngstown has declined steadily from its peak of 166,631 
in 1960 to 73,818 in 2007 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008; City of Youngstown, 2005).  In other 
words, the City has lost well over half of its population since the 1960s.  On average, according 
to the City of Youngstown (2005), the city has lost 16% of its population every ten years for the 
past 40 years.  It has been predicted that the city’s population will fall to 54,000 by 2030 (City of 
Youngstown, 2005).  Despite the assertion in the Youngstown 2010 Plan that the population 
decline trend “will slow and the population will stabilize” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.30), the 














Is Youngstown alone in its population decline?  In other words, is Youngstown’s 
population shrinking while the suburbs continue to grow?  Rather than being a “hole in the 
doughnut” (as is, for instance, Detroit), U.S. Census data reveals a trend in population decline on 
the level of the Metropolitan Statistical Area, county, and surrounding suburban townships.  In 
other words, Youngstown, like Sudbury (as will be seen in the next chapter) is a shrinking city 











1990  264,806 227,813 121,003
2000 602,166 257,555 225,116 120,293








-5.22% -6.62% -5.18% -2.98%
Table 3: Population change on MSA and County Level, 1990-200723 
More specifically with respect to the suburbs surrounding the City of Youngstown,24 between 
1990 and 2000, all lost population except Hubbard City, Austintown Township, Poland 
 
22 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008. 
23 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.  As the MSA definitions changed in 2000 (with Boardman being added to the 
Youngstown-Warren MSA), data is only included on the MSA level from 2000 and 2007. 
24 List of suburbs provided in a personal communication with Anthony Kobak, Youngstown’s chief planner, January 




Township, and Boardman Township, each of which grew only slightly.  During that time, 
Canfield Township also gained 35.19 percent. Since 2000, all areas surrounding the city have 
declined (with the exception of Coitsville Township, which gained 20 people between 2000 and 
2007).    However, the pace of decline is generally much greater in the City of Youngstown than 















1990 95,732 36,740 41,796 10,038 1,841 24,453 12,284
2000 82,026 38,001 42,518 9,460 1,608 23,522 11,756








-10.00% -6.63% -6.82% -9.76% +1.24% -6.05% -7.63%















1990 95,732 10,831 1,349 11,304 8,248 14,863 13,993
2000 82,026 14,642 1,281 10,902 8,284 14,304 14,711








-10.00% -5.20% -9.99% -6.60% -6.13% -5.47% -5.78%
Table 5: Population change in suburbs not abutting Youngstown, 1990-200726 
Furthermore, this trend of population decline in the region is anticipated to continue in the future.  
As Youngstown informant Y13, a university-based urban design consultant/academic who has 
worked in Youngstown, explains:  
 
25 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008. According to Census Geographical Change notes, the boundaries of these 
areas have remained stable throughout the reporting period. 
26 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008. According to Census Geographical Change notes, the boundaries of these 
areas have remained stable throughout the reporting period.  
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…if you look at the census projections for Trumbull county where Youngstown is 
located, they’re estimating that by 2030, another 50,000 people will have departed from 
the county and they’re assuming, and I think we’re all assuming, that the biggest part of 
that hit is going to be in the City of Youngstown, rather than in suburban Boardman or 
one of the other suburbs, although the county as a whole is anticipated to decline. 
 




Physically, although Youngstown has many assets, including a compact downtown with 
many historical buildings and an urban park larger than Central Park (Finnerty, 2003; Lanks, 
2006a), the effects of Youngstown’s population decline are striking.  After losing more than half 
of its population, the city was left with an oversized footprint – the footprint of a much more 
densely populated city (Lanks, 2006a; City of Youngstown, 2005).  The basic problem is that 
Youngstown has the same geography and the same cost structure, but fewer people.  As a result, 
the city has an abundance of excess infrastructure that must be maintained by a shrinking number 
of tax payers (Swope, 2006b).  Mayor Jay Williams has likened Youngstown to a “size-40 man 
wearing a size-60 suit” (Swope, 2006c, p.2).  In the 1950s, when Youngstown’s previous 
comprehensive plan was written, planners had no reason to believe the city would not continue to 
thrive (City of Youngstown, 2005).  Thus, new retail centres were constructed in the city and 
new neighbourhoods were laid out on the fringes in anticipation of future population growth 
(Aeppel, 2007).  On Youngstown’s east side, for instance, in an area known as “Sharon’s Line,” 
the City laid out infrastructure believing that this area would soak up Youngstown’s anticipated 
future growth.  This did not happen and the area is now an “odd country enclave tucked inside a 




Photograph 1: Sharon Line Neighbourhood (photograph by Laura Schatz) 
In addition to excess physical infrastructure, lack of demand for residential housing and 
retail in Youngstown (Lanks, 2006a) has resulted in widespread vacancy and abandonment.  
While the population has dropped, the housing stock has not.  One of the very visible 
manifestations of population shrinkage has been vacant and abandoned lots, businesses, and 
industries (Logan, 2007; Swope, 2006b; City of Youngstown, 2005).  As Youngstown informant 
Y1 (an employee with the City of Youngstown’s Finance Department) succinctly states, 
“Housing is a function of wealth creation.  If there’s no wealth creation going on in your 
community, there’s no need for housing.” In 2000, Youngstown had 3,325 excess housing units 
assuming 2.4 persons per household, well above the “generous 15% ‘normal’ vacancy rate” (City 
of Youngstown, 2005, p.31).  This pattern of abandonment has negatively affected the city’s 
financial situation: “I think our assessed valuation numbers are probably maybe 700 million 
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dollars versus back in the 80s it was probably 5 or 600 million dollars, so there’s almost not 
growth.  Actually, in real dollars, you’ve lost over that period of time” (Y1).  Youngstown 
informant Y9, a professor at Youngstown State University, further explains that 
Well, you’ve wind up in shrinking cities having as Mayor Williams says a size 38 guy in 
a size 46 coat.  You’ve got – most cities at least in this country get their – a major portion 
of their revenue from rates – from property taxes.  So if you take out – if you have half a 
mile of street which had housing on both sides of 60 foot lots – you had all those people 
paying rates to pay for the maintenance, the water, sewer, light, street, sidewalk and all of 
that – you start taking those taxpayers out, the you’re still servicing the same linear 
dimension of pavement and utilities with fewer people to pay.  Also if you have a lower 
income accompanying a lower density you wind up getting hit on the income tax side by 
not having the funds to maintain the same plan.  It’s like a single guy occupying a house 
that used to have a family of 3 kids – you rattle around a lot. 
 
Currently, there are around 1000 abandoned homes and several hundred old stores, 
schools and other structures (Aeppel, 2007).  Between 1980 and 2000, Mahoning County gained 
housing units, more than offsetting loss in the City.  At the same time, the region as a whole lost 
population, so there was no new population to support the housing boom.  This meant that 
“…every new construction yielded a dwelling somewhere else in the region that was no longer 
economically viable.  The majority of nonviable dwellings were in Youngstown.” (City of 
Youngstown, 2005, p.31)   As the vast majority of new construction was taking place in the 
suburbs, the city’s housing stock is disproportionately old compared to the county.  As 
Youngstown informant Y7, a Youngstown State University professor, explains: 
…the city was left with tons of excess housing which naturally fell into decay.  It was left 
with an infrastructure for business, empty buildings, which there was no retail function 
for because the retail had all suburbanized before the collapse.  It was logical then, 
because, there was nowhere to grow in the city… it spread out.  It made sense then.  It 
makes no sense now, but it made sense then.  So, all of that had been suburbanized and 
when the collapse came, the city was stuck with what was in the city limits.  All of that 
was old, all of that was the stuff that was going to get abandoned.   
 
Most of Youngstown’s housing stock was built before 1950.  In fact, the city’s older core 
neighbourhoods, such as Brier Hill and Oak Hill, have especially felt the effects of neglect and 
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abandonment.  Youngstown informant Y9 explains that “well, people leave and there’s no 
market to replace them so the house winds up being empty and I guess vandalized and I guess 
trashed and I guess demolished.  It’s a nasty and often prolonged cycle.”  He further explains that 
these neighbourhoods have also become functionally obsolete: 
Many of the older neighbourhoods in the older cities were developed around trolley car 
networks that were pulled up 50 years ago.  And they are based on a retailing model 
which included an ice box, a trolley car, and a stay-at-home mom…Momma would shop, 
take her hand cart down to the corner to buy food for the night and bring it home…You 
didn’t shop for the week and fill a big refrigerator.  Patterns have changed and they’ve 
changed broadly so that people shop for the week, they have large quantities of food, 
they’ve got a lot of choices…So they’ll go from all over to the big supermarkets, leaving 
behind this obsolete retail – these storefronts with rented apartments over them.  In a 
robust market, those sites get redeveloped.  In a weak market, those sites sit there and 
they just rot and because they’re concentrated along old trolley car strips.  Because they 
were large land users in the neighbourhood…you notice them.  They’ve become very 
visible.  That’s a combination of the decline of the population often followed by a decline 
in the household income combined with functional obsolescence… 
 
The result is that these neighbourhoods have essentially been “gutted” and are “beyond any hope 




Photograph 2: Abandoned homes in Idora Park neighbourhood (Photograph by Laura Schatz) 
 More specifically, the Youngstown’s downtown and the nearby Youngstown State 
University have suffered the effects of a declining and dispersing population.  While downtown 
and the campus of Youngstown State University are oriented back-to-back, for years “mutual 
apathy” resulted in no attempts to link the two (Finnerty, 2003, p.2).  As Finnerty (2003) 
explains, “This relationship was marginally tolerable during the good times, but when the 
economy collapsed, the city suffered, and as part of the city, the university suffered, too” (p.2). 
However, even before the 2010 process, Youngstown’s downtown was beginning to recover with 
a number of renovations, construction, and expansions.   The recovery has been based, in large 
part, on the fact that downtown has a number of assets (City of Youngstown, 2005; Lanks, 
2006a).  It is compact and has many historic buildings – a remnant of its earlier, more prosperous 
days: “The compactness and density of the infrastructure and a built environment that cannot be 
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duplicated are assets that are incalculable.” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.43).  Youngstown 
informant Y7, a Youngstown State University professor, describes Youngstown’s downtown as 
unique because “…it was built when things were good and it was …it’s too big and too valuable 
to put on the demolition list.  Plus, a lot of those are on historic inventory.  And so that unique 
part of the built downtown remained.  That’s a positive in the midst of the negative.”  He further 
explains about the downtown’s built environment that  
…a lot of steel companies started here.  A lot of companies that built steel mills were 
headquartered here.  I don’t know if they told you the history of the buildings but those 
were practice skyscrapers for Chicago and New York.  [Chicago architect Daniel] 
Burnham built buildings downtown Youngstown before he went and built in Chicago.  
Yes.  They practiced here and then built bigger ones elsewhere because the money was 
here to do that.  It’s unique. 
 
The downtown is also home to cultural amenities not typical of a city of 82,000 people.  
According to Youngstown informant Y2 (the head of a Youngstown business association): 
We have a phenomenal symphony in Youngstown.  Youngstown used to have a lot of 
wealth from the steel industries, so there’s some very wealthy foundations still here.  We 
should not have a symphony like we have.  102 musicians are under contract for it.  They 
have a Classical series. They have a Pop series.  They have a Broadway series: that’s 
right across the street [from the business association’s downtown location]. 
 
However, problems in the downtown remain, including conflict over the proposed tearing down 
of some historic buildings.  As Mock (2008) explains, “another problem with shrinking is that 
fewer competing investors increases the chance for one or a small few to buy up more than a fair 
share of property – as in the case with downtown Youngstown, where Louis A. Frangos, the 
single largest property owner, occasionally poses a problem for those trying to preserve the city.” 
(p.44). The City has also run into conflict with preservationists, who have opposed certain 







Youngstown has faced, and continues to face, a number of economic challenges.  Rather 
than being based in heavy industry, Youngstown’s economy is now based on government, public 
schools, Youngstown State University, and two hospitals (Associated Press, 2007).   According 
to the 2002 Economic Census (which provides information for each North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) sector), the largest number of employees work in the health care 
and social assistance sector. 
NAICS Sector Number of 
Employees, 2002 
Annual Payroll, 2002  
($1000) 
Manufacturing 3,061 113,513
Wholesale Trade 2,244 73,573
Retail Trade 2,413 41,599
Information 895 36,525
Real Estate & Rental & Leasing 370 8,290
Professional, Scientific, & Technical 
Services 
1,846 64,099
Administrative & support & waste 
management & remediation service 
851 17,424
Educational Services 29 476
Health Care & Social Assistance 9,516 325,266
Arts, entertainment, & recreation 354 2,162
Accommodation & food services 1,679 14,935
Other services (except public 
administration) 
1,202 24,905
Table 6: Number of employees and annual payroll by NCAIS industry, Youngstown, 200227 
Evidently, there is still some traditional manufacturing in Youngstown.  As Youngstown 
informant Y7, a Youngstown State University professor, explains, “there is one mini-mill that 
used to part of YT Sheet and Tube Briar Hill works.  It is a remnant.  But the blast furnaces are 
gone and a lot of the finishing mills are gone.  They make pipe for the drilling industry and that’s 
still there and it’s profitable.  It’s no longer locally owned, but that’s the last in Youngstown 
steel.”  Youngstown informant Y9, a professor at Youngstown State University, notes that 
 
27 Source: U.S. Economic Census, 2002. 
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Youngstown’s remaining steel industry has been successful in part because of actions taken by 
the city: 
Youngstown has been remarkably successful in a national level at taking down the old 
steel mills, deciding which steel mill sites actually have contemporary viability and 
which don’t – taking the ones that do and providing the road connections to the freeway 
network so that in fact you can operate a contemporary business in the city on an 
industrial park that used to be a steel mill. 
 
Despite the continued presence of some steel in Youngstown, there is a lack of industries 
having the same effect that the old steel mills did (Safford, 2004).  After the collapse of steel, the 
city tried to find other big employers to replace it (for example, two prisons), but these types of 
jobs have not replaced unionized steel jobs (Aeppel, 2007).  Service industries concentrated in 
Youngstown are at the lower end of the skill range and hence also at the lower end of the pay 
range.  One such industry, the call centre industry, has made “significant inroads in Youngstown 
in recent years” (Safford, 2004, p.16).    According to Youngstown informant Y2, the head of a 
Youngstown business association, there are well over 10,000 call centre jobs in the greater 
Youngstown area.  However, he argues that while these may not be well-paying jobs in some 
areas of the country, in Youngstown call centre jobs provide a “decent” standard of living:  
…it’s not a good thing… but the YT’s housing market is the second most affordable 
housing market in the country.  You know why it’s the second more affordable, but 
whereas a call centre job doesn’t buy you a great standard of living, even in YT, it’s 
actually a decent standard of living whereas that call centre wouldn’t do the same thing 
for you out in California, or Florida… 
 
According to Safford (2004), Youngstown has not successfully diversified into the FIRE service 
sector (that is, high-end finance, insurance, and real estate services): “Youngstown…has suffered 
from an inability to develop a coherent approach to attracting inward investment, a lack of 
entrepreneurship and the inability of major local employers to transform in ways that benefit the 
community” (Safford, 2004, p.28).  In addition to Youngstown’s inability to attract a significant 
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number of high-paying, highly-skilled jobs, the shrinking customer base has been very 
problematic for the city’s retail sector.  As mentioned above, several hundred retail 
establishments remain vacant in the city.  Many of the retail establishments that remain are 
struggling.  For example, the city’s paper – the Vindicator – has been negatively affected by 
declining circulation, subscription, advertising, and revenue base (Mock, 2008).  Declining 
demand for the paper prompted workers to strike in 2004 over wages.    
 With respect to rates of unemployment, the annual average unemployment rate for the 
City of Youngstown since 2000 has fluctuated between 14% (in mid 2002) and 8% percent (in 
2008).  When the city embarked on its planning process at the turn of the millennium, the 
average unemployment rate was 8.9%, compared to 5.0% for the Youngstown-Warren-
Boardman Metropolitan Statistical Area and 4.0% for the State of Ohio.  The current (2009) 
unemployment rate is estimated to be 10%, which is still well above the rate for the State of Ohio 
(7.6%) and the rate for Mahoning County (8.4%), and slightly above the rate for Trumbull 
County (9.8%)28 (Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, 2009). 
 In general, Youngstown informant Y1 – an employee with the City of Youngstown’s 
Finance Department – attributes Youngstown’s economic challenges to a lack of investment in 
Youngstown:  
…the main factor I think why Youngstown – symptom of lost population is due to lost 
investment.  This investment takes place, people then have jobs.  One thing – investment 
happens… investment creates a job.  You don’t have investment, you don’t have jobs.  So 
when huge disinvestment takes place – and I actually lived through it between 1979 – I 
actually graduated from undergraduate school in 1979 and from 79 till 81, we lost – 
Youngstown Warren Metropolitan Area lost 29,000 manufacturing, one billion dollars in 
payroll.  And those are in 1979 dollars, so the impact today would probably be three or 
four times that amount in terms of adjusting for inflation. 
 
28 Note: at the time of writing, there were no current statistics on the unemployment rate in the Youngstown-Warren-
Boardman Metropolitan Statistical Area.  
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According to him, the fact that Youngstown was not sufficiently diversified meant that 
“unforeseen economic events” had a “huge impact on the city.”  Further exacerbating the city’s 
economic challenges is the fact that as people have moved to the suburbs, so have the jobs:  
Fifty years ago Youngstown basically was the economy.  90% of the jobs that probably 
existed, existed in Youngstown.  You lived wherever, but you worked in Youngstown.  
Now, Youngstown is still a very large part of the economy, but it’s a smaller part of a 
much larger regional economy.  The outlying suburbs certainly have some economic 





When Youngstown embarked on the 2010 planning process, the city faced a number of 
social issues.  Key among these challenges is a history of racial conflict.  Racial conflict was 
particularly prevalent during the time that the steel industry was thriving and African-American 
steelworkerswere brought in when white labour unions went on strike (Mock, 2008).  This 
exacerbated any discrimination already being felt by African Americans.  For instance, 
“[n]otoriously racist banks refused African Americans home loans, which left neighborhoods 
segregated all the way through the 20th century” (Mock, 2008, p.43).  When Youngstown 
“hollowed out” because of the decline of the steel industry, exacerbated by “white flight” to the 
suburbs which began in the 1950s, Youngstown’s poor and minority residents, many of them 
African Americans, were left behind (Aeppel, 2007).  In the 1980s, whites made up 2/3 of the 
city.  Today, they make up less than half.  According to the City of Youngstown (2005), the city 
is now “racially balanced” (p.30); however, these words belie the racial hostility and conflict that 
has remained entrenched throughout Youngstown’s history (Mock, 2008).  Related to this, the 
City of Youngstown faces high levels of poverty and low median income levels.  In 1999, 24.8% 
of Youngstown residents were living in poverty, compared to 12.5% in Mahoning County, and 
10.6% at the State level.  The median household income in Youngstown was $24,201, versus 
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$35,248 for Mahoning County and $40,956 for the State of Ohio.  Unfortunately, little has 
changed in recent years.  According to Bishaw and Semega (2008), the poverty rate in 
Youngstown in 2007 was 32.6%, which was one of the 10 highest percentages for places in the 
United States with a population between 65,000 and 249,999.  Comparatively, the poverty rate 
for Mahoning County in 2007 was 16.6%, while the State percentage was 13.1%.  With respect 
to median household income, in 2007, Youngstown’s median income was $24,941 (the lowest 
income of “places” of 65,000 to 249,999 people in the United States), compared to $37,358 for 
Mahoning County and $46,597 for Ohio. 
 The effects of population decline, and thus a shrinking tax base, have also been felt by the 
school system (Gwin, 2007).  In fact, the State of Ohio has placed Youngstown’s school district 
in a state of fiscal emergency.  Because of a shrinking pupil population, the Youngstown board 
of education has suffered from large deficits.  In 2007, for instance, the Youngstown board of 
education had $15 million budget deficit (Gwin, 2007).  The City, under the direction of a state-
appointed fiscal oversight commission, is currently making staff cuts and trying to reduce 
spending.  The rapid growth of charter schools is also a major drain on district resources.  The 
City of Youngstown is losing thousands of pupils and about $26 million per year to charter 
schools (Gwin, 2007).  The shrinking student population recently led the oversight commission 
to recommend to Youngstown that it levy new taxes (Gwin, 2007). 
 There are also social issues related to the state of housing.  The number of vacant 
properties has had a number of negative effects, in that these properties have become 
“…convenient places for criminal activities and eventually deteriorat[ing] to the point where 
demolition is the only option.  The impact on neighborhoods where concentrations of abandoned 
houses exist is catastrophic, leading to further disinvestment and abandonment” (City of 
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Youngstown, 20005, p.31).  Crime is particularly a problem in Youngstown neighbourhoods.  As 
Youngstown informant Y1 explains: “There’s a whole bunch of things out there – domestic 
violence, drug abuse, murder rates, all that type of stuff…it kind of reflects the loss of hope 
amongst the population.”  Another Youngstown native (and Community Development 
Corporation employee) – informant Y10 – explains that “I think crime [has been] the biggest 
issue because I have relatives and I have friends and have people that visit me in New England 
that really wanted to stay in the city but because of crime, they had to leave.”  He further 
explains that declining house values as been an issue:   “…these people’s life savings and 
investment was in their house and it was worth nothing after 20 years.  It just declined.”  In fact, 
housing values in City lag behind suburbs and county as a whole; in 2000, Youngstown’s median 
housing value approximately half Mahoning County’s: 
 
Figure 8: Median Housing Values, Youngstown and surrounding area, 200029 
29 Source: City of Youngstown, 2005. 
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As Youngstown informant Y12 – an employee with the City of Youngstown’s planning 
department and Youngstown native – explains: 
When the people left, the houses remained, so that’s where the problem really arises is 
the abandonment of the homes and once you have one house that’s abandoned…  Well, 
right now we’re dealing with foreclosures…  then everyone else’s property values goes 
down because no one is taking care of that particular home and it spreads like cancer. 
 
Youngstown informant Y13 illustrates the situation of declining house values in Wick 
Neighbourhood in this way: 
[This is] Youngstown’s oldest, most significant neighbourhood.  It has these wonderful 
mansions around a very classic urban square with a performing arts centre at one end and 
I mean, at this point, you could buy a house around that square for 8 or 10,000 dollars.  
It’s amazing!  I mean, you can’t re-hab them, really, because you would have to put 
80,000 into just stabilizing the house and you’ve got a house at the end that might be 
worth 20,000 dollars. 
 
Furthermore, the age of city’s housing stock presents health issues as many houses are in 
need of remediation for lead paint and asbestos; some of the oldest houses have lead plumbing.  
In addition to negative health impacts, the presence of lead and asbestos limits resale potential 
and makes it more expensive to demolish or rehab (City of Youngstown, 2005).  Also limiting 
resale potential is the fact that there is little to no demand for the particular type of housing the 
City of Youngstown offers:  
…a lot of problems cities have too is they built row housing… we built housing that the 
steel industry… the steel industry needed to grow and it was somewhere a Microsoft or 
Intel story today literally a hundred years ago, but they came in, needed to grow, and they 
needed a population base to do it.  So they built from their perspective what was the most 
efficient, reasonable housing that they could build.  So it was row housing with one car 
garage and not the amenities that a lot of spoiled Americans are wanting today in terms 
of…. you know, if you take these houses to China, they’re mansions.  At our community, 








The City of Youngstown is bounded on four sides by tributaries: the Mahoning River, 
Mill Creek, and Crab Creek.  Originally, these watercourses were the site of industrial growth, 
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with the exception of parkland along Mill Creek called Mill Creek Park.  Mill Creek Park – the 
“crown jewel in the Mahoning Valley” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.41) – is a city park larger 
than Central Park. It was created in 1891 in order to protect the creek from overdevelopment 
(City of Youngstown, 2005; Lanks, 2006a).  However, industry thrived along the rest of the 
watercourses, leaving a legacy of environmental problems.  As Youngstown informant Y7 
explains: “…at one time I think there were 27 blast furnaces along the Mahoning River in 
various places and it’s all heavy iron and when you mix the nickel and the magnesium and all the 
other stuff in there, through the process, it goes down into the river and sinks and makes this 
sediment and it does not flow to the Gulf of Mexico.” 
 Today, Youngstown is left with the task of cleaning and restoring its watercourses as well 
as cleaning and reusing a number of industrial brownfield sites.  According to Finnerty (2003), 
there have been a number of successful brownfields developments along the Mahoning River.  
The City of Youngstown (2005) claims that “Youngstown has become a leader in the creative 
reuse of old industrial brownfield sites.  This had yielded state of the art industrial parks that fit 
comfortably in the new industrial green classification” (p.45).  Despite these successes, however, 
the City still faces a number of challenges in accomplishing its goal of “cleaning and greening.”  
According to Youngstown informant Y7: 
The river is the reason why the city grew in the first place.  Most people in Youngstown, 
you can’t see the river because Riparian forests are the main reason.  Earlier you couldn’t 
see them because of the mills.  After the mills closed, the trees grew.  So, a lot of people 
still don’t know the river’s there.  And what the 2010 plan does is it opens the river; it 
makes the river a designated greenspace and it plans to take advantage of it for 
recreational activities.  State won’t let you swim in it for years to come, but bike trails 








In addition to the economic collapse and suburban flight, over the years local corruption 
in the courts and county government contributed to the dismal situation which existed in 
Youngstown prior to the 2010 planning process (Faga, 2006).  In addition, infighting amongst 
civic leaders (Safford, 2004) affected the city’s ability to respond in a unified way with a 
coherent approach. All of these factors contributed to a general sense of apathy, arising from 
residents’ disenchantment and a desire to return to Youngstown’s former glory.  In fact, a 1999 
study of community life in Youngstown described residents as “…frustrated and tired, the city as 
‘stuck’ and a ‘place in waiting’” (Smith, 2007, p.1).  As Youngstown informant Y9 explains: 
[significant population loss] clearly has an impact on the retail and may have an impact 
on your schools and other institutions but it changes the way things work to something 
that generally people who remember the way things were find worse.  And what you hear 
in those communities is “we used to be.”  “We used to be.”  “The neighbourhood used to 
be.”  “This was wonderful once upon a time.  It’s falling apart.”  You hear lay 
observations about palpable decline. 
 
Youngstown informant Y14 similarly explains that “in 1977 when steel mills collapsed, the city 
spent 20 or 25 years just looking in a rear view mirror, just lamenting, anguishing over the one 
industry that defined it.”  Citizens were particularly cynical about past failed attempts to 
revitalize the city.  As Faga (2006) explains, prior to the Youngstown 2010 planning process, 
“[d]emoralized residents and a cynical press had already undercut several renewal attempts.” 
(p.55)  As Youngstown informant Y14, a high-ranking city official, states:  
The city’s population had declined but the thinking was such that we were still thinking 
or operating as if we still 150,000 people… Now that we’re at 82,000, your expectations 
have to change.  That would breed frustration or resentment and cynicism in many 
regards so the fact that it had happened and we weren’t acknowledging it was not 
healthy… Over the past several decades, lots of promises have been made, lots of ideas 
have been made … “this will save Youngstown, do this…”  a new factory here, a promise 
from a national politician and I think the community had just grown weary of these 




A Youngstown native (and current employee with a Community Development Organization in 
Youngstown) describes the overall sentiment amongst the citizens and government as follow:  
… when I returned to this city after being away many many years, I was dumbfounded, 
floored, wanted to weep on the total disinvestment and it showed that it wasn’t just that 
the steel mills closed because I lived in cities where mills closed and lost population.  In 
fact, Cleveland lost 87,000 jobs in 1978 – in the late 70s, early 80s.  But what I saw was a 







In this context, at the turn of the millennium, the Youngstown 2010 planning process 
began.  The Youngstown 2010 Plan has been described being “unusual” (Aeppel, 2007), 
“controversial” (Aeppel, 2007), “ambitious” (Swope, 2006c), an “exception” (Nassar, 2006), 
“enormously brave” (Popper, as quoted in Lanks, 2006b), “… a monumental step in the face of 
the US growth paradigm” (Logan, 2007), “…one of the most aggressive proposals to deal with 
rustbelt decline” (NPR, 2007), “haltingly honest” (Swope, 2006c), a “big psychological shift” 
(AP, 2007), “…on the cutting edge of planning” (Russell, 2008), and a “…radical experiment” 
(Russell, 2008).  More specifically, the planning approach taken in the Youngstown 2010 plan 
has received various labels in the popular media, including “controlled shrinkage” (Aeppel, 
2007, NPR, 2007), “managing change” (Morrison, as quoted in Aeppel, 2007) “smart decline” 
(Nassar, 2006, Logan, 2007; Swope, 2006c; Boardman, 2008; Russell, 2008), “smart shrinkage” 
(Nassar, 2006), “creative shrinkage” (Lanks, 2006a, 2006b), “unbuilding the city” (Mock, 2008); 
“owning its population deficit” (Mock, 2008); “right-sizing” (Williams, as quoted in Mock, 
2008),  “planned shrinkage” (Schwarz, 2006), and “managed shrinkage” (Russell, 2008).  
 Whatever the label and/or adjective used to describe Youngstown 2010, there is general 
agreement in the popular media that it is somehow, in the world of urban planning at least, a 
break from tradition.  The aspect of the plan receiving the most attention is the plan’s land use 
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policies, which are based on the notion that Youngstown cannot count on future population 
growth and thus the city needs to focus on contracting the built environment to meet current, 
smaller, population levels.  According to Aeppel (2007), this approach to land use planning 
would be considered blasphemy in most cities, where officials are taught to promote growth and 
development and fight against population decline: “Accepting that a city is going to shrink goes 
against conventional wisdom that a bigger city means more jobs, more taxpayers, more revenue, 
better education, and better services, in essence, a higher standard of living” ( p.2).30 Similarly, 
as Mock (2008) states:  
Most cities in this predicament hunker down, then spend big on casinos, sports stadiums, 
convention centers, hotels and nightclubs to attract new resident.  The success rate for 
this model is unpromising, however, especially for smaller cities that will never compete 
with large metropolises.  Youngstown’s plan is to embrace stunted growth.  The 
‘shrinking city model,’ as it’s called, reasons that a city suffering post-industrial blues 
and losing residents by the thousands won’t suddenly charm people back by way of huge 
commercial bells and blockbuster whistles.  Instead, the shrunk city demolished blocks, 
converting its abandoned buildings and houses into open space for neighborhood 
enterprises and to nurture greenery.” (Mock, 2008, p.41) 
 
In essence, the City is trying to find uses for unused property other than habitation (Mock, 2008) 
and although Youngstown’s approach may seem like an obvious strategy, in the urban realm, 
where growth is equated with success and decline with failure, it certainly is not: “…cities’ 
futures are typically shaped by politicians who can’t think past their next campaign; to them, 
growth – New houses! New arenas! New shopping – wins elections” (Tone, 2007, p.1, emphasis 
in original).  Most cities in this predicament “stubbornly refuse” to admit that they are not likely 
to start growing significantly again and instead they focus on “…reversing population losses in 
an attempt to regain bygone glory” (Swope, 2006c, p.2; see also Associated Press, 2007).  By 
taking a different approach, “Youngstown may emerge as something of a national laboratory for 
 
30 Whether the city is, in fact, accepting that it will continue to shrink as this author suggests is an issue which is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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ideas on how to cope with urban contraction.  It’s not that the town’s civic leaders want to be in 
that position – they simply see little choice” (Swope, 2006c, p.2).   
 In fact, in going against the norm in its land use policies, Youngstown is one of the first 
cities in the United States to adopt a “smart decline” perspective (Boardman, 2008).  It is 
important to note, however, that while other cities such as Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, and 
Flint are not as publicly willing as Youngstown to accept contraction, they are all finding ways 
to adapt to their smaller selves (Russell, 2008).   These cities tend to address the by-products of 
shrinking, such as rotting infrastructure and budget shortages.  Russell (2008) calls these 
strategies “less daring” than Youngstown’s, but cautions that they still bear watching.  For 
example, in Flint, the Genesee County Land Bank has won acclaim for its efforts to deal 
effectively with the city’s large inventory of vacant property.  The land bank holds title to large 
chunk of property in Flint and maintains the property, holding to the philosophy that all the 
properties do not have to be developed in order for them to be a productive part of the landscape.  
It is also important to note that Youngstown did not accept shrinkage at first – it took decades.  
Now, however, “…perhaps because it has fallen so loud and so hard, Youngstown is now at the 
vanguard of American city planning…” (Russell, 2008) and other cities in similar situations – 
such as Wheeling, West Virginia and Dayton, Ohio –  are starting to take notice, sending 
officials to Youngstown to see what this new approach is all about (Lanks, 2006a; NPR, 2007; 
Boardman, 2008).  As Tone (2007) states, “the buzz has left others wishing aloud that Cleveland 








Before discussing the Youngstown 2010 Plan, it is necessary to examine the factors that 
led the city to undertaking the process in the first place.  The first factor that facilitated taking a 
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new approach in Youngstown began in the 1990s when law enforcement cracked down on 
organized crime and political corruption. Particularly significant was the indictment, 
conviction, and imprisonment in federal prison of Congressman James A. Trafficant Jr.  Other 
prominent figures faced criminal charges, including former Mahoning County Sheriff Phil 
Chance, former county Prosecutor James Philomena, and several local judges (Niquette & 
Sheban, 2008; Finnerty, 2003).  Although corruption scandals continue to plague the city – in 
2008 Attorney General Mark Dann from Liberty Township was involved in a sexual harassment 
and mismanagement scandal – the city has made enormous steps in cleaning up its image 
(Niquette & Sheban, 2008).  The jailing of Trafficant, in particular, was viewed by many 
residents and officials “…as a turning point for the community.  It offered an opportunity to 
focus on new beginnings” (Finnerty, 2003, p.1).  As Youngstown informant Y9, a Youngstown 
State University professor, explains, Congressman Trafficant “…was sort of the last of the 
machine politicians…there was a long, long history of a few key actors in the business 
community and the unions and the political world calling the shots.  So you had a power vacuum 
that emerged when he was sort of the last of the bosses.” In this way, these events helped to clear 
the way for the Youngstown 2010 planning process. 
 A second factor that sparked the Youngstown 2010 process was recognition by leading 
city officials in the late 1990s/early 2000s that the old plan needed to be updated and that 
decline needed to be dealt with proactively, rather than passively waiting for growth to happen 
(Finnerty, 2003).  Again, until this point, Youngstown was operating on a comprehensive plan 
that was adopted in 1951 and updated only once in 1974.  This plan envisioned a large amount of 
growth and expansion.  According to the City of Youngstown (2005), “by the late 1970s the plan 
was without foundation and virtually obsolete.  Youngstown lacked direction through its decline, 
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and without vision languished for the next twenty five years” (p.14).  At the turn of the 
millenium, there was a realization on the part of city officials that the city did not have an 
adequate and effective roadmap.  City officials “began to notice that cities benefiting by 
economic recovery had actually planned for it.  Councilmen came back from Chattanooga 
convinced that Youngstown would stop its decline only if it dealt with its current reality and 
developed a plan to cope with it” (Finnerty, 2003, p.3).  According to Youngstown informant Y8 
(a city planner), City Council realized from this trip that “…the success of those cities was not by 
chance…”  In short, the city realized it needed a new vision based on the city’s current reality, 
rather than on past trends that were expected, but never realized (Mock, 2008).  Youngstown 
informant Y9, a professor at Youngstown State University, describes it as “… a little bit like an 
alcoholic bottoming out.  We’ve tried everything else; let’s try this.”  
 A third major factor which contributed to the momentum leading up to the Youngstown 
2010 process was the formation of a partnership between the City and Youngstown State 
University. As Youngstown informant Y7, a Youngstown State University professor, explains, 
“the city and the university did it together and that was kind of serendipity.”  Traditionally, both 
entities were very inward-looking and had not coordinated efforts.  By the late 1990s, both had 
independently decided to modernize their comprehensive plans.  YSU, being required by state 
law to update their comprehensive plan at regular intervals, began to look for ways to clean up 
the areas surrounding the campus in its new comprehensive plan (Faga, 2006).  Youngstown City 
Council, under the leadership of then-Mayor George McKelvey, while not required by law to 
update the plan, also decided to do a new comprehensive plan.  Each side came to realize that 
participating in the other’s process would be a key factor in the success of both (Faga, 2006; 
Finnerty, 2003; Swope, 2006c).  As Finnerty (2003) states, both the city and the university 
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“realized the status quo was only going to lead to further decline, and that the future of both 
institutions was in doubt.  The demise of one would lead eventually to the demise of the other” 
(p.1).  Particularly instrumental was David Sweet, who had a background in planning and who 
became president of YSU in 2000 and “set in motion plans to connect the university’s future 
with the city’s future.  The university realized it was hard to sell on-campus residency if nearby 
neighborhoods were in a state of disrepair.” (Finnerty, 2003, p.2).  Sweet was especially 
interested in halting the decline of enrollment numbers by improving the curb appeal, in 
particular through addressing “…trashed lots and boarded-up windows on nearby street” (Faga, 
2006, p.55).  Instrumental on the City’s side was then-Director of Community Development, Jay 
Williams, who realized the benefits of collaboration and sought out the expertise of YSU (Mock, 
2008).  Youngstown 2010 thus became a partnership between the City’s planning department 
and YSU (Lanks, 2006b).  According to Smith (2007), partnering with YSU proved to be a 
pivotal marketing decision: “The well-regarded institution provided staff expertise and resources, 
as well as something less tangible” (p.1).  In effect, this “unusual town-gown partnership” 
(Swope, 2006c) lent credibility to the plan that it otherwise would not have had if it was just 
done by the City.  As well the city, with a small planning staff, would receive some much needed 
“…expertise that were available in the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies….” (Youngstown 
informant Y7). 
 Finally, in addition to the partnering of the City and YSU, the Youngstown 2010 
planning process was sparked by the fortuitous coming together of certain actors with 
particular attributes, skills, and expectations. Importantly, the turn of the millennium saw 
younger leadership installed as the “old guard” (that is, older politicians and business leaders in 
place when steel collapsed) retired, moved on, or died (Swope, 2006c).  The younger leadership 
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was comprised of: Jay Williams, who was elected as Mayor in 2003 at the age of 34 (the 
youngest mayor ever elected in Youngstown); Anthony Kobak, who was 29 when he took over 
as Chief Planner; and Bill D’Avignon, who became Planning Director in his mid-30s (Tone, 
2007).  These younger officials were better able to leave behind old paradigms in search of a new 
approach.  As Youngstown informant Y14 (a high-ranking city official) explains 
I was born in 1971 and certainly the steel mills were still going.  Youngstown still had a 
significant population, so it hadn’t crashed yet.  But the Youngstown I remember even 
growing up is pretty much Youngstown we have now.  I don’t remember downtown 
when there were 170,000 people where 50,000 people would come and you did all your 
shopping downtown.  The malls were built and the suburbs were growing by the time I 
was growing up, so I think it was generational.  My parents did not work in the steel 
mills.  My grandparents did, but my immediate family members had already understood 
that there was going to be change in their jobs and in their careers.  So I think 
generational influences certainly played a lot in it.  And what you also saw, you saw 
some people from my generation finally breaking through on the political spectrum.  
Congressman Tim Ryan who is just – I’m 35, he’s just a year younger than I am – was 
elected to Congress.  You started seeing some of those people take very influential 
positions so it allowed some of that old guard thinking and there’s still good value in 
having both old and young, but I think that helped too. 
 
Youngstown informant Y7 agrees that there was a generational shift, accompanied by a physical 
removal of the remnants of steel’s presence in Youngstown, which precipitated interest in new 
vision for Youngstown: 
We had 27 mile of mills from Newton to Newcastle Pennsylvania, and all of them are 
gone, so for a long time the buildings were still there and I think a big change in the 
attitude here came when the buildings finally disappeared [in the 1990s].  Most of the 
buildings are gone… that as long as those buildings were standing there, the people who 
had worked in the mills all thought, well there’s still a chance.  When the buildings came 
down, 2 things happened.  First, the older people knew that the mills weren’t coming 
back and you said something about YT’s decline being quick as opposed to Sudbury’s 
slower… but it took a whole generation in YT for the realization to set in.  We have a 
generation now that never saw the mills and so their attitudes’ completely different.  
That’s a positive that grew out of the negative. 
 
In addition to younger leadership, other actors became involved in the process who were able to 
lend their particular expertise.  These actors include: Tom Finnerty, associate director of YSU’s 
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Center for Urban and Regional Studies and a native of Youngstown; the Toronto planning firm 
of Urban Strategies, which was able to provide an “outsiders” point of view; Hunter Morrison, 
Planning Director in Cleveland for 20 years who became Director of YSU’s Centre for Urban 
and Regional Studies when his wife was elected mayor of Cleveland and who was one of the 
prime architects of the 2000 Cleveland Civic Visioning Process; and David Sweet, who became 
YSU’s new president in 2000 and who had worked with Hunter Morrison in Cleveland 
(Finnerty, 2003).  Perhaps most importantly, not only did the coming together of these actors 
help to spark the Youngstown 2010 planning process, it was the fact that they all came together 








There are two main components of Youngstown 2010: the Vision and the Citywide Plan.  
The Vision was crafted after extensive public consultation (described in detail in Chapter 7) in 
2002 and the Plan was written based on the Vision and further public consultation and 
involvement (again, described in Chapter 7).   According to the City of Youngstown (2005): 
A vision is an agreed-upon set of goals and principles about the kind of place that 
Youngstown should be in the future and the changes that need to be made to get there.  A 
comprehensive plan is a detailed framework that puts the visions into action.  It sets out 
the specific policies that will guide the City in making both big and small decisions to 
achieve the goals of the vision. (p.135, emphasis in original) 
 
The Youngstown 2010 Vision is made up of four principles, which are: 
[1] Accepting that we are a smaller city: Youngstown should strive to be a model of a 
sustainable mid-sized city; 
[2] Defining Youngstown’s role in the new regional economy: Youngstown must align 
itself with the realities of the new regional economy; 
[3] Improving Youngstown’s image and enhancing quality of life: Making 
Youngstown a healthier and better place to live and work; and 
[4] A call to action: An achievable and practical action-oriented plan to make things 




As alluded to above, the principle that has received the most attention in both the public and 
academic realm is the first: that is, accepting that Youngstown is a smaller city. The principle 
acknowledges that Youngstown is much smaller than it used to be and that it is unlikely to grow 
significantly in the future.  For that reason, the City is facing difficult decisions in operating a 
town whose infrastructure is meant for a much larger population.  Essentially, the City “…cannot 
sustain all of the services land that it currently has” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.136) and it 
needs to save money by rationalizing and consolidating its infrastructure, defining which parts of 
the city are sustainable and which are not supportable, and directing new development to areas 
already supported by infrastructure.  On the positive side, the amount of vacant land under the 
City’s control means that the City can be “generous” with urban land and can explore “…new 
options for the city’s neighbourhoods and open space systems” (City of Youngstown, 2005, 
p.137).  This part of the Vision also emphasizes that the City needs to take a regional approach to 
its development, seeing itself as part of the Mahoning Valley Region. 
 In addition to accepting that Youngstown is a smaller city, the second principle of the 
Vision – defining Youngstown’s role in the new regional economy – calls for an acceptance 
that steel is gone and that the City’s economy is now dominated by health care, education, 
government, and light industry.  As such, the City needs to adopt policies in its Comprehensive 
Plan that foster and encourage these industries.  In particular, it calls for recognition that 
Youngstown State University will play a “key role” in the City’s revitalization, as will the public 
sector (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.138).   In addition, the City must do whatever it can to help 
nurture small businesses, for instance, by supporting and expanding the Youngstown Business 
Incubator.  Similarly, the next principle – improving Youngstown’s image and enhancing 
quality of life – deals with improving and building upon what already exists in Youngstown, 
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including an authentic urban environment (offering features suburbs cannot), a compact 
downtown, and an extensive system of parks and waterways.  According to this principle, 
building on these assets (and addressing issues such as urban decay, neighbourhood safety, and 
racial division) will both improve the quality of life for residents that remain and will improve 
Youngstown’s image to outsiders.  Finally, in order to translate these principles into a concrete 
plan, the last principle of the Vision is a call to action, which specifies that the City must 
develop a plan that is “…specific, organized, and action-oriented in order to get results.  The 
Plan will only help the community if it is implemented” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.142).  
This principle recognizes the need of a well-articulated plan in obtaining public funds, for which 
there is “..fierce competition” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.412). 
 As mentioned above, the Youngstown 2010 Citywide Plan was written based on this 
Vision and unveiled in January 2005.  It was created through a collaborative process between the 
City and Youngstown State University and involved the efforts of nearly 200 volunteers, 
neighbourhood organizations, and businesses.  The 2010 Plan purports to fill in the details of the 
four Vision principles, which are included as an appendix to the plan itself.  Broadly, the plan:  
 describes the citywide conditions in terms of population, race, age, housing, and vacant 
and abandoned properties as they existed at the time of writing;  
 
 identifies assets to build on, such as regional connectivity, water courses, green networks, 
and a compact core;  
 
 identifies the plan’s themes, which are creating green networks, competitive industrial 
districts, viable neighbourhoods, and a vibrant core;  
 
 illuminates current conditions and identifies assets in four planning districts (North, 
South, East, and West); and  
 
 sets out the next steps in terms of implementation.
179 
 
More specifically, after first describing the demographic, social, physical, economic, and 
environmental conditions (as outlined earlier in this chapter), the second part of the plan stresses 
that the City of Youngstown has many assets upon which it should capitalize and which it should 
seek to improve.  For instance, Youngstown is physically in an advantageous position in terms of 
international, national, and regional connectivity, with two major international airports 
(Cleveland Hopkins International and Pittsburgh International) within 75 miles and two regional 
airports (the Akron-Canton Regional Airport and the Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport) in 
the close vicinity of the city.  Highway connections are also an asset, with two major east/west 
interstates (the I-80 and I-76) passing through the region.  Other assets to be improved and built 
upon include Youngstown’s system of watercourses and the city’s compact and dense core, 
which offers a built environment “that cannot be duplicated” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.43). 
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Photograph 3: Downtown Youngstown (Photograph by Laura Schatz) 
 After identifying Youngstown’s existing assets, the plan discusses the four themes upon 
which it is based.  These themes were identified as important to residents during neighbourhood 
cluster planning meetings and adopted as the guiding forces behind future land use.  First, the 
“green network” theme is part of a broader desire to “clean and green” the City of Youngstown.  
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Existing green space is to be linked in a network and expanded to include more green space.  
Secondly, and also part of the desire to clean and green the City, the City will find creative uses 
for old industrial brownfield sites – effectively turning “grey to green.”  Thirdly, the City will 
work to stabilize viable neighbourhoods, using this as a starting point to reclaim adjacent, less-
successful neighbourhoods.  Finally, recognizing the asset the City has in its compact core, 
significant effort will be focused into returning vibrancy into Youngstown’s downtown.   
 Using these themes as points of departure, the bulk of the Youngstown 2010 Plan deals 
with describing current conditions and identifying the assets of 11 neighbourhood clusters in the 
North, East, South, West and Central planning districts.    For instance, with respect to 
neighbourhoods in the North Side, each has been impacted by deindustrialization and suburban 
flight differently.  The North Side has experienced an average population decline of 16% every 
ten years for the past 40 years, leaving a large number of vacant and abandoned properties.  
While all North Side neighbourhoods are home to blight, it is most concentrated in Briar Hill, 
Wick Park, and North Heights neighbourhoods.  Some of the assets to build on in this district 
that the City identifies include two major medical facilities and a large amount of dedicated 
recreation/open space.  Several parkland gifts made to the city by early industrialists have 
ensured that there are several recreational opportunities for north side residents, including Wick 
Park and the Henry Stambaugh Golf Course.  According to the Plan, these and other assets are to 
be expanded with an increase in the overall greenspace and institutional space.  In comparison, 
the neighbourhoods of the West Side Planning District – some of which are the most recently 
developed neighbourhoods in Youngstown – have weathered the process of deindustrialization 
much better, averaging only a 7.75% population decline every ten years for the past 40 years.  
These predominantly white neighbourhoods are home to significantly less blight than the North, 
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South, and East Districts.  Some of the assets to build on in this district include four planned 
school projects and a large endowment of usable green spaces.  Similar analyses and 
recommendations are made for the other three planning districts, including the downtown, where 
it is envisioned a large amount of investment in redevelopment projects – including establishing 
recreation and open space areas and building a high density mixed use development in largely-
abandoned Smoky Hollow – will take place. 
 Importantly, since completing the general “inventory” of the five planning districts, the 
city has further divided the districts into 127 neighbourhoods (Aeppel, 2007), labelling each as 
stable, transitional, redevelopment, semi-rural, and industrial (City of Youngstown 
Neighbourhood Categories).  The city is now working on customized plans for these 
neighbourhoods, with the goal of crafting plans for about 30 neighbourhoods per year with the 
help of residents.  In general it is envisioned that certain neighbourhoods will not be revived and 
services will eventually be cut off in abandoned areas (City of Youngstown, 2005; Lanks, 2006a; 
Aeppel, 2007; Russell, 2008).  This corresponds with the part of the city’s Vision which calls for 
a downsizing of the massive amount of excess infrastructure.  Along these lines, another major 
component of the plan is the removal of blight in the form of, first, removing the biggest 
eyesores, including 1000 abandoned homes and several hundred old stores, schools, and other 
structures (Aeppel, 2007; Lanks, 2006a; City of Youngstown, 2005).  In fact, one of Mayor 
William’s first official duties was to apply surplus money to demolition.  In 2007, the Mayor 
increased annual demolition budget from $320,000 to $1.5 million (Aeppel, 2007).  The goal of 
removing blight works in concert with the desire to create more green space: empty parcels are to 
be converted into parks for community gardens or sold to remaining residents, allowing them to 
expand their yards or even rebuild their homes spread out over more than one lot (Aeppel, 2007).   
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According to Youngstown informant Y14: “We’ve put forward a very aggressive and cogent 
plan to start eliminating some of the excess units that have become blighted.  We’ve done that 
for years, but we have the ability now through the plan and through some additional resources to 
become much more aggressive and we spent a million dollars just in the 2 past years tearing 
down structures.” 
 The final important component of the plan is a chapter on implementation, which lays out 
the “next steps” citywide and for each planning district.  Each “next step” involves a project that 
would have “an immediate impact on the City” and that could “reasonably be expected to be 
underway or completed by 2010” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.127).  Each project is designed 
for one of three purposes: to make the city “cleaner,” “greener,” or “better planned and 
organized.” For instance, citywide, next steps include targeting highly visible demolitions 
(cleaner), converting surplus school building sites to green space (cleaner), creating and 
maintaining city parks (greener), seeking Clean Ohio funding for brownfields remediation 
(greener) and encouraging organizations to develop neighbourhood plans (better planned and 
organized).  In each district, a “next step” for making the city “cleaner” involves targeting 
demolition in stable neighbourhoods, planned areas, or areas adjacent to catalyst 
projects/neighbourhood assets.  Examples of “green” projects include establishing new parks in 
strategic neighbourhood locations and next steps for making neighbourhoods “better planned and 
organized” include revitalizing priority business centres in strategic neighbourhood locations.  
Most importantly, these steps are designed to keep various groups – government business, 
institutions, and the community – working together to implement the Plan.  As the Plan states: 
“The City cannot afford single handedly to do all that this plan calls for on its own.  This will 
take a collaborative effort between the City, citizens, private sector developers and businesses, 
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Youngstown State University, Youngstown Board of Education, community development 




In 2008, Forbes Magazine named Youngstown among the top 10 fastest dying cities in 
the U.S., referencing Census Bureau data, including population change, unemployment rate, and 
annual gross domestic product (Schoenstein, 2008).  Mayor Jay Williams has strongly 
discredited this characterization because the authors of this article had not visited Youngstown 
and thus had not witnessed firsthand the Youngstown 2010 effort to turn the city’s problems 
around.  Clearly, when it embarked on the Youngstown 2010 planning process, the city faced 
enormous physical, economic, social, environmental, and other challenges.  The Youngstown 
2010 Vision and Citywide Plan was created in an attempt to deal with these issues.  Does the 
Youngstown 2010 Plan embrace any of the principles of “good planning” in shrinking cities as 
laid out in Chapter 3?  If so, what factors led to the adoption of the principles?  If not, what 
mitigated against the adoption of the principles? This issue will be discussed in more detail in 










Greater Sudbury, a mid-sized Canadian city in northern Ontario, a four- to five-hour 
drive from Toronto (Canada’s largest municipality), is a resource-based community that in recent 
decades has suffered from a trend of significant unemployment and out-migration in the face of 
loss of its mining jobs.  Although the city’s population has recently stabilized somewhat due to a 
“booming” mining sector, the general long-term trend of Sudbury’s population has been 
downward.  At its peak in 1971, the population of the communities that make up with City of 
Greater Sudbury was 170,000.  Lay-offs at the city’s two large mining companies sparked a 
long-term downward trend in population and today the population is 157,857.  Unlike the steel 
industry in Youngstown, mining in Sudbury remains a very productive industry.  However, 
advances in technology and the resulting increases in productivity have meant that fewer people 
are needed to work in the mines.  Within this context of a general downward trend in mining 
employment, Sudbury’s economy has prospered or floundered according to the fortunes of the 
two dominant mining companies.  In short, Sudbury is a “boom and bust” community.   
 In June 2006, Sudbury’s City Council approved a new Official Plan called “People 
Engaged, Places Defined, Progress Driven.” The Official Plan is part of the city’s regeneration 
strategy, which includes an economic development plan, environmental reclamation plan, and a 
human services strategy, each prepared by different city departments and each of which is 
incorporated, or at least referred to, in the Official Plan.  Overall, in contrast to Youngstown’s 
strategy of admitting it is a smaller city that needs to “right-size” to its current population, the 
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policies contained in Sudbury’s new Official Plan are based on the assumption of that the 
population of Sudbury will continue to grow in the future.  The following chapter examines 
Sudbury strategy more closely, including the context within which Sudbury planners developed 
their regeneration strategy, the factors that sparked the recent planning exercise, and the main 
elements of the regeneration strategy, including the land-use planning, economic development, 
social, and environmental policies. 





The City of Greater Sudbury is located in what Statistics Canada defines as the Northeast 
Economic Region of Northern Ontario. 31 In total, Northern Ontario occupies more than 800,000 
square kilometres; this is almost 90% of the province’s land base.  More than half of the 
Northern Ontario’s residents live in the region’s five largest cities: Sudbury, North Bay, Sault 
Ste. Marie, Thunder Bay, and Timmins.  Only Sudbury and Thunder Bay have populations over 
100,000, while seven Northern Ontario communities have populations between 10,000 and 
100,000.  Most of the communities in Northern Ontario have less than 10,000 residents.  The rest 
(35%) live in rural communities, many of which are remote and are only accessible by boat or 
air.  Northern Ontario is home to 106 of Ontario’s 134 First Nations32 communities; in total, 40% 
of Ontario’s Aboriginal population lives in Northern Ontario.  As well, 26% of the province’s 
 
31 Statistics Canada combines census districts into “economic regions” for the purposes of analyzing regional 
economic activity.  Northern Ontario is divided into two such regions: the Northwest Economic region and the 
Northeast Economic Region.  The City of Greater Sudbury is located in the Northeast, along with the Districts of 
Nipissing, Parry Sound, Manitoulin, Sudbury, Timiskaming, Cochrane, and Algoma. 
32 A note about terminology: According to the Federal Government’s Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 
there are several terms used to refer to North America’s original inhabitants.  The term “Aboriginal” refers to all 
descendants of the original inhabitants of North America, including Indian, Inuit, and Métis.  The term “First Nation” is 
a terms which came into use in the 1970s to replace the word “Indian,” which some people found offensive.  There 
is no legal definition for the term “First Nation,” but it is generally used to refer to Indian people (Department of 
Indian and Northern Affairs, 2009).  Thus, a First Nation community is an Indian community.   
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Francophone population lives in Northern Ontario.  The region also encompasses most of 
Ontario’s woodlands and some of the richest mineral deposits in the world (Ontario, 2008). 
 
Figure 9: Northern Ontario33 
The City of Greater Sudbury was formed in 2001 through what Leadbeater (2008b) calls 
a “forced amalgamation” (p.18) of the former Regional Municipality of Sudbury (an upper tier 
municipality comprised of the former lower-tier municipalities of Sudbury, Capreol, Nickel 
Centre, Onaping Falls, Rayside-Balfour, Valley East, and Walden) and several unincorporated 
townships (Fraleck, Parkin, Aylmer, Mackelcan, Rathbun, Scadding, Dryden, Cleland and Dill).  
 
33 Source: Hall & Donald (2009). 
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The City of Greater Sudbury is thus made up of Sudbury proper and several surrounding 
communities, including Azilda, Blezzard Valley, Boninville, Capreol, Chelmsford, Coniston, 
Copper Cliff, Dowling, Falconbridge, Frood Mines, Garson, Hanmer, Levack, Lively, Onaping, 
Val Caron, and Val Thérèse.  Each of the various communities which make up Greater Sudbury 
developed around local mine sites, railways, and agricultural infrastructures and, as Leadbeater 
(2008a) explains, these communities have their own “…particular cultural histories different 
from Sudbury proper” (p.9).  In addition to these communities, there are two First Nations 
communities within the City’s boundaries which are politically independent of the City: 
Whitefish Lake First Nation and Wanapitei First Nation.  Of course, as Leadbeater (2008a) 
notes: “…the whole area was Aboriginal territory prior to colonization” (p.9).   
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Figure 10: Communities comprising the City of Greater Sudbury34 
The total area of the City of Greater Sudbury is 3,627 square kilometres, within which 330 lakes 
are located.  It is the largest municipality in Ontario in terms of total area, the second largest in 
Canada and the fourth largest in North America. 
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Sudbury’s beginnings can be traced back to 1883, with the westward expansion of the 
Canadian Pacific rail line.   The discovery of vast copper and nickel reserves propelled the tiny 
railroad junction into the ranks of Canada’s major cities, growing through cycles of boom and 
 
34 Source: City of Greater Sudbury (2009b). 
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bust.  Sudbury’s fortunes have largely depended on the fortunes of two large nickel-mining 
corporations: Inco Ltd (formed in 1886 as the Canadian Copper Company) and Falconbridge 
Ltd. (established in 1928).  The city reached its zenith in 1970, when nickel reached peak prices 
and employment at Inco and Falconbridge reached 30,000.  Residents of the Sudbury Region, 
then numbering approximately 170,000, were among the richest in Canada (Thoms & Pearsall, 
1994).   As Leadbeater (2008b) explains: 
Between the early 1900s and the 1960s, Sudbury mine workers of these two companies 
produced well over half the capitalist world’s nickel.  Based on their Sudbury-generated 
wealth, Inco and Falconbridge expanded across the globe to become major transnational 
corporations. (p.7) 
 
However, changes in the international nickel market brought on by globalization and 
technological advances in the mining industry ended Sudbury’s boom.  Inco, which at one time 
controlled 90 percent of the world nickel market, lost its monopoly because of international 
competition.  Advances in mining technology also meant that fewer workers were needed.  The 
effect on Sudbury’s economy was dramatic.  By 1983 workers in mining numbered less than 
14,000—barely 10% of Sudbury’s workforce (Richardson, 1991).   The loss of mining jobs had a 
significant effect on Sudbury’s population numbers.  By 1981, Sudbury had lost 4.5 % of its 
170,000 residents (Buse, 1993) and population has continued to decline since, with a slight 
recovery in the last census period (see below). The decline in mining has been offset somewhat 
by expansion of Sudbury’s role as a regional centre for government, commercial, educational, 
and health services.  A new middle class has emerged, made up of teachers, government 
employees, and small business owners, replacing blue collar workers as the largest workforce 
sector.  Despite this, the city’s economy – once characterized by high income and high 
employment – has become dominated by high unemployment, low income levels (Robinson, 
2002; Leadbeater, 2008b), increased economic dependency, deteriorating living standards and 
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social programs, and growing social polarization (Leadbeater, 2008b).   While rising nickel 
prices in the past few years reversed this trend somewhat, it is a reprieve that is not expected to 
last: “The current boom in metal process and production cannot hide the deeper economic and 







When Sudbury’s planners undertook the process of updating the City’s official plan in 
the early years of the new millennium, they faced a number of significant challenges – many of 
which continue today.  These challenges include a long-term trend of population decline, 
fluctuating economic conditions dictated by the boom and bust mining sector, a rapidly ageing 
and increasingly homogeneous population, and a legacy of environmental damage.  In the 




Because of changes in boundaries and census divisions and subdivisions, it is difficult to 
track the overall pattern of Sudbury’s population.  Nonetheless, the trend that emerges from a 
review of the available data on several geographical levels is that of overall population decline, 
with a slight increase in the last census period.  The following section examines the demographic 
data for the City of Greater Sudbury, discussing first population trends on a regional level.    
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While Ontario’s population has increased, in recent years the population of Northern 
Ontario has decreased steadily.  In particular, between 2002 and 2007, the population declined 
1.88% from 816,417 to 801,065.  During the same period, the population of Ontario increased 
5.8% from 12,102,045 to 12,803,861.  So in addition to decreasing on an absolute level, 
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Northern Ontario’s population is decreasing as a percentage of Ontario’s population.  It is 
projected that the population of Northern Ontario will decline by 4.5% by 2031 if current 
migration and demographic trends remain unchanged (Ontario, 2008).  Within Northern Ontario, 
the Northeast Economic Region (in which the City of Greater Sudbury is located, see above), 
while declining in population, has fared marginally better than the Northwest Economic Region.  
Between 2002 and 2007, the Northeast Economic Region lost 1.23% of its population, while the 
























245,209 244,900 243,942 242,346 239,999 236,890 -3.39%
Table 7: Population change in Northeast Economic Region, Ontario, 2001-200735 
Within the Northeast Economic Region, there is a trend of long-term population decline, 
followed by a slight recovery, on the level of the former Sudbury Territorial District. Prior to 
1973, the area that approximately corresponds to today’s City of Greater Sudbury was included 
in a region with outlying communities such as Espanola and Massey.  This region was referred to 
as the Sudbury Territorial District.  After 1973, this District was separated into the Regional 
Municipality of Sudbury (which became the City of Greater Sudbury in 2001, see above) and the 
“Sudbury District” (see map above).  Adding together population figures from the post-1973 
Sudbury District and the City of Greater Sudbury, it is evident that population in the area of this 
former Sudbury Territorial District has declined steadily from its peak in 1971 (198,079), with a 
 
35 Source: Statistics Canada (2008). Annual population estimates by economic region, provinces and territories, 
Canada — Population at July 1. 
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slight recovery in the last census period.  In fact, the population of the current Sudbury District 
declined faster in the last census period than the one previous.  For this reason, on this level, the 
recent gains in the population of the City of Greater Sudbury are offset to a certain extent by 
population loss in outlying communities.  It is also possible that the source of at least some of the 



























189,167 178,113 179,249 -5.84% +0.64% -5.24%
Table 8: Population change in former Sudbury Territorial District, 1996-200136 
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On a local level, the City of Greater Sudbury which, as discussed above, was formed in 
2001 by amalgamating the former Regional Municipality of Sudbury (an upper tier municipality 
comprised of the former lower-tier municipalities of Sudbury, Capreol, Nickel Centre, Onaping 
Falls, Rayside-Balfour, Valley East, and Walden) and several unincorporated townships 
(Fraleck, Parkin, Aylmer, Mackelcan, Rathbun, Scadding, Dryden, Cleland and Dill), saw its 
population increase slightly in the last census period in the face of a long-term trend of 
population loss.37 
36 Source: Leadbeater (2008a) and Statistics Canada 1996, 2001, and 2006 Census of Canada 
37 The same trend is true of the Greater Sudbury Census Metropolitan Area, which is comprised of the City of 
Greater Sudbury, as well as Whitefish Lake First Nation and Wanapitei First Nation.  Prior to 2001, the Greater 
Sudbury CMA did not include the former Town of Capreol, the unIncorporated townships, or the Wanapitei First 


















165,336 155,219 157,857 -6.11% +1.70% -4.52%
Table 9: Population change in City of Greater Sudbury, 1996-200638 
Interestingly, most of the increase in the City of Greater Sudbury’s population in the last 
census period can be attributed to an increase in the Aboriginal population of the City.  In 
general, the Aboriginal population is growing at a faster rate than the population of Ontario.  In 
particular, Sudbury’s Aboriginal population grew 36.61% between 2001 and 2006, while the 
non-Aboriginal population declined by 0.05%.  As Northern Ontario is home to 106 of the 
province’s 134 First Nations, it seems plausible that a significant portion of Sudbury’s in-
migration came from other communities in Northern Ontario. 
City of Greater 
Sudbury 








Table 10: Aboriginal population change in City of Greater Sudbury, 2001-200639 
Finally, the general trend of long-term population decline with slight recovery is evident 
for most of the communities that make up the City of Greater Sudbury, including the City of 













Capreol 3,817 3,486 3,492 -8.7% 0.2% -8.5%
Nickel Centre 13,017 12,672 12,629 -2.7% -0.3% -3.0%
38 Source: Leadbeater (2008a) and Statistics Canada 1996, 2001, and 2006 Census of Canada 
39 Source: Statistics Canada 2001 and 2006 Census of Canada 
195 
 
Onaping Falls 5,277 4,887 4,742 -7.4% -3.0% -10.1%
Rayside-Balfour 16,050 15,046 14,359 -6.3% -4.6% -10.5%
Sudbury 92,059 85,354 88,855 -7.3% 4.1% -3.5%
Valley East 23,537 22,374 22,664 -4.9% 1.3% -3.7%
Walden 10,292 10,101 10,159 -1.9% 0.6% -1.3%
Former region 164,049 153,920 156,889 -6.2% 1.9% -6.2%
New townships 1,287 1,299 958 0.9% -26.3% -25.6%
City of Greater 
Sudbury 
165,336 155,219 157,875 -6.1% 1.7% -4.5%
Table 11: Population change in Sudbury proper and surrounding areas, 1996-200640 
Thus, it is evident that Sudbury is a city experiencing long-term population decline, with a slight 
recent recovery due in large part to an increase in its Aboriginal population, within a region that 
is also declining in population.  Predictions have been made that Sudbury’s population will 
continue to decline because of a declining birth rate and ageing population, unless more 
immigrants settle there (Wilkinson, 2005).  According to Matthews (2006), Sudbury’s population 
could decrease to as low as 64 000 (40% of its current population) in 2051 if current birth rates 
and its current share of immigrants are maintained (Matthews, 2006).  Within the City itself, 
several of the communities surrounding Sudbury proper have seen large declines in recent 
decades while others have seen a recent small increase.  All in all, the demographic 
circumstances of the city, while not as dramatic as those faced by the City of Youngstown, 




The City of Greater Sudbury is different from most cities, and certainly different from 
Youngstown, in its physical structure.  As discussed earlier, Greater Sudbury occupies a large 
total area: 3,627 square kilometres. According to Sudbury informant S1 (a city planner):     
One of the challenges we face is our dispersed development in the city - the fact that we 
started with 10 or more urban areas – one central city but with 10 or more smaller urban 
areas and then there’s areas that are non-urban but still clusters of rural population.  And 
 
40 Source: City of Sudbury, 2009a and Statistics Canada 1996, 2001, and 2006 Census of Canada 
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when you consider that it’s a pretty basic planning principle that you try to foster 
development and try to achieve economies of scale and lessen your impact or footprint on 
the environment, [our dispersed structure] is just something we’ll have to continue to deal 
with as we move forward. 
 
Furthermore, each of the City’s distinct communities has its own history and culture and each of 
which is facing different demographic circumstances.  Another city official (a planner) – 
Sudbury informant S12 – explains that 
...there are 7,8,9,10 distinct cultures in this community: there’s the French community, 
there’s geographic separation of communities, there’s former communities that were 
owned by [mining companies]:Falconbridge-kind of towns, former Inco-towns.  [These 
communities] grew up slightly different from a cultural standpoint based on their 
relationships with the companies.  So, the communities are not homogeneous.  This is not 
one big city… it’s a city with many parts.  You have many different cultural, political 
ambitions and expectations that are at play, so part of the challenge is to understand that. 
 
Compounding this geographic and cultural diversity is demographic differences: certain parts of 
the City are losing population at a fast pace, while others remain stagnant and still others have 
gained population in recent years.  On top of the large number of diverse communities, the City 
of Greater Sudbury’s land area contains over 330 lakes over 10 hectares and, as Sudbury 
informant S12 explains, “…an untold number of water bodies in addition to that that are smaller, 
which means there is a heck of a lot of environmental issues in this community.”   All of these 
characteristics present a challenge for Sudbury’s planners, who are faced with the task of 
developing land-use policies in a very dispersed and diverse environment.   
 In addition to, and related to, the challenge of planning for such a large and diverse area, 
Sudbury has faced issues of downtown decline, particularly since the mid-1900s.  Sudbury’s 
downtown occupies approximately 42 city blocks within the city’s 3627 square kilometres.  
Despite the fact that Sudbury was originally established as a temporary railroad junction without 
thought to the location’s suitability as a central business district either in terms of access or 
attractiveness (Saarinen, 1990; Stelter, 1971; Sudbury Planning Board, 1963), by 1951 
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downtown Sudbury became the prominent place of business (Ferrigan, 1996).  However, after 
World War Two, discontinuous urban sprawl led many businesses to relocate near newer 
residential development and the city began orienting itself around the automobile (Saarinen, 
1971). With the opening of a suburban shopping mall in 1957, residents began to patronize 
suburban shopping locations over the downtown core and the core’s retail function began 
declining. 41 In 1966, a report by Sudbury’s Planning Director called for revitalization of the 
downtown, ushering in an era of urban renewal (Sudbury Planning Board, 1966).  
 These revitalization efforts, including the building of the City Centre Shopping Mall in 
1971, succeeded in aiding the downtown to regain a share of the local retail market. However, by 
the 1990s, the downtown core faced competition by new suburban malls as well as emerging 
power centres42 (Downtown Village Development Corporation, 2006) which the city had 
actively encouraged to locate in the periphery, despite the opposition of downtown merchants. 43 
At one low point, the majority of retail space in the City Centre Mall was vacant.   By 1990, the 
New Sudbury suburban area was home to 36.8% of commercial/service establishments while 
13.5% were located in the downtown (in 1951, the downtown had accounted for 62.6% of this 
activity) (Ferrigan, 1996).The office sector also decentralized due to competition from office 
parks in the New Sudbury area, but to a lesser degree.  In this sector, the downtown’s share 
dropped from 96.8% in 1950 to 49.1% in 1990 (Ferrigan, 1996).  In all, the decline of Sudbury’s 
downtown represents a significant challenge for Sudbury’s planners. 
 
41 This mass exodus of people and business out of the downtown core after WWII has been a common pattern in 
mid-size cities across Canada (Bunting, Filion, & Priston, 2002; Filion et al., 2000; 2004; Seasons, 2003).  
42 A “power centre” is defined as a shopping area “having three or more big box retailers with shared parking lot and 
typically ancillary smaller commercial areas” (Centre for the Study of Commercial Activity [CSCA], 2006b).  Big 
box retailers are usually “three times or more times larger than other comparable stores” (CSCA, 2006a). 
43 According to O’Brien (2004), this seemingly counter-productive strategy is common: “…planning and economic 
development sometimes work in a schizophrenic manner” (p.27).  A city may be working to revitalize the central 
area on one hand, while developing power centres on the fringes.  In O’Brien’s opinion, “this is an interesting 
observation, because it points out the tension between shoring up the local ark and being carried along in the 
globalization flood” (p.27). 
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Photograph 4: Space for lease in downtown Sudbury (Photograph by Laura Schatz) 
 Finally, in terms of physical challenges, Sudbury is home to a large amount of crumbling 
physical infrastructure, a fact which Leadbeater (2008b) finds particularly troubling:   
Given that Sudbury is such a world-level centre of mining atop such enormous mineral 
wealth, one might think it would exude substantial prosperity, with well-provided 
cultural, educational, health and social-welfare institutions, and a well-maintained and 
attractive physical infrastructure.  But this is far from the Sudbury most people know.  
Despite doing a major share of the Canadian economy’s heavy lifting for well over a 
century, the Sudbury area as a community has relatively little to show for it. (p.7) 
 
Sudbury’s roads have been in a particular state of disrepair for many years (see, for instance, 
Myers, 2007; Bradley, 2009b).  The major difficulty in fixing the problem, according to Mayor 
Rodriguez, is the fact that there are 3600 kilometres of lanes and roads running through Sudbury 
and not enough money in the budget to fix them (Myers, 2007).  According to a high-ranking 
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city official, Sudbury informant S11: “The cost of providing that service in the wintertime and in 
the summertime to those road infrastructures… We have a 10-year deficit of approximately 540 
million dollars, so over half a billion dollars in a 10 year deficit.” The irony that this lack of 
funds to fix the roads continues to exist even in the context of record profits in recent years for 
both mining companies (who damage Sudbury’s roads by driving massive trucks over them) has 
been pointed out by several observers (Leadbeater, 2008b; Atkins, 2008; Greater Sudbury, 
2006a).  In 2006, a report called “Claiming our Stake; Building a Sustainable Community” was 
released by a task force formed by then-Mayor Courtemanche, who formed the task force in 
response to the take-over by foreign owners of Inco and Falconbridge.  The report points out 
that, even though the municipality is solely responsible for maintaining its physical 
infrastructure, it continues to receive a shrinking amount of mining tax revenue and property tax 
revenue from local mining companies: 
…almost 50% of [mining] tax revenues go to the federal level, 35% go to the provincial 
government while only 16% stays in the local resource municipalities.  As their 
contribution to municipal revenues has fallen over time, the mining companies increased 
their use of public transportation infrastructure and reduced their investment in private 
transportation infrastructure.  Twenty-years ago, most ore was transported throughout the 
Sudbury Basin by railroads that were maintained by the mining companies.  Today ore is 
predominantly transported by truck, causing rapid and costly deterioration of the road 
infrastructure that was not designed for heavy industrial use.  (Greater Sudbury, 2006a, 
p.22) 
 
On top of dwindling contributions by higher levels of government, Sudbury informant S11 (a 
high-ranking city official) explains that the property taxation system for mining companies has 
meant declining revenues for many years: 
The only source of taxation for a community is property taxes and in our case in Sudbury 
the predominant corporations in this community have been the mining companies and 
their properties.  Now, for whatever reason, mining companies come under what’s called 
the Mining Act of Ontario. Even the way we tax them is outlined in the Mining Act. So, 
for example, a citizen’s home is not depreciated when it comes to assessing them for 
property taxes for the city.  But the mining properties depreciate.  So, for example, we 
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don’t collect any tax on the Superstack here in Sudbury anymore.  It’s depreciated 
beyond assessed value, so we don’t collect anything on the Superstack for example… It’s 
still producing wealth for the company, but it’s depreciated.  Then you’ve got the reality 
of the companies looking for efficiency, so if their equipment is getting deeper and 
deeper in the mine, as is the case today, then you don’t need to bring the equipment up to 
the surface to be serviced.  The idea is to take the garage down to where the equipment is.  
So then you don’t need that building up on the surface so you knock it down and we can’t 
follow the assessment underground according to the Mining Act of Ontario.  So we’ve 
lost that assessment.  In fact, 15 years ago, the taxes we collected from the mining 
companies based on their assessment was 26% of our base budget.  Now it’s down to 6%. 
 
Photograph 5: A wealth-creating asset with no assessed property value: The Superstack 
(Photograph by Laura Schatz) 
 
As such, the maintenance of physical infrastructure with increased use and decreased revenue 







Sudbury has faced, and continues to face, significant economic challenges.  As noted 
above, a large number of mining jobs have been lost in recent decades due to increasing 
globalization of the mining industry combined with technological change resulting in large 
productivity increases per worker.  Today, the two large mines in Sudbury employ less than 6000 
workers, down from approximately 30,000 in the 1970s.  Decreasing employment in primary 
mining is a trend that is expected to continue (Leadbeater, 2008b) and thus the City is faced with 
the challenge of diversifying into other industries.  Indeed, in recent years Sudbury has become 
entrenched as a regional centre for government, commercial, educational, and health services 
(Sudbury, 2004).  As Sudbury informant S8 (an employee with the City’s business development 
organization) puts it: “We are very fortunate for a Northern Ontario city.  We are fairly centrally 
located.  We’re three times the size of any other northern city.  We are a referral centre.  We are 
an education centre.” 80% of Sudbury’s labour force are now employed in service activities, 
while 20% are employed in goods-producing activities (City of Greater Sudbury, 2009a).  Much 
of the service employment has been in the public sector. More specifically in terms of labour 
force by industry, in 2006 out of a labour force of 81,590: 
 
Industry by North American Industry 
Classification 
Labour Force % of Sudbury’s 
total labour 
force 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 285 0.3%
Mining and oil and gas extraction44 5,715 7.0%
Utilities  505 0.6%
Construction  5,145 5.8%
44 Note: The North American Industry Classification of “Mining and oil and gas extraction” includes primary 
extraction of naturally occurring minerals and activities which support extraction, including exploration activities 
(Industry Canada, 2008).  Thus, it does not include other activities related to mining, including manufacturing 
industries such as smelting and refining and the mining supply and services industry; unfortunately, there is no 
separate category for these activities and they are thus included in other categories.   
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Manufacturing  4,775 5.9%
Wholesale trade  3,015 3.7%
Retail trade  10,270 12.6%
Transportation and warehousing  3,645 4.5%
Information and cultural industries  1,225 1.5%
Finance and insurance  2,195 2.7%
Real estate and rental and leasing  1,135 1.4%
Professional, scientific and technical services  3,530 4.3%
Management of companies and enterprises  15 0.0%
Administrative and support, waste management 
and remediation services  
3,800 4.7%
Educational services  7,045 8.6%
Health care and social assistance  9,920 12.2%
Arts, entertainment and recreation  1,550 1.9%
Accommodation and food services  5,610 6.9%
Other services (except public administration)  4,225 5.2%
Public administration  6,180 7.6%
Table 12: Labour force by industry in Sudbury, 200645 
However, recent economic diversification has not erased Sudbury’s dependence on the 
mining industry, which remains significant (Leadbeater, 2008b).   In 2006, 50.85% of all 
employment income earned in Sudbury was earned in the mining industry; in particular, 37.23% 
was earned in primary mining (Statistics Canada, 2006).  Indeed on a regional level, it is 
recognized that Northern Ontario’s economy as a whole continues to be largely resource-based 
(Ontario, 2008).  In particular, levels of employment in Sudbury continue to depend in large 
degree on fluctuations in the international nickel market, a fact which has been felt in recent 
months with the sharp decrease in nickel prices.  In the last year, Sudbury’s unemployment rate 
has climbed from 5.6% (in June 2008) to 8.9% (in June 2009) (Robinson, 2009).  In February 
2009, one of the large mines laid off 700 workers and closed three mines.  The other mine has 
been shut down since May, 2009.  In May 2009 alone, 2,400 jobs were lost in Sudbury 
(Robinson, 2009).  In comparison, June 2009, the unemployment rate for Canada was 8.6% 
while Ontario’s was 9.6% (primarily due to large losses in manufacturing in Southern Ontario).  
 
45 Source: City of Greater Sudbury (2009a). 
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Indeed, Sudbury has tended, since mining employment began to decline in the 1970s, to have 
unemployment rates higher than the national and provincial averages (Leadbeater, 2008b), with 
the gap being narrowed or widened according to mineral price fluctuations (Statistics Canada, 
2006).  In 2001, for instance, when nickel markets were particularly depressed, Sudbury’s 
unemployment rate was 9.1%, compared to a rate of 6.1% for Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2001).  
In 2006, when nickel markets were starting to improve, Sudbury’s unemployment rate declined 
to 7.8%, compared to a rate of 6.4% for Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2006). 
 In addition to affecting Sudbury’s levels of employment, on a more general level the 
continued reliance of Sudbury’s economy on mining means that the city remains dependent on 
the corporate decisions of two large mining companies, whose ownership has become 
increasingly distant from the region in recent years.   In 2006, Inco was taken over by 
Companhia do Vale Rio Doce (CVRD), a Brazilian transnational, and Falconbridge was taken 
over by Xstrata Plc, a Swiss mining transnational.  The companies are now known in Sudbury as 
Vale Inco and Xstrata Nickel.  There are suspicions that the restructuring of ownership of the 
companies is not over: “rumours and proposals continue to appear about further rounds of 
corporate takeover and consolidation” (Leadbeater, 2008b, p.7).  Recent layoffs and shutdowns 
have raised concerns from unions and local residents that the further removed ownership is from 
the Sudbury region, the less concerned companies will be with the well-being of the local 
community.46 Of course, neither Inco nor Falconbridge were headquartered in Sudbury (both 
were headquartered in Toronto; the centre of Inco’s world marketing was located in suburban 
New Jersey), but the current transnationals that own both companies are even farther removed 
 





from the region.  Sudbury informant S8, an employee with the City’s business development 
organization, however, points out that foreign ownership may in fact be beneficial:  
Well, there was a bit of an attitude when it all happened that how could we let these 
foreign-owned companies take over.  That passed.  Those companies have shown that 
they’re very socially conscious.  They’ve been very supportive of the community in a 
number of ways, everything from a social cause to an economic development cause.  
They volunteer.  They’re in the community.  So, I think, sure.  If push came to shove and 
things were really bad, it’s a lot easier for an international company to say ‘we’re out’ 
than it is for a locally-owned company but...  To me and to others, we’re starting to see 
that this could be a good thing versus a bad thing.  These are huge international 
companies that bring huge international connections.  Those connections in the past we 
didn’t have to that extent. 
 
Increased international connections and local volunteering aside, foreign ownership creates a 
challenging environment for local planners who are trying to influence the development in a city 
whose fortunes are largely determined in Brazil and Switzerland.  
 As noted, diversification into the service sector – particularly the public sector – has 
somewhat reduced Sudbury’s dependence on mining in recent decades.  This leads Leadbeater 
(2008b) to conclude that Sudbury has become a “two-industry town,” “maintained by the public 
sector as well as by mining” (p.23).  However, employment in the public sector in Sudbury has 
been declining in recent years.  For instance, in 2005 alone, employment in public sector 
occupations declined by about 3000.  After analyzing public sector employment for 2005 and 
years previous, Lange (2005) notes that “…the public sector has been cutting back noticeably on 
employment in the Sudbury region… In short, the employment data suggests that all three levels 
of government and, probably mainly the senior levels, have been abandoning the Sudbury 
region” (p.1).   
 As well, the private sector service jobs that have been created have not replaced the high-
paying unionized mining jobs that have been lost.  The highest-paying jobs in Sudbury continue 
to be those in the primary mining industry: in 2005, the median earnings for full-year, full-time 
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earners in primary mining was $89,070 (up from $67,322 in 2000); for the service sector, median 
earnings were $23,821 (down from $24,660 in 2000) (Statistics Canada, 2006).47 Sudbury 
informant S4, the head of a community organization and member of City Council, explains that  
We’re in an interesting time in Sudbury… Nickel prices have been very high and we 
have a good number of people employed with the mining industry who are making these 
bonus cheques.  They’re making salaries equivalent to very high level CEOs so it’s 
nothing for a miner to have a $160,000 T4 for this city, right?  So, that’s good for the 
economy because they don’t stash that money away.  They spend it.  They buy boats and 
RVs and their camp and do construction, which means that everybody else makes money 
in the community, right?  So, we’ve got a very strong economy and lots of money being 
spent on the one hand and that’s a good thing.  On the other hand, the disparity between 
the haves and have-nots is probably wider because for people that work in the service 
industry, in minimum wage jobs, people that don’t work at all that are living in poverty, 
they get lost in that economy… You look around, there’s cars every place, there’s people 
shopping every place, it’s like man, we’re doing well.  Except for that 10 percent of the 
population that’s not doing so well.  And it’s been hard to draw attention to that.  It’s 
easier to draw attention when it’s 30 percent.  When it’s 10 percent, when it’s actually 
something that we could do something with, it’s hard to get attention because they don’t 
see it… not as evident… 
 
Many of the private sector service jobs created in recent years have been low-paying, high-stress, 
insecure call centre jobs.  In the late 1990s, Sudbury began investing in costly ICT infrastructure 
to become an attractive destination for outsourced technology services.  The city focused on 
attracting the call centre industry because it promised the “quickest job-creation potential” 
(Gordon, 2003).  By 2000, the city had laid some 2500 kilometres of fibre optics and 150 
kilometres of broadband cable readily accessible by business enterprises (HRSDC, 2004).  
Sudbury’s strategy has been successful in attracting approximately 10 call centres, two of which 
are government call centres in the health care sector (Greater Sudbury Development Corporation, 
2009).  Many are foreign owned, particularly by US-based firms with one or more Canadian 
locations.  Despite assertions by the City that the sector is “growing” (Greater Sudbury 
Development Corporation, 2009), call centres remain notoriously footloose and a number have 
 
47 Earnings are in 2005 constant dollars. 
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closed their doors or downsized significantly since locating in Sudbury.48 Recently a private 
sector call centre (headquartered in Nashville) employing 350 people announced it would be 
closing because of “changing business needs” (Bradley, 2009a).  Thus, in addition to not 
replacing the high-paying unionized mining jobs, diversification into the private sector services 
(particularly lower-end, back-office services such as call centres) continues to reinforce 
Sudbury’s dependence on forces beyond its control as decisions which significantly affect 
Sudbury’s economy are made in locations far removed from the community.  Again, this lack of 




Sudbury’s planners have faced and continue to face challenges with respect to planning 
for a population that is losing young people, is ageing, and lacks diversity.  In terms of age 
structure, traditionally there has been a large out-migration of those in Sudbury’s younger age 
groups, which has been stemmed slightly in recent years: between 1996 and 2001, the population 
in the 25 to 34 age group declined by 25% (Social Planning Council of Sudbury, 2005).   
Between 2001 and 2006, the number in this age group remained largely unchanged (Statistics 
Canada, 2006). Sudbury has also been plagued by a significant trend of youth (18-24) out-
migration (Social Planning Council of Sudbury, 2005).  This trend has also been stemmed 
slightly in recent years, although not for children aged 14 and under: in 2006 Sudbury had fewer 
residents of this age group than in 2001 (Sudbury Community Foundation, 2008). It seems likely 
that the 35% growth in Sudbury’s Aboriginal population (in which 4 of 10 are under the age of 
25, compared to 3 of 10 for Sudbury’s non-Aboriginal population) (Statistics Canada, 2006) in 
the last census period has contributed to the slight increase in the population of younger age 
 
48 For a more in-depth discussion of the impacts of Sudbury’s call centres, see Schatz & Johnson, (2007). 
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groups.  Rather than signalling a trend reversal, researchers such as Leadbeater (2008a) expect 
that in the long term Sudbury will continue to witness a drain of is young people.  This seems 
likely given that youth unemployment rates in the city remain high: in 2006, 17.6% of youth 
aged 15-24 were unemployed, which is much greater than the provincial rate of 14.5% and the 
national rate of 12.8% (Sudbury Community Foundation, 2008).   
 Related to the long-term trend of losing young people, Sudbury is an aging population: in 
2001, 13.9 % of the population were seniors aged 65 and over, compared to 12.9% for all of 
Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2001).  In 2006, the median age increased in Sudbury from the last 
census by 2.1 years to 41.0 years, which is higher than the national level (39.5 years) and the 
provincial level (39.0 years) (Sudbury Community Foundation, 2008).  It is projected that in 
2011 the percentage of seniors will reach 16.3 % and by 2021, will rise to 21.3 % (City of 
Greater Sudbury, 2009a).  As noted above, predictions have been made that Sudbury’s 
population will continue to decline because of a declining birth rate and ageing population, 
unless more immigrants settle there (Wilkinson, 2005).  However, to date Sudbury has not 
succeeded as an immigration reception area: in 2001, 7.1 % of Sudbury’s population were 
immigrants.  In 2006, this percentage dropped to 6.68%.  Both are well below the Ontario’s rate 
of foreign-born population, which was 26.8% in 2001 and 28.3% in 2006 (Statistics Canada, 
2001; 2006; Sudbury Community Foundation, 2008).  Particularly troubling is the fact that the 
unemployment rate for recent immigrants (that is, those who have immigrated in the last 5 years) 
in Sudbury in 2006 was 30.1%, up from 8.7% in 2001 (Sudbury Community Foundation, 2008). 
Sudbury also continues to lack diversity in terms of attracting visible minority residents: 
although Sudbury’s visible minority population increased 4.6% between 2001 and 2006, only 
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2.1% of the population are visible minorities, compared to the provincial rate of 22.8% (Sudbury 
Community Foundation, 2008). 
 Finally, Sudbury also faces challenges in the social realm related to housing, education, 
and health.  In terms of housing, the recent boom in nickel prices has meant that more people are 
seeking housing in Sudbury.  Between 1998 and 2007, housing starts increased 256%, compared 
to a national increase of 66% and a provincial increase of 27% (Sudbury Community 
Foundation, 2008).  The number of new houses may be part of the reason the total amount of 
acres farmed in the city decreased 4.2% between 2001 and 2006 (Sudbury Community 
Foundation, 2008).  As well, the vacancy rate for two-bedroom apartments has dropped 
dramatically in recent years and access to affordable housing has become a serious issue (Social 
Housing Services Corporation, 2009).  Sudbury informant S4, the head of a community 
organization, explains that in Sudbury, finding housing “…for anybody is a challenge.  Finding 
housing for low income people is an even greater challenge.  You know, the food banks will tell 
you that food bank use is still high…”.  As well, booming nickel prices have not lowered 
Sudbury’s high-school drop-out rate, which remains high.  According to Sudbury informant S4: 
Our high school drop-out rate is still I think far too high for what it should be.  It’s 
difficult to get good and accurate numbers because you get national numbers and you get 
provincial numbers.  It’s very hard to get local numbers, but [there are] estimates that 
about 25% of our high school kids are not finishing high school anymore.  And what does 
that mean in today’s economy.  Again 30 years ago those guys, because it was just guys 
at that time, could leave high school and go to Inco to get a job and they’re retiring now 
with great pensions from INCO [and they] didn’t have Grade 12.  This next generation is 
not going to be in that boat.  You have to have a college degree to get hired at Inco now.  
So, what’s the economy for that group?  How do we re-engage them after we’ve lost 
them in high school?   
 
With respect to health issues in Sudbury, the 2006 census found that life expectancy in 
Sudbury is 77.3 years, 2.2 years lower than the national life expectancy and 2.4 years lower than 
the provincial life expectancy.  As Nagarajan (2008) explains, “[t]he health status of the people 
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of Sudbury and Northern Ontario is relatively poor” (p.125).  For example, research by 
Nagarajan (2008) has found that mortality rates for almost all major illnesses are higher than the 
rest of the province as are rates of occurrence of chronic diseases.  According to him, the poorer 
health conditions in Sudbury can be explained by a number of factors, one of which is poor 
lifestyle choices. For instance, smoking rates are increasing in Sudbury: in 2007, 27.4% of the 
population over the age of 12 identifying themselves as current smokers, which is 3.4% higher 
than in 2005 and 5.5% and 6.8% higher respectively than the national and provincial rates.  
Obesity rates have also increased in recent years and are higher than both the national and 
provincial averages (Sudbury Community Foundation, 2008).  Another factor is the relative lack 
of access to physicians, nurses, and health-care facilities.  However, another significant factor 
has contributed to poorer health conditions: the pollution of the physical environment.  It is to 







In terms of the natural environment, Sudbury has an abundance of assets.  The City of 
Greater Sudbury contains 330 lakes within its municipal boundaries. At 13,257 hectares in area, 
Lake Wanapitei is the largest city-contained lake in the world.  However, as the region also 
contains one of the world’s largest nickel reserves and is the largest hardrock mining centre in 
North America, Sudbury’s natural environment has suffered enormous degradation from mining 
and smelting activities.  Indeed, according to City publications, “[t]here is no community in 
Canada that has endured as much environmental damage over the past century of mining than 
Sudbury” (Greater Sudbury, 2006, p.22).  As Edinger (2008) states, “Sudbury is a textbook case 
in industrial degradation of the environment... The story of acid rain, deforestation, soil erosion, 
210 
 
and the Sudbury ‘moonscape’ of the 1940s to 1970s has become part of Canadian legend…” 
(p.106).  
 Environmental damage from mining and smelting began in Sudbury shortly after the 
discovery of copper ore in the 1880s (Edinger, 2008).  The damage has taken a number of forms 
since then.  For instance, deforestation occurred prior to the 1920s when trees were used to fuel 
the large roasting beds.  Most of the trees (and animals) that remained were killed by the heavy 
metals that were released into the ground under and beside the roasting beds.  In some areas of 
Sudbury, toxic levels of nickel, copper and other heavy metals remain.  In addition, sulphur 
dioxide and particulate-metal clouds released from smelters have killed vegetation and made re-
greening difficult given the soil’s high acidic content.  While the building of the Superstack in 
1972 reduced local emissions by 90%, the sulphur acidified more than 7000 lakes in a 17,000 
square kilometre radius and “[s]ome lakes in Killarney and the Sudbury region will probably 
never recover” (Edinger, 2008, p.107).   In addition, the building of the Superstack meant that 
the effects of mining pollution were sent further afield.  While much has been made – rightly – 
of the city’s re-greening efforts (since the late 1970s, over 11 million trees have been planted and 
the city has received international awards for its environmental initiatives), Sudbury’s 
environment continues to feel the damaging effects of mining.  For instance, there is still a large 
area left to be re-greened.  As Sudbury informant S7 (an Earthcare Sudbury employee) explains:  
A lot of the emphasis at first was on [re-greening] roadside corridors, so a lot of those 
areas are done and it gives the illusion that everything is green when it’s only on the 
roadway… including some residents of Sudbury.  So the illusion is that oh, aren’t you 
guys done with re-greening yet?  In fact, that’s not the case. There’s thousands of 




Photograph 6: Re-greened slag heaps as seen from the highway… (Photograph by Laura Schatz) 
Photograph 7: …and as seen from the side (Photograph by Laura Schatz) 
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Importantly, Sudbury informant S7, an employee with Earthcare Sudbury, disagrees with the 
assertion that the two mining companies continue to disregard the health of Sudbury’s 
environment.  For instance, Edinger (2008) argues that “[b]oth Inco and Falconbridge continue 
to be convicted of a wide range of environmental violations…” (p.109). According to S7,  
I think the mining companies work very hard at bringing their operation to a more 
environmentally conscious way… it’s constant work on their part to make sure that not 
only they act in regulatory boundaries but also in some instances moving beyond those 
into areas that aren’t regulated but they still want to do the right thing. 
 
Regardless of where the fault lies, a key question is how this environmental damage has 
affected the health of Sudbury residents.  Despite the knowledge that the physical environment 
likely has significant impacts of health, there are few publicly available studies on the health 
impacts of Sudbury’s environment (Nagarajan, 2008).  As Edinger (2008) explains: 
The health implications of sulphur dioxide gas releases and other environmental 
violations require more study.  The fact that Inco compensates employees and residents 
of Copper Cliff and the West End of Sudbury for damage to the paint on their cars caused 
by smelter fallout, but not for damage to their lungs, illustrates the low attention given to 
health impacts of smelter operations. (p.109) 
 
In 2001, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, which has been sampling soil and vegetation 
in Sudbury since 1971, found elevated levels of heavy metals such as nickel, copper, and arsenic 
in Sudbury’s soil (Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 2003).  In response to this report, the 
Sudbury Area Risk Assessment Group (SARA Group) – made up of corporate (including Inco 
and Falconbridge), community, and other partners – did a “Soil Study” which found “no 
unacceptable health risks” from the metals in the environment (SARA Group, 2008, p.3).  The 
study, however, has received criticism, particularly for its choice of cut-off point for deciding 
how much risk is “acceptable.”  For instance, with respect to lead levels, the SARA group chose 
to use a cut-off of 400 parts per million rather than the provincial guideline of 100 parts per 
million (Nagarajan, 2008).  Indeed, a review of this study by the Toronto-based non-profit 
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organization Environmental Defence – conducted at the request of the two local unions –  
concluded that “[t]he risk assessment cannot demonstrate that no harm is occurring; it can only 
estimate the level of risk. The assessors have inappropriately decided what that acceptable level 
of risk should be. This is a decision the community should make” (Environmental Defence, 
2008, p.1). The SARA Group soil study has also been criticized for potential conflict of interest 
given that the two mining companies were included as members of the Technical Committee, 
which made the major decisions about the study, including decisions regarding cut-off points. 49 
Unions, on the other hand, were invited only to “attend and observe” Technical Committee 
meetings (SARA Group, 2008, p.6).  Thus, questions remain about the continued impact of 




According to Leadbeater (2008b), despite the fact that the mining companies continue to 
do damage to the local community (including to the environment, the health of local residents, 
and infrastructure) without paying their fair share of “resource rents” (that is, part of corporate 
profit over and above the average rate of profit for the industry) back to the community, local 
officials are afraid to criticize the companies and indeed have become “subservient” to them 
(p.11). According to him, the reaction to any criticism of the mining corporations is that “…if 
Sudbury or any community wants jobs, then this is what one must expect and accept, however 
reluctantly.  This is the classic ‘TINA’ notion – ‘There Is No Alternative.’” (p.19).  To 
Leadbeater, the TINA “flim-flam” poses an obstacle to developing policy which would see the 
local community receive its fair share of benefits of mining its rich nickel deposits.  Of course, 
others, including the task force mentioned earlier put together by former Mayor Courtemanche in 
 
49 See, for instance, http://www.sudburysoilsstudy.com/EN/media/support/articles/CBCRadio_091703_2.pdf; see 
also Mulligan (2003). 
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the wake of the foreign takeovers of Inco and Falconbridge, have argued that Sudbury does not 
receive its fair share of money from mining companies.  However, their major argument is not 
that there should be more local control over local resources or that mining companies should pay 
compensation for social or environmental damage.  Instead, they argue that the city should 
receive a larger portion of existing government revenues.  That is, mining companies should not 
be paying more taxes; Sudbury should receive a greater share of what they are already paying.   
This is the view which is being argued by the current Mayor.  Regardless of which view one 
adopts, there is a general sense of lack of control in Sudbury which poses a challenge for 
effective policy development. 
 Sudbury’s large and growing Aboriginal community faces significant challenges which 
also warrant special mention.  As stated by the Ontario government in its discussion paper on a 
growth plan for the North, in Northern Ontario “…Aboriginal communities are increasingly 
looking for partnerships to create new employment and economic opportunities.  Engaging and 
working with Aboriginal peoples is key to the future prosperity of the region” (Ontario, 2008, 
p.1).  Despite their key role in the future prosperity of Northern Ontario, Aboriginal people 
continue to experience rates of unemployment higher than the non-Aboriginal population.  
Particularly in Sudbury, the unemployment rate of Aboriginal people in 2006 was 11.9% versus 
7.6% in non-Aboriginal population.   31.9% of First Nation youth were unemployed in 2006 
(Statistics Canada, 2009).  The median income for Aboriginal people was lower than that for 
non-Aboriginal; indeed, both have increased in recent years, but the gap between the two also 
widened from a 31.1% difference in 2000 to a 40.9% difference in 2005 (Sudbury Community 
Foundation, 2008).  In 2005, the median income for Aboriginal women in Sudbury was 
particularly low: $15,891, compared to $20,176 for non-Aboriginal women or $29,377 for 
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Aboriginal men.  As well, in 2005, over one in four (27%) Aboriginal people were living below 
the low-income cut-off, compared to 12% of non-Aboriginal people.  As well, 34% of 
Aboriginal children (14 years and under) were living under the low-income cut-off compared to 




In the context of these significant challenges, Sudbury planners updated the city’s 
Official Plan in the early years of the new millennium.  The Plan, entitled “People engaged, 
places defined, progress driven” was prepared by the Southern Ontario planning firm Meridian 
Planning Consultants and was adopted by City Council on June 14, 2006.  As a whole, the Plan 
sets out the city’s land-use planning policies, in addition to incorporating (or at least referring to) 
strategy developed separately in the areas of economic development (Coming of age in the 21st 
century: An economic development strategic plan for Greater Sudbury 2015), social policy (the 
City of Greater Sudbury Human Services Strategy 2015), and environmental policy (EarthCare 
Sudbury Local Action Plan).  According to local officials and as stated in the Plan itself, the 
strategies and policies contained in the Official Plan represent the main instruments which are 
guiding the future development of the city in the physical, economic, social, and environmental 
realms: “…the Official Plan functions as much more than a land use planning document” (City 
of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.3).  In the following section, I examine more closely policy in each 









Sudbury undertook the task of updating its existing Official Plan largely for two reasons: 
provincial legislative requirements for review and a desire for up-to-date, uniform standards for 
the entire area of the recently amalgamated City of Greater Sudbury.  In terms of legislative 
requirements, Sudbury was required to review its existing Official Plan – a document required 
for each Ontario municipality under the provincial Planning Act50 which sets out general 
planning goals and policies for the area under the municipality’s jurisdiction – under the 
provisions of the Planning Act in order to determine whether revisions were required. One of the 
key requirements of the Planning Act is the one set out in section 26 which states that a 
municipality’s Official Plan must be reviewed at least once every five years to ensure that it 
remains relevant to the municipality’s circumstance and that it incorporates any changes to 
provincial legislation, policies, and guidelines.  Zoning by-laws – the major instrument through 
which official plan policies are put into effect – must then be revised no later than three years 
after an official plan has been revised.   
 This requirement is but one illustration of the level of influence or indeed control that the 
Ontario government exerts over municipalities in terms of local planning.  Basically, through the 
Planning Act, the Province of Ontario lays the ground rules for how municipalities may go about 
controlling land use within their boundaries.  In addition to detailing procedural requirements, 
the Province of Ontario through section 2 of the Planning Act dictates that municipalities must 
“have regard to” matters of provincial interest into their Official Plans, such as the protection of 
farmland, the protection and management of natural resources, and accessibility for persons with 
disabilities.  Because of sections 3(5) and (6) of the Planning Act, municipalities must also 
 
50 R.S.O. 1990, Chapter P.13. 
217 
 
ensure that their decisions and actions are consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement51 (a 
document adopted by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing in 2005 which gives overall 
policy directions in areas such as the provision of affordable housing and the protection of 
employment lands) and conform to plans such as the recently-adopted Greenbelt Plan52 and the 
Growth Plan53 for the Greater Golden Horseshoe (both of which apply to the area surrounding 
the Greater Toronto Area in Southern Ontario).  Thus, in contrast to the State of Ohio’s lack of 
involvement in local land-use planning, the Province of Ontario plays a strong role in local 
development by dictating to municipalities both procedural and substantive requirements through 
the Planning Act.54 The procedural requirement that municipalities review their existing official 
plans at least once every five years played a role in sparking the recent planning exercise in 
Sudbury. 
 As a result of this review – according to local officials and as stated in the Official Plan 
itself – it was determined that for practical reasons Sudbury needed to overhaul its current 
planning policies to create uniform, updated standards across the entire City of Greater 
Sudbury.  As discussed earlier, the City of Greater Sudbury was formed in 2001 by an 
amalgamation of 13 former municipalities in the Regional Municipality of Sudbury.  This meant 
that there were 13 separate planning documents covering the area which constituted the former 
Regional Municipality.  This represented a significant challenge for planners, who determined 
 
51 Available at http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Asset1421.aspx 
52 Available at http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page189.aspx#greenbelt 
53 Available at http://www.placestogrow.ca/images/pdfs/FPLAN-ENG-WEB-ALL.pdf 
54 While the courts have been giving an increasing amount of deference to municipalities decisions in terms of land-
use planning [as long as proper procedures are followed: see the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Croplife 
Canada v. City of Toronto (2005), 37 O.R 355, (C.A )], recent amendments to the Planning Act have actually 
strengthened the Province’s role in controlling land use in the province.  For instance, one of the changes made in 
2006 by Bill 51 (the Planning and Conservation Land Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006) to sections 3(5) and (6) of 
the Planning Act means that municipal decisions and documents must now be consistent with and conform to the 
provincial policy statement and provincial plans.  Both of these standards are higher than those that existed 
previously meaning that provincial interests dealt with in the statement and plans now play an even larger role in 
controlling local development than they did previously.   
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that it was necessary to rationalize the 13 separate documents into one plan covering the entire 
city.  According to the City’s website: 
In developing one Plan for the new City, the goal was to reduce the number of land use 
designations while also accommodating the broad range of uses and activities found 
throughout Greater Sudbury, with an end product that is easier to interpret and more 
efficient in application. (City of Greater Sudbury, 2009b)    
 
Although there was a Regional Plan that applied to the entire city (under which the constituent 
plans for each of the 13 former municipalities were created) and which had been amended 
periodically since its creation in 1976, the five-year review requirement had not been adhered to 
and thus the plan had not been overhauled significantly since its creation. Thus, the creation of a 
new Official Plan presented an opportunity to create an updated and uniform vision for the entire 
city.  As Sudbury informant S1, a city planner, states: “…we saw there was value in having a 
single plan.  It was sort of like … one new plan for one new city.  So it was seen as from some 
standpoint as something that people could rally around as something we could share as a 
community, a first big project.”  Sudbury informant S12, another city planner, similarly states: 







Sudbury’s new Official Plan is divided into the following major sections: managing 
growth and change; protecting the natural environment; investing in infrastructure; developing 
quality of place; healthy people, healthy places (which includes economic development and 
housing issues); and site specific policies.  Before policies are outlines in these sections, 
however, the Plan includes a discussion of the overall vision, guiding principles, and context.  
The vision is made up of six statements, including:  
 Greater Sudbury is a modern, vibrant and diverse community, offering the amenities 




 Greater Sudbury is a “City of Lakes,” with 330 lakes within its municipal 
boundaries…; 
 
 Greater Sudbury is a green community and a world leader in environmental 
protection, rehabilitation and innovation…; 
 
 Greater Sudbury is a healthy and sustainable community which recognizes that the 
quality of life of our citizens is directly related to environmental, economic and social 
determinants…; 
 
 Greater Sudbury is open to business and strives to provide an economic environment 
to retain and grow commercial and industrial enterprises and to attract new investment 
and human capital…; and 
 
 Greater Sudbury’s Downtown will be developed and sustained as the vibrant hub of 
a dynamic city… (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, pp.4-5, emphasis in original) 
 
Thus, the vision – which was developed by “…drawing on past community initiatives and public 
consultation” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.3) – seems to be made up of various statements 
recognizing the City’s current assets which are to be promoted and built upon.  This is in 
contrast to the vision statement put forth in the Youngstown 2010 Plan, which is based more on a 
vision of how Youngstown should be in the future. 
 Using this “collective vision” as a basis, the Plan then outlines four key principles which 
will “…guide future change, growth and development in the City” (City of Greater Sudbury, 
2008, p.5).  The first principle deals with the importance of a balanced approach to local 
development; indeed, according to the Plan, it is “…a Council priority for Greater Sudbury to be 
a Healthy Community offering a high quality of life to its residents” (City of Greater Sudbury, 
2008, p.5).  Sudbury has adopted the healthy community model, recognizing that “….the quality 
of life of citizens is a product of economic, social and natural environments…” (City of Greater 
Sudbury, 2008, p.5). According to the Plan, health determinants include level of citizen 
engagement, opportunities for employment, access to health care and fitness facilities, and 
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educational opportunities.  The second principle states that economic development is essential 
to Sudbury’s future as a healthy community.  This principle recognizes that one of the important 
purposes of the Official Plan is to “…provide a policy framework which supports economic 
development initiatives and facilitates the implementation of the Economic Development 
Strategic Plan” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.6).  In order to attract economic development, 
the Plan emphasizes the importance of improving quality of place in order to attract and retain 
“talented” individuals.   The third principle emphasizes the importance of protecting the 
natural environment through the principles of “sustainable development,” which involve 
ensuring that natural resources are used in the most efficient and environmentally sensitive way 
possible.  The last principle is a general one involving the importance of building on existing 
assets such as the large number of lakes in the City and the growing mining supply and services 
cluster.  According to the Plan, “Greater Sudbury must build upon its strengths and recognize 
where opportunities exist to improve our community” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.8). 
 Importantly, the next section of the Plan details the context of the planning process, 
including the demographic context.  It is clear in this section that local officials expect the 
demand for housing to increase in Sudbury in the future; this increased demand is expected to 
come from new residents or existing residents or both: 
Projecting population change beyond the immediate future is particularly difficult in 
Northeastern Ontario. Greater Sudbury has made economic development a priority and a 
strategic plan has charted the way for numerous initiatives. There is optimism that these 
efforts will yield the necessary employment to fuel population growth. Whatever the 
future growth scenario, decreasing household sizes, changing demographics, and shifts in 
housing preferences will continue to create demand for new housing with or without 
population growth over the plan period. (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.9) 
 
As such, many of the “key observations” about the Plan’s context revolve around the capacity of 
the city – for instance, its physical infrastructure and employment opportunities – to 
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accommodate the population growth which is expected to happen.  While there is 
acknowledgement that the population of Greater Sudbury is ageing (“like Canada as a whole,” 
the Plan is quick to point out), there is no mention of the possibility of future population decline.  
Again, as with the vision, the context factors seem to simply state that the City has many assets, 
including 330 lakes, which should be capitalized upon to improve quality of life for existing 
residents and to attract new residents.  
 Next, the Plan outlines its land-use objectives and policies.  In general, the Plan’s land-
use policies are based on the fundamental recognition that creating policies for a city that is so 
large in total area (3,627 square kilometres) and that is home to several distinct communities is a 
challenge.   The Plan defines Greater Sudbury’s “urban structure” as containing three types of 
settlements: Communities, Non-Urban Settlements, and Rural and Waterfront Areas.  
Communities are “seen as the primary focus of residential development and will absorb most of 
our projected growth. Communities also encompass the majority of our designated Employment 
Areas” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.19).  There is no intention to expand infrastructure 
services such as sewer and water to Non-Urban Settlements, which are primarily residential in 
nature, or Rural and Waterfront Areas, in which seasonal waterfront uses on non-urban lakes 
dominate.  Thus, the land-use planning policies contained in Sudbury’s Official Plan are based 
on the general premise that population growth is to happen within areas that are already serviced 
by municipal infrastructure.  Again, there is no mention of what land-use policies would be used 
should Sudbury’s population decline.   
 In directing where future growth is to occur, the Plan’s land-use policies deal with the 
particular challenges facing physical infrastructure, in particular the “…necessarily complex 
network of infrastructure that needs to be maintained, upgraded, and in some situations, 
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expanded” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.113).  The set of policies dealing with physical 
infrastructure detail how and under what conditions infrastructure is to be improved and/or 
extended to accommodate current and future developments.  The guiding principle is that the 
Plan seeks to ensure that “…water supply and sewer capacity are adequate to service 
development without major line or plant expansion” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.137).  
Finally, in terms of land-use policies the Plan details a number of measures to be taken to protect 
heritage resources and to improve urban design, particularly in downtown Sudbury, something 
which the Plan acknowledges is key to developing “quality of place.”  With respect to the latter, 
the Plan explains that  
…[i]n order to attract economic development opportunities and the skilled labour 
required to achieve strategic planning goals, the City must foster environments that 
emphasize human scale, accessibility, safety, attractiveness, innovation, and integration 
with both the existing built form and the natural environment. (City of Greater Sudbury, 
2008, p.153) 
 
Thus, the main thrust of the land-use planning policies of Sudbury’s new Official Plan appear to 
be the steering of future growth to already-serviced “communities” and the improvement of 
infrastructure and “quality of place” (particularly in the Downtown) in order to attract economic 
development and new residents.  
 With respect to the economic and social policies contained in the Official Plan, while 
economic and social issues are mentioned throughout the Plan, they are more specifically 
discussed in the section of the Plan called Healthy People, Healthy Places.  This section deals 
with the City’s “Healthy Community” approach to local development.  According to the Plan:  
The Healthy Community approach is rooted in the belief that social, environmental and 
economic factors are important determinants of our health. The City of Greater Sudbury 
has supported the Healthy Community approach to community development for a 




The Plan goes on to emphasize the importance of a “diverse and vital economy” to healthy 
communities.  The policies put forth to achieve this – developed in the 2003 Coming of Age 
economic development strategy – are summarized in the Official Plan in order to provide 
“…policy direction for Council” in the achieving the broader community vision discussed above 
(City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.169).  In particular, the Plan quotes the Coming of Age 
economic development strategy’s five “engines for growth” which need to be developed: 
 The best mining and supply services in the world 
 A city of the creative, curious and adventuresome 
 One of Ontario’s top four destinations 
 A leader in health innovation and biotechnology 
 A model for eco-industry and renewable energy (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.179; 
Greater Sudbury Development Corporation, 2003, pp.3-4)  
 
The first of these “engines” – the mining supply and services sector – is the cornerstone of the 
city’s Coming of Age strategy.  While both the Plan and the Coming of Age strategy recognize 
the importance of diversification, the strategy in particular also emphasizes the necessity of 
building on the city’s strength – mining – in order to strengthen the city’s economy as a whole.  
Indeed, according to the strategy:  
Sudbury’s rich mining history will be a springboard for gaining world class recognition 
for mining supply and services.  The past is rooted almost exclusively underground in 
extracting ore by a few large industries.  The future will take advantage of more 
diversified business opportunities using technologically complex processes. (Greater 
Sudbury Development Corporation, 2003, p.3) 
 
As Sudbury informant S8, an employee with the City’s business development organization, puts 
it: 
The mining industry will continue to be key to the City’s future.  The bottom line is: you 
can diversify all you want and we continue to and that was part of the reason why the 
strategic plan was developed.  But one of the engines is to be a world leader in mining 
supply and services.  The bottom line is we are rich with the resources, so let’s not try to 
hide or walk away from… It would be like if you’re an incredible piano player, but you 
refuse to play the piano and you’ve decided you would prefer the tuba.  You could still 
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learn to play the tuba, but if you’re good at piano, you might as well be the best piano 
player you can be… 
 
In order to nurture these engines of growth, including the mining supply and services 
sector, the Official Plan specifies that the four key “igniters” outlined in the strategy are essential 
and are to be facilitated by the land-use policies of the plan.  These “igniters” include 
“…creating a culture of continuous learning, maintaining technology-readiness, investing in 
infrastructure, and developing quality of place” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.179; Greater 
Sudbury Development Corporation, 2003, pp.16-18).  Of these igniters, of particular importance 
is investment in technology infrastructure.  Since 1999, Sudbury has been investing in costly ICT 
infrastructure in a bid to attract technology-based companies.  The city is now home to some 
2500 kilometres of fibre optic cable and 150 kilometres of broadband cable (HRSDC, 2004).  
Both the Official Plan and the Coming of Age Strategy emphasize the importance of expanding 
and promoting Sudbury’s “technology readiness” in order to promote economic growth.  All in 
all, the city’s economic development strategy, which has been incorporated into the Official 
Plan, calls for finding ways to ensure that both the economy and the population continue to grow.  
This is summed up in the overall “vision” of  the Coming of Age document; that is, that “[t]he 
City of Greater Sudbury is a growing, world-class community bringing talent, technology and a 
great northern lifestyle together” (Greater Sudbury Development Corporation, 2003, p.18).    
 In addition to outlining the City’s economic development strategy for Council’s direction, 
the Plan mentions that the social policies developed in the Human Services Strategy should also 
provide policy direction for Council in its efforts to achieve the overall community vision 
discussed above.   The Human Services Strategy was published in June 2005 by the Social 
Planning Council of Sudbury, an arms-length organization that was commissioned by the City in 
2003 to develop a human services strategy as part of the Official Plan.  Basically, the Strategy 
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provides direction in five “strategic areas” of municipal-level policy which are essential to 
achieving “…the quality of life to which Greater Sudburians aspire” (Social Planning Council of 
Sudbury, 2005, p.4).  The first two strategic areas identified by the Social Planning Council 
involve increasing the role that citizens play in developing municipal policy.  The Strategy 
directs the City to be more proactive in encouraging (and indeed establishing implementing 
standard procedures with regard to) citizen participation which is inclusive of residents of all 
levels of socio-economic status, race, gender, ethnicity, age, geographic location, ability, 
language, and sexual orientation.  Next, Council is directed by the Strategy to establish a body 
within the municipality that is “…responsible for long-term human services planning and policy 
development…” (Social Planning Council, 2005, p.5).  The next strategic area involves creating 
a vibrant community through strategies to “…promote social inclusion and diversity, population 
growth and poverty [which] are interconnected” (Social Planning Council, 2005, p.5).    This is 
related to the next strategic direction which is to ensure that policies to achieve population 
growth include strategies relevant to Sudbury’s minority populations.  Finally, the Social 
Planning Council calls on the City to take measures to reduce poverty and improve access to 
education, training, employment, and basic needs (including housing).  In all, according to the 
Social Planning Council, strategies developed in these five strategic areas will improve the 
overall quality of life of Sudbury’s current and future population.  Interestingly, the Strategy 
seems to imply that achieving population growth is necessary to improve the quality of life of 
Sudburians. 
 Unlike the economic development strategies, the Human Services Strategy is not 
summarized in any great detail in the City’s Official Plan.  While the importance of considering 
the social welfare of local residents is mentioned throughout the Plan (particularly when 
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discussing the Healthy Community Model), the only place where social issues are discussed in 
any detail is in the “housing” section of the “Healthy people, healthy places” part of the Plan.  
According to this section, the main goal of the Plan’s housing policies is to provide “adequate 
and affordable housing for all residents [which is] a fundamental component of Greater 
Sudbury’s Healthy Community approach to growth and development” (City of Greater Sudbury, 
2008, p.186).  The Plan seeks to accomplish this goal by ensuring that zoning by-laws permit a 
wide variety of housing types, including low-income housing.  For instance, it is a policy of the 
Plan to “prohibit conversion of rental units to condominium form of tenure when the apartment 
vacancy rate falls below three (3) percent…” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.187).  On a more 
general level, in addition to outlining its land-use planning policies related to housing, the Plan 
directs Council to “…encourage housing providers to pursue housing opportunities that support 
the Economic Development strategic plan and its mission of creating an environment for citizens 
to prosper and experience a satisfying quality of life” (p.188).  This is the extent of discussion in 
the plan on any purely “social” issue.   
 Finally, the Official Plan outlines policy in the area of the natural environment. Like 
the economic development and social strategies, these policies are to work in concert with a 
separately-developed document: the EarthCare Local Action Plan. As noted above, the City of 
Greater Sudbury has faced and continues to face a number of environmental challenges because 
of the presence of the mining industry. Throughout the years, and especially since the late 1970s, 
a number of reclamation efforts (many of them successful and the focus of national and 
international attention) have been made in order to “re-green” Sudbury.  The EarthCare Local 
Action Plan was developed in 2003 by EarthCare Sudbury, which is a coalition of the City and 
local community groups (including Vale Inco and Xstrata Nickel) housed in the City’s 
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Department of Environmental Initiatives.  The three main goals of the EarthCare Plan are as 
follows: 
The first of these is to enhance the environmental health of Greater Sudbury – to improve 
the quality of our air, land, water and living systems – and in so doing, improve the social 
and economic well-being of future generations. The second goal is to encourage each of 
us to take environmental responsibility by carrying out local actions that contribute to 
community sustainability and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. The third goal is to 
share the knowledge and experience gained here with Sudbury’s citizens and other 
communities. (City of Greater Sudbury, 2003, p.1) 
 
Interestingly, the word “mining” is mentioned only a handful of times throughout the entire 
document.  While the past damage inflicted by the mining industry (as part of the Industrial, 
Commercial, and Institutional Sector) is acknowledged, when the role of the sector in improving 
Sudbury’s environment is addressed, the focus is on ensuring industrial, commercial, and 
industrial buildings to become more energy efficient.  Furthermore, the onus is put on the 
businesses to take action on a voluntary basis: “The well-informed business will be aware of 
global best practices and can consider whether to adopt them within its own operations” (City of 
Greater Sudbury, 2003, p.50).  Much more emphasis is placed in the EarthCare Plan on what 
local residents can do to decrease their negative impacts on the environment, such as composting 
and eliminating the use of non-essential pesticides. 
 The Official Plan policies on protecting the natural environment – which are intended to 
support the objectives set out in the EarthCare Sudbury Local Action Plan – are also relatively 
silent on the responsibility of the mining companies in cleaning up past damage and minimizing 
future damage.  Indeed, other than in a small section entitled “Mine hazards and abandoned pits 
and quarries,” the mining industry is barely mentioned.   In general, the stated goal of the 
Official Plan’s policies on the natural environment is to protect Sudbury’s natural assets (which 
are a “defining feature of the City’s image and appeal”) for future generations (City of Greater 
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Sudbury, 2008. p.73).  In order to protect the City’s natural assets, Official Plan policies are 
outlined in the areas of water, natural features, and human safety.  For instance, policies are laid 
out with respect to protecting drinking water sources from potential contamination and depletion.  
One such policy is that “Council will work cooperatively with other agencies to protect and, 
where necessary, improve or restore the quality of drinking water resources” (City of Greater 
Sudbury, 2008, p.77).  Another policy calls for the creation of Subwatershed Plans in order to 
ensure that proper stormwater management practices are undertaken.  Still another directs 
municipal staff to “…determine the potential for significant habitat of endangered species and 
threatened species at the application stage of any new development or redevelopment proposals” 
(City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.93).  Again, however, the role of local policy with respect to 




Thus, in the context of numerous physical, economic, social, and environmental 
challenges, Sudbury’s strategy – contained in its Official Plan and/or supplemented by the 
Coming of Age economic development plan, the Human Services Strategy, and the EarthCare 
Sudbury Local Action Plan – seems to be largely focused on improving economic development 
and on attracting population to the city, while at the same time claiming to take a “balanced” 
approach to improving residents’ quality of life.  In general, the Plan seems to be based on the 
assumption that the City of Greater Sudbury will grow in the future.  Does this Plan reflect any 
of the principles of good planning in shrinking cities as laid out in Chapter 3?  If so, what factors 
led to adoption of the principles?  If not, what factors impeded the adoption?  The next chapter 
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examines this issue more closely with respect to both Sudbury’s Official Plan and Youngstown’s 











As seen in Chapter 2 and 3, the literature (including in particular the shrinking cities, 
strategic planning, and urban regeneration literature) reveals that “good planning” in shrinking 
cities must incorporate all of the following principles in order to have a positive impact, even in 
the context of population decline, on the quality of life offered to remaining residents: 
 Planners must leave behind the assumption of future growth;
 Planners must use processes that are strategic, with an emphasis on citizen 
participation;
 Planners must adopt a balanced approach to addressing the physical, economic, 
environmental and social needs of the community; and 
 Planners must change the role they play in the community. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I introduced the context of the recent planning exercises in Youngstown, 
Ohio and Sudbury, Ontario and outlined the key details of each city’s plan.  In this chapter, I use 
the general principles of good planning in shrinking cities gathered from the literature as a point 
of departure for comparing the plans.  The result of this comparison is an assessment of how 
each planning exercise “measures up” against the principles of good planning and what factors 
facilitated or impeded the adoption or non-adoption of each principle.  In the next and final 
chapter, I surmise how these case studies can provide lessons for planners in shrinking cities 
facing similar demographic decline and how the issues uncovered in this research can be used to 
















Before examining what local officials in each city seek to accomplish with their plans and 
how these plans were developed, it is necessary to ask: how much influence do local officials 
and the plans they craft have over determining a city’s future development?  In other words, does 
local policy matter?  As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, in the context of globalization and 
particularly the increased mobility of capital and people, cities are becoming increasingly 
vulnerable to global forces beyond their control.  This does not mean, however, that they are 
losing significance.  Bradford (2002) argues that “cities are the places where today’s major 
economic, social, and environmental challenges most visibly intersect” (p.iv, emphasis in 
original).  According to Hebdon & Jalette (2008), municipalities provide services that are  
...essential to the vitality of our communities and the quality of life of their citizens.  The 
security, health, and enrichment of our daily lives depend on the effective delivery of 
such services as: parks and recreation; museums, art galleries, and libraries; police, fire, 
and ambulance; health and human; and water and waste. (p.144) 
 
In fact, especially in Canada, in recent years the federal and provincial governments have both 
increased municipal responsibilities.  As Bradford (2002) explains:  
In the past decade, both federal and provincial governments have passed responsibility to 
municipal authorities for significant aspects of urban infrastructure, ranging from 
transportation and communications to social services and cultural programs. (p.iii) 
 
In planning for and delivering a growing number of services, local actors play a very real and 
very direct role in determining the quality of life of the citizens that live within the boundaries 
over which those actors preside: “quality local places ... generat[e] prosperity and well-being for 
citizens and nations” (p.v, emphasis in original).  As Slack (2009) states, local actors are “critical 
in shaping the physical, social, and economic character” of metropolitan areas (p.1).  In a very 
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tangible way, then, local actors in both growing and declining cities have an important role to 
play in determining the quality of life of local residents.   
 However, despite the influence municipalities have over the daily lives of their citizens, it 
must be recognized that municipalities do not operate within a “vacuum.”  That is, in addition to 
being influenced by outside forces such as globalization, the role of local government in 
influencing future development within their boundaries in both countries is filtered through 
historical constitutional relationships which serve to limit the scope of their authority and which 
place financial constraints on exercising the authority they possess.  That being said, in a number 
of ways, municipalities in the United States tend to enjoy more autonomy in developing local 
policy and in collecting revenue than in Canada.  For instance, as a general rule, in both Canada 
and the United States, municipalities are only allowed to exercise the powers granted to them by 
provincial and state governments respectively.  In Canada, the Constitution Act, 1867 grants 
authority over municipalities to the provincial government.  In the United States, the Tenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution makes local government a matter of the state.  That 
means, generally, municipal officials in both countries may only develop policies within their 
boundaries to the extent to which that responsibility has been expressly delegated by a higher 
level of government.  However, many municipalities in the United States, including those in 
Ohio, have been granted “home rule,” which means that they “...may adopt laws for purposes of 
local self-government that are not specifically forbidden by or in conflict with general law” 
(Brubaker, 1998).  Thus, while still being a creature of state government, home rule 
municipalities in states such as Ohio have more autonomy in policy-making. Youngstown is such 
a municipality.  There is no equivalent status in Canada, where municipalities remain more 
constrained by provincial authority.   
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In terms of funding, Canadian municipalities are more limited in terms of revenue 
sources.  In recent years in Ontario, for instance, while federal and provincial governments have 
downloaded more responsibilities onto municipalities, they have done so “...without providing 
the resources...[M]unicipalities are left to foot the bill” (Slack & Bird, 2008, p.73).  Indeed, 
municipalities in Canada have only “...very limited fiscal autonomy,” depending largely on 
property taxes, user fees, and conditional provincial transfers, which have decreased in recent 
years (Slack & Bird, 2008, p.73).55 As  Maxwell (2002) explains, even though there is 
“…growing recognition of the national and local importance of urban spaces as the site of 
innovation, economic development and social and political interaction,” there is also “…growing 
concern that existing policy, planning, and financial arrangements cannot address current 
challenges to urban success or the tasks devolved to cities by senior governments” (p.i).  This is 
likely exacerbated in shrinking cities which most often have shrinking municipal coffers.  In 
comparison, while cities in the United States generally have comparable responsibilities in terms 
of the services they provide (with the exception of some American cities, particularly larger 
cities, having the added responsibility of hospitals, corrections, and airports), they are able to 
draw on other sources of income, such as income, sales (such as alcohol and tobacco taxes), and 
other local taxes (Slack, 2003; 2006).  Larger American cities also receive more federal grants 
than do Canadian municipalities, to which federal grants are negligible (Slack, 2003).  In terms 
of expenditures and revenues, Slack (2003) concludes that, in general, American cities have 
more local autonomy in terms of how local officials decide how to spend the money and from 
what sources that money is raised.  Of particular note is Slack’s (2003) finding that: 
 
55 It should be noted that, according to the City of Toronto Act, 2006, the City of Toronto now has the authority 
(which it exercises) to collect a Land Transfer Tax.  This tax is applied to purchases on all properties within the city 
and is in addition to the province’s Land Transfer Tax. 
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Greater access to other revenue sources (such as income and sales taxes) allows U.S. 
cities to have revenues that increase with the growth in the economy. The downside of 
reliance on these taxes, however, is that revenues can fall significantly when there is a 
downturn in the economy. (p.34) 
 
Thus, municipalities in both the United States and Canada are limited to a certain extent 
in terms of their “room to manoeuvre” with respect to local policy-making and revenue-raising.  
Canadian cities are particularly constrained in terms of raising revenue.  In spite of these 
limitations, in an era of increased down-loading, the role of Canadian and American municipal 
officials in affecting the quality of life of citizens within their jurisdiction is increasing.  Indeed, 
even in areas outside of direct municipal responsibility, that influence may still be felt as many 
areas of municipal responsibility indirectly affect others; for instance, a land-use planning by-law 
(or ordinance, in the United States) passed by a municipal council may have profound economic, 
social, or environmental ramifications.  In other words, in the context of increasing responsibility 
(if not increasing resources), local officials do indeed possess significant power to influence their 
development trajectories.  In short, local policy matters.  This is particularly important in the 
context of population decline, where, as mentioned in Chapter 3, there is a heightened need for 
coordinated planning.  It is worthwhile at this point repeating Pallagst’s (2005) assertion that, in 










Given the importance of local policy, what influence do Youngstown’s and Sudbury’s 
comprehensive or official plans have over their future development trajectories?  In other words, 
why study these plans?  On a general level, both the Youngstown 2010 Plan and Sudbury’s 
Official Plan (as supplemented by its economic, social, and environmental strategic plans) are 
intended to be a framework upon which future policy and planning decisions made by local 
officials in each city are based.  Thus, it is important to analyze in what direction each seeks to 
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move the city. Of course, particularly in the case of Sudbury’s Official Plan, not all policies 
contained within each document carry the same amount of weight in terms of their direct effect 
on decision-making.  City Council in Sudbury, by virtue of the Planning Act, is legally bound by 
the policies contained in its Official Plan.  However, in some matters the Plan provides specific 
direction to Council while in others the policies are mere suggestions.  For instance, policies 
pertaining to land-use (for example, directing where intensification is to occur or protecting 
employment lands) are quite specific in directing Council, who must adhere to these policies in 
its decisions.  When Council fails to act in accordance with the Official Plan in a land-use 
planning matter, in most circumstances its action will be subject to appeal to the Ontario 
Municipal Board (an administrative tribunal in Ontario which deals with local land-use planning 
matters) or to judicial review by the courts.   
 However, in terms of those economic, social, and environmental matters contained in the 
Plan not strictly related to issues of land-use, Official Plan policies merely encourage Council to 
make decisions which will assist in accomplishing the goals set out in the economic, social, and 
environmental strategic plans.   For instance, a strategy outlined in the Coming of Age economic 
plan is to encourage the growth of small businesses in the city.  One of the Official Plan’s 
policies on this point is to direct Council to “…encourag[e] more experienced business persons 
[both working and retired] to volunteer their time to serve as mentors for new small 
businesses…” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.184).  In other words, the economic, social, and 
environmental strategic plans which are summarized or referred to in the Official Plan have been 
translated into policies that provide guidance to Council in terms of suggestions for future action.  
Thus, in Sudbury, it is in the area of land-use planning that the Official Plan has the most direct 
influence.  However, because they are contained or at least referred to in the Official Plan –
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which has been adopted by Council – the economic, social, and environmental strategies carry 
more influence than had they remained as purely separate documents.  
 In Youngstown, the force of the 2010 Plan, including the land-use policies contained 
therein, is that it provides guidance for Council.  It is important to note at this point that the 
“2010” label refers only to census markers – it is not a projected goal.  Officials are not sure how 
long the process will take and 2010 will be used as an opportunity to reflect on what has worked 
and what has not.  According to the Plan itself, Youngstown 2010 is a “citywide plan” that is 
“…a guide for the community and future city administrations to follow and implement.  
Although change is inevitable, this document is intended to provide a solid foundation for a 
cleaner, green, and more efficient city” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.7). Later, the Plan states 
that “[i]ndividual projects and decisions must conform to the new Youngstown 2010 Citywide 
Plan” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.127).  But will the Plan have any legal effect?  According to 
Chapter 713 of the Revised Code of Ohio, any zoning ordinances adopted by Council must be 
done in accordance with “any plan.”   The legal impact of the Plan thus depends on how broadly 
“any plan” is interpreted and given Ohio’s “hands-off” approach to planning discussed in 
Chapter 5, it seems unlikely that it intended for cities to adopt a citywide plan prior to creating or 
amending zoning ordinances.  That being said, the Plan has been adopted by council and both the 
Plan itself and local officials indicate that the City of Youngstown’s zoning ordinances are to be 
updated in accordance with the 2010 Plan’s new policy direction, so at least in the area of land-
use, the Plan policies will have direct influence.  Like Sudbury, the economic, social, and 
environmental matters dealt with in the Youngstown 2010 Plan are meant to provide Council 
with a general guidance when making decisions in those particular areas. 
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On a more general level, in both cities most participants identified each recently-
developed Plan (including the supplemental strategic plans in Sudbury) as the key documents 
providing the framework for city policy.  In other words, they represent the direction in which 
local officials (and, to a greater or lesser extent, local residents) wish to steer the future 
development of each city and reveal underlying assumptions of how the city will develop in the 
future and what issues are more important than others.  The remaining sections of this chapter 
assess whether these plans and the processes used to create them adopt the general principles of 









As noted in Chapter 3, as a first step in effective planning in shrinking cities, planners 
must abandon the assumption that future population growth is both a likelihood and a necessity.  
According to shrinking cities researchers, focusing on planning for and attracting future growth 
when it is unlikely is not only inefficient, but may prove detrimental to urban development in the 
long run (for instance by continuing to allow the city to sprawl, resulting in further “perforation” 
of the urban structure and by leading to burn-out amongst local officials).  Strategies to attract 
new growth may divert much-needed resources in shrinking cities away from more pressing 
issues, wasting scarce resources.  It is worthwhile mentioning again Polèse and Shearmur’s 
(2006) caution that the core premise that a region can “grow” again if it correctly organizes itself 
is ill-suited to the needs of shrinking communities.  Instead, planners in shrinking cities must be 
realistic about demographics and must develop policies which focus on managing future 
population decline where that is the most likely demographic scenario.  Above all, shrinking 
cities researchers assert that planners in shrinking cities must focus on improving the quality of 
life of residents who remain by realizing that with population decline comes a number of 
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opportunities to make a smaller, more liveable city.  Importantly, these researchers also admit 
that the transition away from planning for growth will not be easy for any city, particularly in the 
North American context.  Do the Youngstown 2010 Plan and the Sudbury Official Plan each 





Indeed, if one is to believe recent media reports, the Youngstown 2010 Plan is a break 
from the emphasis on growth so prevalent in urban planning.  For instance, Aeppel (2007) 
explains that  
…rather than struggle to retain its former glory or population, [Youngstown] has adopted 
an economic-development plan that boils down to controlled shrinkage.  By accepting the 
inevitable, the city says it can reduce its housing stock, infrastructure and services 
accordingly. (p.1)   
 
Adjectives used by the media to describe the Plan were listed in Chapter 5.  Terms like 
“monumental” and “cutting edge” have been used to explain the importance of the apparent shift 
to decline-oriented planning in the Youngstown 2010 Plan into context.  For example, El Nassar 
(2006) refers to the Plan as an “exception.”  Logan (2007) describes it as “… a monumental step 
in the fact of the US growth paradigm.” Russell (2008) refers to the Plan as a “…radical 
experiment.”  Similar descriptions of the importance of the Plan are also beginning to appear in 
the academic literature: Pallagst (2005) explains that Youngstown’s Plan is “almost 
revolutionary given US planning traditions.  For the first time a shift in paradigm is about to 
occur leading from growth to ‘shrinking smart’” (p.8).  Media reports have been particularly 
quick to question the “sanity” behind Youngstown’s apparent acceptance of future population 
decline.  For example, after Mock (2008) describes Youngstown’s plan to downsize its 
infrastructure, he asks:  
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But how exactly does a city sustain itself while shrinking?  By 2030, a population of 
73,000 will become 54,000, which will eventually become 20,000 – and then what?  Size 
may not matter, but density does, especially to solidify a tax base that can support schools 
and media.  Is Youngstown sealing its fate by shrinking out of existence? (pp.41-42)   
 
But has there really been a shift away from the growth paradigm in the City of Youngstown?    
 In fact, when one delves beneath the media hype by closely inspecting the contents of the 
Youngstown 2010 Plan and by speaking with local officials, it is clear that the Plan does not 
represent a “clean break” from growth-oriented planning.  Rather than accepting projections that 
the population will continue to decline, the Plan is prefaced with the following statement:  
Linear population projections produced by the Ohio Department of Development and 
analyzed by Youngstown’s metropolitan planning organization… indicate that by 2030, 
Youngstown’s population will fall to 54,000.  Linear projections may be accurate if there 
is no change in the status quo.  Youngstown 2010 is a chance to change the status quo 
and alter the slope of the projected line. (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.7; emphasis 
added) 
 
It is not explicitly stated whether the policies contained in the Plan seek to make the slope of the 
projected line less steep, flat, or tilted in the direction of population growth.  However, document 
and interview transcript analysis reveal that the Youngstown 2010 Plan is based not on the 
assumption that Youngstown will continue to shrink, but on the acceptance that it has already 
shrunk and on the belief that offering an improved quality of life will stem the population 
outflow and even attract a modest number of residents in the future (although not to previous 
levels).  In other words, the Plan characterizes Youngstown not as a shrinking city, but as a 
shrunken city that has stabilized and that will attract future growth if certain measures are put 
into place.  In that way, although there is focus inward on the quality of life of local residents, 
one “eye” remains focused outward on maximizing the attractiveness of the city to potential in-
migrants, something which shrinking cities researchers caution against.  This dual sentiment is 
revealed in several of the Plan’s statements.  For instance: 
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 The Plan’s Vision emphasizes the importance of accepting that Youngstown is a smaller 
city that must recreate itself “…as a sustainable mid-sized city” (p.18).   
 After describing the city’s decline, the Plan explains that “Youngstown 2010 is a 
planning process to pick up the pieces and organize them to set the stage for sustainable 
regeneration in the new economy of the 21st century” (p.15). 
 The Plan’s policies are geared towards improving “…the attractiveness of Youngstown 
as a place to live and do business” (p.19).  Through this Plan, the City of Youngstown 
“…is positioned to become a competitive city once again” (p.19). 
 Policies set forth to increase recreation and open space are justified in part as providing a 
way to improve the quality of life of existing residents but also as a means of attracting 
new economy jobs and workers: “Adequate recreational opportunities have become a 
major factor for business location, especially with high tech firms.   [Establishing these] 
will make Youngstown more attractive to such businesses” (p.47). 
 Capitalizing on opportunities to “green” the city is seen as a way to attract “…business 
and industry in the new millennium” (p.49).   
 While the amount of land set aside for residential use is decreased by 30%, this is a rather 
“…conservative reduction… Leaving excess land in residential use allows the City to 
retain the ability to absorb new residential development should the need arise” (p.50). 
 The Plan classifies current nodes of commercial establishments on major corridors as 
“priority business clusters” which “…will serve as growth poles and as demand develops, 
growth will spread outward along the corridor” (p.52). 
Importantly, nowhere is it stated that Youngstown officials, through the policies contained in the 
2010 Plan, are managing future population decline.   
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Essentially, then, Youngstown 2010 is based on the notion that the city’s physical 
structure needs to be “shrunk” to meet current population levels, not on the acceptance of the 
continued loss of population.  Realizing this distinction is important: accepting shrinking 
represents a complete paradigm shift away from traditional growth-oriented planning; in 
accepting shrinkage, remnants of the growth paradigm remain as one of the reasons for 
downsizing infrastructure is to once again make the city an attractive destination for new 
residents.  Failing to make the distinction may have led to misconceptions that Youngstown 
officials have accepted being a shrinking city.  This means, then, that there has not been a 
wholesale shift away from the growth paradigm in Youngstown and in fact its approach may not 
be as groundbreaking and as unique as has been portrayed.   
 That being said, it is important to note that the characterization of the Youngstown 2010 
Plan as somehow “different” is not completely off the mark: so publicly admitting that the city’s 
population has shrunk and that infrastructure needs to be downsized is a monumental step in 
North American planning culture where, as was stated in Chapter 1, “[g]rowth is to … civic 
leaders what publicity is to Hollywood stars; there is no such thing as bad growth and no such 
thing as too much of it” (Leo & Anderson, 2006, p.169).  There was the sense amongst local 
officials, community leaders, and residents that something “different” needed to be done.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, a number of factors contributed to the adoption of a new approach, 
including: the removal of the “old guard,” including key actors in the business community 
(including the steel industry) and local politicians who had, up until this point, according to one 
informant been “calling the shots;” the recognition that the city had “bottomed out” and needed a 
new approach; and the fortuitous coming together of young leaders who were open to doing 
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something different and experts with experience planning in shrinking cities.  As well, local 
residents were receptive to an approach which was not based on false promises of future growth: 
Over the past several decades, lots of promises have been made, lots of ideas have been 
made … “this will save Youngstown, do this…”  a new factory here, a promise from a 
national politician and I think the community had just grown weary of these empty 
promises that were these unattainable goals...  People were looking to embrace something 
real. (Youngstown informant Y14) 
 
All of these factors resulted in a highly publicized and broadly-based break from tradition in 
Youngstown, a first in North American planning culture.  While other cities may be pursuing 
strategies to downsize their physical structure privately, few, if any, have brought the discussion 
into the public realm in such an honest way, especially in the form of a widely publicized 
citywide plan.  According to Shamess (2006), Youngstown 2010 is likely the first plan in the 
United States to include a section on addressing vacant and abandoned property.  The Plan’s 
honesty about the need to adapt to being a smaller city that will not reach previous population 
levels – as well as its focus on finding opportunities associated with being a smaller city and the 
open discussion amongst local officials regarding ways that “smaller can be better” – is in North 
American planning culture monumental (Pallagst, 2005). 
 As well, although some shrinking cities may be pursuing strategies to downsize their 
physical structure behind the scenes, as the shrinking cities literature points out, growth-oriented 
planning in the context of population decline remains the norm.  Thus, even policies aimed at 
downsizing to current population levels is a break from planning tradition and represents a step 
towards true decline-oriented planning as defined in the shrinking cities literature.   Nonetheless, 
given the likelihood that Youngstown’s current population decline will continue, one must 
question whether this “first step” goes far enough and whether denial of realistic demographic 






In contrast the Youngstown 2010 Plan, a search of newspaper article databases such as 
Factivia reveals that the creation and adoption of Sudbury’s new Official Plan received relatively 
little (that is, hardly any) media attention.  Attention paid tended to be comprised of reports on 
narrow legal issues pertaining to the Plan’s land-use policies.  The comparative lack of media 
attention is likely a result of a number of factors which distinguish this case from the 
Youngstown case.  For instance, as will be discussed below, Sudbury officials did not use the 
media to the extent it was used in Youngstown to inform the public and solicit their involvement.  
As well, unlike the Youngstown 2010 Plan, interviews and document review in the Sudbury case 
did not reveal a sense that the city was embarking on the process of creating a new Official Plan 
in order to address any pressing physical (as was the case Youngstown’s pressing, and visible, 
physical decay), economic, environmental, or social issues.  As noted in Chapter 6, when asked 
why the City created a new Official Plan, informants cited practical reasons: that is, the fact that 
city officials wanted to consolidate the plans of the former municipalities of the region into one 
comprehensive document and the city was required by the Planning Act to review its existing 
plan at least once every 5 years.  For instance, as Sudbury informant S1 explains, the main 
reason for creating the new Official Plan was: 
…the fact that the city was reconstituted in 2001 as the City of Greater Sudbury, so we 
used to have former Regional government, so our local government was restructured.  
We amalgamated a number of municipalities together into 1 single city and we saw that 
there’s a value in having a single plan.  It was sort of like a mantra: one plan for one city. 
 
While some informants suggested that the city wanted to create a new vision for the newly 
amalgamated city, the primary motivation was practical, which likely contributed to the relative 
lack of media attention.  In comparison to Youngstown, while experiencing its share of issues, 
especially economic and social concerns, Sudbury was not seeking, through its Official Plan, to 
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pick itself up from “rock bottom.”  Youngstown had lost the industry upon which it relied and in 
the context of extensive physical decline, was in search of a new identity.  Mining continues to 
be a productive industry in Sudbury and thus even when the industry is in a downturn, there is an 
expectation that it will improve.  According to Sudbury informant S8: 
When [mining] is strong, that is felt across every sector in this community… It is very 
important and it needs to be and there’s absolutely nothing wrong with that.  As long as 
we’re able to make sure that… we are very much a cyclical economy and we have to 
ensure that what we’re doing in all the other areas when it does dip we’re able to weather 
that storm… There will always be a downturn. 
 
In fact, a content search of Sudbury’s two largest papers – the Sudbury Star and the Northern 
Life – for the terms “mining” versus “Official Plan” reveals that much more focus is paid in local 
Sudbury newspapers to the fortunes of the mining industry than issues related to Official Plans.  
This may reflect (and indeed, reinforce) the possibility that local residents see their futures as 
being determined by the fortunes of the mining company rather than the actions of planners, 
hence less interest in the planning process.  In comparison, in Youngstown, the steel industry had 
long since moved on from the city and according to informants, the removal of the “old guard” 
played a role in adopting a new approach.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, how the 
presence of a dominant industry in resource or industrial towns influences over perceptions of 
the efficacy of planning is an important area of future research. 
Finally, the lack of media attention also likely stems from the fact that, unlike in the case 
of the Youngstown 2010 Plan, Sudbury officials did not appear to be doing anything “different” 
in crafting its new Official Plan.  Like many other shrinking cities, Sudbury’s Official Plan is 
based on the assumption that Sudbury, if various strategies are put into place, will attract 
population.  While the Plan briefly acknowledges the possibility that population might decline, 
the prevailing sentiment seems to be that population decline would not be a positive occurrence: 
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Projecting population change beyond the immediate future is particularly difficult in 
Northeastern Ontario. Greater Sudbury has made economic development a priority and a 
strategic plan has charted the way for numerous initiatives. There is optimism that these 
efforts will yield the necessary employment to fuel population growth. Whatever the 
future growth scenario, decreasing household sizes, changing demographics, and shifts in 
housing preferences will continue to create demand for new housing with or without 
population growth over the plan period. (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.9) 
 
In fact, in a draft Discussion Paper on Sudbury’s “Growth and Settlement/Development Options” 
(part of the City of Greater Sudbury’s Infrastructure Background Study completed in preparation 
for the creation of the Official Plan), city officials considered whether Sudbury’s infrastructure 
within existing boundaries was “…capable of accommodating…anticipated growth” over the 
next twenty years (Meridian Planning Consultants, 2005, p.1).  As such, the document was 
meant to provide “…the technical basis for assigning expected growth to specific geographical 
areas so that engineering and transportation modeling exercises can be undertaken” (Meridian 
Planning Consultants, 2005, p.1). 
 In determining what this “anticipated growth” would be, four future population scenarios 
were considered: the first based on “out-migration exceeding natural increase and in-migration” 
(resulting in large population decline to 135,407 by 2021), the second based on “out-migration 
and in-migration have no net effect, leaving natural increase to affect population levels” 
(resulting in slight population decline to 150,012 by 2021, but an increase in the number of 
households due to decreasing average household sizes), the third based on “in-migration 
exceeding out-migration” (resulting in moderate population increase to 169,579 by 2021), and 
the fourth based on “high in-migration exceeding out-migration” (resulting in large population 
increase to 175,000 by 2011) (Meridian Planning Consultants, 2005, p.3).  The first three 
scenarios were based on population projections while the last was based on a “…stated desire to 
achieve 175,000 population in 2014” (Meridian Planning Consultants, 2005, p.9).  In the ensuing 
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discussion of how much land should be set aside for residential purposes, while there is a 
technical discussion on how growth should be distributed, there is no discussion on how decline 
would be dealt with, should it happen.  In fact, it is stated that for the decline scenario, “…no 
technical analysis is needed” (Meridian Planning Consultants, 2005, p.6).  A similar lack of 
policy solutions for dealing with the effects of population decline, should it occur, is absent from 
the Housing Background Study, which examined issues related to the projected supply of and 
demand for housing in Sudbury (Greater Sudbury, 2005). 
 Furthermore, while the decline scenario is mentioned, the tone of the document is one of 
dealing with development in a growing city.  Terms such as “anticipated growth” and “future 
growth” are scattered throughout the document.  What will happen to the city’s physical 
structure should the population decline is not considered in any meaningful way.  In fact, in 
interviews for this research, when informants were asked if strategies for population decline were 
considered during the planning process, one informant (a city planner) said “no, we didn’t get 
there.  We didn’t say that.  We picked [the growth scenario]” (Sudbury informant S12).  Another 
said: “…rightly or wrongly we’re still focused on growth and I don’t know that we’re very much 
focused on the decline part of it.  I think partly because it’s very hard for people to admit that 
eventuality” (Sudbury informant S3).  This lack of paradigm shift from growth-oriented to 
decline-oriented planning may prove problematic in the future.  In fact, during the planning 
process, planners received feedback from higher-level officials, who expressed concern that the 
Plan’s higher growth estimates were “not based on standard growth projections methodology” 
(Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, letter, March 21, 2006).   These officials were 
concerned that despite the fact that population in Sudbury is likely to decrease in the next 20 
years, the Plan sets aside a disproportionate amount of land for urban uses.  They stressed the 
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importance that the city has a “practical handle” on expected population changes in order to 
“appropriately plan for anticipated change.”  This echoes from Hall’s (2007) research which 
examined whether planners in Sudbury were being realistic in their assessment of the city’s 
demographic future.  She found that the majority of planners are indeed unwilling to consider 
that Sudbury is currently in a state of population decline or no-growth.  In fact, at times in her 
research, when she suggested the contrary, some informants refused to speak with her while 
others appeared openly irritated by her suggestion.  According to “some” of her key informants, 
Sudbury should not be planning for future decline or no-growth (Hall, 2007, p.83).   
 For those reasons, Sudbury’s Official Plan is based largely on managing and directing 
projected future population growth, instead of developing strategies to deal with possible future 
population decline.   This persistence of the growth paradigm plays out in many of the specifics 
of the Official Plan.  For instance: 
 The first major section of the Plan is entitled “Managing Growth and Change.” 
 One “pillar” of the Plan’s Vision, which is largely a list of the city’s already-existing 
assets, is that Greater Sudbury is “open to business and strives to provide an economic 
environment to retain and grow commercial and industrial enterprises and to attract new 
investment and human capital” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.4, emphasis in 
original). 
 Plan policies are geared towards improving quality of place, both to improve quality of 
life for existing residents and to attract and retain talent.  According to the Plan, 
improving quality of place is crucial to growing the city’s economy. 
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 The Plan states that existing infrastructure (such as water, wastewater, and transportation) 
can support new growth, but does not mention what will happen if the population 
declines. 
 In discussing where growth is likely to happen within the city, the Plan states that the 
“community of Sudbury…will continue to be a major focus of growth and change.
The former City of Sudbury currently provides three quarters of the jobs for residents of 
the City.  This concentration will grow as the service, educational and health sectors of 
the local economy expand in the future” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.10, emphasis 
in original). 
 Policies with respect to how the city’s urban structure is to develop mention that growth 
and development is to happen in areas already serviced by municipal infrastructure.  In 
other words, the city will focus on in-fill development by steering new growth to already 
serviced locations. 
 In discussing the need to invest in infrastructure, the Plan states that Sudbury’s “…vast 
geographic area, combined with new obligations imposed under amalgamation and other 
provincial directives, have resulted in a necessarily complex network of infrastructure 
that needs to be maintained, upgraded, and in some situations, expanded” (City of 
Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.113, emphasis added). 
 In general, the words “growth and development” are scattered throughout the Plan.  For 
instance, in discussing issues related to housing, the Plan states that “[a]dequate and 
affordable housing for all residents is a fundamental component of Greater Sudbury’s 




The focus on planning for growth is similarly reflected in the economic, social, and 
environmental plans that are summarized or referred to in the Official Plan.  For example: 
 The Coming of Age economic development strategic plan mentions that Sudbury is like 
many cities in that it “…aspires to growth and sustainability” (Greater Sudbury 
Development Corporation, 2003, p.7).  The plan explicitly adopts Richard Florida’s 
“creative class” thesis in stating that, following his thesis, it is essential that Sudbury 
offer an “enviable quality of life” in order to attract “talented individuals” (p.3).  In 
developing the strategic plan, the authors learned from the experiences of other cities that 
local officials in Sudbury need to “…alter policies that impede growth and to promote the 
virtues of living, visiting and doing business” in the city (p.10).  While the plan discusses 
the trend of out-migration, it sees a trend reversal as both possible and essential for the 
city’s “sustainable prosperity” (p.13).  The ultimate result of these strategies is that 
Sudbury is a “growing, world-class community bringing talent, technology and a great 
northern lifestyle together” (p.18). 
 The Human Services Strategy, which is focused on social issues, indicates that 
“…attracting immigration and improving the quality of life for current citizens plays an 
important role in improving the local economy” (Social Planning Council of Sudbury, 
2005, pp.5-6).  Overall, the Human Services Strategy seems to be based on the 
assumption that “achieving population growth” is essential to having a “vibrant 
community” (p.22).  As such, the strategy is geared towards how social issues should be 
included in the city’s growth strategy, instead of how social issues can be addressed if the 
population declines.  For instance, the strategy recommends ensuring that historically 
disadvantaged groups – such as Aboriginals, visible minorities, and gay, bisexual, 
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lesbian, and transgender communities – are included in the city’s “overall population 
growth strategy” (p.6). 
 While the Earthcare Sudbury Local Action Plan, which deals with the city’s non land-use 
related environmental issues, does not provide much discussion on the city’s 
demographic prospects, it does echo the economic development strategy’s focus on 
improving quality of place as a means of attracting “talented” individuals.  According to 
Earthcare, these people will be attracted by a “clean and healthy environment, diverse 
and accessible recreational opportunities, and abundant lifestyle amenities” (City of 
Greater Sudbury, 2003, p.45). 
Thus, all of the policies and strategies in key documents guiding Sudbury’s future development 
are fixed strongly within the growth paradigm.  While there is talk of ensuring that existing 
infrastructure is used efficiently, this is done in the context of deciding where it is desirable to 
steer future growth.  Improving quality of life, while discussed to a certain extent in terms of 
improving the experiences of existing residents, is generally seen as a way to attract new 
residents in the “new economy.” 
 Interestingly, if one examines the Official Plans of the former Regional Municipality of 
Sudbury and the plans of its constituent municipalities, one sees that not all of those plans were 
based on the assumption of future growth.  Indeed, this “consolidation in the face of growth” 
approach was apparent in the previous Official Plan for the Regional Municipality of Sudbury – 
originally passed by Council in 1978 and last updated in July 2004 – which designated one 
community in each of the component municipalities as “growth centres” (Regional Municipality 
of Sudbury, 1978, p.1).  These centres were to attract a majority of the expected population 
growth while “remaining settlements” would “be allowed to infill” but would “rely largely on the 
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growth centres for most of their goods and services” (Regional Municipality of Sudbury, 1978, 
p.1).  The Regional Official Plan predicted that the population of Sudbury would increase to 
228,000 by 1996 and 350,000 by 2025, an increase of 1.5% per year.  This is despite the fact 
that, at the time the Regional Official Plan was written (in the mid-1970s), population had 
already declined in Sudbury from 168,371 in 1971 to 166,121 in 1975.  Creating the conditions 
that would result in this large population increase was listed as one of the “goals” of the plan.  
Despite many changes to the regional plan in subsequent years, this goal was not formally 
amended (Regional Municipality of Sudbury, 1978, Appendix C). 
 However, the Secondary Plan for the City of Sudbury (the largest constituent 
municipality in terms of population), adopted by Council in 1987 and remaining in effect until 
2004, reveals that although this “growth goal” of the Regional Official Plan was never amended, 
by the mid-1980s, planners and the local officials (in the context of further population decline) 
were shifting away from basing policies on lofty population predictions and were concentrating 
on (at least in the area of land-use) planning in a “no growth or decline” scenario.  This is 
revealed in the introduction to the Sudbury’s Secondary Plan – entitled “Land Use Policies for 
Qualitative Development” – which states: 
In a city experiencing conventional growth, land use planning has meant essentially two 
things, allocation of land for different uses and regulations to guide the use of such lands.  
In a city experiencing no growth or decline in quantitative terms, land use planning has 
to have a different focus. Although past commitments of land have to be acknowledged 
and various past regulations retained to guide development efforts, different policies and 
programs are also increasingly necessary in order to facilitate community conservation, 
infilling and redevelopment efforts.  In a no growth situation qualitative development to 
improve the structure of the built form becomes a compelling imperative. (Greater 
Sudbury Planning Services Division, 1987, p.2-1, emphasis added) 
 
One of the “guiding principles” of the Secondary Plan is as follows: 
In the absence of quantitative growth, the existing built form configuration is likely to 
remain virtually unchanged in the next twenty years; however, continuous qualitative 
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development will alter the internal structure of the built form and is likely to enhance the 
quality of the habitat… (Greater Sudbury Planning Services Division, 1987, p.2-1). 
 
Specifically with respect to infrastructure, the Secondary Plan acknowledges the danger of 
allowing the city to spread out in the context of no-growth or decline:  
Declining resources available to the municipality necessitate infill development of 
serviced land, contiguous development as opposed to leap frogging, and the minimization 
of total infrastructure expenditures… (Greater Sudbury Planning Services Division, 1987, 
p.2-2)  
 
Furthermore, the Secondary Plan emphasizes that “…it is the intent of Regional Council to 
preserve stable areas…” (Greater Sudbury Planning Services Division, 1987, p.2-4).  Thus, 
although planning for future population growth (in the context of actual population decline) was 
the overall thrust of planning in the mid-1970s, the Sudbury Secondary Plan reveals that during 
the 1980s, planners and local politicians were actively planning for a no-growth or decline 
scenario.  While there is no mention of downsizing the existing built form in the Secondary Plan 
(even though there is an admission that the built environment is “out of proportion to the 
population size of the City”), the focus on controlling sprawl in the context of decline or no-
growth (by, for instance, encouraging the reuse of “surplus” buildings) and a shift in emphasis 
from quantitative to qualitative development reveals that the growth paradigm was loosening its 
hold on Sudbury planners and local politicians (at least in the realm of land-use planning) long 
before relaxing its grip on local officials in Youngstown (Greater Sudbury Planning Services 
Division, 1987, p.2-2 and 8-8).  However, in consolidating all of the existing secondary plans 
into the current Official Plan and adopting a more “competitive” approach, this slight shift away 
from growth-oriented planning in the Sudbury Secondary Plan has been lost and once again 














As stated in Chapter 3, one of the principles of “good planning” in shrinking cities set out 
in the shrinking cities, strategic planning, and urban regeneration literatures is that planning must 
incorporate key elements of strategic planning.  First, planning that improves quality of life (that 
is, qualitative development) in declining cities is best done by pursuing strategies based on a 
comprehensive, integrated, long-range vision which emphasizes how a city could or should be.  
Secondly, the process of planning in shrinking cities must be inclusive in that any vision or plan 
must be developed through extensive and meaningful citizen participation.  Thirdly, plans must 
be selective; that is, they must be focused on pressing issues so that local officials can use scarce 
resources where they will have the most effect.  Fourthly, plans must be context-specific and, in 
particular, must be based on a realistic assessment of demographic trends.  Fifthly, planning in 
shrinking cities should be flexible in order to avoid “lock-in” to strategies that may not be 
working.  Finally, planning in shrinking cities must be integrative on a regional scale so that 
communities within a region cooperate, rather than waste scarce resources. Ultimately, however, 
according to the literature, what matters most in shrinking cities is the process of planning, not 
the outcome: the creation of a decision framework, put together by a wide range of actors 
(including actors from the entire region, not just the city), matters more than the document.  Can 






The Youngstown 2010 Plan, although it is called a “comprehensive plan” reads much 
more like a strategic plan.  It contains a long-range Vision, upon which the “framework” for 
future planning (the Plan itself) is based.   This framework is designed to be flexible: 
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Obviously, the city changes, the state, the nation, the world changes, the economics, the 
environment changes, so we’ll want to make sure that the Youngstown 2010 Plan always 
remains relevant to the current state of affairs and also it’s always pointing us towards the 
future. (Youngstown informant Y14) 
 
The creation of the Vision included an extensive examination of the context in which the city 
was mapping its future, including a more or less honest discussion of the likelihood of future 
growth (although the hope for future growth, at least amongst local officials, remains, as 
discussed above).  However, as will be discussed in more detail below, the Vision, although to a 
lesser degree than the Plan, is slightly unbalanced as it does spend a great deal of time on 
physical regenerations issues, likely due to the fact that the wide extent of physical decay in 
Youngstown has made it a priority issue for both local officials and the general population.  For 
that reason, the comprehensiveness of the Vision can be questioned.  However, regardless of the 
content of the Vision and Plan, what is important in Youngstown, and instructional for other 
shrinking cities, is the inclusive nature of the planning process used to create the Vision and 
Plan.  As stated by Weichmann (2008b), plans may be forgotten, but what is learned during the 
process is what is important. 
In the process of creating the Youngstown 2010 Plan, the City of Youngstown sought 
extensive, meaningful public participation.  According to Youngstown informant Y13 (a 
university-based urban design consultant/academic): 
I think that’s YT’s major strength is the level of civic engagement that they’ve been able 
to achieve as a result of having this open dialogue.  This is who we are and this is what 
we’re turning into and people have embraced it.  Anthony Kobak [Youngstown’s Chief 
Planner at the time the Plan was made] tells me that when he goes down to a community 
meeting and talks about development, people raise their hand and go excuse me, but I 
thought this process was about shrinking!  The fact that they’ve been forthright about 
what’s happening and what the potential of the city could be, people have embraced it in 
a way that if they stood up and had this rhetoric about growth, people would have been 
inherently sceptical of it, with good reason.  So YT, their major strength is that they’ve 




Finnerty (2003) describes the 2010 planning process as a “unique collaborative planning 
process…” (p.4). According to Faga (2006), the Youngstown 2010 process is a “fascinating” and 
“promising” one (p.67). Skolnick (2008) asserts that the Youngstown 2010 process was 
particularly effective in engaging stakeholders. In total, more than 5000 residents participated in 
the process in one way or another; indeed, the amount of public interest and participation was 
unexpected and caught many off guard (Smith, 2007).  As recognition for its efforts to encourage 
public participation, in 2007, the City was the recipient of the American Planning Association’s 
National Planning Excellence Award for Public Outreach.  As Faga (2006) explains, “going into 
the process, City/YSU planners were mindful that strong public support would be needed to 
overcome any political roadblocks and to propel the plan into action” (Faga, 2006, p.65).  Given 
the high level of public apathy planners faced when embarking on the Youngstown 2010 
planning process, it is indeed significant that, in the end, “when the Youngstown public was 
faced with the choice to hang on to old ideas or move forward, they put aside their misgivings 
and joined the discussion” (Faga, 2006, p.67). 
 So, how did this “discussion” happen?  As a result of the convergence of factors 
discussed in Chapter 5 that sparked interest in developing a new vision and plan for 
Youngstown, in 2001 then-Mayor George McKelvey and city council allocated $300,000 in 
Community Development Block Grants for the planning process (Finnerty, 2003; Boardman, 
2008).56 That year, the City sent out a Request for Proposals (RFPs) for Phase 1 of 
comprehensive plan: the vision. At the same time, YSU was conducting its own visioning 
process and had also sent out RFPs for its plan update.  As Finnerty (2003) explains, “as a first 
step in building collaboration, YSU’s Center for Urban and Regional Studies had a staff member 
 
56 According to Boardman (2008), $20,000 in Community Development Block Grants is allocated annually to 
helping the city advance the plan.  
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on both search committees” (p.2).  When the city chose Urban Strategies, Inc., of Toronto, to 
facilitate the visioning process in late 2001, YSU “…delayed choosing a planning consultant so 
the university could fully participate in the city’s visioning process” (Finnerty, 2003, p.2).  Soon 
after being chosen, the Urban Strategies team – consisting of partners George Dark and Frank 
Lewinberg, project manager and associate Pino Di Mascio, planner Oliver Jerschow, and urban 
designer Eric Turcotte – performed a reconnaissance of the city (using the expertise of the City 
and YSU) and then began the visioning process. 
 What was particularly unique about the Youngstown 2010 process was that, instead of 
beginning the visioning process with large public meetings where everyone would have their say 
(the traditional approach), Urban Strategies proposed a different approach to counteract the 
widespread cynicism that had already led to the failure of more than one renewal attempt.  Urban 
Strategies proposed engaging local leaders in focus groups to develop an outline of a common 
vision before taking this vision to the public to for input.  As Youngstown informant Y5 (an 
“outside” planner who was involved in facilitating the visioning process) explains: 
What we said in the beginning was, “if this going to be successful, you have to take it 
seriously.”  And that is a big part of it which is, we’re not just going to go out and have 
public meetings and advertise public meetings.  You’ll get input that way, but it’s not 
how you make sure people take it seriously.  It’s not how we get you to take it seriously. 
 
In order to get people to take the process seriously, Urban Strategies proposed having the Mayor 
(in order to lend legitimacy to the process) invite community leaders to participate in focus 
groups and one-on-one interviews: 
[We explained to Youngstown officials that] if you really want to start to tackle the issue, 
we’re going to sit down with you and with whoever else you think you need to bring to 
the table and start to list who the community leaders are. What we mean when we say 
“community leaders” are people who are active in all different kinds of discourses and 
different parts of civic engagement.  Once you get them, they first of all can probably 
generally represent the various interests, the various issues that are going on in the city 
and two will then go back and talk to other people because they’re engaged in that.  So, it 
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kind of works both ways – you get with a smaller group of people, a larger representation 
of ideas and you inevitably are talking to more people because you’re relying on them. 
(Youngstown informant Y5) 
 
Urban Strategies needed to convince the City (who wanted to be all-inclusive right from the 
beginning) that this was the right approach:  
...launching a grassroots public process by starting a conversation with selected members 
of the community seemed counterintuitive; and, indeed, the proposal met with initial 
resistance from Youngstown officials, who raised questions about possible elitism.  But 
eventually, the city came around to the Urban Strategies approach (Faga, 2006, p.57).  
 
As a first step in forming the focus groups, the YSU/City planning team identified Youngstown’s 
“influentials:” that is, people who “…knew what needed to happen and held some say among 
their peers” (Faga, 2006, p.58).  These approximately 250 influentials included representatives 
from government, Neighbourhood Watch programs, social agencies, banks, and industries.  The 
planning team made sure to include supporters and critics.  With these leaders, Urban Strategies 
conducted 40-50 interview sessions (one-on-one or in small focus groups); particularly with 
respect to the focus groups: 
[There were] about 15 to 20 people at each [focus group meeting] and what we told them 
at each of the session, you have to mix everyone.  So, nobody gets to choose what session 
– well, they get to choose in terms of timeline, but they’re not topic-specific.  We don’t 
want all the university people in one.  We don’t want all the church people… because all 
you’re going to have is people talking about the same issues...  In Youngstown, it really 
was kind of the first time people had been engaged at this level and had quite a bit to say 
so we got into quite interesting discussions. At the end of the session, we got a lot of 
good feedback.  (Youngstown informant Y5) 
 
Urban Strategies distilled the results of the interviews and focus groups into key issues and then 
held six stakeholder workshops where a SWOT analysis was done:   
The discussions managed to evoke and clarify the diverse perspectives of these 
individuals on the issues and challenges facing Youngstown.  The process also deepened 
their involvement and their stake in the success of Youngstown 2010.  This influential 




According to Finnerty (2003), “the level of concern, hope, and intensity expressed at the focus 
groups was palpable” (p.3).  Between June 2002 and December 2002, Urban Strategies distilled 
the ideas into four vision principles which they then brought back to community leaders 
comments and criticism.  They then crafted final document to present to public.  In all, Urban 
Strategies progressively brought in more and more people to talk to each other about the issues in 
an “ever-widening circle of participation” (Faga, 2006, p.59).  
 Thus, before the wider public was consulted, the vision was crafted with the input of 
community leaders.  The visioning process culminated with public meeting in December 2002 in 
2500-seat Stambaugh Auditorium.  The planning team did not anticipate high attendance because 
“public meetings concerning planning in Youngstown have never been well attended” (Finnerty, 
2003, p.3).  In fact, a local reporter predicted only about 200 people would show up.  However, 
between 1200 and 1400 people (including a large number of suburbanites) came to the meeting, 
which came as a “…pleasant shock to city and planning professionals alike” (Faga, 2006, pp.61-
62; Finnerty, 2003).  As Youngstown informant Y5 states: 
I saw the auditorium ahead of time and said, well, this is going to feel pretty empty when 
we’re in here.  They had a newspaper ad.  They had the local radio station talk about it 
too, so that got people out.  But not only was it the number of people, but how positive….
by the end of it, it really felt like there was a “this is great.”  And while it didn’t feel like 
they were saying your vision is 100 percent right on, it’s like, yeah, you’re right.  We 
have to start thinking positively and saying what it is we’re going to do in the future or 
what we’re going to be as a city – person, after person, after person... 
 
During the meeting, the public made oral and written comments about the vision and 100 people 
volunteered to participate in the planning process.  In general, the response from the public was 
positive and there seemed to be wide agreement on the principles: 
I hate to make it sound so wonderful and euphoric and just a great process here with little 
opposition but there really wasn’t much negativity.  I mean at that time, all of our 
comments, nearly all… I mean I can count on one hand… about someone saying oh, 
Youngstown should have done this 20 years ago and it’s too late now, but truly I mean, 4 
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or 5 people making some comments at the meeting, but it was all supportive. 
(Youngstown informant Y8) 
 
Key to the success of the visioning process (and the later planning process) was the 
involvement of the media.  Especially important was the fact that the City/YSU planning team 
involved the local media in the process “…as participants rather than observers and critics on the 
sidelines.  Media owners and editors were invited to take their places in the leadership groups, in 
recognition of their vital business and institutional interests in the future of the region.  As a 
result, the process garnered well-informed and supportive coverage” (Faga, 2006, p.61, emphasis 
in original).  Essentially, the media stopped being reporters and started being participants and 
they saw the process in a new and positive way.  The Vindicator ran a four-part series laying out 
the principles of the vision and leading up to the public meeting, the paper ran editorials and 
other stories emphasizing the importance of public participation: “Hundreds of Youngstown’s 
residents responded to the publicity by emailing and phoning their comments and checking the 
Youngstown 2010 website for details” (Faga, 2006, p.61).  As Youngstown informant Y14, a 
high-ranking city official, states: “...the media really got on board, which I think helped.”  
Youngstown informant Y8, a city planner, explains that 
Our approach … what made it successful (not so much for decline but it has to do with 
maybe apathy and obviously if you’re talking about decline, there’s usually some apathy 
thrown in there) ...is the marketing effort.  We engaged our public broadcasting station to 
run, to rebroadcast meetings.  We’d highly publicize them through our marketing 
channels – full page ad in our newspaper or our network with our existing neighbourhood 
groups, things like that.  We marketed truly like a company markets its own products.  
[We also had a] really unique partnership with PBS and even the public radio station 
would rebroadcast stuff.  I think [marketing is essential] if you’re going to talk about 
decline or just planning in general, but even decline because people’s attitudes can be 
really down. 
 
After the vision was created, Urban Strategies recommended that the City demonstrate its 
commitment to the process; to that end, City Council adopted the vision principles by unanimous 
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resolution on February 19, 2003.  At the same time, it enacted other recommendations of Urban 
Strategies which would facilitate the creation of the more technical comprehensive plan.  For 
instance, it formed a technical committee consisting of city planning and YSU staff to oversee 
the creation of a steering committee to be comprised of citizens who had volunteered during the 
visioning process.  In addition, working groups were also created for each of the 4 platforms.  
Volunteers mobilized to assess neighbourhood conditions (that is, conditions of buildings, 
sidewalks, lots, etc…).  In 2004, 11 neighbourhood clusters targeted for citizen input into the 
comprehensive plan and more than 800 residents participated in this process.  In time, however, 
momentum started to slightly fade (Faga, 2006).  To counteract this, one of the volunteer 
committees, under the leadership of Richard Hahn, a local marketing and media professional, 
undertook a branding campaign in March 2004 designed to keep the momentum going.  The 
campaign included billboards, a newly designed website, and televisions public service 
announcements, featuring members of the public.  In addition, since 2003, WNEO, the public 
television station for Northeast Ohio rebroadcast the vision presentation and began broadcasting 
quarterly updates on the successes of the planning process.  For instance, the first update 
consisted of panel discussion between David Sweet, Hunter Morrison, then-Mayor George 
McKelvey, Bill D’Avignon, and Anthony Kobak (Finnerty, 2003).  In all, the branding campaign 
and media coverage was designed to keep people thinking about where the plan would take them 
in the future and to get people invigorated and excited about the process.  All of these efforts 
culminated in more than 1300 residents attending a public meeting in January 2005, where the 
comprehensive plan was formally presented.   
 Thus Youngstown, in order to create its 2010 Plan, embarked on a major strategic 
planning process, which emphasized public participation and partnership with community 
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organizations, in particular YSU.  According to Faga (2006), “in an effort to ward off naysaying 
and inspire new interest and faith in the future of the city, the ‘Youngstown 2010’ initiative 
turned pubic engagement into the project’s primary focus” (pp.53-54). The process was meant to 
be as inclusive as possible; from the beginning of the process, the “public” defined as “anyone 
who might care, should care, or could be convinced to care about Youngstown” (Faga, 2006, 
p.57).  In addition to encouraging residents to participate, the City reached out across county 
lines to include anyone dealing with the City in its efforts.  Importantly, given the history of 
hostility between the city’s white and African American residents, African Americans were and 
continue to be given equal access to the planning process.  The City has made the effort to bring 
together people for a common cause, focusing on neighbourhood issues, and not black/white 
issues.  To this end, in addition to the media coverage mentioned above, the city produced 
television shows and had town hall meetings on race issues during the planning process (Mock, 
2008).  As a result, the public participated in the planning process at an unusually high rate for a 
comprehensive planning process.    
Thus public participation in the planning process has played a large role in igniting a new 
sense of hope in the community.  However, some issues remain unaddressed.  For instance, the 
Youngstown 2010 Plan lacks a regional focus, resulting in the Plan not being as integrative as it 
could have been.  According to Youngstown informant Y14, a high-ranking city official: 
...there still hasn’t been enough [regional collaboration] here in the [Mahoning] Valley – 
certainly not enough between the city and its surrounding areas.  Over the past couple of 
years, the surrounding suburbs have more and more recognized the fact that there’s got to 
be some collaboration.  Now, they’re still resisting the collaboration with the City 
unfortunately, but they’re starting to collaborate more amongst themselves and eventually 
that collaboration is going to have to happen with the city in all the areas. 
 
While the Plan pays lip service to developing a regional approach, it is largely focused on 
addressing Youngstown’s planning issues.  As well, while people from the suburbs participated 
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in the process by attending public meetings (although not to the same extent as Youngstown 
residents), the suburbs have generally not been cooperative in Youngstown’s efforts to 
regenerate itself.  In order to develop more of a regional approach to Youngstown’s regeneration, 
in recent years, Youngstown officials (led by Mayor Williams) have put forth a proposal to join 
the suburbs in a Joint Economic Development District (JEDD), which is used in the State of 
Ohio when one or more municipalities agree to work together to develop township land for 
commercial or industrial purposes.  A JEDD benefits a municipality because it can get a portion 
of taxes levied in the JEDD without having to annex it.  Surrounding townships benefit by 
receiving municipal services such as water.  JEDDs are established under State legislation 
(Chapter 715, Ohio Revised Code).  Essentially, Youngstown’s JEDD proposal would mean that 
workers who work at every business in the JEDD that receives Youngstown’s water would pay a 
2 percent city income tax (PMF Group, 2008).  As explained by Youngstown informant Y14: 
So the city of Youngstown has an income tax.  So, if you work in Youngstown or if you 
live in Youngstown, you pay an income tax.  Well, there are surrounding communities 
that are suburbs, that are not cities, that don’t have income taxes... [L]et’s say you live in 
a suburb and you work in a suburb, you potentially don’t have any income tax.  What 
we’re saying is that … the income taxes applicable to Youngstown ... need to expand that 
to incorporate more people.  Well the people out here are going to say, you’ve lost your 
mind!  I’m not paying that!  I don’t live in Youngstown.  I don’t work in Youngstown.  
Why should I pay it?  Well, we’re saying however, you still benefit from Youngstown’s 
existence.  Now, some of them don’t think they do.  Some of them say, you can close the 
lights, shut down Youngstown, we’ll be fine.  That’s not the case.  What we’re saying is 
that because you benefit from Youngstown’s existence primarily because your water and 
your water service comes from Youngstown. 
 
This proposal has met with opposition from the suburbs, with one Austintown trustee calling 
Youngstown’s actions an “attack” (Skolnick, 2008).  However, according to Youngstown 
informants, the JEDD is necessary: 
It’ll be litigated and challenged, but to me it’s one of those things that you’ve got to do 
because just thinking that we’re going to be able to maintain [water service] with that 
whole core of fewer people paying a higher rate would be insanity... [I]t’s not popular, 
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but we think at the end of the day ...it means that it’s a more equitable distribution of the 
resources…  People don’t want to realize, but they benefit in so many ways of having 
Youngstown. (Youngstown informant Y14) 
 
In addition to opposition from the suburbs towards adopting a more regional approach, the 
relationship between the City of Youngstown and the County has been strained: 
...the relationship with the county is a work in progress.  There is a strange relationship at 
times, and depending on the subject matter, still a strained relationship between the city 
and the county on certain issues - on roles and responsibilities in terms of certain 
financial matters. (Youngstown informant Y14) 
 
In particular, the county government has taken action in recent years that has been to the 
detriment of physical regeneration efforts in Youngstown.  Particularly problematic was the 
selling of tax liens by the county to a third party.  This has hindered the City’s ability to acquire 
the properties and add them to their land bank (because they now have to rely on a third party to 
foreclose on the property).  As Youngstown informant Y12, an employee with the City’s 
planning department, explains: 
It’s one big mess. The first time, [the County sold the tax liens because they] wanted to 
clean their books.  There was over 32 million dollars worth of delinquent property taxes.  
[sarcastically] There was no need to aggressively go after property taxes in the City of 
Youngstown because all of the property in the City of Youngstown is garbage, so why 
waste our time?  So, they decided they wanted to clear their books, so we’ll sell these 
delinquent taxes to this company.  But they’ve been doing it since 2004 and every year 
since then.  After the first time, our books are clean.  Now, we can start fresh and we 
could actually do our job and collect taxes.  No.  They sell tax liens.  And this is for 
someone who has missed one-quarter or one half of paying their taxes.  Their lien is 
sold... This company is out of Florida.  So, this money is taken out of the city and given 
all the way to Florida.  And they’re never going to put any money back into the city so 
this money is taken out of the city.  Period.  It’s a compounded problem on top of 
problems that we already have. 
 
According to Youngstown informant Y13, what the County has done is “...they [have given] up 
control in exchange for short term economic benefit and I think that that actually undermined 
[the City of Youngstown’s] ability to really plan for decline.” 
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In addition, there is concern that the projects based on the Plan may not be as selective as 
they should be.  While the Plan is meant to be a framework for selecting key projects in order to 
advance the city’s vision, Youngstown planners have divided the city into approximately 130 
separate neighbourhoods, each of which will require a neighbourhood plan.  To date, only a few 
of these neighbourhood plans have actually been created and there are concerns that the slow 
pace of implementation will lead to further disenchantment: 
The plan is almost too ambitious.  Some of the ideas should have been reserved for a 
“Youngstown 2020” plan.  You cannot fix everything at once.  While it is great to see 
where you are going and what you would like to become, there is danger in that the 
public may be disappointed when the city cannot immediately deliver on ideas that can 
only be reasonably implemented over a span of twenty or thirty years, not five...  There 
are way too many neighbourhoods in the plan.  It is not necessary to break the city into 
120+ neighbourhoods for planning purposes.  There is no way that any good planner can 
come up with 120 unique neighbourhood plans within the same city.  It would be a lot 
more efficient to have a couple dozen planning zones, or even overlay districts, instead of 
the 20+ neighbourhood plans. (Youngstown informant Y16, former City of Youngstown 
employee) 
 
Youngstown informant Y13, a university-based urban design consultant/academic, echoes these 
implementation concerns:  
The implementation of that plan...is still to be determined.  I think that despite all of the 
attention that Youngstown has received for its planning process, which I think is good, 
the outcomes of that process have really not happened yet. So, in Youngstown, they’ve 
started on this planning process that’s very very micro.  I mean, it’s tiny… it’s dividing 
the neighbourhood into these tiny sort of sub-groups and embarking on a planning 
process.  The problem is there’s like a hundred and some of them and I think at this point 
they’ve delved into three and they were hoping to have those three done by the end of the 
year, but I don’t know that that’s gonna happen.  And there’s also the whole question of 
if you do these very detailed plans at that level, will the city be able to leverage their 
resource to implement the ideas the residents put forward.  Especially, if they can do it 
for the first 3, are they going to be able to sustain it when they get to 138 or whatever the 
number is.  So, I mean, I look at Youngstown and I think that from a perspective of 
planning and policy-making, the plan is very strong.  From a question of implementation, 
I think that it’s pretty much almost non-existent.   
 
On balance, however, although creating a regional approach to planning in Youngstown has not 
yet successful, either in the Youngstown 2010 Plan or in subsequent attempts and in spite of 
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criticisms that planners may be taking on “too much” in terms of projects to implement the Plan,  
the Youngstown 2010 planning process still stands out as an example of a successful planning 
process in its ability to include a large number of citizens and to generate excitement about 




In comparison, Sudbury’s Official Plan is a comprehensive plan which adopts strategic 
planning terminology but does not utilize to any significant degree the key strategic planning 
principles mentioned above.  Most notably, Sudbury’s Official Plan does not contain a 
comprehensive vision that was developed through extensive public participation.  The Official 
Plan does have some degree of flexibility in that it can be amended at the request of City Council 
or any Sudbury resident; however, the process for amending the Plan – as set out in the Ontario 
Planning Act – can be long and expensive (especially if appeals to the Ontario Municipal Board 
are involved).  In addition, Sudbury’s Official Plan is not a framework for selecting key projects 
based on a comprehensive, long-range vision.  In fairness, in creating a “comprehensive plan,” 
Sudbury’s planners were merely meeting the requirements set out for them by the Ontario 
government in the Planning Act. However, in choosing to incorporate elements of strategic 
planning, but not fulfilling the “spirit” of those elements, the benefits which could have been 
gained will likely not be realized.   For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 3 and as reiterated 
above, creating a long-term, comprehensive vision through meaningful public participation is a 
key component of strategic planning.  Again, strategic planning is as much, if not more, about 
the process of participation and the creation of a decision-making framework as the product.  The 
parties who participated in creating the vision upon which the Youngstown 2010 Plan is based 
benefited from the process itself.  One of the greatest benefits was that people, through 
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meaningful participation, became excited once again about Youngstown’s future.  In contrast, 
while Sudbury’s Official Plan begins with a discussion of the “vision” upon which the Plan is 
ostensibly based, the public was not directly involved in its creation, meaning that the process 
was less inclusive than Youngstown’s.  Essentially, planners wrote the vision based on various 
sources and took it to the public in their various consultations, rather than the other way around:  
What we did is, by that time we had the benefit of the public input at the background 
stage, but we also looked at things like Earthcare, economic development plan, and we 
sort of … we wanted to… it doesn’t make sense to do a new Official Plan ignoring other 
plans that went before you.  So, we took information – some of the key points from the 
background studies but we also looked at these other plans in what they’ve received.  So, 
we put together a vision which we thought recognized all of those things.  We tried to go 
to as many sources as we could.  We really drew on a lot of sources. (Sudbury informant 
S1) 
 
While the vision was discussed in the planners’ presentations of the first and second draft of the 
Official Plan at the various public meetings and open houses held between September 2003 and 
March 2006 (unfortunately, informants did not know how many people in total participated – 
Sudbury informant S1 estimated two to three hundred people participated in total), Sudbury 
residents were less interested in the overall vision of the Plan and more interested in how the 
Plan affected them personally.  As Sudbury informant S12, a city planner who participated in 
many of the open houses, explains: “…no one ever asked me about the vision.”  The lack of 
public interest in the vision could have been a result of a number of factors, including the fact 
that the vision was not discussed in meetings prior to the writing of the Plan itself (as was done 
in Youngstown) and the fact that Sudbury officials were not trying to re-invent the city through 
the Official Plan (as were Youngstown officials), thus making the “rallying” behind a new vision 
less necessary.  Indeed, at least one high level official (Sudbury informant S11), when 
interviewed for this research, was unaware of the vision contained in the Official Plan.  When 
asked if the Vision was located somewhere on the website, he replied: “Oh, there’s a vision.  It’s 
267 
 
all up here, of course, [points to his head], but we haven’t put it down on paper.  I suppose we 
should be doing that and we should be putting on our website.”  Also, Sudbury informant S1, a 
city planner, speculates that because a comprehensive plan is so all-encompassing, people may 
be less interested in the vision: “I think Official Plans – a lot of people take them for granted.  
Because they’re so all-encompassing, unless someone’s got a particular interest in a particular 
issue, I don’t think… it’s always a challenge.”  In the end, while there was an opportunity to 
generate public excitement about the planning process and sense of involvement through the 
creation of a truly comprehensive, long-term vision based on residents’ meaningful input, 
Sudbury’s “vision” was written by local officials and seems to be, for the most part, a listing of 
selling features geared towards attracting outsiders (for instance, the statement that Sudbury is a 
“city of lakes”) as opposed to a vision that reflects the views and concerns of local residents. 
Also in contrast with the Youngstown 2010 Plan, Sudbury’s Official Plan was not as 
context-specific with respect to future population levels. As is generally the case with all Ontario 
municipalities, in crafting its Official Plan, the City undertook a number of “background 
studies,” including the following: 
 Agricultural Study 
 Healthy Community Study 
 Housing Study 
 Infrastructure Study 
 Natural Heritage Study 
 Parks & Leisure Study & Master Plan 
 Stormwater Study 
 Transportation Study 
 Waterfront and Rural Study & Background Policy Paper 
 Downtown Vision 




These studies informed the policies of the Official Plan, providing evidence of effort on the part 
of local officials to develop a context-specific approach.  For example, in the Agricultural Study, 
land was categorized according to the Province’s Land Evaluation and Area Review (LEAR) 
process, classifying agricultural land in terms of, for instance, soil classifications, quantity of 
arable land, and drainage (Greater Sudbury, 2004).  A Housing Study examined existing housing 
stock in terms of future supply and demand.  However, with respect to the fundamental issue of 
likely future population levels, the accuracy of the assessment of the demographic context may 
be questioned.  As discussed above, planners did not craft the Official Plan with population 
decline in mind.  Of the four future population scenarios put forth (outmigration, natural 
increase, in-migration, and high in-migration), planners chose the in-migration scenario, which 
forecasts a moderate population increase to 169,579 by 2021.  Indeed, the “motto” of the 
planning process in Sudbury, set out on the front page of each background study and contained 
in each public notice, was: “Developing a single, up-to-date Official Plan that fosters sustainable 
growth, economic development and a high quality of life to attract people and investment.”  
From that statement, it appears that considering future population decline was not a priority.  To 
be fair, population decline scenarios were briefly considered in the Housing and Infrastructure 
Studies, but policies to deal with the consequences of policy decline were not seriously 
considered (Greater Sudbury, 2004; 2005).  Indeed, population decline scenarios were not even 
considered in the Transportation Study, which dealt with forecasting future supply and demand 
for roads networks in Sudbury.  Instead, the “high in-migration” scenario (which forecasts an 
increase to 175,000) was used.  As stated in the study: 
The rationale for modeling the high in-migration scenario was that it would have the 
greatest impact on the transportation system. This population level had been reached 




According to Sudbury informant S1, a city planner who participated in the background studies: 
…the emphasis was on trying to get a handle on future costs as a result of growth and so 
in terms of the out-migration, that wasn’t much of a concern from the standpoint that it 
could be using existing infrastructure and we’d still have all these various settlement 
areas that would have to be sustained. 
 
It seems to be assumed that the effects of a reduced population do not warrant attention.  For 
these reasons, at least in terms of demographics, Sudbury’s Official Plan does not seem to have 
been based on a realistic assessment of context. 
Finally, while the Plan takes a regional approach in terms of dealing with issues in the 
large land area that is the City of Greater Sudbury, it is unclear how some of the policies 
contained in the Plan might affect communities beyond the city’s boundaries.  For instance, in 
the Coming of Age economic development strategic plan which has been incorporated into the 
Official Plan, drafters identify the Mining Supply and Services (MS&S) Sector (which supplies 
the mining community with machinery and specialized services) as one of the five “economic 
engines” for which strategic actions and initiatives are targeted.  Indeed, the MS&S sector in 
Sudbury has been growing in importance in recent years: the trend towards declining 
employment in mining and smelting has been offset partially by growth in MS&S sector 
(Robinson, 2004).  Anchored by Sudbury’s two large mines – Vale Inco and Xstrata 
Falconbridge – in 2008 it was estimated that the sector employed about 14,000 people in 
Sudbury (Bradley, 2008), more than are employed the primary mining, smelting and refining 
sector (Sudol, 2008).  According to Sudbury informant S2, whose organization promotes the 
Mining Supply and Services Sector internationally, ““Our website gets 100,000 hits a month; in 
2004, there were over 7 million hits.  We have 30-40 countries visiting on a daily basis.”  Sudol 
(2008) states that this sector is “rapidly growing” (however, this growth likely has been 
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negatively affected by the seven-month strike at Vale Inco which continues as of early February, 
2009).   
Given the importance to Sudbury’s economy of the MS&S Sector, it would seem logical 
that Sudbury’s economic strategic plan would call for strategies and initiatives to help promote 
Sudbury as the international centre for mining supply and services (City of Greater Sudbury, 
2008, p.179).  As Sudbury informant S9, an employee with the City’s business development 
organization, explains: 
We have worked here in the Mining Supply and Service Sector to attract different 
companies to come here.  This is the centre because you have the end users here.  So this 
is the place to be.  The location here works for supplying the hard rock mining industry 
across Northern Ontario and into Northern Quebec.  We have a number of national firms 
here, like Atlas Copco.  Their main headquarters are based here for sales and service for 
mining and construction equipment.  There’s a number like that that supply the whole 
Canadian market here and we’ve been able to attract them to make the move because 
of… to be close to their customers, Vale INCO and Xstrata. 
 
However, several mining supply and services firms also exist in other northeastern Ontario 
communities such as North Bay, located about an hour east of Sudbury.  According to the City of 
North Bay’s Office of Economic Development:  
The Mining Supply Industry is one of the most prominent sectors in the North Bay 
region. There are approximately 65 local area businesses providing mining exploration 
and development services, including engineering, fabrication, machinery and equipment 
manufacturing for the mining industry. North Bay is proud to have over a half dozen 
multinational Canadian headquarters here. In the North Bay area, 2,100 direct and 
indirect jobs are attributed to mining supply firms, which is nine times greater than the 
provincial average.   This sector brings in excess of $19 million dollars in wages in the 
local economy each year and accounts for more than 1,300 full time positions. (City of 
North Bay, 2007, p.1) 
 
The City of North Bay also has adopted a strategy to entice MS&S firms to locate in the city.  
Timmins, located approximately 3 hours north of Sudbury, is also home to a cluster of MS&S 
firms.  It  is thus unclear how Sudbury’s strategy, articulated in the Official Plan, of trying to 
become the premier Mining Supply and Services Centre in the world will impact smaller MS&S 
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clusters such as those that exist in North Bay and Timmins.  Thus, in the end, while Sudbury’s 
Official Plan uses strategic planning “speak,” several key aspects of strategic planning – 
including developing a comprehensive vision created from extensive participation, taking an 
inclusive regional approach, and creating a flexible framework upon which discrete projects can 
be based – are not present to a significant degree.  Perhaps most importantly, Sudbury planners 
did not see it as their role to get the public interested in planning in general or in the vision for 
the city in particular.  In the end, people paid more attention to how the particular policies 


















As discussed in Chapter 3, the shrinking cities literature suggests that planning in cities 
that are losing population needs to be pursued in a balanced manner; that is, planning policies 
must not prioritize, for instance, economic over physical, social, and environmental concerns.  
Urban regeneration literature provides more details as to how this might be accomplished.  
According to this literature, above all, it is critically important for cities experiencing decline to 
create a balanced framework with a clearly articulated vision upon which discrete urban 
regeneration policies would be based.   Having an overarching strategic framework allows cities 
to undertake projects that are seemingly discrete, but which are based actually on a longer-term 
vision for the city – a vision that recognizes the interdependence of the economic, social, 
physical, and environmental spheres.  Do the Youngstown and Sudbury plans provide such a 
framework?  In other words, do the plans provide a balanced, holistic approach to each city’s 








As discussed in Chapter 5, the Youngstown 2010 Plan is based on a Vision which 
contains four “pillars:” 
 Accepting that Youngstown is a smaller city; 
 Defining Youngstown’s role in the new regional economy; 
 Improving Youngstown’s image and enhancing quality of life; and  
 A call to action. 
In addition, the Plan itself is based organized around the following themes, emphasizing the 
importance of creating: 
 A green network 
 Competitive industrial districts 
 Viable neighbourhoods; and 
 A vibrant core. 
Again, the Vision (agreed-upon principles and goals as to what kind of place Youngstown should 
be in the future) is contained as an appendix to the comprehensive Plan (a detailed framework 
designed to “guide the City in making both big and small decisions to achieve the goals of the 
vision”) (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.135).   
 While it is asserted in the Youngstown 2010 Plan that the city is setting the stage for 
“sustainable regeneration in the new economy of the 21st century” (City of Youngstown, 2005, 
p.15), a detailed review of both the Plan and the Vision upon which it is based reveals that it 
places a strong emphasis on physical regeneration and, by implication, re-greening, with a 
moderate discussion of strategies to incorporate into the “new economy,” and only a brief 
mention of social issues and issues related to protecting the environment for its own sake.  With 
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respect to physical regeneration, both the Vision and the Plan are largely based on the need for 
city officials and residents to recognize that the city can no longer sustain its over-sized 
infrastructure and that there are too many abandoned properties and underutilized sites.  Thus, a 
major focus of the Youngstown 2010 is essentially the “unbuilding” of the city to meet current 
population levels and the consolidation of urban infrastructure.  In fact, while the Vision deals 
with economic, social, and environmental issues to varying degrees, the Plan itself deals almost 
exclusively with issues of physical regeneration.  The “meat” of the Plan is the detailed analysis 
of the physical conditions of each of the planning districts.  For instance, with respect to the east 
side planning district, after discussing briefly the history of each neighbourhood within that 
district and the population, race, and age composition the district, the Plan lays out maps of 
vacant property in the district and explains: 
Vacant land on the East Side... is widespread, although much has never been developed.  
The spread of vacant parcels inside populated areas is the greatest concern.  The East 
Side presents a mixture of serious problems and great opportunities. (City of 
Youngstown, 2005, p.88) 
 
The Plan goes on to inventory the physical assets of the East Side District, including a new high 
school, two fire stations, and parks, and to lay out the new land use plan for the district.  In 
particular, with respect to the East Side: 
There is an abundance of green space available on the East Side...The new plan defers to 
green...  It is the part of the City with agricultural land use, has extensive recreation/open 
space land use and takes advantage of the new industrial green classification. (City of 
Youngstown, 2005, p.91) 
 
The Plan then discusses in more detail where uses in each classification – recreation/open space, 
residential, institutional, commercial, and industrial – will be located.  Particularly in the East 
Side District, the focus of the new land use plan is decreasing the amount of land set aside for 
residential and commercial uses and changing heavy industrial classifications to “green 
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industrial” classifications.  This is consistent with the overall goal of “shrinking” the physical 
structure of the city to meet current population levels.  This format is repeated for each of the 
five districts.  Although a “vibrant core” is listed as one of the Plan’s themes, interestingly the 
Central Planning District, in which the downtown is located, does not receive much of an 
extended consideration compared to the rest of the neighbourhoods.  Much of the focus in the 
discussion in this district involves capitalizing on the existing assets of the downtown, including 
its adjacent location to Youngstown State University and its large number of key government 
facilities, including two federal court offices and many of the State’s regional offices.   
Indeed, this focus on the physical aspects of regeneration has permeated the actual 
projects undertaken by the city since the Plan was adopted.  In the past 4 years, the City has 
already spent millions of dollars tearing down structures and reducing the city’s physical 
structure.  Examination of the Plan, newspaper coverage of the Plan, and interview transcripts 
reveals that physical regeneration is indeed the major focus of Youngstown 2010.  As 
Youngstown informant Y14 explains, “we’ve put forward a very aggressive and cogent plan to 
start eliminating some of the excess units that have become blighted.”  According to a recent 
article in The Economist, Mayor Williams plans to “...use federal stimulus funds to demolish 
areas with high vacancy rates and turn them into green space for parks or even farms” (2009, 
p.37).  Youngstown informant Y14 explains that 
In 06 and 07, we spent 3 million dollars aggregately [on demolition] between those two 
years.  We had a slowdown in 08 because of the economic crisis.  We were battling a 
deficit, but we will be back up to speed next year.  The federal government provided 
some neighbourhood stabilization money, so we’ll be doing upwards of 1.5-2 million 
dollars of demolition in 09...  I mean, there was this blip in the radar screen in 08 because 
of the economics, but we’ll be right back at it in 09. 
 
As well, city officials have stated that it is pointless to revive certain neighbourhoods (Aeppel, 
2007).  The city is thus offering tax incentives for people to move out of abandoned areas.  Some 
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are being offered relocation money as opposed to money to rehabilitate their existing home 
(Nassar, 2006).   In addition, the city and county are turning over abandoned lots to neighbours 
and placing a moratorium on the (often haphazard) construction of new dwellings and 
encouraging rehabilitation of existing homes (Lanks, 2006a).  Moreover, according to Swope 
(2006c), until recently, funding from the city’s program for helping low income residents fix up 
their homes was based on first-come, first-served basis, regardless of the condition of the 
neighborhood.  Now, the Community Development Agency skips homes in far-gone areas, 
giving money instead to people in these areas to relocate because it does not make sense to invest 
in homes on streets where more than half of the homes have to be demolished.  A moratorium 
has also been placed on the construction of homes financed with low-income housing tax credits 
as city officials do not want, for instance, a new home to be built between two homes that have 
to be demolished (Swope, 2006c; Tone, 2007; Russell, 2008). 
While protecting the environment for its own sake is not a large focus of the 
Youngstown 2010 Vision or Plan, the emphasis on physical regeneration in both means that the 
city’s desire to “re-green” figures prominently in both as well, particularly in the Vision.  Here, it 
is recognized that “shrinking” the city’s physical footprint naturally opens up more opportunities 
to create green space.  One of the “pillars” of the city’s Vision is to “be generous with our urban 
land “(City of Youngstown, 2005, p.137), meaning that physically downsizing the city’s physical 
infrastructure and housing will open up vacant land for purposes other than development, such as 
neighbourhood parks or community gardens: 
[Shrinking] may actually open up some possibilities because often the areas that are in 
decline – neighbourhoods that are in decline – are the ones in the contemporary market 
are the weakest.  So you may find that old industrial properties that when you look at it 
with a fresh eye are great park sites because in 1890 it made sense to put a steel mill on it 
and run railroad tracks to it.  It makes no sense to try to run a road to it.  It’s too small.  
It’s irregularly shaped.  It’s hard to…  Fine, make a park out of it.  Make a bike way out 
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of it.  Make a linear greenway out of it.  Do something else with it.  You’re free to do 
that.  The land values have dropped sufficiently.  The competition for land use is pretty 
minimal. (Youngstown informant Y9] 
 
Capitalizing on opportunities for re-greening also figure prominently in the 2010 Plan.  In fact, 
as noted above and in Chapter 5, one of the Plan’s themes is the creation of a “green network” 
that involves “linking the existing green spaces in the city via water courses and trails...” (City of 
Youngstown, 2005, p.45).  In the “implementation” section of the Plan, for each planning 
district, “next steps” are set out in order to meet the goal of re-greening the city.  For instance, 
the next steps for the South Side district in this respect include expanding several existing parks, 
establishing new parks in “strategic neighborhood locations,” creating a “green boulevard” on 
two streets, and creating “green enhancements” along a rail line (City of Youngstown, 2005, 
p.130).   The next steps for the East Side district in this respect involve creating and maintaining 
“high quality parks” and seeking Clean Ohio57 funding for “open space land acquisitions” (City 
of Youngstown, 2005, p.132).  Indeed, in the September 2008 Grey to Green Festival at Wick 
Park, efforts were made to encourage residents to, among other things, plant lots or vegetable 
gardens on vacant lots (Barron, 2008).   
In addition to contributing to physical regeneration, the Plan’s re-greening policies are 
also geared towards improving social and economic conditions in the city.  For example, part of 
the City’s Vision is that “[p]arks, open spaces, and a clean natural environment are important 
elements in public health, active lifestyles, quality of life and even economic development” (City 
of Youngstown, 2005, p.140).  Particularly with respect to economic development goals, it is 
stated in the Plan that having recreational opportunities in open space has “...become a major 
factor for business location, especially with high tech firms” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.47).   
 
57 The Clean Ohio fund is a administered by the State of Ohio and seeks to restore, protect, and connect “Ohio's 
important natural and urban places by preserving green space and farmland, improving outdoor recreation, and by 
cleaning up brownfields to encourage redevelopment and revitalize communities.” See www.cleanohio.gov
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Existing open space is to be protected by two new land classifications: recreational/open space 
and agricultural.  Also, removing the “residue” of heavy industry works will allow the city to 
convert industrial brownfields to “green industrial” sites and to attract “green industries.”  One of 
the only mentions of protecting the environment for at least partly its own sake is found in the 
Vision, where the importance of “restoring the Mahoning River” is discussed.  According to the 
Vision, the  
Mahoning River has been abused in the past, but it should be a resource in the 
revitalization of Youngstown.  A vision for the future of the river must be implemented 
which includes environmental clean up, public access and recreational opportunities to 
serve the region (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.140). 
 
Thus, within the City’s framework for planning for the future of Youngstown, considerable 
attention is paid to re-greening policies which appear to be designed to enhance the physical, 
economic, and, to a lesser extent, social conditions of the City.  Unfortunately, the attention paid 
to protecting the environment for its own sake appear to be lacking and one may question 
whether the Plan will provide sufficient guidance for policy-makers seeking to develop 
environmentally-sensitive policies. 
In addition to being heavily focused on physical regeneration (and, by implication, re-
greening the city), the Vision contained within the Youngstown 2010 Plan pays a good deal of 
attention to addressing the City’s economic woes through creating jobs in and attracting jobs to 
the city.  On the surface, it may appear that “unbuilding” the city does not “fit” with attempting 
to attract economic growth.  In fact, interviews reveal that the city is hoping that the cost-savings 
from reducing infrastructure will mean that more money can be used for economic development 
initiatives: 
…obviously we’re looking to always attract new investment to this city.  So, while it 
sounds when you say “shrinking city,” that also might include economic development, 
our economic development efforts actually have been enhanced by the fact that if  there’s 
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less infrastructure we have to maintain, those funds can be used to more aggressively 
fund economic development initiatives.  If we get the city employment structure 
balanced, then that means those dollars that heretofore would have been going to salaries 
and benefits and other things can now be driven towards economic development 
initiatives.  So, don’t let anybody confuse the notion of a shrinking city.  Our economic 
development efforts are more robust now probably than they’ve ever been! (Youngstown 
informant Y14). 
 
In the area of economic development, the Vision provides a framework for policies that appears 
to be inward-focused; that is, it is focused on capitalizing on the city’s existing economic 
strengths.   Inward-focused goals include supporting the university and health care sector and 
nurturing innovative start-up high tech businesses in the downtown core.  For instance, part of 
the Vision is that Youngstown becomes an even more important centre for health care, 
education, government, and light industry.  In particular, part of the Vision calls for Youngstown 
to be “open for business” in order to retain small businesses: 
Small businesses account for most of the jobs created in today’s economy.  The City of 
Youngstown should do everything possible to help these businesses.  The Youngstown 
Business Incubator helps new technology firms and it is expanding – it’s an example of a 
step in the right direction. (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.139) 
 
The Plan itself, while not dealing directly with economic issues to any great extent, deals with 
them by implication: that is, physical regeneration is seen as a way of accomplishing the 
economic goals set forth in the Vision.  For instance, as mentioned above, part of the reason for 
re-greening the city and developing more outdoor recreational opportunities is to make the city 
more attractive for businesses – particularly high-tech, “new economy” businesses – whose 
workers value “quality of life” factors.   
In practice, some of the Vision’s economic development goals can be seen to be at work.  
As explained by Boardman (2008):  
Youngstown uses enterprise zones, tax and fee abatements, city façade renovation loans 
and other programs to help attract and retain businesses in the city.  In 2007, $5.3 million 
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was spent on business development, nearly twice the amount spent in 2006…New 
businesses have moved in…  
 
In particular, the Youngstown Business Incubator has become an integral part of the City’s 
downtown and has helped revitalize the area in which it is located.  According to Mock (2008), 
the Youngstown Business Incubator, assisted by federal grants, is successfully nurturing start-up 
knowledge- and technology-based businesses and is contributing to downtown revitalization.  
One company that started here, Turning Technologies, was voted top software company in 2007 
by Inc. Magazine. Skolnick (2008) argues that the Youngstown Business Incubator has turned 
the city into “hot spot” for business-to-business software development.  Youngstown informant 
Y2 explains that  
…[the Youngstown Business Incubator has] been amazingly successful at [nurturing 
business-to-business software companies] in Youngstown Ohio.  In 5 years we’ve been 
able to create over 200 jobs.  And that’s accelerating faster than even we imagined. 
There’s just nothing like us in the region, or even really in the country. 
 
In fact, Youngstown recently lobbied for the state to establish one of twelve “hubs of innovation 
and opportunity” in Youngstown (Runyan, 2008).  According to Youngstown informant Y14, “... 
the Youngstown Business Incubator is a good example of Youngstown’s economy being 
redefined where you get some high tech companies in here.” 
Youngstown Business Incubator aside, interviews reveal that, in practice, key officials 
within the city are concentrating economic development funds on projects that are much more 
outward –focused than the approach called for in the 2010 Plan.  That is, their efforts are 
concentrated on attracting foreign investment to the city (in particular, companies that will 
provide a large number of jobs), especially to newly constructed state-of-the-art industrial parks 
on converted brownfield sites.  This is one area where there appears to be a disconnect between 
the Plan in principle and in practice.  One city official – Youngstown informant Y1 (an employee 
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with the City’s Finance Department) – was particularly adamant that the way to address 
Youngstown’s economic issues was to attract large firms that would create a large number of 
jobs.  To him, while the Youngstown Business Incubator  is a good idea, it is not the answer: 
[The Youngstown Business Incubator] is nice, but we’ll do one or two deals that’ll equal 
what they’re doing on an annual basis in a month from the city’s perspective... Now, I 
applaud their efforts.  I want them to do well.  I want them to continue to succeed.  I want 
them to be downtown, but at the same time, I think as an overall redevelopment strategy 
for the area that we have to cookie cutter this stuff.  We have to do a lot and we need to 
do it fast.  That’s what our focus is.   
 
This had been frustrating for a proponent of the 2010 Plan, who expressed the hope that this 
official would eventually “buy-in” to the critical importance of smaller-scale initiatives like the 
Youngstown Business Incubator: 
... [Youngstown informant Y1] is a bright guy.  He’s sort of critical of the incubator 
because this is a guy who’s put together deals, taking old steel mill sites and done 
wonderful things.  The incubator is sort of a different animal.  A lot of money has been 
thrown in that thing, but right now, on the front page, one of the companies is the seventh 
fastest growing company in the country or small and medium sized companies 
headquartered two minutes from here.  And that company’s acquiring and going global.  
So it’s different than what [Youngstown informant Y1] has been fighting for for 20 years 
and he’s done a great job... I’m trying to say, hey, [Youngstown informant Y1], do what 
you do, and let them do what they do.  At the end of the day, these companies have the 
ability to sort of eradicate that whole issue of outsourcing.  They can maybe reverse part 
of that trend and at least find their niche. 
 
In spite of the efforts of others to persuade him, according to Youngstown informant Y1, 
focusing on attracting investment from industries that would provide large numbers of jobs 
(instead of focusing on nurturing small start-ups) is critically important to the city.  Indeed, 
having more jobs in Youngstown is actually more beneficial to the city fiscally than having 
residents: 
People who work in Youngstown pay an income tax.  They don’t have to live in 
Youngstown.  If they’re working in the community, they’re paying.  In effect, 80% of our 
revenue comes from people who work in this environment but live outside of the 
environment, live outside the city borders.  So we’re able to tax a large group of people 
who aren’t necessarily living in the community.  Somebody’s living here, we have to 
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provide all those services of a resident.  A lot of time, those resident services are much 
more costly than that person’s giving you back in tax dollars… [T]he true trick is that 
taking those additional resource dollars and using them on the job creation side and if 
people want to live somewhere else, we’re OK with it…   You’ve got more revenue and 
less services.  It’s a wonderful equation! (Youngstown informant Y1) 
 
Unfortunately, what the focus on unbuilding the city for people while increasing the city’s 
attractiveness for industry may mean for the physical structure of the city remains a question.  
The state-of-the-art industrial parks being promoted as attractive locations to foreign investment 
are located in the outskirts of the city, meaning that this may work against both the Vision’s and 
Plan’s stated goal of consolidating the city’s infrastructure for efficiency’s sake.  This would also 
steer development away from the downtown, which would, again, seem to work against the 
Plan’s theme of creating a vibrant core.  In addition, encouraging people to work in the city, but 
not live in the city, promotes the further dispersal of residences to suburban areas outside of the 
city, again, negatively affecting the goal of consolidation.  It also would negatively affect local 
businesses, which depend on local residents for their survival.  For instance, as noted by Mock 
(2008), a shrinking customer base has already been problematic for many industries, including 
the local newspaper: “City hall may not have been concerned with drawing people from other 
cities for growth, but the Vindicator was” (p.44).  Attracting industry, but losing people to the 
suburbs, will likely exacerbate the dismal situation of many local businesses.  Again, this appears 
to be an area where the goals of the Plan and the goals of local officials are working at cross-
purposes. 
In addition, what “unbuilding” the city for people while seeking to attract industry may 
mean to social issues such as neighborhood vitality also remains a question.  The view that it is 
more attractive fiscally for the city to be home to jobs, but not people, works against the vision of 
improving the quality of life of Youngstown residents.  According to the Vision, social issues 
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such as education, neighbourhood safety, and racial divisions need to be addressed.  In fact, in 
the visioning process, a number of radio broadcasts were aired which addressed racial divisions 
in the community and encouraged participation in the planning process by all races.  The city 
also produced television shows and held town hall meetings on the issue of racial divisions 
(Mock, 2008).  As Youngstown informant Y9, a Youngstown State University professor 
explains: 
[Mayor Williams] understood the power and importance of it as a civic dialogue, as a 
lancing of boils that had festered for too long, as an exercise in recent hope, as something 
that had to be practical.  And he spent a lot of time going out into the community and 
listening so when he came back, said back up guys… in the barber shops and beauty 
parlours, nobody feels like their part of this and we’ve got to figure this one out.  That’s 
when we went on public television and had 3 hours of… 2 hours of which were live… of 
face-to-face discussion, black, white, across the community, about the issue of race.  So, 
we’re not going to have anybody buy into this thing if we don’t confront the way which 
we deal with each other…It loosened up the joints a lot.  It got people to believe that 
maybe they were being listened to… 
 
Mayor Williams also hoped that the planning process would bring people of all races together for 
a common cause – neighbourhood issues – not black/white issues.  Indeed, African Americans 
continue to be given equal access in the Youngstown 2010 process (Mock, 2008).   
Specifically, according to the Vision: 
Members of our community have said that there are divisions – especially racism – which 
are holding Youngstown back. The Comprehensive Plan will not be able to resolve these 
divisions, but we must begin to take steps to improve the situation. (City of Youngstown, 
2005, p.141) 
 
Despite this statement, however, social issues are not dealt with to any great extent in the 
Youngstown 2010 Plan.  Issues such as education, crime, and racial divisions) are addressed in 
the Plan generally only where they relate to the city’s physical condition (that is, improving the 
physical environment to make the streets safer and rehabilitating the older housing stock which 
are health risks because of lead paint and asbestos).  For instance, according to Mock (2008), to 
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tackle crime, Williams increased demolition budget since abandoned buildings are haven from 
criminals. However, social problems such as Youngstown’s high poverty rates – as was 
mentioned in Chapter 5, according to Bishaw and Semega (2008), the poverty rate in 
Youngstown in 2007 was 32.6%, one of the 10 highest percentages for places in the United 
States with a population between 65,000 and 249,999 – and low household incomes – again as 
mentioned in Chapter 5, in 2007 Youngstown’s median income was $24,941, the lowest income 
of “places” of 65,000 to 249,999 people in the United States (Bishaw and Semega, 2008) –  are 
not addressed in the Plan.   
Of course, that is not to say that the city is not attempting to address these issues in other 
venues (for example, through their Community Development Agency), although, according to 
Skolnick (2009), Mayor Williams admits that the city lacks an organization which does true 
community development.  However, social issues (or at the very least an explicit consideration of 
the social impacts of the Plan) are not expressly included as part of the city’s framework for 
future development and it is unclear how the City’s strategies to improve the physical, economic, 
and environmental conditions will alleviate these issues.  In fact, the city’s strategy of 
encouraging residents to move to more stable neighborhoods, while logical from an 
infrastructure efficiency standpoint, is meeting some resistance from citizens who feel strong ties 
to their neighborhoods, abandoned or otherwise (Christie, 2008).  According to Boardman 
(2008), some residents have turned down $50,000 cash to move to busier parts o the city.  As 
well, although the city is not forcing anyone to move, it is acknowledged that the “hollowing 
out” of unstable neighbourhoods will hit poor and minority residents hardest (Aeppel, 2007).  
According to Mock (2008), “[i]t’s acknowledged across the board that when cities shrink, the 
neighborhoods that end up most expendable are typically low-income and often predominantly 
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African- or Latino-American communities” (p.44).  Boardman (2008) also explains that historic 
preservationists expressing concern about the tearing down of historic buildings and the impact 
on the city’s sense of history.  This lack of focus on social issues contributes to the overall 
unbalanced approach of the Youngstown 2010 Plan.  Physical regeneration, and by implication, 
environmental regeneration, is clearly the priority, in part in order to achieve economic 
development goals.  Social issues, while mentioned in the Vision, seem to have fallen by the 
wayside, both in the Plan and in the thinking of at least one highly-placed official.  Issues of 




In comparison, at first glance, Sudbury’s Official Plan, as supplemented by the economic, 
humans services, and environmental strategic plans, seems at first glance to represent a much 
more balanced approach towards planning the future development of the city.  Especially within 
the context of the trend in Ontario towards greater municipal responsibility (although without 
corresponding resources), planners in Sudbury appear to have produced a document which 
acknowledges the linkages between the physical, economic, environmental, and social spheres of 
urban life.  For instance, the stated purpose of the Official Plan is to “...establish goals, 
objectives, and policies to manage and direct physical change and its effects on the social, 
economic and natural environment for the twenty-year planning period” (City of Greater 
Sudbury, 2008, p.3).  Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 6, the introductory comments of the Plan 
explicitly state that it is meant to be much more than a land-use planning document, 
encompassing objectives related to social, economic, and environmental matters as well. 
Furthermore, the theme of “balance” is repeated in the “vision statements” and elsewhere 
throughout the Plan.  For instance, one of the vision statements is that Sudbury is a healthy and 
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sustainable community, providing a quality of life that is “...directly related to environmental, 
economic and social determinants” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.4).  One of the “principles” 
of the Plan that is advanced to “guide future change, growth and development in the City” is that 
it is a priority of Sudbury’s City Council to adopt the “healthy community” approach to planning 
in the Official Plan, the human services strategy, and other city initiatives.  As a matter of fact, 
two informants who have both worked for the City for a number of years explained that Sudbury 
was one of the first cities in Ontario to adopt the healthy community model, long before it was 
considered “en vogue” to do so.  According to Sudbury informant S5, a city planner, “…back in 
1986 when we hosted a national conference here, [adopting the Healthy Community Model] was 
one of the key points of that national conference.  And then we joined Healthy Communities 
movement and carried those ideas into the plan.”  Indeed, as he explains, the former Region of 
Sudbury was “the first region in Ontario who really included social policy in our plan.”  Sudbury 
informant S1, a city planner, explains that “historically, Sudbury has pushed the envelope that 
tries to deal with more than just land use issues... the Sudbury Regional Plan dealt with what we 
call the Healthy Communities stuff – like the social aspects…  It was ahead of its time in that 
way.”  In 2004, Sudbury City Council (under former Mayor David Courtemanche) recognized 
the importance of developing a Healthy Community Strategy, which was done by an “Expert 
Panel” formed with various “opinion leaders” from the community (Greater Sudbury, 2006b, 
p.3).  The strategy outlines four “strategic priorities” for the City, including: active living/healthy 
lifestyle; natural environment; civic engagement/social capital, and economic growth.  In order 
to achieve these priorities, the City was to establish a Healthy Community Cabinet made up of 
“key community stakeholders” (Greater Sudbury, 2006b, p.3).  Unfortunately, while a Healthy 
Community Cabinet Advisory Committee has been formed, it has not been very active and the 
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initiative has “fallen by the wayside” under the leadership of the current Mayor John Rodriguez.  
As Sudbury informant S4, the head of a community organization and member of City Council, 
states: 
[The Healthy Community Strategy] was the previous Mayor’s baby and it was a priority.  
David Courtemanche and I were big proponents of it.  The new Mayor got elected and it 
wasn’t part of his agenda.  Now, he’s been supportive and great, but he’s not leading the 
charge.  So, it’s very difficult to get the same level of engagement with the community on 
this because you don’t have the mayor up front carrying the torch as David was carrying 
it.  And that will happen with new mayors and new people all the time.  So, you do end 
up with good plans and good documents that can fall by the wayside. 
 
In fact, none of the informants identified the Healthy Community Strategy as one of the key 
documents guiding city policy. 
In the Official Plan, however, the notion of the “healthy community” is repeated 
throughout: determinants of a “healthy community” are listed to include community engagement, 
employment opportunities, accessible health care, protected natural areas, social supports, a safe 
city, and educational opportunities.  An entire section of the Plan – Part VI, entitled “Healthy 
People, Healthy Places” – is devoted to describing the health community model.  According to 
Part VI: 
The Healthy Community approach is rooted in the belief that social, environmental and 
economic factors are important determinants of our health.  The City of Greater Sudbury 
has supported the Healthy Community approach to community development for a 
number of years. (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.169) 
 
The Plan goes on to note that a “diverse and vital” economy is an essential part of a Healthy 
Community and the Coming of Age strategic economic development plan is aimed at producing 
such an economy: 
Greater Sudbury has adopted an economic development strategic plan that identifies 
several key engines of growth.  In addition to mining and supply services, other targeted 
sectors include tourism, arts & culture, health care services and research, and the 
development of an environmental services sector that will build upon the City’s well 
established land reclamation and lake water quality programs.  This Plan adopts a broad 
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and flexible approach to land use policies in order to facilitate economic activity in 
existing industrial sectors as well as all emerging areas of growth. (City of Greater 
Sudbury, 2008, p.169) 
 
It is then explained that “many” of the social issues outlined in the Human Services Strategy 
2015 are relevant to the Healthy Community model.  Some of the policies advanced in support of 
achieving a healthy community according to the indicators mentioned above do deal with social 
issues, including the policy to “provide through partnerships with the non-profit sector, the social 
support network to address the basic necessities of life including food and shelter...” (City of 
Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.176).  A chapter of this part of the Plan entitled “Housing” deals with a 
range of issues related to housing, including strategies to “encourage a greater mix of housing 
and tenure” and strategies to increase the availability of affordable housing (City of Greater 
Sudbury, 2008, p.189).  In addition, the Plan advances policies to deal with homelessness, 
including the policy to “support the provisions of shelters and other temporary housing 
facilities...” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, p.190).  The bulk of the rest of Part VI of the Plan is 
devoted to a discussion of the economic development strategic plan and how the land use plan 
will facilitate and expedite development projects by, for example, making the development 
approval process more user-friendly. 
 Despite explicitly advocated a balanced approach, closer inspection of the Plan and 
examination of interview transcripts and recent projects decisions, reveals that Sudbury has, 
similar to the cities discussed in Chapter 3, placed economic goals above aspirations of achieving 
a “healthy community.”  While the Plan itself contains many detailed policies with respect to 
land-use planning (which are required by Ontario’s Planning Act), the overall tone of the Plan is 
one of a marketing document intended to “sell” the city’s assets to prospective businesses who 
may be considering Sudbury as a place to locate.  In that way, the Plan – with the exception of 
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the detailed land-use policies – is focused “outward” towards attracting economic growth and 
population as opposed to being an inward-focused, balanced, and honest assessment of the city’s 
current conditions and the ways to improve quality of life for the citizens that already live there.
Those areas where, for instance, social issues are discussed are minimal compared to the 
discussion devoted to economic development.  This may be a result of the lack of a department 
within the city that deals with social planning.  As it currently stands, social planning is done by 
an arms-length organization – the Social Planning Council of Sudbury, who has stated in their 
Human Services Strategy that “...there needs to be intentional planning through a Human 
Services Strategy that is integrated with economic and environmental planning” (Social Planning 
Council of Sudbury, 2005, p.12) which could be achieved by creating, within the city, a “human 
services and policy development body [to] support  the activities of coordination, intersectoral 
action, service integration, and accountability” (Social Planning Council of Sudbury, 2005, 
p.22).  In fact, a 2008 poverty reduction study put forth by the Social Planning Council of 
Sudbury, that suggestion was repeated as a way of ensuring that social issues do not get sidelined 
within city policy: 
Giving this poverty reduction strategy the same priority and attention as economic and 
environmental strategies will allow for a sustained focus on employment and training, 
affordable housing, food security and transportation.  By creating a human services 
planning and policy development body the CGS [City of Greater Sudbury] Council will 
be investing in the type of social infrastructure that will allow this strategy and any other 
social strategy, committees, solution teams, roundtables and /or advisory panels to be part 
of a process that could inform the direction of social development in the CGS. (Social 
Planning Council of Sudbury, 2008, p.2). 
 
To date, no such body has been created. 
Instead, the focus on planning for population growth means that, like the cases of 
unbalanced regeneration attempts mentioned in Chapter 3, this means that economic priorities 
have taken precedence over physical, social, and environmental priorities.  Again, Sudbury’s 
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Official Plan reads much more like a document intended to sell the city to businesses (and hence, 
future residents) as opposed to one intended to improve the quality of life of current residents.   
The vision statements pay lip service to environmental and social concerns, but the only words 
highlighted in the vision is that Sudbury is “open to business” (City of Greater Sudbury, 2008, 
p.4, emphasis in original).  While the Human Services Strategy and the Earthcare Sudbury Plan 
are referred to in the Plan, the only supplemental strategy that is discussed at any length is the 
Coming of Age Economic development strategy.  Furthermore, when environmental or social 
issues are discussed, they tend to be addressed in the context of how either existing assets could 
be capitalized upon in order to attract foreign investment, or how conditions can be improved in 
order to attract foreign investment (although there are exceptions, as seen, for instance, in the 
housing policies mentioned above).  For example, it is stated in the Plan that the Plan “provides 
land use policies which protect our natural resources to support long-term economic growth, 
including mining, aggregate and agricultural lands” (p.7).  While, of course, there is nothing 
wrong with considering economic issues in an official plan, the problem with Sudbury’s Official 
Plan is that the attention paid to attracting new economic growth is not balanced with careful 
consideration of how that strategy may affect the physical, environmental, and social aspects of 
the city. 
Indeed, the focus on attracting foreign investment (and retaining foreign investment 
already located in Sudbury) at the expense of a consideration of social, environmental, and 
physical issues has also resulted in the city pursuing projects that may have detrimental effects 
on those areas.  For example, the Plan’s policy to “expedite the development process” seems to 
have resulted in a lack of consideration towards where new businesses are allowed to locate in 
the city.  As mentioned in Chapter 6, the proliferation of big box stores in recent years has had a 
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negative impact on downtown development and seems to work counter to the Official Plan’s 
stated objective of revitalizing the downtown.   
Photograph 8: Vacancy in downtown Sudbury (photograph by Laura Schatz) 
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Photograph 9: Big box stores in the suburbs (photograph by Laura Schatz) 
In fact, a new Wal Mart Superstore is currently being constructed on the outskirts of the city’s 
south end, which will likely draw even more customers away from any downtown retail. 
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Photograph 10: Walmart being constructed on the edge of the city (photograph by Laura Schatz) 
Although the city has considered the effects of these peripheral big box stores on the downtown, 
they have determined that the benefits outweigh the negative impacts: 
…we aggressively went after big box stores, for example.  There were opponents to that.  
There were people that – downtown merchants, for example, that were opposed to it -- 
people that just didn’t want to see us become a big box city, who wanted the mom and 
pop stores, the small businesses, that kind of thing. (Sudbury informant S13, a former 
high-ranking city official) 
 
As well, given that Sudbury’s population is likely to decline in the long-term, what this 
continued location of retail on the outskirts of the city will mean for the city’s ability to maintain 
such a dispersed infrastructure system in the future remains unaddressed in the Plan.  Indeed, the 
Mayor’s concern about the lack of funds to fix the city’s large network of crumbling 
infrastructure (discussed in Chapter 6) is unlikely to be ameliorated if retail in the city continues 
to spread out.  Concerns have also been raised that, in the short term, the development in the 
South End will negatively affect Sudbury’s quality of life: 
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Walmart’s coming in and you can barely turn left on Thursday at six o’clock without 
sitting through 4 lights.  I can’t wait to see what’s going to happen out there when all of 
that opens up… That entire corridor is going to be a mess.  Walmart, Smart Centres, 
another Home Depot…  There are hotels going up in the South End.  You’ve got to move 
people!  So, if we keep selling our great quality of life saying that you can avoid city 
traffic, we may be losing that.  (Sudbury informant S8) 
 
As well, the Plan’s promotion of a continued (and even increased) dependence on the 
mining industry, including the mining supply and services sector, will likely result in continued 
environmental damage and harm to the health of local residents.  Unfortunately, the Official Plan 
and even the Earthcare Sudbury plan, remain relatively silent about the continued negative 
impacts of the two dominant mining companies on the health of the environment and local 
residents.  In fact, in conducting interviews with local officials for this study, none of them were 
willing to be critical of the mining company’s environmental impacts.  As Sudbury informant S7, 
an Earthcare Sudbury employee, was quoted in Chapter 5: 
I think the mining companies work very hard at bringing their operation to a more 
environmentally conscious way… it’s constant work on their part to make sure that not 
only they act in regulatory boundaries but also in some instances moving beyond those 
into areas that aren’t regulated but they still want to do the right thing. 
 
When asked what major environmental challenges the city is currently facing, one local official 
did not mention the mining companies: 
I think the City is very conscious of its environment because it has to be.  I think that the 
re-greening efforts… because of Earthcare, you have Earth Day at the market.  That was 
a wild success.  People are trying to teach their children to be environmentally conscious.  
I think Sudbury should be proud of their efforts in that area. (Sudbury informant S8) 
 
This unwillingness to be critical of the mining companies, who historically have inflicted (and 
continue to inflict) environmental damage, only reinforces the conclusion that economic 
development, in both the Plan and in practice, remains the priority.    
 In addition, it is not clear how the city’s policy of selling the city in order to attract any 
and all types of businesses addresses any of the social issues currently faced by the city, 
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including increasing gap between rich and poor.  As discussed in Chapter 6, in recent years, the 
city has put considerable efforts into attracting call centres to the city.  Indeed, call centres have 
had some positive impacts on the community: for instance, the call centres which have located 
downtown have contributed to the adaptive reuse of buildings and their workers have contributed 
to the sustainability of businesses located in the downtown (Schatz & Johnson, 2009).  In 
addition, the industry contributes substantial money to the economy by providing entry-level and 
second-income jobs. It provided an impetus to develop telecommunications infrastructure so that 
high tech firms could come to Sudbury. However, most of the call centres provide low-paying, 
high-stress, insecure jobs that have not replaced the highly-paid union jobs that have been lost. 
Furthermore, the high tech firms that were supposed to follow the call centres to Sudbury have 
not yet materialised in the numbers expected. And call centres can come and go fairly easily, as 
is evident from the number of firms that have already departed (Schatz & Johnson, 2007).  Here 
again, economic priorities seem to have take precedence over social issues, such as the need to 
provide well-paying, quality work opportunities for Sudbury residents. 
The lack of balance in the city’s Official Plan and policies resulted in Sudbury, in a 
recent study by the Pembina Institute,58 ranking last out of 27 Ontario municipalities on the 
Institute’s “sustainability” index (Pembina Institue, 2007).  This index ranked the municipalities 
according to 33 indicators in three broad categories: smart growth, liveability, and economic 
vitality.  According to the Institute: 
Although various definitions of urban sustainability have been put forward, they all pivot 
on the idea of achieving growth and development in a way that balances environmental, 
social and economic concerns. Development is sustainable when it conserves resources, 
avoids damaging ecological processes, and contributes to social equity, quality of life and 
a vital, diverse economy. (Pembina Institute, 2007, p.5) 
 
58 The Pembina Institute is a Canadian not-for-profit think tank, established by a citizen group in 1985, whose 




Unfortunately, the findings of this study suggest that development has not been sustainable in 
Sudbury, despite the assertion in Sudbury’s Official Plan that it is a “healthy and sustainable” 
community.  This is not surprising, given the unbalanced approach taken in both the Plan and in 










As outlined in Chapter 3, according to shrinking cities researchers, in order to be 
effective, the role of planners must change in the context of population decline.  The basic 
conclusion is that in some respects planners need to play a qualitatively different role in 
shrinking cities than in growing cities (for instance, planners should actively manage the effects 
of population decline rather than plan for growth that is unlikely to happen); in other respects, 
the role of the planner is the same in any demographic context – growth or shrinkage – but the 
importance of that role must be emphasized in the context of population decline (for example, 
facilitating residents to undertake projects on their own becomes more important when a 
municipality is under fiscal strain).  In this section, I examine whether, as compared to growth-
oriented Sudbury, in developing their “right-sizing” land-use policies, planners in Youngstown 
have begun to take on new roles.  I find, that despite planners in Youngstown not completely 
abandoning the growth paradigm, in the area of land-use planning they have taken a significant 
step towards changing the role they play in the community.  Indeed, in developing the 
Youngstown 2010 Plan’s and Sudbury Official Plan’s land-use policies, the role of planners in 
Youngstown and Sudbury differed in several ways, providing support to the notion that when the 
“hold” of the growth paradigm is relaxed, the role of planners changes.  In short, Youngstown 
planners – at least those engaging in land-use planning – have begun to take on some of those 
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key roles outlined in the literature as being necessary in practicing “good planning” in shrinking 
cities, while the role of Sudbury planners remains more traditional.  The following section 








Instead of taking the traditional role of planning to direct where future development and 
growth will occur, planners in Youngstown have essentially become managers of the physical 
effects of population decline.  Through the Plan, they are directing where and how the physical 
structures of the city will be downsized.  Rather than increasing the amount of residential space, 
the Plan calls for a 30% decrease in residential land (City of Youngstown, 2005).  The Plan also 
calls for the demolition of vacant and derelict buildings.  As mentioned above, millions of dollars 
have been spent in recent years on demolition.  As Youngstown informant Y14 explains: 
There’s still very difficult questions that have to be answered about parts of the city that 
are just very marginally inhabited, sparsely inhabited.  What do we do?  We’re not going 
to force people to relocate or move but … we want to make sure that we don’t encourage 
investment in areas of the city that won’t be sustainable.  And if we find an area of the 
city that becomes almost non-inhabited, can we somehow structure it so we aren’t 
allocating resources there when there’s really no citizens there that would need those 
resources and redirect some of those things. 
 
Currently, Youngstown planners are working with local residents to develop neighbourhood 
plans based on the “smart shrinkage” principles contained in the Youngstown 2010 Plan (see 
discussion below regarding Idora Park Neighbourhood Plan).   
 In comparison, planners in Sudbury have not taken on the role as “managers” of the 
decline process, which is not surprising given the growth-oriented nature of the policies 
contained in Sudbury’s Official Plan.  Sudbury planners have very much retained the traditional 
planning role of directing where future growth will be located in the community.  As discussed 
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above, population decline was not seriously considered as a possible scenario in the city’s 
demographic future and there was no discussion of how the physical effects of population 
decline might be handled should population decline occur.  Planners instead based the Official 
Plan’s policies on an assumption of future population increases.  As also mentioned above, when 
asked if strategies for population decline were considered during the planning process, 
informants indicated that they chose to base the Plan on the growth scenario, prompting higher-
level officials to express concern that the Plan’s higher growth estimates were “not based on 
standard growth projections methodology” and that too much land was being set aside for urban 
land uses (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, letter, March 21, 2006).  The lack of 
willingness to seriously consider future population decline as a possibility and how this decline 
might be managed means that Sudbury planners will be unprepared for future population decline 




From the beginning of the Youngstown 2010 process, planners believed that traditional 
planning processes and policies would not work given the demographic context and widespread 
disillusionment and apathy amongst the population.  There was a sense that something 
“different” was needed and that residents would not be receptive to hearing more false promises.   
Although the planners emphasized in interviews that the idea of admitting Youngstown is a 
smaller city essentially came from the people, they took those ideas and translated them into 
decline-oriented land-use policies – policies which are innovative in the North American context 
and essentially without precedent.  As Youngstown informant Y13, a university-based urban 
designer who has consulted in Youngstown explains, “to Youngstown’s credit, they did take a 
risk in adopting this plan and they don’t know how it’s going to come out...” Importantly, other 
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cities in similar demographic situations are beginning to take notice.  Since the Youngstown 
2010 Plan was published, other cities have shown interest in the innovative aspects of the 2010 
Plan, meaning that Youngstown planner’s innovative approach to planning may soon diffuse to 
other shrinking cities, further strengthening the assertion that Youngstown planners have been 
“innovators:” 
...other cities are finally starting to accept the notion that cities do shrink and embracing 
that, acknowledging that is something productive.  And I think that’s been evidenced by 
the amount of attention that’s been shown from both nationally and internationally to the 
Youngstown 2010 Plan.  I mean, I’ve been across the country and I’ve been in Europe 
talking about this Plan. (Youngstown informant Y14) 
 
Youngstown informant Y8, a city planner, explains that the City has hosted delegates from such 
cities as Flint Michigan, Dayton Ohio, and Fort Wayne Indiana.  At the time of the interview, a 
delegation of professors from six shrinking cities in Japan was planning to visit Youngstown to 
learn about the Youngstown 2010 approach.  Youngstown has also fielded inquiries from 
shrinking cities in Europe.  As Youngstown informant Y14 explains: 
Not necessarily all of [the cities inquiring] are ready to acknowledge and hit on the 
shrinking city concept and that’s ok, but they’re certainly asking questions on what we’re 
doing, how we’re going about doing it and this is still a very much process that is 
evolving, that’s in the making.  We’re not telling them we have necessarily figured out all 
the answers.  But, cities certainly have been inquiring significantly about how we went 
about it and what we’re doing and what the plans are. 
 
In addition to the Youngstown planners being innovators in developing the land-use planning 
policies contained in the 2010 Plan, Urban Strategies’ planners were also innovative in coming 
up with the process of developing the Vision.  As noted above, in order to combat the general 
feeling of apathy towards any planning process amongst Youngstown residents, the firm first 
conducted focus groups with community leaders and then went to the larger public, rather than 
simply conducting large scale public meetings. Also in terms of process, Youngstown planners 
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engaged in an innovative marketing process, which served to ignite interest in the general 
population.  Explains Youngstown informant Y8, a city planner: 
Our approach … what made it successful, again not so much for decline but it has to do 
with maybe apathy and obviously if you’re talking about decline, there’s usually some 
apathy thrown in there, is what that public participation that public outreach is the 
marketing effort.  We engaged our public broadcasting station to run, to rebroadcast 
meetings.  We’d highly publicize them through our marketing channels – full page ad in 
our newspaper or our network with our existing neighbourhood groups, things like that.  
We marketed truly like a company markets its own products.  But then also the really 
unique partnership with PBS and even the public radio station would rebroadcast stuff so 
I think that all goes hand in hand with if you’re going to talk about decline or just 
planning in general, but even decline because people’s attitudes can be really down.  
 
The result of the efforts of planners to reach out to the public using focus groups of community 
leaders prior to large-scale public meetings and to use the local media to help “brand” the 
Youngstown 2010 planning efforts resulted in the large amount of participation, outlined above, 
in the planning process.  Recognition in the form of the American Planning Association’s 2007 
National Planning Excellence Award for Public Outreach and mention in academic works such 
as Barbara Faga’s 2006 book Designing Public Consensus has meant that Youngstown’s 
planning process is starting to be held out as a model for engaging the local community. 
 Certainly, in adopting a traditional growth-oriented planning approach, Sudbury’s land 
use planners have not taken on the role, as Youngstown planners did, of innovators either in 
policy or process.  It must be mentioned that there are likely several factors contributing to the 
lack of shift in this respect, including less pressing physical decline and the recent slight gain in 
population.  Also, unlike in Ohio where municipalities have a large degree of control over 
municipal planning, in Ontario, legislative constraints are placed on the content of planning 
policies by the Ontario government through the Ontario Planning Act and other provincial 
documents such as the Places to Grow Act (which contains provincial policies on how growth 
should occur in each Ontario municipality) and the Provincial Policy Statement (which contains 
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provincial policies relating to planning, such as the protection of prime agricultural land and the 
encouragement of residential intensification).  Planners in Ontario may thus be less likely to 
“chart their own path” than to ensure they follow the path laid out for them by the Province – a 
path which, incidentally, does not lead in the direction of effective planning for long-term 
population decline.  Finally, as discussed above, interviews with Sudbury officials reveal a 
general unwillingness amongst policy-makers (although this is by no means universal) to 
consider the possibility of future population decline; this may have served to limit the perceived 
options available to planners when crafting the Official Plan policies.  All of these factors have 
likely contributed to Sudbury’s planners taking a more traditional path rather than taking on the 










As stated in the Youngstown 2010 Plan, with only two planners and a limited amount of 
funds, the city does not have the resources to implement the Plan on its own: 
The City cannot afford single handedly to do all that this plan calls for on its own.  This 
will take collaborative effort between the City, citizens, private sector developers and 
businesses, Youngstown State University, Youngstown Board of Education, community 
development corporations, other government agencies, religious entities, etc. (City of 
Youngstown, 2005, p.127) 
 
The Plan goes on to outline which types of projects could be undertaken by city officials and 
residents city-wide and in each planning district which would “have an immediate impact on the 
City...” (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.127).   For example, to make the North Side “better 
planned and organized,” residents are encouraged to form an organization to develop various 
neighbourhood plans (City of Youngstown, 2005, p.129).  Planners in Youngstown have, in large 
measure, become facilitators of local resident action, mainly out of necessity: 
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Our planning department is woefully understaffed as we go out and do the 
neighbourhood-level planning.  Our economic development department is understaffed.  
Now, the people who we have there are phenomenal and proficient at what they do.  In 
fact, as far as I’m concerned, they’re all geniuses, but the resources just aren’t there and 
that’s where the collaboration becomes much more important.  But, yeah, the community 
has a lot of involvement and there’s reliance on the community. (Youngstown informant 
Y14) 
 
Planners are essentially depending on local residents, the private sector, and other groups to 
implement the Plan because they cannot do it on their own.  In fact, as a result of the process of 
public participation and education described above, residents have been inspired to take action 
on their own.  For example, as Youngstown informant Y13 explains: 
...the other sort of strength of Youngstown is not only that people have bought into it but 
people of the city are beginning to implement it.  I was talking to somebody a couple of 
weeks ago who said, you know, the city has been a little bit slow to actually do anything 
on the ground.  But one of the churches has begun acquiring vacant properties, and there 
are lots of them in the area around it, and they’ve planted corn and they had this big event 
this summer where you could come out and eat corn.  I know it might sound silly, but I 
really think that corn-eating may save Youngstown in the end.  There’s a day-care centre 
in Youngstown that’s adopting a similar strategy.  
 
Furthermore, as Youngstown informant Y13 states, this has resulted in a level of uncertainty as 
to what the final results of the Plan will “look” like: 
...the city just doesn’t just have the resources in terms of planning staff or in dollars to be 
able to implement any sort of large scale vision so this sort of piecemeal vision that takes 
place one parcel at a time may kind of end that way.  It’s kind of a question mark as to 
what the end is.  But to me, the most interesting questions are the ones you don’t have the 
answers to!  What Youngstown turns into… and the planning process may be about 
enabling rather than about actually doing and if the city is able to do that… if the city is 
able to relax some of its ordinances enough to enable individual actions to take hold then 
I think something really good can happen.  It’s all kind of unknown at this point. 
 
Indeed, a number of citizen groups have been formed to undertake projects designed to 
implement principles of the Youngstown 2010 Plan.  For instance, in the South Side District, 15 
citizen groups are listed on the Youngstown 2010 website as being involved in some respect in 
implementing the Youngstown 2010 Plan.  One group in particular – the  Idora Neighbourhood 
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Association (INA) – has set up a website (http://idoraneighborhoodassociation.weebly.com)
wherein the stated mission of the INA is “...to revitalize the neighborhood and carry out the 
strategies laid forth in the neighborhood plan. The INA has developed as a grassroots 
organization with leadership from within the neighborhood.”  Together with residents of the 
Idora Neighbourhood and GIS experts from Youngstown State University, Karen Perkins (a 
zoning officer with the City of Youngstown) and Ian Beniston (of Ohio State University) co-
managed the project of creating a neighbourhood plan for the Idora Neighbourhood.  In March, 
2008, the Plan was recognized through a City Council resolution as accurately reflecting the 
Youngstown 2010 Plan and as being the “guiding document for the future development of the 
neighborhood” (City of Youngstown Planning Department and The Ohio State University, 2008, 
p,3).  Among other purposes, the Plan is aimed at dealing with the 30.5 percent of land parcels 
within the neighbourhood that remain vacant.  Plans are put forth to convert vacant land into 
community gardens, parks, or sideyards.  Residents are encouraged to “embrace their vacant 
spaces” as an opportunity to create these types of greenspace (City of Youngstown Planning 
Department and The Ohio State University, 2008, p.44).  The Plan sets forth a number of other 
strategies, many of which (like finding creative ways to use vacant lands and creating 
neighborhood watch associations) are to be undertaken by the residents and other members of the 
Idora Neighborhood.  City of Youngstown planners are largely facilitators in the implementation 
of the Plan: 
It was very successful.  What it did was it got the residents of that neighbourhood 
involved in the Plan.  We held meetings for them to come and give their input, things that 
they wanted to change and things they wanted done in their neighbourhood because they 
lived there so they’re affected by everything that goes on in that neighbourhood.  And it 
was a huge success because they’re now taking over their own neighbourhood.  They 
don’t wait for the city to come in and suggest that you need to do this or that.  They may 
call the city and say “we need this done and that done.”  So, it was a huge success … 
(Youngstown informant Y12) 
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According to a recent article in Youngstown’s online version its newspaper, The Vindicator, the 
Plan is beginning to have effect: 
Little by little, the redevelopment is starting to work. Residents have joined to form the 
Idora Neighborhood Association, which has grown to more than 240 members. The INA 
works with the city and MVOC [Mahoning Valley Organizing Collaborative], and 
decaying houses are coming down. Residents are maintaining vacant properties and 
refurbishing rusted posts and fire hydrants. They are establishing youth groups. The Idora 
Wildcats 4-H youth program participated for the first time this year at the Canfield Fair 
and received an award for its display. Block parties are bringing neighbors closer. 
(Keling & Denen, 2009) 
 
The revitalization of Wick Park (a central park in the Wick Neighbourhood) is another example 
of planners in Youngstown facilitating residents and other organizations to take on 
implementation of the principles of the Youngstown 2010 Plan.  The Wick Park Revitalization 
Project (www.wickparkproject.info/) has been undertaken by a group of community 
organizations, led by two such organizations: Defend Youngstown and Youngstown CityScape.  
The group has enlisted the services of urban designer Terry Schwarz, from The Urban Design 
Center of Northeast Ohio, an outreach department of Kent State University that assists 
communities by providing technical assistance and urban design services for local design 
initiatives.   
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Photograph 11: Wick Park public meeting (photograph by Laura Schatz) 
While Youngstown planner Anthony Kobak attended the community meetings as a participant, 
this project was undertaken by the residents themselves, with planners playing only a facilitative 
role.  Youngstown informant Y8, a city planner, explains that while he was asked to be on the 
steering committee for this project “…with being so busy, I just said no, you guys look like 
you’re going in the right direction.  I offered comments and I just kind of watch how things are 
going and offer advice that way.”  These and other projects are being undertaken by local 
residents and organizations under the Youngstown 2010 banner, with the city planners acting as 
facilitators.  It should be mentioned, however, that Youngstown planners see themselves as 
facilitating local residents’ actions, they are not always comfortable with completely removing 
themselves from the process: 
I always get nervous if [residents] want to do it themselves.  Like one neighbourhood in 
particular, there’s a guy who said yeah, OK, we’re supposed to do a neighbourhood plan, 
OK, I’ll do it.  And I’m just like… you don’t just kind of do it.  I mean, what’s your 
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background?  If you’re going to do it, are you going to get money and then pay a 
consulting firm to assist with this? I talked to him and I extended our help, but I haven’t 
heard much from him.  I think he’s actually not going forward with it. (Youngstown 
informant Y8) 
 
The role of “planner as facilitator” does not exist to any significant extent in Sudbury in 
the area of land-use planning.  Planners did not indicate that any part of their role was to 
facilitate citizens to undertake implementing the Official Plan on their own.  There was more of a 
sense that the Official Plan represented the “rules of the game,” which the residents are expected 
to follow.  The only area in which Sudbury planners were seemingly taking on the role of 
facilitator to any extent was in the area in economic development, primarily due to the fact that 
the city has little control over economic development and therefore economic development 
planners must rely on the community, particularly the private sector, to implement their overall 
vision.  When asked what parts of the economic strategic plan have been implemented, according 
to Sudbury informant S8, an employee with the City’s business development organization: 
The limits the province places on local action are constraining… Implementation would 
be a stretch-word [in terms of the economic development strategy]… For instance, we 
said we wanted to build a city for the creative, curious, and adventuresome and since then 
the community has kind of come together and formed groups, for example, the 
community group that’s advancing the School of Architecture…  So, we don’t 
implement.  The community goes after projects that advance the economic strategic plan.  
Sometimes we facilitate.  Sometimes we don’t.  Sometimes it’s not required. 
 
There was no sense that economic development planners in Sudbury were acting in any way 
different than economic development planners in other Ontario cities, who face the same limits 







In developing the Youngstown 2010 Plan, Youngstown undertook a massive effort to 
include the public in the planning process, soliciting their views and including a consensus of 
these views in the final planning document.  As discussed in more detail above, initial workshops 
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involved over 200 community leaders, including representatives from neighbourhood groups, 
local government, business, and trade unions.  The city also conducted smaller individual 
meetings with churches, neighbourhood groups, and business people.  As Youngstown informant 
Y8, a city planner, explains: “…we wanted to engage the community.  We wanted to educate 
people about the importance of planning.”  As noted, planners made extensive use of the media 
(television, print, and radio) to link the public to the visioning process and “…the media really 
got on board…” (Youngstown informant Y14).  In creating a brand that residents identified with, 
planners generated excitement within the local community so that they could get as many people 
involved as possible in order to reach a consensus as to how the city should plan for the future.  
Again, when the Vision was unveiled at a public meeting in 2002, 1400 people attended.  After 
the Vision was adopted by City Council, the city undertook a series of neighbourhood meetings 
in order to obtain input on how to develop the comprehensive plan.  Over 800 people 
participated in these meetings and 1300 people attending the unveiling of the comprehensive 
plan in 2005. As a result of the City’s efforts at public inclusion, over 5000 people directly 
participated in the developing the Vision and the comprehensive plan.  Thus, planners made a 
concerted effort to gain meaningful grassroots participation and to build a consensus among 
residents.  As one Youngstown resident who participated in the process succinctly explains, “the 
city did a real good job of getting the public involved!” (Youngstown informant Y3). 
 In comparison, planners in Sudbury did consult, but on a much lesser scale than the 
consultation that was undertaken in Youngstown.  When drafting a new Official Plan, or revising 
an existing plan, planners in Ontario are required by the Planning Act to hold one public 
meeting.  According to informants, Sudbury’s planning department went over and above the 
requirements contained in the Planning Act, conducting a number (about 16) of “open houses” in 
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communities throughout the city.  During these open houses, planners did a presentation about 
the Plan, followed by questions and answers.  Some of the open houses were well attended while 
others were not.  One informant explained that attendance varied according to the location, the 
subject of the open houses, and the weather (many were conducted during the winter).  As 
mentioned above, informants could not provide an exact number of how many people 
participating in the planning process: “how many people did we touch?  I don’t know” (Sudbury 
informant S12).  Sudbury informant S1 estimates that around 200 to 300 people participated in 
open houses.  However, it is clear that the same effort was not put in to advertising the open 
houses or to getting the public interested in the planning process as was done in Youngstown.  
According to one city planner (Sudbury informant S12), although planners tried at the public 
meetings to educate the public, most attendees attended out of “self-interest;” that is, out of 
concern as to how the policies affected their specific parcel of land.  The public generally did not 
raise concerns about the broad principles underlying the Plan or the content of the policies 
themselves.  As mentioned above, as Sudbury informant S12 puts it, “…no one ever asked me 
about the vision.”  In the end, planners in Sudbury, with the help of external planning 
consultants, were much more like “experts” who developed the Plan, including the Vision upon 
which the Plan was based, with later feedback from residents.  This is very different than in 
Youngstown, where planners saw themselves as facilitating a consensus amongst the population 





Although Youngstown planners spent considerable effort finding out the views of the 
public and encouraging them to take action on their own, I found no direct evidence of planners 
acting as a ghostwriter or advocate.  However, it is worthwhile mentioning at this point that 
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perhaps this role will begin to become more important in Youngstown as citizens undertake more 
and more projects on their own and planners begin to see positive outcomes from these projects.  
Not surprisingly, I found no evidence of planners in Sudbury acting as ghostwriters or advocates. 
 Thus, in several ways, the role of the planner in Youngstown indeed reflects the 
suggestions in the literature of how planning in shrinking cities should take place in order to be 
effective.  Again, it could be said that some of these – for instance, planner as consensus-builder 
and planner as facilitator – should be present in the planning process of any city, growing or 
declining, but what was important in Youngstown was the degree to which these were necessary 
in order to develop land-use policies aimed at managing the city’s physical decline.  As the city 
undertakes the massive task of implementing the Plan (and overseeing the creation of 130 
neighbourhood plans), it is likely that the role of the planner in Youngstown will need to evolve 
further towards facilitating residents’ actions and the role of  advocating for actions already 
being undertaken may soon appear.  As mentioned above, Youngstown informant Y13 believes 
that, in the end “…the planning process may become about enabling rather than about actually 
doing...”  In comparison, several of the key roles suggested in the literature for good planning in 
shrinking cities found in Youngstown are not present in Sudbury, suggesting that the role of 
planners in cities that have begun to shift away from the growth paradigm is indeed different.   
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The literature suggests that planning needs to change in many respects in shrinking cities; 
to that end, “good planning” in shrinking cities must incorporate all of the following principles: 
 Planners must leave behind the assumption of future growth;




 Planners must adopt a balanced approach to addressing the physical, economic, 
environmental and social needs of the community; and 
 Planners must change the role they play in the community. 
Rather than focusing on achieving and distributing future growth (which is unlikely to happen to 
any significant degree), planners need to focus on improving the quality of life of the people who 
remain, developing policies, through extensive citizen participation, that are balanced and 
strategic.  In doing so, planners must be willing to take on new roles in the community, 
particularly the role of manager of the decline process.  Youngstown, Ohio and Sudbury, Ontario 
are illuminating case studies of how planning differs (in some respects) in shrinking cities that 
have begun to adopt some of these principles versus those that have not.  
 With respect to the first principle of “good planning” in shrinking cities, the shift away 
from growth-oriented planning has begun in Youngstown.   A major focus of the Youngstown 
2010 Plan is the downsizing of infrastructure in order to make the city “fit” its current population 
levels.  A number of factors contributed to Youngstown taking the first steps towards breaking 
away from the growth paradigm, including: a new generation of political leaders and policy-
makers; extensive public participation by residents who were tired of unfulfilled promises of 
growth; a plan so old that it was generally seen as time for a whole new approach; the 
involvement of key people, such as Hunter Morrison and other members of Youngstown State 
University, who had experience working in shrinking cities; and a pressing need to deal with the 
ever-worsening negative effects of extensive physical decline.  All of these factors contributed to 
Youngstown admitting it is a “shrunken,” but not “shrinking” city.  This is an important 
distinction: there has not been a complete shift away from the focus on growth in Youngstown.  
Ultimately, there is hope amongst local officials that the city will start growing again; indeed, the 
focus of the Plan thus seems to be to “shrink” the city and make it more attractive so that it will 
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grow again (although not to former population levels) in the future.  Even this small step away 
from the emphasis on growth, however, is a monumental one in North American planning 
culture. 
 In contrast, Sudbury’s Official Plan remains heavily influenced by the growth-oriented 
approach, despite the likely long-term decline in population.  Overall, planners and policy-
makers appear to be unwilling to first, be candid about the prospects for future population growth 
and second, have possible policy responses “at the ready” for managing the likely population 
decline.  Sudbury’s Official Plan seems to be a reflection of the “competition between cities” 
mentality and the “growth is the only option” approach.  Interestingly, this was not always the 
case, as can be seen in the more pragmatic approach taken to population decline in Sudbury’s 
previous plan.  This provides hope that Sudbury planners may, in the future, be once again 
willing to shift away from the planning for growth mentality.  In the meantime, the growth 
paradigm dominates in Sudbury.  Interviews indicate that this dominance is influenced by a 
number of factors, including: the recent slight gain in population; the fact that, unlike in 
Youngstown where steel is no longer the dominant industry, mining still dominates Sudbury’s 
economy and thus downturns (which may lead to an outmigration of population) are expected to 
be only temporary; and the fact that the city had not hit “rock bottom” and was not in search of 
an entirely new approach to planning.  In fact, the motivation for revising the Official Plan was 
primarily practical: that is, the desire to have uniform Official Plan policies for the newly 
amalgamated City of Greater Sudbury.  All of these factors contributed to a lack of paradigm 
shift away from growth-oriented planning in Sudbury.   
With respect to planning processes, the Youngstown 2010 Plan was indeed crafted using 
many of the principles of strategic planning seen by shrinking cities researchers as so vital to 
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good planning in cities experiencing population loss.  Most importantly, the Vision and the Plan 
which was based upon the Vision involved extensive citizen participation.  The planning process 
was inclusive: extensive efforts were made to get the public involved, including strategic use of 
the media and use of “outsider” firm that employed innovative methods of encouraging public 
involvement that had not previously been tried.  Also importantly, the process involved an honest 
self-reflection on the city’s demographic context.  Residents were ready to talk about what could 
realistically be done given current circumstances and trends and planners were ready to listen 
and to translate their suggestions into the Youngstown 2010 Plan.  However, contrary to strategic 
planning principles, the Vision is not as comprehensive as it could have been, being largely 
dominated by physical regeneration issues.  As well, the Plan may not be as flexible as it could 
have been, being that it will be updated only once every 10 years.  Finally, the Plan does not 
integrate parties on a regional level and is very Youngstown-focused.   
In comparison, while Sudbury’s Official Plan contains much strategic planning “speak” – 
for instance, speaking of a “vision” and “strategy” – the Plan itself is a comprehensive plan as 
required by the Ontario Planning Act (a requirement over which, of course, planners in Sudbury 
had no control).  The strategies are also not context-specific, as required by strategic planning 
principles; they are based on selling the city, not on a realistic assessment of demographic, 
economic, physical, social and environmental circumstances.  Planners did not consider the 
potential ramifications of future population decline, nor did they pay attention to the impact of 
the dominant mining companies (other than their positive impacts) on the city.  In terms of 
process, planners did go over and above the requirements of the Planning Act to solicit public 
involvement.  However, the public was not involved in writing the “vision” and in the many 
Official Plan open houses conducted in Sudbury, the vision was not of particular interest to those 
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who attended (most of whom attended out of self-interest; that is, to determine how policies 
would affect their particular parcel of land).  Interviews failed to reveal the same desire on the 
part of Sudbury planners to get the public excited about the process that was evident with 
Youngstown planners.  Perhaps this could be attributed to the fact that Sudbury planners were 
not attempting to do anything “new” with their Official Plan.  In particular, they were not trying 
to create an entirely new vision for the city. 
In terms of whether each planning exercise created a balanced approach, interviews and 
document review indicate that both Youngstown’s and Sudbury’s plans do not  meet the 
“balanced” requirement for good planning in shrinking cities.  With respect to the Youngstown 
2010 Plan, there is an emphasis on physical regeneration (likely because of the visibility of 
physical decline and the belief that “fixing” physical issues will alleviate other concerns).  A lack 
of attention is paid to both environmental (where it is not related to physical, economic, or social 
goals) and social issues (at least, the social impacts of the Plan).  There is also a lack of a 
coherent approach to economic regeneration, which not all local officials “buying in” to the 
approach as outlined in the Youngstown 2010 Plan. 
Sudbury’s Official Plan is similarly unbalanced, but it is unbalanced in favour of 
economic concerns.  The wholesale adoption of the notion that the city needs to “sell” itself to 
outsiders in order to grow (because growth is the only option), has resulted in a Plan that is 
skewed towards economic concerns and toward making the city attractive to outsiders.  The 
focus on economic concerns has led to a lack of willingness to critically examine the two 
dominant mining companies’ continued environmental and health impacts and to question why 
the mining companies, with all their wealth, do not make a greater financial contribution to the 
quality of life of the local community.  The lack of integrated human services planning and 
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policy development body with the municipal structure means that the Official Plan’s Human 
Services Strategy remains more of an “arm’s length” document than one that is truly integrated 
into all other aspects of planning. 
Finally, there are indications that the role of the planner is starting to shift in 
Youngstown, where planners have taken steps away from (without leaving it behind completely) 
the growth paradigm.  This shift has not happened in Sudbury, where the growth paradigm 
remains firmly entrenched.  Youngstown planners, at least in the area of land use planning, are 
beginning to act as “managers of the decline process,” determining how the physical structure of 
the city can be “downsized” to fit current population levels.  Sudbury planners continue to direct 
future growth.  Youngstown planners (and planners from the Toronto consulting firm, Urban 
Strategies) have acted as innovators both in process (using innovative techniques to get people 
involved) and in policy (developing methods to downsize certain neighbourhoods).  Youngstown 
planners, in comparison with Sudbury planners, also played much more of the role of 
“facilitator” both in finding a consensus upon which the Plan could be built and in facilitating 
residents in their implementation of the 2010 Plan.  On the other hand, planners in Sudbury have 
acted very much as experts, writing the vision upon which the Plan is based themselves and 
taking the finished product to the public for comment.  There is no sense in Sudbury (whose 
planning department is much larger than that of Youngstown’s) that planners are relying on the 
public to implement the Official Plan. 
Thus, this evaluation of whether Youngstown and Sudbury have incorporated the 
principles of “good planning” for shrinking cities has produced mixed results.  What is clear is 
that Youngstown (which has admitted shrinkage, although has not resigned itself to shrinking)
has begun to base its planning on more of these principles than growth-oriented Sudbury.  In the 
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final chapter, I comment on the lessons they case studies may provide for planners and policy-












In the context of a growing number of shrinking cities, the lack of attention paid to 
finding effective planning approaches in the context of population decline will have serious 
repercussions for those cities disadvantaged by processes of economic restructuring and 
demographic change.  There is general agreement in the shrinking cities literature that it is not 
simply the case that growth-oriented planning strategies can be super-imposed onto shrinking 
cities.  Planners in shrinking cities need strategies geared towards the many unique challenges 
that arise when population declines. Continuing to focus the academic telescope on growing 
cities does a significant disservice to the increasing number of planners who are finding 
themselves faced with the reality of population loss and its accompanying challenges and 
opportunities.  Luckily, there is a small but growing body of shrinking cities literature that is 
beginning to address how municipal officials in shrinking cities can tackle those challenges and 
capitalize upon the opportunities.  My intention is that my research will contribute to this 
growing body of literature.  In the remainder of this chapter, I revisit my central research 
question, relate my findings to the literature, and discuss implications for planning practitioners, 






As stated in Chapter 1, the vulnerability of cities to outside economic and demographic 
forces has led to two opposing, but related views: the first is that there is nothing planners can do 
in this context and the second is that planners should focus on “growing” their cities to previous 
population levels.  Both approaches assume that growth is the only positive development in the 
life of a city and that municipal officials are powerless to “shape” global forces to suit the needs 
of the residents who remain in these shrinking cities.  There are indeed examples of cities 
pursuing both approaches, particularly, as was seen in Chapter 3, the “going for growth” 
approach. Unfortunately, the former leaves pressing problems (such as infrastructure 
overcapacity) unaddressed while the latter wastes ever dwindling municipal resources.  
As was also seen in Chapter 3, shrinking cities researchers have pointed out that there is a 
different way of planning in shrinking cities, one that is based on the premise that planners can 
indeed effect positive change in the cities in which they plan.  Together with echoes found in the 
urban regeneration and strategic planning literature, this approach prompts planners in shrinking 
cities neither to focus on planning for growth nor to ignore decline but to focus on planning to 
meet the needs of the population that remains. In focusing on the needs of remaining residents, 
planners can shape the effects of global forces beyond their control in a proactive, effective, and 
realistic way.  Importantly, in order to do so, planners need to change the way they plan in 
shrinking cities by following certain principles of “good planning” in shrinking cities, including: 
 Planners must leave behind the assumption of future growth;
 Planners must use processes that are strategic, with an emphasis on citizen 
participation;
 Planners must adopt a balanced approach in addressing the physical, economic, 
environmental and social needs of the community; and 
 Planners must change the role they play in the community. 
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In exploring the recent, ostensibly polar, planning approaches taken by two shrinking cities – 
Youngstown and Sudbury – I have attempted to address my over-arching research question; that 
is: shrinking cities researchers tell us that the adoption of certain principles of “good planning” is 
necessary in shrinking cities, but what do the principles of good planning in shrinking cities look 
like in practice and what might make their adoption more or less likely?  More specifically, in 
this thesis I am asked the following sub-questions: 
 What approach have Youngstown, Ohio and Sudbury, Ontario taken in their recently-adopted 
Official/Comprehensive Plans? 
 Does this approach incorporate each principle of good planning in shrinking cities? 
 If yes, what motivated the break from tradition?  If no, what mitigated against a break from 
tradition? 
The point of comparing these two approaches was to uncover whether each principle of good 
planning in shrinking cities has been incorporated and to illuminate what factors either facilitated 
or impeded adoption of each principle.  To date, this aspect of planning in shrinking cities has 





In Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, I outlined the shrinking cities literature 
(augmented by the urban regeneration and strategic planning literature) as it relates to the causes 
and effects of population decline and the four principles of “good planning” in shrinking cities.  
While the goal of this thesis was not to provide a detailed account of the reasons for population 
decline in Youngstown and Sudbury nor was the goal to provide a complete picture of the effects 
of population decline, both case studies tend to confirm the assertion in the literature that the 
causes of population decline are many, varied, and inter-related.  In both Sudbury and 
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Youngstown, the trend towards long-term population decline (with a recent, but likely temporary 
slight increase in Sudbury’s population) has been the result of a number of demographic and 
economic factors.   Furthermore, the effects of shrinkage are equally varied, lending support to 
the conclusion in the literature that not all cities shrink in the same way. 
 Because of the diverse causes and effects of shrinkage, it would be a mistake to conclude 
that there are substantive policies that will work in all shrinking cities, including Youngstown 
and Sudbury.  In other words, as per the shrinking cities literature, given the complexity of urban 
shrinkage, there likely are no “one-size-fits-all” policies that can be translated to any 
demographic, economic, and political context.  However, there are certain principles of good 
planning process in shrinking cities which, according to the literature, can provide planners in 
shrinking cities with an opportunity to make a positive difference in these communities.  As I 
noted in Chapter 3, I am inferring from the literature and from logic that these principles of good 
planning will be more effective than previous approaches in shrinking cities.  Again, this is an 
untested assumption.   As was seen in Chapters 5 and 7, Youngstown has begun to adopt some of 
these principles while, as outlined in Chapters 6 and 7, Sudbury, Ontario has not.  These case 
studies provide a picture as to what factors make it easier or harder for shrinking cities to adopt 
these principles.  My key conclusions as to how these case studies “flesh out” these principles of 







 Through the Youngstown 2010 Plan, Youngstown officials have begun to move away from 
planning for growth as a dominant approach.  In comparison, Sudbury’s recently adopted 
Official Plan is more focused on planning for growth than its previous Official Plan. 
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 In the case of Youngstown, the 2010 Plan calls for accepting Youngstown is a smaller city.  
Media hype aside, the Plan does not represent a complete break from the growth paradigm.  
Municipal officials, including planners, continue to hope that the city will grow sometime in 
the future.  For now, municipal officials are concentrating on “shrinking” the city’s 
infrastructure to meet current population levels.  The belief is that this will improve the 
quality of life for existing residents and also make the city more attractive to potential 
residents.   
 However, so publicly accepting that a city’s infrastructure needs to be reduced in order to 
meet current population levels is one step away from the growth planning paradigm – a step 
that is unprecedented in the North American context.  A number of factors contributed to 
this, including: the removal of the “old guard,” including key actors in the business 
community (including the steel industry) and local politicians; the recognition that the city 
had “bottomed out” and needed a new approach; the fortuitous coming together of young 
leaders who were open to doing something different and experts with experience planning in 
shrinking cities; and the receptivity of local residents to an approach which was not based on 
false promises of future growth. 
 In the case of Sudbury, the recently-adopted Official Plan is based on the assumption that the 
city will continue to grow in the future.  The Plan discusses how this future population 
growth will be accommodated within the City’s existing infrastructure.  While population 
decline scenarios are briefly mentioned in the background studies for the Plan, they were 
quickly dismissed and thus the possibility of future population loss was not considered at a 
policy level.  In all, the Official Plan is very outward-focused and in many respects reads as a 
marketing tool designed to “sell” the city to outsiders. 
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 Interestingly, the former City of Sudbury’s Secondary Plan (which has been replaced by the 
new Official Plan), was focused on a “no growth or decline” scenario, suggesting that in 
recent years the City of Greater Sudbury has shifted more towards planning for growth rather 
than away from it. 
 A number of factors have contributed to the renewed focus on planning for future population 
growth in the City of Greater Sudbury.  These factors include: less pressing physical decline 
in Sudbury than that which existed in Youngstown when the 2010 Plan was created; less of a 
sense of urgency that the Sudbury had hit “rock bottom” and needed to do something 
different than what other cities were doing (Sudbury’s new Official Plan was created largely 
for practical reasons, making it a much less “emotional” process than the one undertaken in 
Youngstown); a general sense amongst policy-makers that the city’s future is determined by 
the fortunes of the dominant mining companies, rather than the actions of planners; and a 
focus on “competing” with other cities for population and economic growth (a notion with 
which admitting population decline seems fundamentally incompatible). 
 In general, the case studies lend support to the literature in stating that even though planners 
in shrinking cities need to leave behind any assumption of future growth, it will be very 
difficult for any city, particularly in North America, to shift the focus completely away from 
population growth.  Even in Youngstown, the factors that created an atmosphere conducive 
to a shift away from the growth paradigm were only enough to prompt a small step and not a 
clean break.  In fact, the general sense from document review, direct observation, and 
interviews is that Youngstown chose this new approach not because it was the desirable thing 
to do, but because it had no choice.  In that way, leaving behind the assumption of future 
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growth (even if only to a certain extent), was still done with a sigh of resignation and a 
lingering hope that the situation would someday change. 
+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 Youngstown incorporated more of the elements of strategic planning put forth in the 
literature as necessary for good planning in shrinking cities.  This is despite the fact that 
Sudbury’s Official Plan incorporates more strategic planning “speak” than the Youngstown 
2010 Plan. 
 Particularly important in the case of Youngstown was the fact that the process of creating the 
Vision upon which the Youngstown 2010 Plan was based generated considerable excitement 
about the planning process.  The same level of involvement and excitement was not present 
in Sudbury, where planners did consult the public, but not to the same extent.  In fact, 
planners in Sudbury wrote the Vision themselves and presented it to the public in a number 
of open houses.  At these open houses, no one commented on the Vision.  One key step that 
Youngstown planners took which Sudbury planners did not is educating the public about the 
importance of planning and creating an overall vision of how the city could and should be. 
 The case of Youngstown confirms the importance placed in the literature on getting the 
public involved in the planning process.  Indeed, the process of coming together and creating 
a Vision for the city and a Plan based on that Vision was ultimately more important than the 
Plan itself.  This case shows that, even in the context of widespread decline and public 
apathy, the remaining residents in shrinking cities can be brought together for a common 
purpose if the right techniques (in the case of Youngstown, public education, consultation 
first with local leaders, and strategic use of the media were particularly important) are used. 
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 In comparison, the case of Sudbury shows that without the same effort to get the public 
involved in creating a vision of how the city could or should be in the future, the public will 
be more interested in how the plan affects them on an individual level.  The case also shows 
that having an outward focus in terms of “selling” the city to outsiders shifts the focus away 
from bringing current residents together to discuss how they see the city moving forward in 
the future in terms of improvements to their quality of life. 
 These two cases also show the following key points: it may be easier for cities to adopt 
strategic planning principles where they have the legislative freedom to determine the form 
and content of their plans; and developing a regional focus is challenging, especially where 
















 Like other cities examined in the literature, both Youngstown and Sudbury have struggled in 
achieving balanced approach in addressing the physical, economic, environmental, and social 
needs of the community. 
 With respect to Youngstown, likely because of the pressing issues arising from the extensive 
physical decline, there is an emphasis on physical regeneration in the Youngstown 2010 
Plan.  A lack of attention is paid to both environmental (where it is not related to physical, 
economic, or social goals) and social issues (at least, the social impacts of the Plan).  There is 
also a lack of a coherent approach to economic regeneration, which not all local officials 
“buying in” to the approach as outlined in the Youngstown 2010 Plan. 
 In the case of Sudbury, the Official Plan is similarly unbalanced, but it is unbalanced in 
favour of economic concerns.  Through the Plan, municipal officials have adopted the 
approach that the city needs to “sell” itself to outsiders in order to grow (because growth is 
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the only option).  This has resulted in a Plan that is skewed towards economic concerns and 
toward making the city attractive to outsiders.  The focus on economic concerns has led to a 
lack of willingness to critically examine the two dominant mining companies’ continued 
environmental and health impacts.  The lack of integrated human services planning and 
policy development body with the municipal structure means that the Official Plan’s Human 
Services Strategy remains more of an “arm’s length” document than one that is truly 
integrated into all other aspects of planning. 
 Both cases illustrate the fact that while it may be a principle of good planning in shrinking 
cities to adopt a balanced approach, this is in practice very difficult to achieve.  In both cases, 
the plans emphasize what each city perceives is the most pressing concern: in Youngstown 
that is physical issues; in Sudbury, that is economic issues.  Also in both cases, social issues 
and environmental protection for its own sake appear to be included as more of an 








 Planners in Youngstown, who have taken a step away from growth-oriented planning, have 
begun to change the role they play in planning for the city.  In contrast, planners in growth-
oriented Sudbury continue to play the more traditional role of “experts.”  
 With respect to Youngstown, planners, at least in the area of land use planning, are beginning 
to act as “managers of the decline process,” determining how the physical structure of the 
city can be “downsized” to fit current population levels.  Youngstown planners (and planners 
from the Toronto consulting firm, Urban Strategies) have also begun to act as innovators 
both in process (using innovative techniques to get people involved) and in policy 
(developing methods to downsize certain neighbourhoods).  Finally, Youngstown planners 
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are very much taking on the role of facilitators in the implementation of the Youngstown 
2010 Plan.  This role has been made easier by the fact that planners took the time to develop 
a consensus amongst residents which was translated into a plan about which residents were 
excited. 
 In the case of Sudbury, where the growth paradigm is firmly entrenched, planners continue to 
occupy the role of managing and directing future growth.  As a result of the lack of 
willingness to consider future population decline as a possibility, planners have not acted as 
innovators in developing new strategies to deal with population decline.  They also have not 
acted as facilitators for resident implementation of the plan (which may be a result of the 
both the lack of necessity – Sudbury’s planning department is much larger than 
Youngstown’s – and the lack of desire – discussions with Sudbury planners did not reveal the 
intent to have the residents implement the plan on their own – to do so).   
 The Youngstown case illustrates the fact that, once planners begin to shift away from 
growth-oriented planning, they may begin to take on new roles in the community.  Again, in 
the case of Youngstown, this appears to have been the result of necessity: the city had hit 
“rock bottom” and the two planners employed at the time had little choice but to change the 
role they played in the community.  Interviews revealed no indication that Sudbury planners 





 Taken as a whole, I have found through my case studies that the principles of “good 
planning” as outlined in the literature are difficult to achieve, even where a city has actively 
begun to manage population decline.   
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 However, a number of inter-related factors facilitate the adoption of these principles, most 
importantly: more pressing physical decline resulting from a large percentage of population 
loss; the complete loss of a dominant industry and the election/hiring of “new blood” in the 
municipality; the willingness on the part of planners and municipal officials to consider the 
possibility of future population decline; and the involvement of the public in creating a new 
vision for the community resulting in the public being willing to take on a large amount of 
responsibility in implementing the plan. 
 A number of inter-related factors also may impede the adoption of these principles of good 
planning, most importantly: a smaller percentage of population loss intermixed with periods 
of slow-growth or stagnation (meaning the physical effects of population decline are not as 
visible); a dominant industry that remains productive, with predictable cycles of growth and 
decline (meaning the hope for new growth is always on the horizon); the adoption of an 
outward-focused “competitive” approach resulting in a lack of willingness to consider the 
possibility of future population decline; a broader legislative framework which does not 
provide guidance for cities facing long-term population decline; and a broader legislative 
framework which sets strict procedural and content-based rules for planning not based on the 









What are the key points that planners in shrinking cities can take from this research?  
First and foremost, it is clear from document analysis, interviews, and direct observation that 
planners in shrinking cities such as Youngstown and Sudbury are in desperate need of guidance 
when it comes to effective planning approaches. As mentioned several times throughout this 
thesis, planners know how to plan for growth; unfortunately, they do not have the same kind of 
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theories, models, and tools at their disposal when dealing with population decline. When asked if 
having some kind of guiding principles at the state/provincial level would have helped in 
choosing a particular approach, nearly all of the planners indicated that that would have helped.  
Thus, there is a need for a dialogue not only at the local level about planning for population 
decline, but also at the broader state/provincial and even federal level.  Particularly in Ontario 
where planning is so heavily influenced by the provincial government, having no guidance in the 
Planning Act for communities facing population decline is a serious oversight.  This is especially 
true given the number of communities, particularly in Northern Ontario, that are likely to face 
long-term population decline in the future.  Focusing planning in Ontario only on planning for 
population growth (including by developing a “Growth Plan” for Northern Ontario) is a mistake 
on the part of the Ontario government that borders on negligence.  Policies are sorely needed at 
this level in order to give guidance to planners in shrinking communities. 
 Secondly, both the Youngstown and Sudbury case study makes clear the fact that making 
the initial shift away from the growth paradigm is not easy and planners who choose to take on 
this task will likely face a number of obstacles. This seems to be particularly the case where the 
dominant industry that is the lifeblood of the community remains as such, as it does in Sudbury.  
My sense in speaking to municipal officials in Sudbury, including planners, was that no one 
wanted to talk about population decline for fear of scaring potential economic activity 
(particularly activity related to the mining industry) away from the area.  However, the case of 
Youngstown provides hope to planners in shrinking communities that embarking on a planning 
process in the spirit of starting an honest dialogue about a city’s demographic prospects is 
possible, particularly where a city has hit “rock bottom.”  Planners, with their responsibility for 
determining how a city will develop in the future, are in the best position to spark the debate; 
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indeed, given the political stigma associated with even mentioning population decline, they may 
be the only ones willing and able to take on this task.  And even though the case studies show 
that it is easier to start the dialogue about planning in the context of long-term population decline 
when a city has hit “rock bottom,” it is necessary for planners to start the dialogue early so that a 
city may be prepared to deal with the effects of population decline when they happen.  Perhaps 
shifting the focus away from planning for growth towards “planning for quality of life” will be 
less politically contentious. 
 Thirdly, it is important that planners keep in mind the need to achieve a balanced 
approach to addressing a shrinking city’s physical, economic, social, and environmental 
challenges. Evidently, focusing mostly on growth makes balance harder to achieve balance, but 
so does focusing mostly on addressing physical effects of population decline.  In both, social 
issues and environmental protection tend to get lost.  Planners need to work together with social, 
economic, and environmental officials in order to avoid developing strategies which may 
improve conditions in one area, but which may leave issues in another area unaddressed or, even 
more problematic, worsened.   Related to this, planners in shrinking cities need to find a balance 
between public participation and employing experts to ensure that key issues which may not be 
at the forefront of the public’s concern are not ignored.  In Youngstown, there was much 
emphasis put on public participation and achieving a public consensus with respect to the Vision.  
While this was indeed an important process, it may have resulted in the Vision being focused on 
issues which were most pressing for the public – visible physical decline.  In Sudbury, there was 
less public participation, meaning that the Official Plan seems to be focused on what was 
important to local officials, which was attracting people and industry.  Planners need to find a 
balance between employing experts and involving the public in developing planning strategies. 
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Fourthly, the case of Youngstown provides important lessons for planners in shrinking 
cities who are seeking to get a heretofore apathetic public involved in the planning process.
Education about the importance of planning prior to embarking on a public participation exercise 
is especially important.  An honest examination of the demographic prospects is also important.  
Planners in Youngstown emphasized to me how important it was during the process that the 
public did not feel as if planners and other municipal officials were creating false hope and 
making empty promises about the next project that would “save” Youngstown.  As well, where 
possible, partnering with a local university may help lend legitimacy and expertise to the process.  
Informants in Youngstown believed that both were the case in that planning process.  Finally, 
generating a public consensus has led to public buy-in in Youngstown which in turn has made it 
easier for planners to take on the role of facilitator.  This is an important lesson for planning 
departments in shrinking cities who have seen the number of planners dwindle with the decrease 
in population.  Any plan will need local buy-in if it is to be successful, especially in the context 
of declining revenues for implementation. 
 Ultimately, the major implication of this research for planners is the reassurance that, 
based on the assumption that the principles of “good planning” are more likely to have a positive 
impact in shrinking cities than previous approaches, planners can have a positive impact in the 
face of forces largely beyond their control, if they are willing to take the first step away from 
focusing on planning for population growth. If nothing else, starting an honest dialogue in the 
context of widespread, meaningful public participation can generate excitement about a city’s 
future, even in the context of widespread apathy.  Not all effects of population decline are 
negative, and planners, if they can see the opportunities, can find ways to capitalize on them.  
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Indeed, dealing with the effects of urban shrinkage is a complex process in which urban planners 







Simply put, there is a need for more education about planning in the context of 
population decline.  Indeed, one way to deal with the “taboo” of planning for population decline 
would be to start the dialogue when planners are first being educated.  With the growing number 
of shrinking cities, there is a greater and greater chance that planners will find themselves 
working in a city where the population is declining.  If all planners learn about is how to plan for 
growth, this will leave a large number of planners unprepared for the situation that awaits them.  
It will be up to planning educators to encourage the creation of classes and studios that are 
geared towards planning for population decline.  It would be particularly useful for students to 
gain practical experience in community outreach initiatives in shrinking cities.  Again, if 
planning students see the issue of planning for population decline as part of the standard 
curriculum in planning education, they will be less likely to view the issue as “taboo” when they 
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Finally, what does this research mean for planning academics?  What are some directions 
for future research?  As this is a relatively new and growing research area, there are a number of 
issues which demand further research.  Given the growing number of shrinking cities (as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, even now in traditional growth areas such as the sunbelt in the United 
States), it is particularly important to continue the dialogue about planning for population 
decline.  Creating more connection between the European research on this issue (which is far 
more advanced) and the North American research would be a good first step in this regard.  
330 
 
Unfortunately, at the moment, there appears to be a “silo mentality” in the shrinking cities 
literature in which research in different geographic areas remains disconnected.  There is thus a 
need for more international comparative case studies. 
 More specifically, my research raises the following questions: 
 To what outcomes do the principles of good planning in shrinking cities lead when they are 
put into practice? 
 What does “accepting decline” really mean?  What does a complete shift away from the 
growth paradigm look like? 
 In a capitalist system, where areas of growth and decline are produced in the ever-present 
search for new sources of profit, is it realistic to believe that any city will fully accept further 
population decline?  What role does the broader capitalist system play in the ability of 
municipal officials to fully accept population decline?  Is it even possible, in this system, to 
“decline gracefully?” 
 What does accepting decline mean for the social, economic, and environmental “realms?”  
The current research on shrinking cities tends to focus on planning for the physical aspects of 
population decline.  However, the physical, economic, social, and environmental realms are 
inter-related and we need to know what “smart decline” means for a shrinking city’s 
economy, social well-being, and environment. 
 Why do social concerns tend to be left by the wayside in planning in cities experiencing 
population and economic decline?  What can be done to make sure they are an integral part 
of the planning process? 
 How does the current focus on “competition” for people and economic activity (promoted by 
such authors as Richard Florida) affect the way the shrinking cities plan?  My research seems 
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to suggest that the competition mentality is making shrinking cities more outward-focused 
and plans become more of a marketing tool than a way to improve the quality of life of 
residents who remain.   
 What is the role of planning in cities whose fortunes are so dependent on one industry?  
Interviews with planners and municipal officials in Sudbury revealed the sense that local 
actors are “planning around” the industry’s fortunes rather than focusing on creating their 
own fortunes.  In other words, how does “institutional lock-in” (Boschma & Lambooy, 1999;  
Hassink, 2005; Hassink & Shin, 2005; Hudson, 2005) affect planning in such cities?  
Furthermore, are residents in such a city less interested in participating in planning 
processes? 
 How can power relations between the dominant industry in single-industry communities and 
municipal officials be modified so that more of the power shifts towards municipal officials?  
It seems grossly unfair that a city can be established to support an industry, but that industry 
is not held accountable for contributing to the quality of the city (beyond philanthropic 
donations).  When the industry leaves or downsizes, it leaves municipal officials in the 
position of floundering to attract new industries.  Are there examples of single-industry 
communities in which more responsibility for a community’s well-being has been 
demanded?  Are there examples of “best practices” in this regard? 
 How can we ensure that shrinking cities take a regional approach to planning, particularly 
where different parts of the region are experiencing different demographic and economic 
conditions?  Again, are there examples of “best practices” in this regards?    
 How does the way municipalities are given power and funded affect their ability to 
effectively plan for population decline?  According to researchers such as Enid Slack, 
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municipalities have too little power in Canada and too few resources.  Furthermore, if 
funding arrangements reward having more people there, then how can we expect local 
officials to plan for a declining population? 
 Is there a danger that  policy-makers will use the notion of “smart decline” as an excuse to 
favour growing areas over shrinking ones in terms of funding (“well, it’s going to decline 
anyway…”)? 
Certainly, there are many fundamental questions that need to be addressed before we can discuss 
what specific planning strategies should be undertaken in shrinking cities.  In general, when it 
comes to planning in shrinking cities, before we get to the “what,” we need to deal with the 
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Identifier Position/Place of 
Employment (with 
level of detail so as 
to not violate 
confidentiality) 
Date of Interview Type of Interview 
Y1 Employee, City of 
Youngstown, Finance 
Department 





Nov 29/07 In person 
Y3 Resident, Planning 
process participant 
Nov 30/07 In person 
Y4 Planner, City of 
Youngstown 
July 26/07 In person 
Y5 Independent Planning 
Consultant 
June 20/07 In person 
Y6 Planner (New York 
City) 






July 27/07 In person 
Y8 Planner, City of 
Youngstown 
July 26/07 In person 
Y8(2) Planner, City of 
Youngstown 
Nov 30/07 In person 
Y8(3) Planner, City of 
Youngstown 










Nov 29/07 In person 
Y10 
 





Dec 19/07 Telephone 





Y12 Employee, City of 
Youngstown, 
Planning Department 
Nov 30/07 In person 
Y12(2) Employee, City of 
Youngstown, 
Planning Department 





Kent State University 
(Urban Design 
Outreach) 
Dec 19/07 Telephone 
Y14 High-level city 
official, City of 
Youngstown 
July 13/07 In person 
Y14(2) High-level city 
official, City of 
Youngstown 
Nov 26/08 Telephone 




Nov 14/08 In person 
Y16 
 
Former employee,  
City of Youngstown 
Sept 28/08 Email 
2.0 SUDBURY 
 
Identifier Position Date of Interview  Type of Interview 
S1 
 
Planner, City of 
Greater Sudbury 
June 10/08 In person 
S2 
 
Head of Business 
Organization 
June 10/08 In person 
S3 
 
Planner, City of 
Greater Sudbury 
June 10/08 In person 
S4 
 




Oct 1/08 In person 
S5 
 
Planner, City of 
Greater Sudbury 











Employee, City of 
Greater Sudbury, 
Earthcare Sudbury 
Sept 29/08 In person 
S8 
 




June 10/08 In person 
S9 
 














official, City of 
Greater Sudbury 
Sept 29/08 In person 
S12 
 
Planner, City of 
Greater Sudbury 
June 10/08 In person 
S13 Former high-level 
city official, City of 
Greater Sudbury 
July 14/05 In person 
